m 


University  of  California. 

FROM   Tin     LIBRARY    <>F 

DR.    FRANCIS     LIEBKR. 
Profe-or  of  History  and  Law  in  Columbia  College,  Now  Yofk. 


THK   GIFT   or 

MICHAEL    RfiESE 

Of  Sii;i  Francisco. 
1  S  r  3  . 


ELEMENTS 


OF 


MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE: 


COURSE  OF  INSTRUCTION 


STRATEGY,  FORTIFICATION,  TACTICS  OF  BATTLES,  &e 

EMBRACING 

THE  DUTIES  OF  STAFF,  INFANTRY,  CAVALRY. 
ARTILLERY,  AND  ENGINEERS. 

ADAPTED  TO  THE   USE  OF 

VOLUNTEERS    AND    MILITIA. 

THIRD  EDITION. 
WITH  CRITICAL  NOTES  ON  THE  MEXICAN  AND  CEIMEAN  WARS. 

BY 

H.  WAGER  HALLEOK,  A.  M., 

MAJOR  GENERAL,  H.  8.  A. 


NEW  YORK : 

D.    APPLETON    &    COMPANY, 

443  &  445  BROADWAY. 
LONDON:  16  LITTLE  BRITAIN. 

1802. 


Entered,  according  to  the  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1846, 
BY  D.  APPLETON  &  COMPANY, 

In  the  Clerk's  Office  of  the  District  Court  of  the  United  States  for  the  Southern 
District  of  New  York. 


CONTENTS 


PAGI 

5 

CHAPTER   I.  INTRODUCTION.— Dr.  Wayland's  Arguments  on  the  Justifiable 

ness  of  War  briefly  examined 7 

II.  STRATEGY. — General  Divisions  of  the  Art. — Rules  for  planning 
a  Campaign. — Analysis  of  the  Military  Operations  of  Na 
poleon  35 

III.  FORTIFICATIONS.— Their  importance  in  the  Defence  of  States 

proved  by  numerous  Historical  Examples 61 

IV.  LOGISTICS. — Subsistence. — Forage. — Marches. — Convoys. — Cas- 

trametation 88 

V.  TACTICS.— The  Twelve  Orders  of  Battle,  with  Examples  of 
each.— Different  Formations  of  Infantry,  Cavalry,  Artillery, 
and  Engineers  on  the  Field  of  Battle,  with  the  Modes  of 
bringing  Troops  into  action 114 

VI.  MILITARY  POLITY.— The  Means  of  National  Defence  best  suited 

to  the  character  and  condition  of  a  Country,  with  a  brief  Ac- 
•         count  of  those  adopted  by  the  several  European  Powers —  135 

VII.  DEFENCE  OF  OUR  SEA-COAST. — Brief  Description  of  onr  Mari 

time  Fortifications,  with  an  Examination  of  the  several  Con 
tests  that  have  taken  place  between  Ships  and  Forts,  inclu 
ding  the  Attack  on  San  Juan  d'Ulloa,  and  on  St.  Jean 
d'Acre 155 

VIII.  OUR  NORTHERN  FRONTIER  DEFENCES. — Brief  Description  of 
the  Fortifications  on  the  Frontier,  and  an  analysis  of  our 
Northern  Campaigns * 210 

IX.  ARMY  ORGANIZATION. — Staff  and  Administrative  Corps. — Their 

History,  Duties,  Numbers,  and  Organization 235 

X.  ARMY  ORGANIZATION.— Infantry  and  Cavalry.— Their  History, 

Duties,  Numbers,  and  Organization 256 

XI.  ARMY  ORGANIZATION. — Artillery. — Its  History  and  Organiza 
tion,  with  a  Brief  Notice  of  the  different  kinds  of  Ordnance, 
the  Manufacture  of  Projectiles,  &c 275 

XII.  ARMY  ORGANIZATION.— Engineers.— Their  History,  Duties,  and 
Organization,— with  a  Brief  Discussion,  showing  their  im 
portance  as  a  part  of  a  modern  Army  Organization  300 


4  CONTENTS. 

PAGM 

CHAP.  XIII.  PERMANENT  FORTIFICATIONS.  Historical  Notice  of  the  progress 
of  this  Art. — Description  of  the  several  parts  of  a  Fortress, 
and  the  various  Methods  of  fortifying  a  Position 327 

XIV.  FIELD  ENGINEERING— Field  Fortifications.— Military  Communi 

cations.—  Military  Bridges.— Sapping,  Mining,  and  the  Attack 
and  Defence  of  a  Fortified  Place 342 

XV.  MILITARY   EDUCATION.— Military  Schools  of  France,  Prussia, 

Austria,  Russia,  England,  &c. — Washington's  Reasons  for 
establishing  the  West  Point  Academy. — Rules  of  Appoint 
ment  and  Promotion  in  Foreign  Services. — Absurdity  and  In 
justice  of  our  own  System 378 

EXPLANATION  OF  PLATES 409 


PREFACE. 


THE  following  pages  were  hastily  thrown  together  in 
the  form  of  lectures,  and  delivered,  during  the  past  winter, 
before  the  Lowell  Institute  of  Boston.  They  were  writ 
ten  without  the  slightest  intention  of  ever  publishing  them ; 
but  several  officers  of  militia,  who  heard  them  delivered, 
or  afterwards  read  them  in  manuscript,  desire  their  publi 
cation,  on  the  ground  of  their  being  useful  to  a  class  of 
officers  now  likely  to  be  called  into  military  service.  It 
is  with  this  view  alone  that  they  are  placed  in  the  hands 
of  the  printer.  No  pretension  is  made  to  originality  in 
any  part  of  the  work ;  the  sole  object  having  been  to  em 
body,  in  a  small  compass,  well  established  military  princi 
ples,  and  to  illustrate  these  by  reference  to  the  events 
of  past  history,  and  the  opinions  and  practice  of  the  best 
generals. 

Small  portions  of  two  or  three  of  the  following  chap 
ters  have  already  appeared,  in  articles  furnished  by  the 
author  to  the  New  York  and  Democratic  Reviews,  and  in 
a  "  Report  on  the  Means  of  National  Defence,"  published 
by  order  of  Congress. 

H.  W.  H. 

MAY,  1846. 


ELEMENTS 


MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 


CHAPTER   I. 

INTRODUCTION. 

OUR  distance  from  the  old  world,  and  the  favorable  cir 
cumstances  in  which  we  have  been  placed  with  respect 
to  the  other  nations  of  the  new  world,  have  made  it  so 
easy  for  our  government  to  adhere  to  a  pacific  policy,  that, 
in  the  sixty-two  years  that  have  elapsed  since  the  ac 
knowledgment  of  our  national  independence,  we  have  en 
joyed  more  than  fifty-eight  of  general  peace ;  our  Indian 
border  wars  have  been  too  limited  and  local  in  their  char 
acter  to  seriously  affect  the  other  parts  of  the  country,  or 
to  disturb  the  general  conditions  of  peace.  This  fortunate 
state  of  things  has  done  much  to  diffuse  knowledge,  pro 
mote  commerce,  agriculture,  and  manufactures  ;  in  fine,  to 
increase  the  greatness  of  the  nation  and  the  happiness  of 
the  individual.  Under  these  circumstances  our  people 
have  grown  up  with  habits  and  dispositions  essentially 
pacific,  and  it  is  to  be  hoped  that  these  feelings  may  not 
soon  be  changed.  But  in  all  communities  opinions  some 
times  run  into  extremes ;  and  there  are  not  a  few  among 
us  who,  dazzled  by  the  beneficial  results  of  a  long  peace, 
have  adopted  the  opinion  that  war  in  any  case  is  not  only 
useless,  but  actually  immoral ;  nay,  more,  that  to  engage 
in  war  is  wicked  in  the  highest  degree,  and  even  brutish. 


8  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

All  modern  ethical  writers  regard  unjust  war  as  not  only 
immoral,  but  as  one  of  the  greatest  of  crimes — murder  on 
a  large  scale.  Such  are  all  wars  of  mere  ambition,  en 
gaged  in  for  the  purpose  of  extending  regal  power  ot 
national  sovereignty ;  wars  of  plunder,  carried  on  from 
mercenary  motives ;  wars  of  propagandism,  undertaken 
for  the  unrighteous  end  of  compelling  men  to  adopt  certain 
religious  or  political  opinions,  whether  from  the  alleged 
motives  of  "  introducing  a  more  orthodox  religion,"  or  of 
"  extending  the  area  of  freedom."  Such  wars  are  held  in 
just  abhorrence  by  all  moral  and  religious  people  :  and 
this  is  believed  to  be  the  settled  conviction  of  the  great 
mass  of  our  own  citizens. 

But  in  addition  to  that  respectable  denomination  of 
Christians  who  deny  our  right  to  use  arms  under  any  cir 
cumstances,  there  are  many  religious  enthusiasts  in  other 
communions  who,  from  causes  already  noticed,  have 
adopted  the  same  theory,  and  hold  all  wars,  even  those  in 
self-defence,  as  unlawful  and  immoral.  This  opinion  has 
been,  within  the  last  few  years,  pressed  on  the  public  with 
great  zeal  and  eloquence,  and  many  able  pens  have  been 
enlisted  in  its  cause.  One  of  the  most  popular,  and  by 
some  regarded  one  of  the  most  able  writers  on  moral 
science,  has  adopted  this  view  as  the  only  one  consonant 
with  the  principles  of  Christian  morality. 

It  has  been  deemed  proper,  in  commencing  a  course  of 
lectures  on  war,  to  make  a  few  introductory  remarks  re 
specting  this  question  of  its  justifiableness.  We  know  of  no 
better  way  of  doing  this  than  to  give  on  the  one  side  the  ob 
jections  to  war  as  laid  down  in  Dr.  Wayland's  Moral  Phi 
losophy,  and  on  the  other  side  the  arguments  .by  which 
other  ethical  writers  have  justified  a  resort  to  war.  We  do  not 
select  Dr.  Wayland's  work  for  the  purpose  of  criticizing  so 
distinguished  an  author ;  but  because  he  is  almost  the  only 
writer  on  ethics  who  advocates  these  views,  and  because 


INTRODUCTION.  9 

the  main  arguments  against  war  are  here  given  in  brief 
space,  and  in  more  moderate  and  temperate  language  than 
that  used  by  most  of  his  followers.  I  shall  give  his  argu 
ments  in  his  own  language. 

"  I.  All  wars  are  contrary -to  the  revealed  will  of  God." 
It  is  said  in  reply,  that  if  the  Christian  religion  con 
demns  all  wars,  no  matter  how  just  .the  cause,  or  how  ne 
cessary  for  self-defence,  we  must  expect  to  find  in  the 
Bible  some  direct  prohibition  of  war,  or  at  least  a  prohibi-. 
tion  fairly  implied  in"  other  direct  commandments.  But 
the  Bible  nowhere  prohibits  war :  in  the  Old  Testament 
we  find  war  and  even  conquest  positively  commanded,  and 
although  war  was  raging  in  the  world  in  the  time  of  Christ 
and  his  apostles,  still  they  said  not  a  word  of  its  unlawful 
ness  and  immorality.  Moreover,  the  fathers  of  the  church 
amply  acknowledge  the  right  of  war,  and  directly  assert, 
that  when  war  is  justly  declared,  the  Christian  may  en 
gage  in  it  either  by  stratagem  or  open  force.  If  it  be  of 
that  highly  wicked  and  immoral  character  which  some 
have  recently  attributed  to  it,  most  assuredly  it  would  be 
condemned  in  the  Bible  in  terms  the  most  positive  and 
unequivocal. 

But  it  has  been  said  that  the  use  of  the  sword  is  either 
directly  or  typically  forbidden  to  the  Christian,  by  such 
passages  as  "  Thou  shalt  not  kill,"  (Deut.  v.  17,)  "I  say 
unto  you,  that  ye  resist  not  evil :  but  whosoever  shall 
smite  thee  on  thy  right  cheek,  turn  to  him  the  other  also," 
(Matt.  v.  39,)  &c.  If  these  passages  are  to  be  taken  as 
literal  commands,  as  fanatics  and  religious  enthusiasts 
would  have  us  believe,  not  only  is  war  unlawful,  but  also 
all  our  penal  statutes,  the  magistracy,  and  all  the  institu 
tions  of  the  state  for  the  defence  of  individual  rights,  the 
protection  of  the  innocent,  and  the  punishment  of  the 
guilty.  But  if  taken  in  conjunction  with  the  whole  Bible, 
we  must  infer  that  they  are  hyperbolical  expressions,  used 


10  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

to  impress  strongly  on  our  minds  the  general  principle  of 
love  and  forgiveness,  and  that,  so  far  as  possible,  we  over 
come  evil  with  good.  Can  any  sober-minded  man  sup 
pose,  for  a  moment,  that  we  are  commanded  to  "encou 
rage  the  attacks  of  the  wicked,  by  literally  turning  the 
left  cheek  when  assaulted  on  the  right,  and  thus  in 
duce  the  assailant  to  commit  more  wrong  ?  Shall  we  in 
vite  the  thief  and  the  robber  to  persevere  in  his  depreda 
tions,  by  literally  giving  him  a  cloak  when  he  takes  our 
coat ;  and  the  insolent  and  the  oppressor  to  proceed  in 
his  path  of  crime,  by  going  two  miles  with  him  if  he  bid 
us  to  go  one  ? 

Again,  if  the  command,  "  Thou  shall  not  kill,"  is  to  be 
taken  literally,  it  not  only  prohibits  us  from  engaging  in 
just  war,  and  forbids  the  taking  of  human  life  by  the 
state,  as  a  punishment  for  crime  ;  it  also  forbids,  says  Dr. 
Leiber,  our  taking  the  life  of  any  animal,  and  even  ex 
tends  to  the  vegetable  kingdom, — for  undoubtedly  plants 
have  life,  and  are  liable  to  violent  death — to  be  killed. 
But  Dr.  Wayland  concedes  to  individuals  the  right  to 
take  vegetable  and  ai,<mal  life,  and  to  society  the  right  to 
punish  murder  by  death.  This  passage  undoubtedly 
means,  thou  shalt  not  unjustly  kill, — thou  shalt  do  no 
murder ;  and  so  it  is  rendered  in  our  prayer-books.  It 
cannot  have  reference  to  war,  for  on  almost  the  next  page 
we  find  the  Israelites  commanded  to  go  forth  arid  smite 
the  heathen  nations, — to  cast  them  out  of  the  land, — to 
utterly  destroy  them, — to  show  them  no  mercy,  &c.  If 
these  passages  of  the  Bible  are  to  be  taken  literally,  there 
is  no  book  which  contains  so  many  contradictions ;  but  if 
taken  in  connection  with  the  spirit  of  other  passages,  we 
shall  find  that  we  are  permitted  to  use  force  in  preventing 
or  punishing  crime,  whether  in  nations  or  in  individuals ; 
but  that  we  should  combine  love  with  justice,  and  free 
our  hearts  from  all  evil  motives. 


INTRODUCTION.  11 

II.  All  wars  are  unjustifiable,  because  "  God  commands 
us  to  love  every  man,  alien  or  citizen,  Samaritan  or  Jew, 
as  ourselves ;  and  the  act  neither  of  society  nor  of  gov 
ernment  can  render  it  our  duty  to  violate  this  command." 

It  is  true  that  no  act  of  society  can  make  it  our  duty  to 
violate  any  command  of  God :  but  is  the  above  command 
to  be  taken  literally,  and  as  forbidding  us  to  engage  in 
just  war  ?  Is  it  not  rather  intended  to  impress  upon  us, 
in  a  forcible  manner,  that  mutual  love  is  a  great  virtue  ; 
that  we  should  hate  no  one,  not  even  a  stranger  nor  an 
enemy,  but  should  treat  all  with  justice,  mercy,  and 
loving-kindness  ?  If  the  meaning  attempted  to  be  given 
to  this  command  in  the  above  quotation  be  the  true  one,  it 
is  antagonistical  not  only  to  just  war,  but  to  civil  justice, 
to  patriotism,  and  to  the  social  and  domestic  affections. 

But  are  we  bound  to  love  all  human  beings  alike  ;  that 
is,  to  the  same  degree  ?  Does  the  Bible,  as  a  whole,  in 
culcate  such  doctrine  ?  On  the  contrary,  Christ  himself 
had  his  beloved  disciple, — one  whom  he  loved  pre-emi 
nently,  and  above  all  the  others  ;  though  he  loved  the 
others  none  the  less  on  that  account.  We  are  bound  to 
love  our  parents,  our  brothers,  our  families  first,  and  above 
all  other  human  beings  ;  but  we  do  not,  for  this  reason, 
love  others  any  the  less.  A  man  is  not  only  permitted  to 
seek  first  the  comfort  and  happiness  of  his  own  family, 
but  if  he  neglect  to  do  so,  he  is  worse  than  an  infidel. 
We  are  bound  to  protect  our  families  against  the  attacks 
of  others ;  and,  if  necessary  for  the  defence  of  their 
lives,  we  are  permitted  to  take  the  life  of  the  assailant ; 
nay  more,  we  are  bound  to  do  so.  But  it  does  not  follow 
that  we  hate  him  whom  we  thus  destroy.  On  the  con 
trary,  we  may  feel  compassion,  and  even  love  for  him. 
The  magistrate  sentences  the  murderer  to  suffer  the  pen 
alty  of  the  law ;  and  the  sheriff  carries  the  sentence  into 
execution  by  taking,  in  due  form,  the  life  of  the  prisoner ; 


12  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

nevertheless,  both  the  magistrate  and  the  sheriff  may  have 
the  kindest  feelings  towards  him  whom  they  thus  deprive 
of  life. 

So  it  is  in  the  external  affairs  of  the  state.  Next  to 
my  kindred  and  my  neighbors  do  I  love  my  countrymen. 
I  love  them  more  than  I  do  foreigners,  because  my  in 
terests,  my  feelings,  my  happiness,  my  ties  of  friendship 
and  affection,  bind  me  to  them  more  intimately  than  to  the 
foreigner.  I  sympathize  with  the  oppressed  Greek,  and 
the  enslaved  African,  and  willingly  contribute  to  their 
relief,  although  their  sufferings  affect  me  very  remotely ; 
but  if  my  own  countrymen  become  oppressed  and  en 
slaved,  nearer  and  dearer  interests  are  affected,  and  pecu 
liar  duties  spring  from  the  ties  and  affections  which  God 
has  formed.  If  my  countrymen  be  oppressed,  my  neigh 
bors  and  kindred  will  be  made  unhappy  and  suffering ; 
this  I  am  bound  to  take  all  proper  measures  in  my  power 
to  prevent.  If  the  assailant  cannot  be  persuaded  by  ar 
gument  to  desist  from  his  wicked  intentions,  I  unite  with 
my  fellow-citizens  in  forcibly  resisting  his  aggressions. 
In  doing  this  I  am  actuated  by  no  feelings  of  hatred  to 
wards  the  hostile  forces  ;  I  have  in  my  heart  no  malice, 
no  spirit  of  revenge  ;  I  have  no  desire  to  harm  indi 
viduals,  except  so  far  as  they  are  made  the  instruments 
of  oppression.  But  as  instruments  of  evil,  I  am  bound 
to  destroy  their  power  to  do  harm.  I  do  not  shoot  at  my 
military  enemy  from  hatred  or  revenge  ;  I  fight  against 
him  because  the  paramount  interests  of  my  country  can 
not  be  secured  without  destroying  the  instrument  by 
which  they  are  assailed.  I  am  prohibited  from  exercising 
any  personal  cruelty ;  and  after  the  battle,  or  as  soon  as 
the  enemy  is  rendered  harmless,  he  is  to  be  treated  with 
kindness,  and  to  be  taken  care  of  equally  with  the  wound  - 
ed  friend.  All  conduct  to  the  contrary  is  regarded  by 
civilized  nations  with  disapprobation, 


INTRODUCTION.  13 

That  war  does  not  properly  beget  personal  malignity 
but  that,  on  the  contrary,  the  effects  of  mutual  kindness 
and  courtesy  on  the  battle-field,  frequently  have  a  bene 
ficial  influence  in  the  political  events  of  after  years,  may 
be  shown  by  innumerable  examples  in  all  history.  Soult 
and  Wellington  were  opposing  generals  in  numerous  bat 
tles  ;  but  when  the  former  visited  England  in  1838,  he 
was  received  by  Wellington  and  the  whole  British  nation 
with  the  highest  marks  of  respect ;  and  the  mutual  warmth 
of  feeling  between  these  two  distinguished  men  has  con 
tributed  much  to  the  continuance  of  friendly  relations  be 
tween  the  two  nations.  And  a  few  years  ago,  when  we 
seemed  brought,  by  our  civil  authorities,  almost  to  the 
brink  of  war  by  the  northeastern  boundary  difficulties,  the 
pacific  arrangements  concluded,  through  the  intervention 
of  General  Scott,  between  the  Governors  of  Maine  and 
New  Brunswick,  were  mainly  due  to  ancient  friendships 
contracted  by  officers  of  the  contending  armies  during  our 
last  war  with  Great  Britain. 

III.  "  It  is  granted  that  it  would  be  better  for  man  in 
general,  if  wars  were  abolished,  and  all  means,  both  of 
offence  and  defence,  abandoned.  Now,  this  seems  to  me 
to  admit,  that  this  is  the  law  under  which  God  has  created 
man.  But  this  being  admitted,  the  question  seems  to  be 
at  an  end  ;  for  God  never  places  man  under  circumstances 
in  which  it  is  either  wise,  or  necessary,  or  innocent,  to 
violate  his  laws.  Is  it  for  the  advantage  of  him  who  lives 
among  a  community  of  thieves,  to  steal ;  or  for  one  who 
lives  among  a  community  of  liars,  to  lie  ?" 

The  fallacy  of  the  above  argument  is  so  evident  that  it 
is  scarcely  necessary  to  point  out  its  logical  defects. 

My  living  among  a  community  of 'thieves  would  not 
justify  :ne  in  stealing,  and  certainly  it  would  be  no  reason 
why  I  should  neglect  the  security  of  my  property.  My 
living  among  murderers  would  not  Justify  me  in  commit 


14  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE 

ting  murder,  and  on  the  other  hand  it  would  be  no  reason 
why  I  should  not  fight  in  the  defence  of  my  family,  if  the 
arm  of  the  law  were  unable  to  protect  them.  That  other 
nations  carry  on  unjust  wars  is  no  reason  why  we  should 
do  likewise,  nor  is  it  of  itself  any  reason  why  we  should 
neglect  the  means  of  self-defence. 

It  may  seem,  to  us  short-sighted  mortals,  better  that  we 
were  placed  in  a  world  where  there  were  no  wars,  or 
murders,  or  thefts  ;  but  God  has  seen  fit  to  order  it  other 
wise.  Our  duties  and  our  relations  to  our  fellow-men  are 
made  to  suit  the  world  as  it  is,  and  not  such  a  world  as 
we  would  make  for  ourselves. 

We  live  among  thieves :  we  must  therefore  resort  to 
force  to  protect  our  property — that  is,  to  locks,  and  bars, 
and  bolts ;  we  build  walls  thick  and  high  between  the 
robber  and  our  merchandise.  And  more  :  we  enact  laws 
for  his  punishment,  and  employ  civil  officers  to  forcibly 
seize  the  guilty  and  inflict  that  degree  of  punishment 
necessary  for  the  prevention  of  other  thefts  and  robberies. 

We  live  among  murderers  :  if  neither  the  law  nor  the 
ordinary  physical  protections  suffice  for  the  defence  of  our 
own  lives  and  the  lives  of  our  innocent  friends,  we  forci 
bly  resist  the  murderer,  even  to  his  death,  if  need  be. 
Moreover,  to  deter  others  from  like  crimes,  we  inflict  the 
punishment  of  death  upon  him  who  has  already  taken 
life. 

These  relations  of  individuals  and  of  society  are  laid 
down  by  all  ethical  writers  as  in  accordance  with  the 
strictest  rules  of  Christian  morality.  Even  Dr.  Wayland- 
considers  it  not  only  the  right,  but  the  duty  of  individuals 
and  of  society  to  resort  to  these  means,  and  to  enact  these 
laws  for  self-protection.  Let  us  extend  the  same  course 
of  reasoning  to  the  relations  of  different  societies. 

We  live  among  nations  who  frequently  wage  unjust 
wars ;  who,  disregarding  the  rights  of  others,  oppress 


INTRODUCTION.  15 

and  rob,  and  even  murder  their  citizens,  in  order  to  reach 
seme  unrighteous  end.  As  individuals,  we  build  fences 
and  walls  for  the  protection  of  our  grounds  and  our  mer 
chandise  ;  so,  as  a  nation,  we  build  ships  and  forts  to 
protect  our  commerce,  our  harbors,  and  our  cities.  But 
the  walls  of  our  houses  and  stores  are  useless,  unless 
made  so  strong  and  high  that  the  robber  cannot  break 
through  or  scale  them  without  great  effort  and  personal 
danger ;  so  our  national  ships  and  forts  would  be  utterly 
useless  for  protection,  unless  fully  armed  and  equipped. 

Further:  as  individuals  and  as  societies  we  employ 
civil  officers  for  the  protection  of  our  property  and  lives, 
and,  when  necessary,  arm  them  with  the  physical  means 
of  executing  the  laws,  even  though  the  employment  of 
these  means  should  cost  human  life.  The  prevention  and 
punishment  of  crime  causes  much  human  suffering ;  nev 
ertheless  the  good  of  community  requires  that  crime 
should  be  prevented  and  punished.  So,  as  a  nation,  we 
employ  military  officers  to  man  our  ships  and  forts,  to  pro 
tect  our  property  and  our  persons,  and  to  repel  and  punish 
those  who  seek  to  rob  us  of  our  life,  liberty,  and  pursuit 
of  happiness.  National  aggressions  are  far  more  terrible 
in  their  results  than  individual  crime  ;  so  also  the  means 
of  prevention  and  punishment  are  far  more  stupendous, 
and  the  employment  of  these  means  causes  a  far  greater 
amount  of  human  suffering.  This  may  be  a  good  reason 
for  greater  caution  in  resorting  to  such  means,  but  assuredly 
it  is  no  argument  against  the  moral  right  to  use  them. 
IV.  War  is  unjustifiable  because  unnecessary  : 
"  1st.  The  very  fact  that  a  nation  relied  solely  upon  the 
justice  of  its  measures,  and  the  benevolence  of  its  con 
duct,  would  do  more  than  any  thing  else  to  prevent  the 
occurrence  of  injury.  The  moral  sentiment  of  every  com 
munity  would  rise  in  opposition  to  injury  inflicted  upon 
the  just  the  kind,  and  the  merciful." 


16  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

The  moral  duty  of  nations  in  this  respect  is  the  same 
as  that  of  individuals.  Active  benevolence  and  forbear 
ance  should  be  employed,  so  far  as  may  be  proper ;  bui 
there  are  points  at  which  forbearance  ceases  to  be  a  vir 
tue.  If  we  entirely  forbear  to  punish  the  thief,  the  rob 
ber,  and  the  murderer,  think  you  that  crime  will  be  dimin 
ished  ?  Reason  and  experience  prove  the  contrary. 
Active  benevolence  and  kindness  should  always  attend 
just  punishment,  but  they  were  never  designed  to  prohibit 
it.  The  laws  of  God's  universe  are  founded  on  justice  as 
well  as  love.  "  The  moral  sentiment  of  every  community 
rises  in  opposition  to  injury  inflicted  upon  the  just,  the 
kind,  and  the  merciful ;"  but  this  fact  does  not  entirely 
prevent  wicked  men  from  robbing  and  murdering  innocent 
persons,  and  therefore  wise  and  just  laws  require  that 
criminals  shall  be  punished,  in  order  that  those  who  are 
dead  to  all  moral  restraints  may  be  deterred  from  crime 
through  fear  of  punishment. 

"2d.  But  suppose  the  [national]  injury  to  be  done.  I 
reply,  The  proper  appeal  for  moral  beings,  upon  moral 
questions,  is  not  to  physical  force,  but  to  the  consciences 
of  men.  Let  the  wrong  be  set  forth,  but  be  set  forth  in 
the  spirit  of  love ;  and  in  this  manner,  if  in  any,  will  the 
consciences  of  men  be  aroused  to  justice." 

Argument,  and  "  appeals  to  the  consciences  of  men" 
should  always  be  resorted  to  in  preference  to  "  physical 
force ;"  but  when  they  fail  to  deter  the  wicked,  force 
must  be  employed.  I  may  reason  with  the  robber  and 
the  murderer,  to  persuade  him  to  desist  from  his  attempt 
to  rob  my  house,  and  murder  my  family;  bufrif  he  refuse 
to  listen  to  moral  appeals,  I  employ  physical  force, — I 
call  in  the  strong  arm  of  the  law  to  assist  me  ;  and  if  no 
other  means  can  be  found  to  save  innocent  life  that  is  as 
sailed,  the  life  of  the  assailant  must  be  sacrificed. 

"  If,"  says  Puffendorf,  "  some  one  treads  the  laws  of 


INTRODUCTION.  17 

peace  under  his  feet,  forming  projects  which  tend  to  my 
ruin,  he  could  not,  without  the  highest  degree  of  impu 
dence,  (impudentissime,)  pretend  that  after  this  I  should 
consider  him  as  a  sacred  person,  who  ought  not  to  be 
touched  ;  in  other  words,  that  I  should  betray  myself,  and 
abandon  the  care  of  my  own  preservation,  in  order  to 
give  way  to  the  malice  of  a  criminal,  that  he  may  act 
with  impunity  and  with  full  liberty.  On  the  contrary, 
since  he  shows  himself  unsociable  towards  me,  and  since 
he  has  placed  himself  in  a  position  which  does  not  per 
mit  me  safely  to  practice  towards  him  the  duties  of  peace, 
I  have  only  to  think  of  preventing  the  danger  which 
menaces  me  ;  so  that  if  I  cannot  do  this  without  hurting 
him,  he  has  to  accuse  himself  only,  since  he  has  reduced 
me  to  this  necessity."  De  Jure  Nat.  et  Gent.,  lib.  ii.,  ch. 
v.,  §  1 .  This  same  course  of  reasoning  is  also  applied 
to  the  duties  of  a  nation  towards  its  enemy  in  respect  to 
war. 

"  3d.  But  suppose  this  method  fail.  Why,  then,  let  us 
suffer  the  evil." 

This  principle,  if  applied  to  its  full  extent,  would,  we 
believe,  be  subversive  of  all  right,  and  soon  place  all 
power  in  the  hands  of  the  most  evil  and  wicked  men  in 
the  community.  Reason  with  the  nation  that  invades  our 
soil,  and  tramples  under  foot  our  rights  and  liberties,  and 
should  it  not  desist,  why,  then,  suffer  the  evil !  Reason 
with  the  murderer,  and  if  he  do  not  desist,  why,  then, 
suffer  him  to  murder  our  wives  and  our  children !  Reason 
with  the  robber  and  the  defaulter,  and  if  they  will  not 
listen,  why,  then,  let  them  take  our  property !  We  can 
not  appeal  to  the  courts,  for  if  their  decisions  be  not  re 
spected,  they  employ  force  to  compel  obedience  to  tr.eir 
mandates.  But  Dr.  Wayland  considers  the  law  of  be 
nevolence  to  forbid  the  use  of  force  between  men.  He 
forgets  this,  it  is  true,  in  speaking  of  our  duties  towards 


18  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE 

our  fellow-men  of  the  same  society,  and  even  allows  us  to 
punish  the  murderer  with  death;  but  towards  the  for 
eigner  he  requires  a  greater  forbearance  and  benevolence 
than  towards  our  neighbor ;  for  if  another  nation  send  its 
armies  to  oppress,  and  rob,  and  murder  us  by  the  thou 
sand,  we  have  no  right  to  employ  physical  force  either  to 
prevent  or  to  punish  them,  though  we  may  do  so  to  pre 
vent  or  punish  a  neighbor  for  an  individual  act  of  the 
same  character.  The  greater  the  scale  of  crime,  then, 
the  less  the  necessity  of  resorting  to  physical  force  to 
prevent  it ! 

"  4th.  But  it  may  be  asked,  what  is  to  prevent  repeated 
and  continued  aggression?  I  answer,  first,  not  instru 
ments  of  destruction,  but  the  moral  principle  which  God 
has  placed  in  the  bosom  of  every  man.  I  think  that  obe 
dience  to  the  law  of  God,  on  the  part  of  the  injured,  is 
the  surest  preventive  against  the  repetition  of  injury.  I 
answer,  secondly,  suppose  that  acting  in  obedience  to  the 
law  of  benevolence  will  not  prevent  the  repetition  of  in 
jury,  will  acting  on  the  principle  of  retaliation  prevent 
it?"  Again;  "I  believe  aggression  from  a  foreign  nation  to 
be  the  intimation  from  God  that  we  are  disobeying  the 
law  of  benevolence,  and  that  this  is  his  mode  of  teaching 
nations  their  duty,  in  this  respect,  to  each  other.  So  that 
aggression  seems  to  me  in  no  manner  to  call  for  retalia 
tion  and  injury,  but  rather  to  call  for  special  kindness  and 
good-will." 

This  argument,  if  such  it  can  be  called,  is  equally  ap 
plicable  to  individual  aggressions.  We  are  bound  to 
regard  them  as  intimations  of  our  want  of  benevolence, 
and  to  reward  the  aggressors  for  the  intimations !  Is  it 
true,  that  in  this  world  the  wicked  only  are  oppressed, 
and  that  the  good  are  always  the  prospered  and  happy  1 
Even  suppose  this  true,  and  that  I,  as  a  sinful  man,  de 
serve  God's  anger,  is  this  any  reason  why  I  should  not 


INTRODUCTION.  IS 

resist  the  assassin,  and  seek  to  bring  him  to  punish 
ment ?  The  whole  of  this  argument  of  Dr.  Wayland 
applies  with  much  greater  force  to  municipal  courts  than 
to  war. 

V.  '*  Let  us  suppose  a  nation  to  abandon  all  means 
both  of  offence  and  of  defence,  to  lay  aside  all  power  of 
inflicting  injury,  and  to  rely  for  self-preservation  solely 
upon  the  justice  of  its  own  conduct,  and  the  moral  effect 
which  such  a  course  of  conduct  would  produce  upon  the 
consciences  of  men.  *  *  *  How  would  such  a 

nation  be  protected  from  external  attack,  and  entire  sub 
jugation  ?  I  answer,  by  adopting  the  law  of  benevolence, 
a  nation  would  render  such  an  event  in  the  highest  de 
gree  improbable.  The  causes  of  national  war  are,  most 
commonly,  the  love  of  plunder  and  the  love  of  glory. 
The  first  of  these  is  rarely,  if  ever,  sufficient  to  stimulate 
men  to  the  ferocity  necessary  to  war,  unless  when  assisted 
by  the  second.  And  by  adopting  as  the  rule  of  our  con 
duct  the  law  of  benevolence,  all  motive  arising  from  the 
second  cause  is  taken  away.  There  is  not  a  nation  in 
Europe  that  could  be  led  on  to  war  against  a  harmless, 
just,  forgiving,  and  defenceless  people." 

History  teaches  us  that  societies  as  well  as  individuals 
have  been  attacked  again  and  again  notwithstanding  that 
they  either  would  not  or  could  not  defend  themselves. 
Did  Mr.  White,  of  Salem,  escape  his  murderers  any  the 
more  for  being  harmless  and  defenceless  ?  Did  the  Qua 
kers  escape  being  attacked  and  hung  by  the  ancient  New 
Englanders  any  the  more  because  of  their  non-resisting 
principles  ?  Have  the  Jews  escaped  persecutions  through 
out  Christendom  any  the  more  because  of  their  imbecility 
and  non-resistance  for  some  centuries  past  ?  Poland  was 
comparatively  harmless  arid  defenceless  when  the  three 
groat  European  powers  combined  to  attack  and  destroy 
the  entire  nation,  dividing  between  themselves  the  Polish 


20  MILITARY'  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

territory,  and  enslaving  or  driving  into  exile  the  Polish 
people. 

"  Oh,  bloodiest  picture  in  the  book  of  time, 
Sarmatia  fell,  unwept,  without  a  crime  !" 

We  need  not  multiply  examples  under  this  head ;  all  history 
is  filled  with  them. 

Let  us  to-morrow  destroy  our  forts  and  ships  of  war, 
disband  our  army  and  navy,  and  apply  the  lighted  torch 
to  our  military  munitions  and  to  our  physical  means  of  de 
fence  of  every  description;  let  it  be  proclaimed  to  the 
world  that  we  will  rely  solely  upon  the  consciences  of 
nations  for  justice,  and  that  we  have  no  longer  either  the 
will  or  the  ability  to  defend  ourselves  against  aggression. 
Think  you  that  the  African  and  Asiatic  pirates  would  re 
frain,  any  the  more,  from  plundering  our  vessels  trading  to 
China,  because  we  had  adopted  "the  law  of  benevolence?" 
Would  England  be  any  the  more  likely  to  compromise  her 
differences  with  us,  or  be  any  the  more  disposed  to  re 
frain  from  impressing  our  seamen  and  from  searching  our 
merchant-ships  ?  Experience,  shows  that  an  undefended 
state,  known  to  suffer  every  thing,  soon  becomes  the  prey 
of  all  others,  and  history  most  abundantly  proves  the  wis 
dom  and  justice  of  the  words  of  Washington — "  IF  WE 

DESIRE    TO    SECURE    PEACE,  IT  MUST    BE    KNOWN   THAT  WE 
ARE  AT  ALL  TIMES  READY  FOR  WAR." 

But  let  us  bring  this  case  still  nearer  home.  Let  it  be 
known  to-morrow  that  the  people  of  Boston  or  New  York 
have  adopted  the  strictly  non-resisting  principle,  and  that 
hereafter  they  will  rely  solely  on  the  consciences  of  men 
for  justice  ;  let  it  be  proclaimed  throughout  the  whole  ex 
tent  of  our  Union,  and  throughout  the  world,  that  you  have 
destroyed  your  jails  and  houses  of  correction,  abolished 
vour  police  and  executive  law  officers,  that  courts  may 
decide  justice  but  will  be  allowed  no  force  to  compel  re- 


INTRODUCTION.  21 

spect  to  their  decisions,  that  you  will  no  longer  employ 
walls,  and  bars,  and  locks,  to  secure  your  property  and 
the  virtue  and  lives  of  your  children ;  but  that  you  will 
trust  solely  for  protection  to  "  the  law  of  active  benevo 
lence."  Think  you  that  the  thieves,  and  robbers,  and 
murderers  of  Philadelphia,  and  Baltimore,  and  New  Or 
leans,  and  the  cities  of  the  old  world,  will,  on  this  ac 
count,  refrain  from  molesting  the  peace  of  New  York  and 
Boston,  and  that  the  wicked  and  abandoned  men  now  in 
these  cities,  will  be  the  more  likely  to  turn  from  the  evil 
of  their  ways  ? 

Assuredly,  if  this  "  law  of  active  benevolence,"  as  Dr. 
Wayland  denominates  the  rule  of  non-resistance,  will 
prevent  nations  from  attacking  the  harmless  and  defence 
less,  it  will  be  still  more  likely  to  prevent  individuals 
from  the  like  aggressions ;  for  the  moral  sense  is  less 
active  in  communities  than  where  the  responsibility  is 
individual  and  direct. 

Throughout  this  argument  Dr.  Wayland  assumes  that 
all  wars  are  wars  of  aggression,  waged  for  "  plunder"  or 
"  glory,"  or  through  "  hatred"  or  "  revenge,"  whereas 
such  is  far  from  being  true.  He  indeed  sometimes  speaks 
of  war  as  being  generally  of  this  character ;  at  others  he 
speaks  of  it  as  being  always  undertaken  either  from  a 
spirit  of  aggression  or  retaliation.  Take  either  form  of 
his  argument,  and  the  veriest  schoolboy  would  pronounce 
it  unsound :  viz., 

All  wars  are  undertaken  either  for  aggression  or  retal 
iation  ; 

Aggression  and  retaliation  are  forbidden  by  God's  laws; 
—therefore, 

All  wars  are  immoral  and  unjustifiable. 

Or, 

Wars  are  generally  undertaken  either  for  aggression  or 
retaliation ; 


Ml  UTAH  V     A  I,  I      v 

Aggression  and  retaliation  are  forbidden  by  (Jod's  laws 
—therefore, 

All  wars  arc*  iniiiioral  and  unjuMiliable. 

\  I  "  Let  any  man  reflect  upon  the  amount  of  pecuniary 
expenditure*,  and  the  awful  waste  of  human  life,  which  (ho 
<«l  the,  la*t  hundred  yearn  have  occ.r-i<mt  d.  .md  then 
we  will  link  him  whether  it  he  not  evident,  that  the  one- 
hundredth  part  of  this  expense  and  sullrim:-.  it  duplex  <  .1 
iu  the  IUHK  I  ellort  to  render  mimkmd  \\  r  <  i  .md  txiui. 
would,  lontf  before  this  time,  have  banished  warn  from 
ibi-  earth,  and  i«  n<l<  HM|  the  civili/.ed  world  like  ih, 
deu  of  Kden  ?  If  thin  he  true,  it  will  follow  that  the  •  id 
in.ition  of  n.  military  ipinl  IN  injunouN  to  .1  « •oiuiuiituiv , 
iuiiNinu<  li  .!••  ii  .(••:•  1. 1\  .(:<••,  [lu«  Moure«»  of  the  cwil,  the  cor 
rupt  paMttioim  of  the  human  hreawl,  by  the  very  manner  in 
\\  UK  It  ii  .iiiciupts  to  correct  the  evil  itself." 

Much  has  been  •  .ml  to  nhow  that  war  !><:,!•.  inuno- 
i.ihix  .  tind  that  the1  «  uldv.iiion  of  the  military  spirit  hn.s  a 
roiTiiplm:'.  inlhiciuc  «'ii  i  iiiiiiiiunily.  And  memberH  of  the 
clergy  nnd  of  the  bar  have  not  uuin  .JIM -ntly  HO  far  for 
gotten,  1 1  uot  truth  and  fact,  at  leant  the  common  cour- 
ICNie*  ;ind  charities  of  life,  as  to  attribute  to  the  mtliiaix 
profe*Nion  an  tmeqtial  whare  of  immorality  and  crime. 
We  are  <leclared  not  only  parasites  on  the  body  politic, 
but  professed  violate ra  of  (Jod's  laws — men  so  degraded, 
iluui:-!i  inn  »n>cu)usly,  that  "  in  the  pursuit  of  j\istice  we 
i<  ii.uiiice  the  Innu.ni  cliMTacter  and  assume  thai  of  the 
beasts;"  it  is  said  that  "  murder,  robbery,  rape,  arson, 
theft.,  if  only  plaited  with  the  soldier's  tfarh,  go  \mwhipped 
of  justice."*  It  has  never  been  the  habit  of  the  nu 

upon  tin1  oth«M'  prolessions.     We 

prefer  10  leave  them  uu.-m->\\  «-ied        It    jlciu.-ii'Hijm  s   mi  the 
••lump,"  or  in  the  h^islatne  halls,  or  in  their  Founi'  "t 


INTttOUUOTION,  M 

July  .i.l.l i «•  -  .  cnn  tin. I  no  litior  mihjcriN  "  to  point  n 
moral  or  adorn  a  talo,"  wo  must  ho  content  i«»  I-  m  th<  ir 
mUroproNontationrt  and  abuse, 

Unjust  Wars,  nit  w«ll  MM  nM|u-  i  h,i>  ..in.!,.  »ro  in. in.. i. ,i 
in  ili- ;i  «  I:.  .  i  .UK!  .1!-"  in  thoir  «.m-.  lint  just  wnrn 
und  jiiHt  In  Ration  nro  not  dtmondlllng.  JSupposo  nil 
wnw  and  nil  rowin  of  pi-itico  ft)  bo  abolished,  mid  t,ho 

WU'kod     ii. ill. MI  •     UN     Woll     JIM     ini'n  nlii.il  .    U)    llO  NllU'cM't  <l   lo 

mm   ii.|iiM<  .   v.  nil. mi   opposition  and  without  pum  ii 

ninrit ;  would  imi  iiMiiu.i.iiiiy  and  iiini'-iiii  ouMtictHM  Increwn 
rnthor  thnri  diminish  f  I'Vw  ovonU  rou*«  niul  «lovni««  tho 
p.iii  h.ir  in  tuid  |>iti>h.  •  |.n  i!  ..i  .1  n. <t ii  111  -.11  inn.  Ii  an  fcjttttft&d 
|...iiKiiio  war.  h  i.n  .  •  iln  lono  of  pulilic  inoi.'iliiy,  nnci 
d«  •  IMI\  -.  ili<  Mordid  • «  lir  IUK  -.:<  and  dc^rndin^;  *ubmi««ivci" 
tWHH  which  HO  ol'ion  n^uili  Iroin  a,  long-prolrai'tod  piuu'o. 
Htifh  wnit  tho  Dutch  war  ol'  indopondonco  ngditiNl  tho 
'  -|i .(martin  ;  nur.h  l.h«  (Jorman  war  n^nitiNi  ilu*  aggrn««ion« 
ol'  I...IH  .  XIV.,  ntiii  tli«  l-'riMic-li  war  a^ainwt  tho  COM|IH<M» 
of  171W.  Hut  without  looking  nlirond  lor  illunirnliort,  wo 
mid  lunplo  proof  in  our  own  history.  Onn  it  ho  «aid  that 
ih«  warn  of  tho  American  K< •Mdutmn  Mini  of  IHI'J,  worn 
domomli/iuM;  in  tluur  oIlocU  ?  "  Whonco  do  Amcirtannn," 
•inyn  Dr.  Liolinr,  "  h.ii'iiu  illy  mko  thoir  html  nnd  puromt 
.  x  .inpl.  of  all  that  in  ...,,,,,,  i,  , I  with  patriotism,  puhltc 
•  I.MII.  id  \ct<  .IIICNM  to  t'ommon  good,  punty  ol'  moiivo  nrid 
...  IIIMI.  ii  imi  tnnii  tho  daring  htind  oi'  tin  n  patriots  of  tho 

l\  «     M'llll  I"  Ml    f" 

Tho  prim  ip.il  a<  i«»rs  in  tho  military  ovonts  of  tho  Uovo- 
luiioii  and  of  INI'J,  hold,  whilo  living,  high  potitK  <l  "Hi 
ccn-H  in  tin  M.iti  .  :itid  Hi'  moral  lorn*  which  they  dcrivod 
from  thoHo  wnrn  may  ho  judg(»d  of  by  tho  chararior 
Htampod  ou  ili<  n  admiuif*t ration  ui  i  li-  <«>\  <  i  MUM  ni  'I 'In  •••<• 
nn'ti  have  paNMod  away,  nnd  their  plncn«  have,  for  some 
in..  IK  (  n  iiil.-il  by  in.  n  who  tnko  tlunr  moral  tono  from  tlu« 
r«  I..IHUIW  of  r»«c'e  '!'»»  tli«*  ini««  bc»linvr»r  in  thrt  »*rtic'tt«'y 


24  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

of  non-resistance,  and  in  the  demoralizing  influence  of  all 
wars,  how  striking  the  contrast  between  these  different 
periods  in  our  political  history !  How  infinitely  inferior 
to  the  rulers  in  later  times  were  those,  who,  in  the  blind 
ness  of  their  infatuation,  appealed  to  physical  force,  rather 
than  surrender  their  life,  liberty,  and  pursuit  of  happiness  ! 
Let  us  trace  out  this  contrast : — 

In  the  earlier  ages  of  our  republic,  and  under  the  rule 
of  those  whose  moral  character  had  been  corrupted  by 
war,  party  spirit  ran  higher  and  was  less  pure  than  at 
later  periods  in  our  history.  The  object  of  the  principal 
leaders  of  the  great  political  parties  was  then  to  render 
the  opinions  of  the  opposite  party  odious  :  now,  their  only 
object  is  to  sustain  their  own  opinions  by  argument. 
Then,  each  party  claimed  to  itself  an  exclusive  love  of 
country,  and  stigmatized  the  other  as  aliens  and  the  natu 
ral  enemies  of  the  state :  now,  they  both  practise  great 
forbearance,  love,  and  charity,  towards  political  opponents. 
Then,  men  obtained  place  through  intrigue  and  corruption, 
and  a  universal  scramble  for  the  loaves  and  fishes  of  of 
fice  on  the  one  side,  and  a  universal  political  proscription 
on  the  other,  were  regarded  as  the  natural  results  of  an 
election  :  now,  this  disgusting  strife  for  office  has  ceased  ; 
men  no  longer  seek  place,  but  wait,  like  Cincinnatus,  to 
be  called  from  their  ploughs  ;  and  none  are  proscribed  for 
opinion's  sake.  Then,  in  electing  men  to  office  the  most 
important  social  and  constitutional  principles  were  forgot 
ten  or  violated :  now,  we  have  the  august  spectacle  of  a 
nation  choosing  its  rulers  under  the  guidance  of  strict 
moral  principle.  Then,  the  halls  of  congress  were  fre 
quently  filled  with  demagogues,  and  tiplers,  and  the  small 
men  of  community  :  now,  the  ablest  and  best  of  the  coun 
try  are  always  sought  for  as  representatives.  Then,  the 
magnates  of  party  were  the  mere  timid,  temporizing  slaves 
of  expediency,  looking,  not  to  the  justice  and  wisdom  of 


INTRODUCTION.  25 

their  measures,  but  to  their  probable  popularity  with  theii 
sneaking  train  of  followers :  now,  they  rely  for  respect 
and  support  upon  the  judgment  of  the  honest  and  enlight 
ened.  Then,  the  rank  and  file  of  party  were  mere  politi 
cal  hirelings,  who  sold  their  manhood  for  place,  who 
reviled  and  glorified,  and  shouted  huzzas  and  whispered 
calumnies,  just  as  they  were  bidden ;  they  could  fawn 
upon  those  who  dispensed  political  patronage  with  a 
cringing  servility  that  would  shame  the  courtiers  of  Louis 
XIV.,  or  the  parasites  and  hirelings  of  Walpole  :  now,  all 
political  partisans,  deriving  their  moral  tone  from  the  piping 
times  of  peace,  are  pure,  disinterested  patriots,  who,  like 
the  Roman  farmer,  take  office  with  great  reluctance,  and 
resign  it  again  as  soon  as  the  state  can  spare  their  ser 
vices.  Then,  prize-fighters,  and  blacklegs,  and  gamblers, 
having  formed  themselves  into  political  clubs,  were  court 
ed  by  men  high  in  authority,  and  rewarded  for  their  dirty 
and  corrupting  partisan  services  by  offices  of  trust  and 
responsibility :  now,  no  man  clothed  with  authority  would 
dare  to  insult  the  moral  sense  of  community  by  receiving 
such  characters  in  the  national  councils,  or  by  bestowing 
public  offices  upon  these  corrupt  and  loathsome  dregs  of 
society. 

Such,  the  advocates  of  non  resistance  would  persuade 
us,  are  the  legitimate  results  in  this  country  of  war  on  the 
one  hand  and  of  a  long-protracted  peace  on  the  other. 
But  there  are  men  of  less  vivid  imaginations,  and,  per 
haps,  of  visions  less  distorted  by  fanatical  zeal,  who  fail 
to  perceive  these  results,  and  who  even  think  they  see 
the  reverse  of  all  this.  These  men  cannot  perceive  any 
thing  in  the  lives  of  Washington,  Hamilton,  and  Knox,  to 
show  that  they  were  the  less  virtuous  because  they  had 
borne  arms  in  their  country's  service :  they  even  fail  to 
perceive  the  injurious  effects  of  the  cultivation  of  a  mili 
tary  spirit  on  the  military  students  of  West  Point,  whose 

3 


26  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE 

graduates,  they  think,  will  compare  favorably  in  tnora 
character  with  the  graduates  of  Yale  and  Cambridge. 
Nay,  more,  some  even  go  so  far  as  to  say  that  our  army, 
as  a  body,  is  no  less  moral  than  the  corresponding  classes 
in  civil  life ;  that  our  common  soldiers  are  as  seldom 
guilty  of  riots,  thefts,  robberies,  and  murders,  as  similarly 
educated  men  engaged  in  other  pursuits  ;  that  our  military 
officers  are  not  inferior  in  moral  character  to  our  civil 
officers,  and  that,  as  a  class,  they  will  compare  favorably 
with  any  other  class  of  professional  men — with  lawyers, 
for  example.  In  justification  of  these  opinions — which 
may,  perhaps,  be  deemed  singularly  erroneous — they  say, 
that  in  the  many  millions  of  public  money  expended  during 
the  last  forty  years,  by  military  officers,  for  the  army,  for 
military  defences,  and  for  internal  improvements,  but  a 
single  graduate  of  West  Point  has  proved  a  defaulter,  even 
to  the  smallest  sum,  and  that  it  is  exceedingly  rare  to  see 
an  officer  of  the  army  brought  into  court  for  violating  the 
laws. 

But  even  suppose  it  true  that  armies  necessarily  diffuse 
immorality  through  community,  is  it  not  equally  true  that 
habitual  submission  to  the  injustice,  plunder,  and  insult 
of  foreign  conquerors  would  tend  still  more  to  degrade 
and  demoralize  any  people  1 

With  regard  to  "pecuniary  expenditures"  required  in 
military  defence,  many  absurd  as  well  as  false  statements 
have  been  put  forth.  With  respect  to  our  own  country, 
the  entire  amounts  expended,  under  the  head  of  war  de 
partment,  whether  for  Indian  pensions,  for  the  purchase 
of  Indian  lands,  the  construction  of  government  roads,  the 
improvement  of  rivers  and  harbors,  the  building  of  break 
waters  and  sea-walls,  for  the  preservation  of  property,  the 
surveying  of  public  lands,  &c.,  &c. ;  in  fine,  every  ex 
penditure  made  by  officers  of  the  army,  under  the  war 
department,  is  put  down  as  "  expenses  for  military  de- 


INTRODUCTION  27 

fence."  Similar  misstatements  are  made  with  respect  to 
foreign  countries :  for  example,  the  new  fortifications  of 
Paris  are  said  to  have  already  cost  from  fifty  to  seventy- 
five  millions  of  dollars,  and  as  much  more  is  said  to  be  re 
quired  to  complete  them.  Indeed,  we  have  seen  the  whole 
estimated  cost  of  those  works  stated  at  two  hundred  and 
forty  millions  of  dollars,  or  twelve  hundred  millions  of 
francs  !  The  facts  are  these :  the  works,  when  done, 
will  have  cost  about  twenty-eight  millions.  We  had  the 
pleasure  of  examining  them  not  long  since,  in  company 
with  several  of  the  engineer  officers  employed  on  the 
works.  They  were  then  three-fourths  done,  and  had 
cost  about  twenty  millions.  We  were  assured  by  these  offi 
cers  that  the  fortifications  proper  would  be  completed  for 
somewhat  less  than  the  original  estimate  of  twenty-eight 
millions.  Had  we  time  to  enter  into  details,  other  examples 
of  exaggeration  and  misrepresentation  could  be  given. 

But  it  is  not  to  be  denied  that  wars  and  the  means  of 
military  defence  have  cost  vast  amounts  of  money.  So 
also  have  litigation  and  the  means  deemed  requisite  for 
maintaining  justice  between  individuals.  It  has  been 
estimated  that  we  have  in  this  country,  at  the  present 
time,  thirty  thousand  lawyers,  without  including  petti 
foggers.  Allowing  each  of  these  to  cost  the  country  the 
average  sum  of  one  thousand  dollars,  and  we  have  the 
annual  cost  to  the  country,  for  lawyers,  thirty  millions  of 
dollars.  Add  to  this  the  cost  of  legislative  halls  and  legis 
lators  for  making  laws ;  of  court-houses,  jails,  police- 
offices,  judges  of  the  different  courts,  marshals,  sheriffs, 
justices  of  the  peace,  constables,  clerks,  witnesses,  &c., 
employed  to  apply  and  enforce  the  laws  when  made ;  the 
personal  loss  of  time  of  the  different  plaintiffs  and  defend 
ants,  the  individual  anxiety  and  suffering  produced  by 
litigation ;  add  all  these  together,  and  I  doubt  not  the  re 
sult  for  a  single  year  will  somewhat  astonish  these  modern 


28  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

economists.  But  if  all  the  expenditures  of  this  nature 
that  have  been  made  for  the  last  fifty  years,  in  this  indi 
vidual  "  war  of  hate,"  be  added  together,  we  have  no  doubt 
a  very  fruitful  text  might  be  obtained  for  preaching  a  cru 
sade  against  law  and  lawyers  !  But  could  any  sane  man 
be  found  to  say  that,  on  account  of  the  cost  of  maintaining 
them,  all  laws  and  lawyers  are  useless  and  should  be 
abolished  ? 

If,  therefore,  these  vast  sums  of  money  are  deemed 
necessary  to  secure  justice  between  individuals  of  the 
same  nation,  can  we  expect  that  the  means  of  international 
justice  can  be  maintained  without  expenditures  commen 
surate  with  the  object  in  view  ?  If  we  cannot  rely  exclu 
sively  upon  the  "  law  of  active  benevolence"  for  main 
taining  justice  between  brothers  of  the  same  country,  can 
we  hope  that,  in  the  present  state  of  the  world,  strangers 
and  foreigners  will  be  more  ready  to  comply  with  its  re 
quisitions  1 

The  length  of  the  preceding  remarks  admonishes  us 
to  greater  brevity  in  the  further  discussion  of  this  subject. 

It  is  objected  to  war,  that  men  being  rational  beings, 
should  contend  with  one  another  by  argument,  and  not  by 
force,  as  do  the  brutes. 

To  this  it  is  answered,  that  force  properly  begins  only 
where  argument  ends.  If  he  who  has  wronged  me  can 
not  be  persuaded  to  make  restitution,  I  apply  to  the  court, 
— that  is,  to  legal  force, — to  compel  him  to  do  me  justice. 
So  nations  ought  to  resort  to  military  force  only  when  all 
other  means  fail  to  prevent  aggression  and  injury. 

But  war  often  fails  to  procure  redress  of  grievances,  or 
to  prevent  repeated  and  continued  aggression. 

So  does  a  resort  to  civil  force ;  but  such  a  resort  is 
none  the  less  proper  and  just  on  that  account. 

But  in  war  the  innocent  party  is  sometimes  the  sufferer, 
while  the  guilty  triumph. 


INTRODUCTION.  29 

So  it  often  is  in  civil  life  :  God,  for  some  wise  purpose, 
sometimes  permits  the  wicked  to  triumph  for  a  season. 

But  in  all  wars  one  party  must  be  in  the  wrong,  and 
frequently  the  war  is  unjust  on  both  sides.  * 

So  in  suits  at  law,  one  party  is  necessarily  wrong,  and 
frequently  both  resort  to  the  civil  tribunals  in  hopes  of 
attaining  unrighteous  ends. 

But  nations  do  not  resort  to  tribunals,  like  individuals, 
to  settle  their  differences. 

For  the  reason  that  it  is  believed  a  tribunal  of  this 
character — a  congress  of  nations,  as  it  has  been  called, 
— would  be  more  productive  of  evil  than  of  good.  By 
such  an  arrangement  the  old  and  powerful  European 
monarchies  would  acquire  the  authority  to  interfere  in 
the  domestic  affairs  of  the  weaker  powers.  We  see  the 
effects  of  establishing  such  a  tribunal  in  the  so-called 
Holy  Alliance,  whose  influence  is  regarded  by  the  friends 
of  liberty  as  little  less  dangerous  than  the  Holy  Inqui 
sition.  Moreover,  such  a  tribunal  would  not  prevent  war, 
for  military  force  would  still  be  resorted  to  to  enforce  its 
decisions.  For  these  and  other  reasons,  it  is  deemed 
better  and  safer  to  rely  on  the  present  system  of  Inter 
national  Law.  Under  this  system,  and  in  this  country,  a 
resort  to  the  arbitrament  of  war  is  not  the  result  of  im 
pulse  and  passion, — a  yielding  to  the  mere  "  bestial  pro 
pensities"  of  our  nature  ;  it  is  a  deliberate  and  solemn 
act  of  the  legislative  power, — of  the  represents^! <*>*  of 
the  national  mind,  convened  as  the  high  council  of  the 
people.  It  is  this  power  which  must  determine  when  all 
just  and  honorable  means  have  been  resorted  to  to.obtain 
national  justice,  and  when  a  resort  to  military  force  is 
requisite  and  proper.  If  this  decision  be  necessarily  un 
christian  and  barbarous,  such,  also,  should  we  expect 
to  be  the  character  of  other  laws  passed  by  the  same 
body,  and  under  the  same  circumstances.  A  declaration 


30  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

of  war,  in  this  country,  is  a  law  of  the  land,  made  by  a 
deliberative  body,  under  the  high  sanction  of  the  consti 
tution.  It  is  true  that  such  a  law  may  be  unjust  and 
wrong,  but  we  can  scarcely  agree  that  it  will  necessarily 
be  so.  The  distinction  between  war,  as  thus  duly  de 
clared,  and  "  international  Lynch-law"  is  too  evident  to 
need  comment. 

But  it  is  said  that  the  benefits  of  war  are  more  than 
counterbalanced  by  the  evils  it  entails,  and  that, "  most 
commonly,  the  very  means  by  which  we  repel  a'  des 
potism  from  abroad,  only  establishes  over  us  a  military 
despotism  at  home." 

Much  has  been  said  and  written  about  military  des 
potism  ;  but  we  think  he  who  studies  history  thoroughly, 
will  not  fail  to  prefer  a  military  despotism  to  a  des 
potism  of  mere  politicians.  The  governments  of  Alex 
ander  and  Charlemagne  were  infinitely  preferable  to 
those  of  the  petty  civil  tyrants  who  preceded  and  fol 
lowed  them ;  and  there  is  no  one  so  blinded  by  prejudice 
as  to  say  that  the  reign  of  Napoleon  was  no  better  than 
that  of  Robespierre,  Danton,  and  the  other  "lawyers" 
who  preceded  him,  or  of  the  Bourbons,  for  whom  he  was 
dethroned. 

"  Csesar,"  says  a  distinguished  senator  of  our  own 
country,  "  was  rightfully  killed  for  conspiring  against  his 
country ;  but  it  was  not  he  that  destroyed  the  liberties  of 
Rome.  That  work  was  done  by  the  profligate  politicians 
without  him,  and  before  his  time ;  and  his  death  did  not 
restore  the  republic.  There  were  no  more  elections : 
rotten  politicians  had  destroyed  them ;  and  the  nephew 
of  Caesar,  as  heir  to  his  uncle,  succeeded  to  the  empire 
on  the  principle  of  hereditary  succession. 

"  And  here  History  appears  in  her  grand  and  instruc 
tive  character,  as  Philosophy  teaching  by  example :  and 
let  us  not  be  senseless  to  her  warning  voice.  Superficial 


INTRODUCTION.  31 

readers  believe  it?  was  the  military  men  \\  ho  destroyed 
the  Roman  republic  !  No  such  thing  !  It  was  the  poli 
ticians  who  did  it! — factious,  corrupt,  intriguing  politi 
cians — destroying  public  virtue  in  their  mad  pursuit  after 
office — destroying  their  rivals  by  crime — deceiving  and 
debauching  the  people  for  votes — and  bringing  elections 
into  contempt  by  the  frauds  and  violence  with  which  they 
were  conducted.  From  the  time  of  the  Gracchi  there 
were  no  elections  that  could  bear  the  name.  Confederate 
and  rotten  politicians  bought  and  sold  the  consulship. 
Intrigue  and  the  dagger  disposed  of  rivals.  Fraud,  .vio 
lence,  bribes,  terror,  arid  the  plunder  of  the  public  trea 
sury  commanded  votes.  The  people  had  no  choice  ;  and 
long  before  the  time  of  Caesar,  nothing  remained  of  re 
publican  government  but  the  name  and  the  abuse.  Read 
Plutarch.  In  the  '  Life  of  Caesar,'  and  not  three  pages 
before  the  crossing  of  the  Rubicon,  he  paints  the  ruined 
state  of  the  elections, — shows  that  all  elective  government 
was  gone, — that  the  hereditary  form  had  become  a  neces 
sary  relief  from  the  contests  of  the  corrupt, — and  that  in 
choosing  between  Pompey  and  Caesar,  many  preferred 
Pompey,  not  because  they  thought  him  republican,  but 
because  they  thought  he  would  make  the  milder  king. 
Even  arms  were  but  a  small  part  of  Caesar's  reliance, 
when  he  crossed  the  Rubicon.  Gold,  still  more  than  the 
sword,  was  his  dependence  ;  and  he  sent  forward  the  ac 
cumulated  treasures  of  plundered  Gaul,  to  be  poured  into 
the  laps  of  rotten  politicians.  There  was  no  longer  a 
popular  government ;  and  in  taking  all  power  himself,  he 
only  took  advantage  of  the  state  of  things  which  profli 
gate  politicians  had  produced.  In  this  he  was  culpable, 
and  paid  the  forfeit  with  his  life.  But  in  contemplating 
his  fate,  let  us  never  forget  that  the  politicians  had  under 
mined  and  destroyed  the  republic,  before  he  came  to 
seize  and  to  master  it." 


32  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE 

| 

We  could  point  to  numerous  instances,  where  the  ben 
efits  of  war  have  more  than  compensated  for  the  evils 
which  attended  it ;  benefits  not  only  to  the.  generations 
who  engaged  in  it,  but  also  to  their  descendants  for  long 
ages.  Had  Rome  adopted  the  non-resistance  principle 
when  Hannibal  was  at  her  gates,  we  should  now  be  in 
the  night  of  African  ignorance  and  barbarism,  instead  of 
enjoying  the  benefits  of  Roman  learning  and  Roman  civ 
ilization.  Had  France  adopted  this  principle  when  the 
allied  armies  invaded  her  territories  in  1792,  her  fate  had 
followed  that  of  Poland.  Had  our  ancestors  adopted  this 
principle  in  1776,  what  now  had  been,  think  you,  the 
character  and  condition  of  our  country  ? 

Dr.  Lieber's  remarks  on  this  point  are  peculiarly  just 
and  apposite.  "The  continued  efforts,"  says  he,  "requi 
site  for  a  nation  ,to  protect  themselves  against  the  ever- 
repeated  attacks  of  a  predatory  foe,  may  be  infinitely 
greater  than  the  evils  entailed  by  a  single  and  energetic 
war,  which  forever  secures  peace  from  that  side.  Nor 
will  it  be  denied,  I  suppose,  that  Niebuhr  is  right  when 
he  observes,  that  the  advantage  to  Rome  of  having  con 
quered  Sicily,  as  to  power  and  national  vigor,  was  unde 
niable.  But  even  if  it  were  not  so,  are  there  no  other 
advantages  to  be  secured  ?  No  human  mind  is  vast 
enough  to  comprehend  in  one  glance,  nor  is  any  human 
life  long  enough  to  follow  out  consecutively,  all  the  im 
measurable  blessings  and  the  unspeakable  good  which 
have  resolved  to  mankind  from  the  ever-memorable  vic 
tories  of  little  Greece  over  the  rolling  masses  of  servile 
Asia,  which  were  nigh  sweeping  over  Europe  like  the 
high  tides  of  a  swollen  sea,  carrying  its  choking  sand 
over  all  the  germs  of  civilization,  liberty,  and  taste,  .and 
nearly  all  that  is  good  and  noble.  Think  what  we  should 
have  been  had  Europe  become  an  Asiatic  province,  and 
the  Eastern  principles  of  power  and  stagnation  should 


INTRODUCTION  33 

have  become  deeply  infused  into  her  population,  so  that 
no  process  ever  after  could  have  thrown  it  out  again ! 
Has  no  advantage  resulted  from  the  Hebrews  declining 
any  longer  to  be  ground  in  the  dust,  and  ultimately  anni 
hilated,  at  least  mentally  so,  by  stifling  servitude,  and  the 
wars  which  followed  their  resolution  ?  The  Netherlands 
war  of  independence  has  had  a  penetrating  and  decided 
effect  upon  modern  history,  and,  in  the  eye  of  all  who 
value  the  most  substantial  parts  and  elementary  ideas  of 
modern  and  civil  liberty,  a  highly  advantageous  one,  both 
directly  and  through  Great  Britain.  "Wars  have  frequently 
been,  in  the  hands  of  Providence,  the  means  of  dissemi 
nating  civilization,  if  carried  on  by  a  civilized  people — as 
in  the  case  of  Alexander,  whose  wars  had  a  most  decided 
effect  upon  the  intercourse  of  men  and  extension  of  civili 
zation — or  of  rousing  and  reuniting  people  who  had  fallen 
into  lethargy,  if  attacked  by  less  civilized  and  numerous 
hordes.  Frequently  we  find  in  history  that  the  ruder  and 
victorious  tribe  is  made  to  recover  as  it  were  civilization, 
already  on  the  wane  with  a  refined  nation.  Paradoxical 
as  it  may  seem  at  first  glance,  it  is,  nevertheless,  amply 
proved  by  history,  that  the  closest  contact  and  consequent 
exchange  of  thought  and  produce  and  enlargement  of 
knowledge,  between  two  otherwise  severed  nations,  is 
frequently  produced  by  war.  War  is  a  struggle,  a  state 
of  suffering ;  but  as  such,  at  times,  only  that  struggling 
process  without  which — in  proportion  to  the  good  to  be 
obtained,  or,  as  would  be  a  better  expression  for  many 
cases,  to  the  good  that  is  to  be  borne — no  great  and  essen 
tial  good  falls  ever  to  the  share  of  man.  Suffering,  merely 
as  suffering,  is  not  an  evil.  Our  religion,  philosophy, 
every  day's  experience,  prove  it.  No  maternal  rejoicing 
brightens  up  a  mother's  eve  without  the  anxiety  of  la 
bor." 

One  word  more,  and  we  must  leave  this  subject.     It 


34  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

has  been  said  by  some  that  the  duties  of  patriotism  are 
less  binding  upon  us  than  upon  our  ancestors  ;  that,  what 
ever  may  have  been  the  practice  in  years  that  are  past 
the  present  generation  can  in  no  manner  bear  arms  in 
their  country's  cause,  such  a  course  being  not  only  dis 
honorable,  but  in  the  eye  of  the  Christian,  wicked,  and 
even  infamous!  It  is  believed,  however,  that  such  are 
not  the  general  opinions  and  sentiments  of  the  religious 
people  of  this  country.  Our  forefathers  lighted  the  fires 
of  Religion  and  Patriotism  at  the  same  altar ;  it  is  be 
lieved  that  their  descendants  have  not  allowed  either  to 
be  extinguished,  but  that  both  still  burn,  and  will  continue 
to  burn,  with  a  purer  and  brighter  flame.  Our  forefathers 
were  not  the  less  mindful  of  their  duty  to  their  God,  be 
cause  they  also  faithfully  served  their  country.  If  we  are 
called  upon  to  excel  them  in  works  of  charity,  of  benev 
olence,  and  of  Christian  virtue,  let  it  not  be  said  of  us 
that  we  have  forgotten  the  virtue  of  patriotism.* 

-  *  For  further  discussion  of  this  subject  the  reader  is  referred  to 
Lieber's  Political  Ethics,  Part  IL,  book  vii.  chap.  3  ;  Paley's  Moral  and 
Political  Philosophy ;  Legare's  Report  of  June  13,  1838,  in  the  House 
of  Representatives ;  Mackintosh's  History  of  the  Revolution  of  1688, 
chap.  x. ;  Bynkershock  ;  Vatel ;  Puffendorf ;  Clausewitz  ;  and  most 
other  writers  on  international  law  and  the  laws  of  war. 

Dr.  Waylaud's  view  of  the  question  is  advocated  with  much  zeal  by 
Dymond  in  his  Inquiry  into  the  Accordancy  of  War  with  the  Princi 
ples  of  Christianity ;  Jay's  Peace  and  War ;  Judd's  Sermon  on  Peace 
and  War ;  Peabody's  Address,  &c. ;  Coue's  Tract  on  What  is  the  Use 
of  the  Navy  ?  Sumner's  True  Grandeur  of  Nations. 


STRATEGY.  35 


CHAPTER   II. 

STRATEGY. 

WAR  has  been  defined,  "  A  contest  between  nations  and 
states  carried  on  by  force."  But  this  definition  is  by  some 
considered  defective,  inasmuch  as  it  would  exclude  all 
civil  wars. 

When  war  is  commenced  by  attacking  a  nation  in  peace, 
it  is  called  offensive,  and  when  undertaken  to  repel  invasion, 
or  the  attacks  of  an  enemy,  it  is  called  defensive.  A.  war 
may  be  essentially  defensive  even  where  we  begin  it,  if 
intended  to  prevent  an  attack  or  invasion  which  is  under 
preparation.  Besides  this  general  division  of  war,  mili 
tary  writers  have  made  numerous  others,  such  as — 

Wars  of  intervention,  in  which  one  state  interferes  in 
favor  of  another.  This  intervention  may  either  have  re 
spect  to  the  internal  or  to  the  external  affairs  of  a  nation. 
The  interference  of  Russia  in  the  affairs  of  Poland,  of 
England  in  the  government  of  India,  Austria  and  the 
allied  powers  in  the  affairs  of  France  during  the  Revolu 
tion  and  under  the  empire,  are  examples  under  the  first 
head.  The  intervention  of  the  Elector  Maurice  of  Sax 
ony  against  Charles  V.,  of  King  William  against  Louis 
XIV.,  in  1688,  of  Russia  and  France  in  the  seven  years' 
war,  of  Russia  again  between  France  and  Austria,  in 
1805,  and  between  France  and  Prussia,  in  1806,  are  ex 
amples  under  the  second  head  Most  liberal  publicists 
consider  intervention  in  the  internal  affairs  of  nations  as 
indefensible  ;  but  the  principle  is  supported  by  the  advo 
cates  of  the  old  monarchies  of  Europe. 

Wars  of  insurrection  to  gain  or  to  regain  liberty ;   as 


36  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

was  the  case  with  the  Americans  in  1776,  and  the  modern 
Greeks  in  1821. 

Wars  of  independence  from  foreign  dictation  and  control 
as  the  wars  of  Poland  against  Russia,  of  the  Netherlands 
against  Spain,  of  France  against  the  several  coalitions  of 
the  allied  powers,  of  the  Spanish  Peninsula  against  France 
and  of  China  and  India  against  England.  The  American 
war  of  1812  partook  largely  of  this  character,  and  some 
judicious  historians  have  denominated  it  the  war  of  Inde 
pendence,  as  distinguished  from  the  war  of  the  Revolution. 

Wars  of  opinion,  like  those  which  the  Vendeans  have 
sustained  in  support  of  the  Bourbons,  and  those  France 
has  sustained  against  the  allies,  as  also  those  of  propa- 
gandism,  waged  against  the  smaller  European  states  by 
the  republican  hordes  of  the  French  Revolution.  To  this 
class  also  belong — 

Religious  wars,  like  those  of  Islamism,  of  the  crusades, 
and  of  the  Reformation. 

Wars  of  conquest,  like  those  of  the  Romans  in  Gaul,  of 
the  English  in  India,  of  the  French  in  Egypt  and  Africa, 
and  of  the  Russians  in  Circassia. 

National  wars,  in  which  the  great  body  of  the  people 
of  a  state  engage,  like  those  of  the  Swiss  against  Austria 
and  the  Duke  of  Burgundy,  of  the  Catalans  in  1712,  of 
the  Americans  against  England,  of  the  Dutch  against 
Phillip  II.,  and  of  the  Poles  and  Circassians  against 
Russia. 

Civil  wars,  where  one  portion  of  the  state  fights  against 
the  other,  as  the  war  of  the  Roses  in  England,  of  the 
league  in  France,  of  the  Guelphs  and  Ghibelines  in  Italy, 
and  of  the  factions  in  Mexico  and  South  America. 

It  is  not  the  present  intention  to  enter  into  any  discus 
sion  of  these  different  kinds  of  war,  but  rather  to  consider 
the  general  subject,  and  to  discuss  such  general  principles 
and  rules  as  may  be  applicable  to  all  wars. 


STRATEGY.  37 

War  in  its  most  extensive  sense  may  be  regarded  both 
as  a  science  and  an  art.  It  is  a  science  so  far  as  it  inves 
tigates  general  principles  and  institutes  an  analysis  of 
military  operations  ;  and  an  art  when  considered  with  re 
ference  to  the  practical  rules  for  conducting  campaigns, 
sieges,  battles,  &c.  So  is  engineering  a  science  so  fal 
as  it  investigates  the  general  principles  of  fortification, 
and  also  artillery,  in  analyzing  the  principles  of  gunnery ; 
but  both  are  arts  when  considered  with  reference  to  the 
practical  rules  for  the  construction,  attack,  and  defence 
of  forts,  or  for  the  use  of  cannon-. 

This  distinction  has  not  always  been  observed  by  wri 
ters  on  this  subject,  and  some  have  asserted  that  strategy 
is  the  science,  and  tactics  the  art  of  war.  This  is  evi 
dently  mistaking  the  general  distinction  between  science, 
which  investigates  principles,  and  art,  which  forms  prac 
tical  rules. 

In  popular  language,  however,  it  is  usual  to  speak  of 
the  military  art  when  we  refer  to  the  general  subject  of 
war,  and  of  the  military  sciences  when  we  wish  to  call 
attention  more  particularly  to  the  scientific  principles  upon 
which  the  art  is  founded.  We  shall  here  consider  the 
military  art  in  this  general  sense,  as  including  the  entire 
subject  of  war. 

As  thus  denned,  the  military  art  may  be  divided  into 
four  distinct  branches,  viz. :  1st.  Strategy;  2d.  Fortifica 
tion,  or  Engineering;  3d.  Logistics;  4th.  Tactics.  Sev 
eral  general  treatises  on  this  art  add  another  branch, 
called  The  Policy  of  War,  or  the  relations  of  war  with 
the  affairs  of  state. 

Strategy  is  defined  to  be  the  art  of  directing  masses  on 
decisive  points,  or  the  hostile  movements  of  armies  be 
yond  the  range  of  each  other's  cannon.  Engineering  em 
braces  all  dispositions  made  to  enable  troops  to  resist  a 
superior  force  the  longest  time  possible  ;  and  also  the 


-    38  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

means  resorted  to  by  the  opposing  army  to  overcome 
these  material  obstacles.  Logistics  embraces  the  prac 
tical  details  of  moving  and  supplying  armies.  Tactics  is 
the  art  of  bringing  troops  into  action,  or  of  moving  them 
in  the  presence  of  an  enemy,  that  is,  within  his  view,  and 
within  the  reach  of  his  artillery.  All  these  are  most  in 
timately  connected.  A  fault  in  tactics  may  occasion  the 
loss  of  strategic  lines ;  the  best  combined  manosuvres  on 
the  field  of  battle  may  lead  to  no  decisive  results,  when 
the  position,  or  the  direction  of  the  operation  is  not  strat 
egic  ;  sometimes  not  only  battles,  but  entire  campaigns, 
are  lost  through  neglect  of  the  engineer's  art,  or  faults  in 
his  dispositions  ;  again,  armies  would  be  of  little  use  with 
out  the  requisite  means  of  locomotion  and  of  subsistence. 
I.  Strategy  regards  the  theatre  of  war,  rather  than  the 
field  of  battle.  It  selects  the  important  points  in  this 
theatre,  and  the  lines  of  communication  by  which  they 
may  be  reached ;  it  forms  the  plan  and  arranges  the  gen 
eral  operations  of  a  campaign ;  but  it  leaves  it  to  the 
engineers  to  overcome  material  obstacles  and  to  erect 
new  ones ;  it  leaves  to  logistics  the  means  of  supporting 
armies  and  of  moving  them  on  the  chosen  lines  ;  and  to 
tactics,  the  particular  dispositions  for  battle,  when  the  ar 
mies  have  reached  the  destined  points.  It  is  well  to 
keep  in  mind  these  distinctions,  which  may  be  rendered 
still  more  obvious  by  a  few  illustrations.  The  point 
where  several  lines  of  communications  either  intersect 
or  meet,  and  the  centre  of  an  arc  which  is  occupied  by 
the  enemy,  are  strategic  points ;  but  tactics  would  reject 
a  position  equally  accessible  on  all  sides,  especially  with 
its  flanks  exposed  to  attack.  Sempronius  at  Trebbia  and 
Varro  at  Cannae,  so  placed  their  armies  that  the  Cartha- 
genians  attacked  them,  at  the  same  time,  in  front,  on  the 
flanks,  and  in  rear ;  the  Roman  consuls  were  defeated : 
but  the  central  strategic  position  of  Napoleon  at  Rivoli 


STR  \TEGY.  39 

was  eminently  successful.  At  the  battle  of  Austerlitz  th« 
allies  had  projected  a  strategic  movement  to  their  left,  in 
order  to  cut  off  Napoleon's  right  from  Vienna  ;  Weyrother 
afterwards  changed  his  plans,  and  executed  a  correspond 
ing  tactical  movement.  By  the  former  there  had  been 
some  chance  of  success,  but  the  latter  exposed  him  to 
inevitable  destruction.  The  little  fort  of  Koenigsten, 
from  its  advantageous  position,  was  more  useful  to  the 
French,  in  1813,  than  the  vast  works  of  Dresden.  The 
little  fort  of  Bard,  with  its  handful  of  men,  was  near  de 
feating  the  operations  of  Napoleon  in  1800,  by  holding  in 
check  his  entire  army ;  whereas,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
ill-advised  lines  of  Ticino,  in  1706,  caused  an  army  of 
78,000  French  to  be  defeated  by  only  40,000  men  under 
Prince  Eugene  of  Savoy. 

War,  as  has  already  been  said,  may  be  either  offensive 
or  defensive.  If  the  attacking  army  be  directed  against 
an  entire  state,  it  becomes  a  war  of  invasion.  If  only  a 
province,  or  a  military  position,  or  an  army,  be  attacked, 
it  is  simply  regarded  as  taking  the  initiative  in  offensive 
movemtr  ts. 

Offensive  war  is  ordinarily  most  advantageous  in  its 
moral  and  political  influence.  It  is  waged  on  a  foreign 
soil,  and  therefore  spares  the  country  of  the  attacking 
force  ;  it  augments  its  own  resources  at  the  same  time 
that  it  diminishes  those  of  the  enemy ;  it  adds  to  the 
moral  courage  of  its  own  army,  while  it  disheartens  its 
opponents.  A  war  of  invasion  may,  however,  have  also 
its  disadvantages.  Its  lines  of  operation  may  become  too 
deep,  which  is  always  hazardous  in  an  enemy's  country. 
All  the  natural  and  artificial  obstacles,  such  as  mountains, 
rivers, 'defiles,  fortifications,  &c.,  are  favorable  for  de 
fence,  but  difficult  to  be  overcome  by  the  invader.  The 
local  authorities  and  inhabitants  oppose,  instead  of  fa 
cilitating  his  operations ;  and  if  patriotism  animate  the 


40  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

defensive  army  to  fight  for  the  independence  of  its  threat 
cried  country,  the  war  may  become  long  and  bloody.  Bui 
if  a  political  diversion  be  made  in  favor  of  the  invading 
force,  and  its  operations  be  attended  with  success,  it 
strikes  the  enemy  at  the  heart,  paralyzes  all  his  military 
energies,  and  deprives  him  of  his  military  resources,  thus 
promptly  terminating  the  contest.  Regarded  simply  as 
the  initiative  of  movements,  the  offensive  is  almost  always 
the  preferable  one,  as  it  enables  the  general  to  choose  his 
lines  for  moving  and  concentrating  his  masses  on  the  de 
cisive  point. 

The  first  and  most  important  rule  in  offensive  war  is,  to 
keep  your  forces  as  much  concentrated  as  possible.  This 
will  not  only  prevent  misfortune,  but  secure  victory, — 
since,  by  its  necessary  operation,  you  possess  the  power 
of  throwing  your  whole  force  upon  any  exposed  point  of 
your  enemy's  position.  . 

To  this  general  rule  some  writers  have  laid  down  the 
following  exceptions : — 

1st.  When  the  food  and  forage  of  the  neighborhood  in 
which  you  act  have  been  exhausted  and  destroyed,  and, 
your  magazines  are,  from  any  cause,  unable  to  supply  the 
deficiency,  one  of  two  things  must  be  done ;  either  you 
must  go  to  places  where  these  articles  abound,  or  you 
must  draw  from  them  your  supplies  by  detachments.  The 
former  is  rarely  compatible  with  your  plan,  and  neces 
sarily  retards  its  execution ;  and  hence  the  preference 
which  is  generally  given  to  the  latter. 

2d.  When  reinforcements  are  about  to  join  you,  and 
this  can  only  be  effected  by  a  march  through  a  country 
actually  occupied  by  hostile  corps,  or  liable  to  be  so  oc 
cupied,  you  must  again  waive  the  general  rule,  and  risk 
one  party  for  the  security  of  the  other ;  or,  (which  may 
be  better,)  make  such  movements  with  your  main  body  aa 
thall  accomplish  your  object. 


STRATEGY.  41 

3d.  When  you  have  complete  evidence  of  the  actual, 
or  probable  insurrection  in  your  favor,  of  a  town  or  prov 
ince  of  your  enemy,  or  of  a  division  of  his  army,  you 
must  support  this  inclination  by  strong  detachments,  or  by 
movements  of  your  main  body.  Napoleon's  operations 
in  Italy,  in  1796-7,  furnish  examples  of  what  is  here 
meant. 

4th.  When,  by  dispatching  a  detachment,  you  may  be 
able  to  intercept  a  convoy,  or  reinforcement,  coming  to 
the  aid  of  your  enemy. 

These  are  apparent  rather  than  real  exceptions  to  the 
rule  of  concentration.  This  rule  does  not  require  that 
all  the  army  should  occupy  the  same  position.  Far  from  it. 
Concentration  requires  the  main  body  to  be  in  immediate 
and  supporting  reach :  small  detachments,  for  temporary 
and  important  objects,  like  those  mentioned,  are  perfectly 
legitimate,  and  in  accordance  with  correct  principles. 
Napoleon's  position  in  Spain  will  serve  as  an  illustration 
A  hand,  placed  on  the  map  of  that  country,  will  represent 
the  position  of  the  invading  forces.  When  opened,  the 
fingers  will  represent  the  several  detachments,  thrown 
out  on  important  strategic  lines,  and  which  could  readily 
be  drawn  in,  as  in  closing  the  hand,  upon  the  principal 
and  central  mass,  preparatory  to  striking  some  important 
blow. 

"  If,  as  we  have  seen,  it  be  the  first  great  rule  for  an 
army  acting  on  the  offensive  principle,  to  keep  its  forces 
concentrated,  it  is,  no  doubt,  the  second,  to  keep  them  fully 
employed.  Is  it  your  intention  to  seize  a  particular  prov 
ince  of  your  enemy  ?  to  penetrate  to  his  capital  ?  or  to 
cut  him  off  from  his  supplies  ?  Whatever  measure  be 
necessary  to  open  your  route  to  these  objects  must  be 
promptly  taken ;  and  if  you  mean  to  subsist  yourself  at 
his  expense,  your  movements  must  be  more  rapid  than 
his.  Give  him  time  to  breathe, — and  above  all,  give  him 


42  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

time  to  rest,  and  your  project  is  blasted ;  his  forages  will 
be  completed,  and  his  magazines  filled  and  secured.  The 
roads  of  approach  will  be  obstructed,  bridges  destroyed, 
and  strong  points  everywhere  taken  and  defended.  You 
will,  in  fact,  like  Burgoyne,  in  1777,  reduce  yourself  to 
the  necessity  of  bleeding  at  every  step,  without  equiva 
lent  or  use. 

"  Such  cannot  be  the  fate  of  a  commander  who,  know 
ing  all  the  value  of  acting  on  the  offensive,  shakes,  by 
the  vigor  and  address  of  his  first  movements,  the  moral 
as  well  as  physical  force  of  his  enemy, — who,  selecting 
his  own  time,  and  place,  and  mode  of  attack,  confounds 
his  antagonist  by  enterprises  equally  hardy  and  unex 
pected, — and  who  at  last  leaves  to  him  only  the  alterna 
tive  of  resistance  without  hope,  or  of  flying  without  re 
sistance." 

The  British  army,  in  the  war  of  the  American  Revo 
lution,  must  have  been  most  wretchedly  ignorant  of  these 
leading  maxims  for  conducting  offensive  war.  Instead  of 
concentrating  their  forces  on  some  decisive  point,  and 
then  destroying  the  main  body  of  our  army  by  repeated 
and  well-directed  blows,  they  scattered  their  forces  over 
an  immense  extent  of  country,  and  became  too  weak  to 
act  with  decision  and  effect  on  any  one  point.  On  the 
other  hand,  this  policy  enabled  us  to  call  out  and  disci 
pline  our  scattered  and  ill-provided  forces. 

The  main  object  in  defensive  war  is,  to  protect  the 
menaced  territory,  to  retard  the  enemy's  progress,  to  mul 
tiply  obstacles  in  his  way,  to  guard  the  vital  points  of  the 
country,  and — at  the  favorable  moment,  when  the  enemy 
becomes  enfeebled  by  detachments,  losses,  privations, 
and  fatigue — to  assume  the  offensive,  and  drive  him  from 
the  country.  This  combination  of  the  defensive  and 
offensive  has  many  advantages.  The  enemy,  being 
forced  to  take  the  defensive  in  his  turn,  loses  much  of 


STRATEGY.  43 

the  moral  superiority  due  to  successful  offensive  opera 
tions.  There  are  numerous  instances  of  this  kind  oi 
war,  "  the  defensive-offensive,"  as  it  is  sometimes  called, 
to  be  found  in  history.  The  last  four  campaigns  of  Fred 
erick  the  Great  of  Prussia,  are  examples  which  may 
serve  as  models.  Wellington  played  a  similar  part  in  the 
Spanish  peninsula. 

To  merely  remain  in  a  defensive  attitude,  yielding  grad 
ually  to  the  advances  of  the  enemy,  without  any  effort  to 
regain  such  positions  or  provinces  as  may  have  fallen  into 
his  power,  or  to  inflict  on  him  some  fatal  and  decisive 
blow  on  the  first  favorable  opportunity  ;  such  a  system  is 
always  within  the  reach  of  ignorance,  stupidity,  and  cow 
ardice  ;  but  such  is  far  from  being  the  true  Fabian  system 
of  defensive  war. 

"  Instead  of  finding  security  only  in  flight ;  instead  of 
habitually  refusing  to  look  the  enemy  in  the  face  ;  instead 
of  leaving  his  march  undisturbed ;  instead  of  abandoning, 
without  contest,  points  strong  by  nature  or  by  art ; — instead 
of  all  this,  the  true  war  of  defence  seeks  every  occasion 
to  meet  the  enemy,  and  loses  none  by  which  it  can  annoy 
or  defeat  him ;  it  is  always  awake ;  it  is  constantly  in 
motion,  and  never  unprepared  for  either  attack  or  defence. 
When  not  employed  in  efforts  of  courage  or  address,  it 
incessantly  yields  itself  to  those  of  labor  and  science.  In 
its  front  it  breaks  up  roads  or  breaks  down  bridges  ;  while 
it  erects  or  repairs  those  in  its  rear:  it  forms  abbatis, 
raises  batteries,  fortifies  passes,  or  intrenches  encamp 
ments  ;  and  to  the  system  of  deprivation  adds  all  the  ac 
tivity,  stratagem,  and  boldness  of  la  petite  guerre.  Divi 
ding  itself  into  detachments,  it  multiplies  its  own  attacks 
and  the  alarms  of  the  enemy.  Collecting  itself  at  a  single 
point,  it  obstructs  his  progress  for  days,  and  sometimes 
fo*  weeks  together.  Does  it  even  abandon  the  avenues 
it  is  destined  to  defend?  It  is  but  for  the  purpose  of 


44  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE.  ' 

shielding  them  more  securely,  by  the  attack  of  his  hospi 
tals,  magazines,  convoys,  or  reinforcements.  In  a  word, 
by  adopting  the  maxim,  that  the  enemy  must  be  made  to  pay 
for  whatever  he  gains,  it  disputes  with  him  every  'inch  of 
ground,  and  if  at  last  it  yields  to  him  a  victory,  it  is  of 
that  kind  which  calls  forth  only  his  sighs." 

In  discussing  the  subject  of  strategy,  certain  technical 
terms  are  employed,  such  as  theatre  of  war ;  theatre  of 
operations;  base  of  operations,  or  the  line  from  which 
operations  start ;  objective  points,  or  points  to  which  the 
operations  are  directed ;  line  of  operations,  or  the  line 
along  which  an  army  moves  ;  key  points,  or  points  which 
it  is  important  for  the  defensive  army  to  secure ;  line  of 
defence,  or  the  line  which  it  is  important  to  defend  at  all 
hazards  :  and  in  general,  strategic  points,  strategic  lines, 
strategic  positions,  fyc.  As  these  terms  are  very  generally 
used  in  military  books,  it  may  be  well  to  make  ourselves 
thoroughly  acquainted  with  their  import.  After  defining 
these  terms  and  explaining  their  meaning  and  application, 
it  is  deemed  best  to  illustrate  their  use  by  reference  to 
well-known  and  striking  historical  examples. 

The  theatre  of  a  war  embraces  not  only  the  territory  of 
the  two  belligerent  powers,  but  also  that  of  their  allies, 
and  of  such  secondary  powers  as,  through  fear  or  interest, 
may  be  drawn  into  the  contest.  With  maritime  nations  it 
also  embraces  the  seas,  and  sometimes  crosses  to  another 
continent.  Some  of  the  wars  between  France  and  Eng 
land  embraced  the  two  hemispheres. 

The  theatre  of  operations,  however,  is  of  a  more  limited 
character,  and  should  not  be  confounded  with  the  theatre 
of  war.  In  general,  it  includes  only  the  territory  which 
an  army  seeks,  on  the  one  hand,  to  defend,  and  on  the 
other,  to  invade.  If  two  or  more  armies  be"  directed  to 
wards  the  same  object,  though  by  different  lines,  their 
combined  operations  are  included  in  the  same  theatre  • 


STRATEGY.  45 

• 

but  if  each  acts  independently  of  the  others,  and  seeks 
distinct  and  separate  objects,  each  must  have  its  own  in 
dependent  theatre  of  operations. 

A  war  between  France  and  Austria  may  embrace  all 
Italy  and  Germany,  but  the  theatre  of  operations  may  be 
limited  to  only  a  portion  of  these  countries.  Should  the 
Oregon  question  lead  to  hostilities  between  the  United 
States  and  England,  the  theatre  of  war  would  embrace 
the  greater  part  of  North  America  and  the  two  oceans, 
but  the  theatre  of  operations  would  probably  be  limited  to 
Canada  and  our  northern  frontier,  with  naval  descents 
upon  our  maritime  cities. 

The  first  point  to  be  attended  to  in  a  plan  of  military 
operation  is  to  select  a  good  base.  Many  circumstances 
influence  this  selection,  such  as  mountains,  rivers,  roads, 
forests,  cities,  fortifications,  military  depots,  means  of  sub 
sistence,  &c.  If  the  frontier  of  a  state  contain  strong 
natural  or  artificial  barriers,  it  may  serve  not  only  as  a 
good  base  for  offensive  operations,  but  also  as  an  excellent 
line  of  defence  against  invasion.  A  single  frontier  line 
may,  however,  be  penetrated  by  the  enemy,  and  in  that 
case  a  second  or  third  base  further  in  the  interior  becomes 
indispensable  for  a  good  defence. 

A  French  army  carrying  on  military  operations  against 
Germany  would  make  the  Rhine  its  first  base ;  but  if  driven 
from  this  it  would  form  a  second  base  on  the  Mouse  or 
Moselle,  a  third  on  the  Seine,  and  a  fourth  on  the  Loire  ; 
or,  when  driven  from  the  first  base,  it  would  take  others 
perpendicular  to  the  front  of  defence,  either  to  the  right, 
on  Befort  and  Besancon,  or  to  the  left,  on  Mezieres  and 
Sedan.  If  acting  offensively  against  Prussia  and  Russia, 
the  Rhine  and  the  Main  would  form  the  first  base  the 
Elbe  and  the  Oder  the  second,  the  Vistula  the  third,  the 
Nieman  the  fourth,  and  the  Dwina  and  the  Dnieper  the 
fifth. 


46  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

• 

A  French  army  operating  against  Spain  would  have  the 
Pyrenees  for  its  first  base ;  the  line  of  the  Ebro  for  a 
second,  resting  its  wings  on  the  gulf  of  Gascony  and  the 
Mediterranean.  If  from  this  position  it  advance  its  left, 
possessing  itself  of  the  kingdom  of  Valencia,  the  line  of  the 
Sierra  d'Estellas  becomes  its  third  base  of  operations 
against  the  centre  of  Spain. 

A  base  may  be  parallel,  oblique,  or  perpendicular  to 
our  line  of  operations,  or  to  the  enemy's  line  of  defence. 
Some  prefer  one  plan  and  some  another;  the  best  authori 
ties,  however,  think  the  oblique  or  perpendicular  more 
advantageous  than  the  parallel ;  but  AVC  are  not  often  at 
liberty  to  choose  between  these,  for  other  considerations 
usually  determine  the  selection. 

In  1806,  the  French  forces  first  moved  perpendicular 
to  their  base  on  the  Main,  but  afterwards  effected  a  change 
of  front,  and  moved  on  a  line  oblique  or  nearly  parallel  to 
this  base.  They  had  pursued  the  same  plan  of  operations 
in  the  Seven  Years'  War.  The  Russians,  in  1812,  based 
perpendicularly  on  the  Oka  and  the  Kalouga,  and  extended 
their  flank  march  on  Wiozma  and  Krasnoi ;  in  1813,  the 
allies,  based  perpendicularly  on  Bohemia,  succeeded  in 
paralyzing  Napoleon's  army  on  the  Elbe. 

An  American  army  moving  by  Lake  Champlain,  would 
be  based  perpendicular  on  the  great  line  of  communica 
tion  between  Boston  and  Buffalo ;  if  moving  from  the  New 
England  states  on  Quebec  and  Montreal,  the  line  of  oper 
ations  would  be  oblique  ;  and  if  moving  from  the  Niagara 
frontier  by  Lake  Ontario  and  the  St.  Lawrence,  the  line 
would  be  nearly  parallel  both  to  our  base  and  to  the  ene 
my's  line  of  defence — an  operation,  under  the  circum 
stances,  exceedingly  objectionable. 

Any  point  in  the  theatre  of  operations  which  gives  to 
the  possessor  an  advantage  over  his  opponent,  is  regarded 
as  strategic.  Their  geographical  position  and  political 


STRATEGY.  47 

and  military  character,  give  them  a  greater  or  less  influ 
ence  in  directing  the  campaign.  These  points  are  occu 
pied  by  the  defensive  army,  and  attacked  by  the  offensive ; 
if  on  or  near  the  base,  they  become  the  key  points  for  the 
former,  and  the  objective  points  for  the  latter.*  There  are 
also  between  these  two  a  greater  or  less  number  of  strate 
gic  points,  which  have  an  important  though  inferior  influ 
ence  upon  the  result  of  the  war. 

The  first  object  of  the  French  in  attacking  Belgium,  is 
to  gain  possession  of  the  Meuse,  as  this  position  would 
give  them  a  decided  advantage  in  any  ulterior  operations. 
In  attacking  southern  Germany,  the  course  of  the  Danube 
offers  a  series  of  points  which  exercise  an  important  in 
fluence  on  the  war.  For  northern  Germany,  Leipsic  and 
the  country  bordering  on  the  Saale  and  the  Elbe,  are  ob 
jects  often  fiercely  contested  by  the  French  and  other  bel 
ligerent  powers.  In  a  war  between  this  country  and 
England,  Montreal  and  the  points  on  the  St.  Lawrence 
between  Montreal  and  Quebec,  would  become  objects  of 
the  highest  importance,  and  their  possession  would  prob 
ably  determine  the  result  of  the  war. 

The  capital  of  a  state,  from  its  political  importance 
as  well  as  its  military  influence,  is  almost  always  a  deci 
sive  strategic  point,  and  its  capture  is  therefore  frequently 
the  object  of  an  entire  campaign.  The  possession  of 
Genoa,  Turin,  Alexandria,  Milan,  &c.,  in  1796,  both 
from  their  political  and  military  importance,  had  a  decided 
influence  upon  the  results  of  the  war  in  these  several 
states.  In  the  same  way  Venice,  Rome,  and  Naples,  in 
1797,  Vienna,  in  the  campaigns  of  1805  and  1809,  Berlin, 

*  It  may  be  well  to  remark  that  a  strategic  point  is  not  necessarily  a 
geometrical  point ;  an  entire  province,  or  a  considerable  portion  of  a 
geographical  frontier,  is,  in  military  language,  sometimes  denominated 
a  point.  In  the  same  way,  strategic  lines,  instead  of  being  mathemati 
cal  lines,  are  frequently  many  miles  in  width. 


48  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

in  1806,  Madrid,  in  1808,  and  Paris,  in  1814  and  1815. 
If  Hannibal  had  captured  the  capital  immediately  after  the 
battle  of  Cannae,  he  would  thus  have  destroyed  the  Roman 
power.  The  taking  of  Washington,  in  1814,  had  little  or 
no  influence  on  the  war,  for  the  place  was  then  of  no  im 
portance  in  itself,  and  was  a  mere  nominal  capital.  It, 
however,  greatly  influenced  our  reputation  abroad,  and  re 
quired  many  brilliant  successes  to  wash  the  blot  from  our 
national  escutcheon. 

Lines  of  defence  in  strategy  are  either  permanent  or 
temporary.  The  great  military  frontiers  of  a  state,  espe 
cially  when  strengthened  by  natural  and  artificial  obsta 
cles,  such  as  chains  of  mountains,  rivers,  lines  of  for 
tresses,  &c.,  are  regarded  as  permanent  lines  of  defence. 
The  Alpine  range  between  France  and  Piedmont,  with  its 
fortified  passes  ;  the  Rhine,  the  Oder,  and  the  Elbe,  with 
their  strongly-fortified  places ;  the  Pyrenees,  with  Bay- 
onne  at  one  extremity  and  Perpignon  at  the  other ;  the 
triple  range  of  fortresses  on  the  Belgian  frontier — are  all 
permanent  lines  of  defence.  The  St.  Lawrence  river  is 
a  permanent  line  of  defence  for  Canada ;  and  the  line  of 
lake  Champlain,  the  upper  St.  Lawrence,  and  the  lakes, 
for  the  United  States. 

Temporary  lines  of  defence  are  such  as  are  taken  up 
merely  for  the  campaign.  Napoleon's  position  in  Saxony, 
to.  1813  ;  the  line  of  the  allies  in  Belgium,  in  1815  ;  the 
line  of  the  Marne,  in  1814,  are  examples  of  temporary 
lines  of  defence. 

It  will  be  seen  from  these  remarks  that  lines  of  defence 
are  not  necessarily  bases  of  operation. 

Strategic  positions  are  such  as  are  taken  up  during  the 
operations  of  a  war,  either  by  a  corps  d'armee  or  grand  de 
tachment,  for  the  purpose  of  checking  or  observing  an 
opposing  force  ;  they  are  named  thus  to  distinguish  them 
from  tactical  positions  or  fields  of  battle.  The  positions 


STRATEGY.  49 

of  Napoleon  at  Rivoli,  Verona,  and  Legnaiio,  in  1796  and 
1797,  to  watch  the  Adige  ;  his  positions  on  the  Passarge, 
in  1807,  and  in  Saxony  and  Silesia  in  front  of  his  line  of 
defence,  in  1813;  and  Massena's  positions  on  the  Albis, 
along  the  Limmat  and  the  Aar,  in  1799,  are  examples 
under  this  head. 

Before  proceeding  further  it  may  be  well  to  illustrate 
the  strategic  relations  of  lines  and  positions  by  the  use  of 
diagrams. 

(Fig.  1.)  The  army  at  A  covers  the  whole  of  the 
ground  in  rear  of  the  line  DC  perpendicular  to  the  line 
AB,  the  position  of  the  enemy  being  at  B. 

(Fig.  2.)  AJ  being  equal  to  BJ,  A  will  still  cover  ev 
ery  thing  in  rear  of  DC. 

(Fig.  3.)  If  the  army  A  is  obliged  to  cover  the  point  a, 
the  army  B  will  cover  all  the  space  without  the  circle 
whose  radius  is  aB  ;  and  of  course  A  continues  to  cover 
the  point  a  so  long  as  it  remains  within  this  circle  aB. 

A  line  of  operations  embraces  that  portion  of  the  theatre 
of  war  which  an  army  or  corps  d'armee  passes  over  in  at 
taining  its  object ;  the  front  of  operations  is  the  front  form 
ed  by  the  army  as  it  advances  on  this  line. 

When  an  army  acts  as  a  single  mass,  without  forming 
independent  corps,  the  line  it  follows  is  denominated  a 
simple  line  of  operations. 

If  two  or  more  corps  act  in  an  isolated  manner,  but 
against  the  same  opposing  force,  they  are  said  to  follow 
double  or  multiple  lines. 

The  lines  by  which  Moreau  and  Jourdan  entered  Ger 
many  in  1796,  were  double  lines  ;  but  Napoleon's  advance 
by  Bamberg  and  Gera,  in  1806,  although  moving  in  seven 
distinct  corps  d'armee,  formed  but  a  single  line  of  opera 
tions. 

Interior  lines  of  operations  are  those  followed  by  an 
army  which  operates  between  the  enemy's  lines  in  such 

5 


50  MILITARY  ART   AND  SCIENCE. 

a  way  as  to  be  able  to  concentrate  his  forces  on  one  of 
these  lines  before  the  other  can  be  brought  to  its  assist 
ance.  For  example,  Napoleon's  line  of  operations  in 
1814,  between  the  Marne  and  the  Seine,  where  he  man 
oeuvred  with  so  much  skill  and  success  against  the  im 
mensely  superior  forces  of  the  allies. 

Exterior  lines  present  the  opposite  results  ;  they  are 
those  which  an  army  will  form  in  moving  on  the  extremi 
ties  of  the  opposing  masses.  For  example,  the  lines  of  the 
Marne  and  the  Seine,  followed  by  the  army  of  Silesia  and 
the  grand  Austro-Russian  army,  in  the  campaign  of  1814. 
Burgoyne's  line  of  operations,  in  1777,  was  double  and 
exterior. 

Concentric  lines  are  such  as  start  from  distant  points,  and 
are  directed  towards  the  same  object,  either  in  the  rear  or 
in  advance  of  their  base. 

If  a  mass  leaves  a  single  point  and  separates  into  sev 
eral  distinct  corps,  taking  divergent  directions,  it  is  said 
to  pursue  eccentric  lines. 

Lines  are  said  to  be  deep,  when  the  end  to  be  attained 
is  very  distant  fcom  the  base. 

The  lines  followed  by  a  secondary  or  auxiliary  force 
are  denominated  secondary  lines. 

The  lines  pursued  by  the  army  of  the  Sombre-et-Meuse 
in  1796,  and  by  Bagration  in  1812,  were  secondary  lines, 
as  the  former  were  merely  secondary  to  the  army  of  the 
Rhine,  and  the  latter  to  that  of  Barclay. 

Accidental  lines  are  those  which  result  from  a  change 
in  the  primitive  plan  of  campaign,  which  give  a  new  direc 
tion  to  the  operations.  These  are  of  rare  occurrence, 
but  they  sometimes  lead  to  important  results. 

The  direction  given  to  a  line  of  operations  depends  not 
only  on  the  geographical  situation  of  the  country,  but  also 
on  the  positions  occupied  by  the  enemy.  The  general 
plan  of  campaign  is  frequently  determined  on  previous  to 


STRATEGY.  51 

beginning  operations,  but  the  choice  of  lines  and  positions 
must  ordinarily  result  from  the  ulterior  events  of  the  war, 
and  be  made  by  the  general  as  these  events  occur. 

As  a  general  rule,  a  line  of  operations  should  be  directed 
upon  the  centre,  or  one  of  the  extremities  of  the  enemy's  line 
of  defence ;  unless  our  forces  be  infinitely  superior  in  num 
ber,  it  would  be  absurd  to  act  against  the  front  and  ex 
tremities  at  the  same  time. 

If  the  configuration  of  the  theatre  of  operations  be  fa 
vorable  to  a  movement  against  the  extremity  of  the  ene 
my's  line  of  defence,  this  direction  maybe  best  calculated 
to  lead  to  important  results.  (Fig.  4.) 

In  1 800  the  army  of  the  Rhine  was  directed  against 
the  extreme  left  of  the  line  of  the  Black  Forest ;  the  army 
of  reserve  was  directed  by  the  St.  Bernard  and  Milan  on 
the  extreme  right  and  rear  of  Melas's  line  of  defence  :  both 
operations  were  most  eminently  successful.  (Fig.  5.) 

It  may  be  well  to  remark  that  it  is  not  enough  merely 
to  gain  the  extremity  and  "rear  of  the  enemy,  for  in  that 
case  it  may  be  possible  for  him  to  throw  himself  on  our 
communications  and  place  us  in  the  very  dilemma  in 
which  we  had  hoped  to  involve  him.  To  avoid  this  dan 
ger  it  is  necessary  to  give  such  a  direction  to  the  line  of 
operations  that  our  army  shall  preserve  its  communica 
tions  and  be  able  to  reach  its  base. 

Thus,  if  Napoleon,  in  1800,  after  crossing  the  Alps, 
had  marched  by  Turin  on  Alexandria  and  received  battle 
at  Marengo,  without  having  first  secured  Lombardy  and 
the  left  of  the  Po,  his  own  line  of  retreat  would  have 
been  completely  cut  off  by  Melas  ;  whereas,  by  the  direc 
tion  which  he  gave  to  his  line  of  operations  he  had,  in 
case  of  reverse,  every  means  for  reaching  either  the  Var 
or  the  Valois.  (Fig.  6.)  Again,  in  1 806,  if  he  had  march 
ed  directly  from  Gera  to  Leipsic,  he  would  have  been  cut 
ofT  from  his  base  on  the  Rhine  ;  whereas,  by  turning  from 


52  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

Gera  towards  Weimar,  lie  not  only  cut  off  the  Prussians 
from  tlie  Elbe,  but  at  the  same  time  secured  to  himself 
the  roads  of  Saalfield,  Schleitz,  and  Hoff,  thus  rendering 
perfectly  safe  his  communications  in  his  rear.  (Fig.  7.) 

We  have  said  that  the  configuration  of  the  ground  and 
the  position  of  the  hostile  forces  may  sometimes  render  it 
advisable  to  direct  our  line  of  operations  against  the  ex 
tremity  of  the  enemy's  line  of  defence ;  but,  as  a  general 
rule,  a  central  direction  will  lead  to  more  important  re 
sults.  This  .severs  the  enemy's  means  of  resistance,  and 
enables  the  assailant  to  strike,  with  the  mass  of  his  force, 
upon  the  dissevered  and  partially  paralyzed  membejs  of 
the  hostile  body.  (Fig.  8.) 

Such  a  plan  of  operations  enabled  Napoleon,  in  the 
Italian  campaigns  of  1796  and  1797,  to  pierce  and  destroy, 
with  a  small  force,  the  large  and  successive  armies  which 
Austria  sent  against  him.  In  1805  his  operations  were 
both  interior  and  central-  in  1808  they  were  most  em 
inently  central :  in  1809,  by  the  central  operations  in  the 
vicinity  of  Ratisbonne,  he  defeated  the  large  and  almost 
victorious  army  of  the  Archduke  Charles  :  in  1814,  from 
his  central  position  between  the  Marne  and  Seine,  with 
only  seventy  thousand  men  against  a  force  of  more  than 
two  hundred  thousand,  he  gained  numerous  victories,  and 
barely  failed  of  complete  success.  Again  in  1815,  with 
an  army  of  only  one  hundred  and  twenty  thousand  men 
against  an  allied  force  of  two  hundred  and  twenty  thou 
sand,  by  his  central  advance  on  Charleroi  and  Ligny,  he 
gained  a  most  decided  advantage  over  the  enemy — an  ad 
vantage  lost  by  the  eccentric  movement  of  Grouchy  :  and 
even  in  1813,  his  central  position  at  Dresden  would  have 
secured  him  most  decisive  advantage?,  had  not  the  faults 
of  his  lieutenants  lost  these  advantages  in  the  disasters  of 
Kulm  and  the  Katzbach. 

For  the  same  frontier  it  is  objectionable  to  form  more 


STRATEGY.  '     53 

than  one  army ;  grand  detachments  and  corps  of  observa 
tion  may  frequently  be  used  with  advantage,  but  double  or 
multiple  lines  of  operation  are  far  less  favorable  than  one 
simple  line.  It  may  however  sometimes  occur  that  the 
position  of  the  enemy's  forces  will  be  such  as  to  make 
this  operation  the  preferable  one.  In  that  case,  interior 
lines  should  always  be  adopted,  unless  we  have  a  vast 
superiority  in  number.  Double  exterior  lines,  with  corps 
several  days'  march  asunder,  must  be  fatal,  if  the  enemy, 
whether  acting  on  single  or  double  interior  lines,  take  ad 
vantage  of  his  position  to  concentrate  his  masses  succes 
sively  against  our  isolated  forces.  The  Roman  armies 
under  the  consuls  Flaminius  and  Servilius  opposed  Han 
nibal  on  exterior  lines,  the  one  by  Florence  and  Arrezzio, 
and  the  other  by  Modena  and  Ariminum.  Hannibal  turned 
the  position  of  Flaminius  and  attacked  the  Roman  armies 
separately,  gaining  a  complete  and  decisive  victory.  Such 
also  was  the  character  of  the  operations  of  the  French  in 
1795,  under  Pichegru  and  Jourdan;  they  met  with  a 
bloody  and  decisive  defeat.  Again  in  1796,  the  French 
armies  under  Jourdan  and  Moreau,  pursued  exterior  lines  ; 
the  Archduke  Charles,  from  his  interior  position,  succeed 
ed  in  defeating  both  the  opposing  generals,  and  forcing 
them  to  retreat.  If  the  two  armies  united  had  pursued  a 
single  line,  the  republican  flag  had  been  carried  in  tri 
umph  to  Vienna. 

Converging  lines  of  operation  are  preferable,  under 
most  circumstances,  to  diverging  lines.  Care  should  be 
taken,  however,  that  the  point  of  meeting  be  such  that  it 
may  not  be  taken  as  a  strategic  position  by  the  enemy, 
and  our  own  forces  be  destroyed  in  detail,  before  they 
can  effect  a  junction.  In  1797  the  main  body  of  the 
Austrians,  under  Alvinzi,  advanced  against  Napoleon,  on 
three  separate  lines,  intending  to  concentrate  at  Rivoli, 
and  then  attack  the  French  in  mass  ;  but  Napoleon  took 
i 


54    %  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

his  strategic  position  at  Rivoli,  and  overthrew  the  en 
emy's  corps  as  -they  successively  appeared.  In  the  same 
way  the  Archduke  Charles  took  an  interior  position,  be 
tween  Moreau  and  Jourdan,  in  1796,  and  prevented  them 
from  concentrating  their  forces  on  a  single  point.  Wurm- 
ser  arid  Quasdanowich  attempted  to  concentrate  their 
forces  on  the  Mincio,  by  moving  on  the  opposite  shores 
of  Lake  Garda;  but  Napoleon  took  an  interior  position 
and  destroyed  them.  In  1815  Blucher  and  Wellington, 
from  their  interior  position,  prevented  the  junction  of 
Napoleon  and  Grouchy. 

Diverging  lines  may  be  employed  with  advantage 
against  an  enemy  immediately  after  a  successful  battle 
or  strategic  manoeuvre ;  for  by  this  means  we  separate 
the  enemy's  forces,  and  disperse  them ;  and  if  occasion 
should  require  it,  may  again  concentrate  our  forces  by 
converging  lines.  Such  was  the  mano3uvre  of  Frederick 
the  Great,  in  1757,  which  produced  the  battles  of  Ros- 
bach  and  Leuthen ;  such  also  was  the  manosuvre  of  Na 
poleon  at  Donawert  in  1805,  at  Jena  in  1806,  and  at  Rat- 
isbon  in  1809. 

Interior  lines  of  operations,  when  properly  conducted, 
have  almost  invariably  led  to  success :  indeed  every  in 
stance  of  failure  may  be  clearly  traced  to  great  unskilful- 
ness  in  their  execution,  or  to  other  extraneous  circum 
stances  of  the  campaign.  There  may,  however,  be  cases 
where  it  will  be  preferable  to  direct  our  forces  on  the 
enemy's  flank ;  the  geographical  character  of  the  theatre 
of  war,  the  position  of  other  collateral  forces,  &c.,  ren 
dering  such  a  direction  necessary.  But  as  a  general 
rule,  interior  and  central  lines,  for  an  army  of  moderate 
'"orces,  will  lead  to  decisive  results. 

Napoleon's  Italian  campaigns  in  1796  and  1797,  the 
campaign  of  the  Archduke  Charles  in  1796,  Napoleon's 
campaigns  of  1805  and  1809  against  Austria,  and  of 


STRATEGY.  55 

1806  and  1807  against  Prussia  and  Russia,  of  1808  in 
Spain,  his  manoeuvres  in  1814,  between  the  battle  of  Bri- 
enne  and  t  aat  of  Paris,  and  his  operations  previous  to  the 
battle  of  Ligny  in  1815,  are  all  brilliant  examples  under 
this  head. 

To  change  the  line  of  operations,,  an  the  middle  of  a 
campaign,  and  follow  accidental  lines,  is  always  a  delicate 
affair,  and  can  only  be  resorted  to  by  a  general  of  great 
skill,  and  with  disciplined  troops.  In  such  a  case  it  may 
be  attended  with  important  results.  It  was  one  of  Na 
poleon's  maxims,  that  "  a  line  of  operations,  when  once 
chosen,  should  never  be  abandoned."  This  maxim,  how 
ever,  must  sometimes  be  disregarded  by  an  army  of  un 
disciplined  troops,  in  order  to  avoid  ^entire  destruction ; 
but  the  total  abandonment  of  a  line  of  operations  is  al 
ways  attended  with  great  loss,  and  should  be  regarded  as 
a  mere  choice  of  evils.  A  regular  army  can  always 
avoid  this  result,  by  changing  the  direction  of  its  line ; 
thus  frequently  gaining  superior  advantages  in  the  new 
theatre  of  action.  If  the  plan  of  this  change  be  the  re 
sult  of  a  good  coup  d'ozil,  and  it  be  skilfully  executed,  the 
rear  of  the  operating  army  will  be  secure  from  the  en 
emy  ;  and  moreover,  he  will  be  left  in  doubt  respecting 
its  weak  points.  But  such  is  the  uncertainty  of  this 
manoeuvre,  that  it  is  very  rarely  taken  by  the  best  troops, 
unless  actually  forced  upon  them.  .  If  the  army  be  of  in 
congruous  materials,  generally  a  change  of  direction  will 
be  less  advantageous  than  to  entirely  abandon  the  line, 
and  save  as  many  as  possible  of  the  troops  for  some  new 
plan  of  operations.  (Maxim  20.)  If,  however,  the  undis 
ciplined  army  be  sustained  by  fortifications,  it  can  take 
up  the  accidental  line  of  operations  in  the  same  manner, 
and  with  the  same  probability  of  success,  as  is  done  by  a 
regular  force. 

We  have  examples  of  accidental  lines  in  the  operations 


56  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

of  the  king  of  Prussia,  after  the  battle  of  Hohenkirchertj 
and  of  Washington,  in  New-Jersey,  after  the  action  of 
Princeton.  This  is  one  of  the  finest  in  military  history. 
Napoleon  had  projected  a  change  in  his  line  of  opera 
tions,  in  case  he  lost  the  battle  of  Austerlitz ;  but  victory 
rendered  its  execution  unnecessary.  Again  in  1814  he 
had  planned  an  entire  change  of  operations ;  but  the 
want  of  co-operation  of  the  forces  under  Mortier  and 
Marmont  forced  him  to  abandon  a  plan  which,  if  properly 
executed,  had  probably  defeated  the  allies.  Jomini  pro 
nounced  it  one  of  the  most  brilliant  of  his  military  career. 
Having  explained  the  principal  terms  used  in  strategy, 
let  us  trace  out  the  successive  operations  of  war  in  their 
usual  strategic  relations. 

We  will  suppose  war  to  be  declared,  and  the  army  to  be 
just  entering  upon  a  campaign.  The  political  and  military 
authorities  of  the  state  detennine  upon  the  nature  of  the 
war,  and  select  the  theatre  of  its  enterprises.  The  chief 
selects  certain  points,  on  or  near  the  borders  of  the  seat 
of  war,  where  his  troops  are  to  be  assembled,  and  his 
materiel  collected.  These  points,  together,  form  his  base 
of  operations.  He  now  selects  some  point,  within  the 
theatre  of  the  war,  as  the  first  object  of  his  enterprises, 
and  chooses  the  line  of  operations  most  advantageous  for 
reaching  this  objective  point.  The  temporary  positions 
taken  on  this  line  become  strategic  positions,  and  the  line 
in  his  rear,  a  line  of  defence.  When  he  arrives  in  the 
vicinity  of  his  first  object,  and  the  enemy  begins  to  oppose 
his  enterprises,  he  must  force  this  enemy  to  retreat,  either 
by  an  attack  or  by  manoeuvres.  For  this  purpose  he 
temporarily  adopts  certain  lines  of  manoeuvre,  which  may 
deviate  from  his  general  line  of  operations.  The  ulterior 
events  of  the  campaign  may  possibly  cause  him  to  make 
.hese  new,  or  accidental  lines,  his  lines  of  operations. 
The  approach  of  hostile  forces  may  cause  him  to  detach 


STRATEGY.  57 

secondary  corps  on  secondary  lines  ;  or  to  divide  liis 
army,  and  pursue  double  or  multiple  lines.  The  primi 
tive  object  may  also  be  relinquished,  and  new  ones  pro 
posed,  with  new  lines  and  new  plans  of  operations.  As 
he  advances  far  from  his  primitive  base,  he  forms  new 
depots  and  lines  of  magazines.  He  may  encounter  nat 
ural  and  artificial  obstacles.  To  cross  large  rivers  in  the 
face  of  an  enemy  is  a  hazardous  operation ;  and  he  re 
quires  all  the  art  of  the  engineer  in  constructing  bridges, 
and  securing  a  safe  passage  for  his  army.  If  a  fortified 
place  is  to  be  taken,  he  will  detach  a  siege  corps,  and 
either  continue  his  march  with  the  main  army,  or  take  a 
strategic  position  to  cover  this  siege.  Thus  Napoleon, 
in  1796,  with  an  army  of  only  50,000  combatants,  could 
not  venture  to  penetrate  into  Austria,  with  Mantua  and 
its  garrison  of  25,000  men  in  his  rear,  and  an  Austrian 
force  of  40,000  before  him.  But  in  1806  the  great  supe 
riority  of  his  army  enabled  him  to  detach  forces  to  be 
siege  the  principal  fortresses  of  Silesia,  and  still  to  con 
tinue  his  operations  with  his  principal  forces.  The  chief 
of  the  army  may  meet  the  enemy  under  circumstances 
such  as  to  induce  or  compel  him  to  give  battle.  If  he 
should  be  victorious,  the  enemy  must  be  pursued  and 
harassed  to  the  uttermost.  If  he  should  be  defeated,  he 
must  form  the  best  plan,  and  provide  the  best  means  of 
retreat.  If  possible,  he  must  take,  shelter  in  some  line 
of  fortifications,  and  prepare  to  resume  the  offensive. 
Lines  of  intrenchment  and  temporary  works  may  some 
times  serve  him  as  a  sufficient  protection.  Finally,  when 
the  unfavorable  season  compels  him  to  suspend  his  oper 
ations,  he  will  go  into  winter  cantonments,  and  prepare 
for  a  new  campaign. 

Such  are  the  ordinary  operations  of  war :  its  relations 
to  strategy  must  be  evident,  even  to  the  most  superficial 
reader. 


58  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

Not  unfrequently  the  results  of  a  campaign  depend  more 
upon  ihe  strategic  operations  of  an  army,  than  upon  its 
victories  gained  in  actual  combat.  Tactics,  or  movements 
within  the  range  of  the  enemy's  cannon,  is  therefore  sub 
ordinate  to  the  choice  of  positions  :  if  the  field  of  battle  be 
properly  chosen,  success  will  be  decisive,  and  the  loss 
of  the  battle  not  disastrous  ;  whereas,  if  selected  without 
reference  to  the  principles  of  the  science,  the  victory,  if 
gained,  might  be  barren,  and  defeat,  if  suffered,  totally 
fatal :  thus  demonstrating  the  truth  of  Napoleon's  maxim, 
that  success  is  oftener  due  to  the  genius  of  the  general, 
and  to  the  nature  of  the  theatre  of  war,  than  to  the  number 
and  bravery  of  the  soldiers.  (Maxim  17,  18.) 

We  have  a  striking  illustration  of  this  in  the  French 
army  of  the  Danube,  which,  from  the  left  wing  of  General 
Kray,  marched  rapidly  through  Switzerland  to  the  right 
extremity  of  the  Austrian  line,  "  and  by  this  movement 
alone  conquered  all  the  country  between  the  Rhine  and 
Danube  without  pulling  a  trigger." 

Again,  in  1805,  the  army  of  Mack  was  completely  para 
lyzed,  and  the  main  body  forced  to  surrender,  at  Ulm, 
without  a  single  important  battle.  In  1806,  the  Prussians 
were  essentially  defeated  even  before  the  battle  of  Jena. 
The  operations  about  Heilesberg,  in  1807,  the  advance 
upon  Madrid,  in  1808,  the  manoeuvres  about  Ratisbon,  in 
1809,  the  operations  of  the  French  in  1814,  and  the  first 
part  of  the  campaign  of  1815,  against  vastly  superior 
numbers,  are  all  familiar  proofs  of  the  truth  of  the  maxim. 

Strategy  may  therefore  be  regarded  as  the  most  impor 
tant,  though  least  understood,  of  all  the  branches  of  the 
military  art.* 


*  Strategy  may  be  learned  from  didactic  works  or  from  general  mili 
tary  histories.  There  are  very  few  good  elementary  works  on  this 
branch  of  the  military  art.  The  general  treatises  of  the  Archduke 


STRATEGY.  59 

Charles,  and  of  General  Wagner,  in  German,  (the  former  has  been 
translated  into  French,)  are  considered  as  tho  best.  The  discussions 
of  Jomiui  on  this  subject  in  his  great  work  on  the  military  art,  are  ex 
ceedingly  valuable  ;  also  the  writings  of  Rocquaucourt,  Jacquinot  de 
Presle,  and  Gay  de  Vernon.  The  last  of  these  has  been  translated 
into  English,  but  the  translation  is  exceedingly  inaccurate.  The 
military  histories  of  Lloyd,  Templehoff,  Jomiui,  the  Archduke  Charles, 
Grimoard,  Gravert,  Souchet,  St.  Cyr,  Beauvais,  Laverne,  Stutter- 
heim,  Wagner,  Kausler,  Gourgaud  and  Montholon,  Foy,  Mathieu 
Dumas,  Scgur,  Pelet,  Koch,  Clausewitz,  and  Thiers,  may  be  read 
with  great  advantage.  Napier's  History  of  the  Peninsular  War  is  the 
only  English  History  that  is  of  any  value  as  a  military  work:  it  is  a 
most  excellent  book.  Alison's  great  History  of  Europe  is  utterly 
worthless  to  the  military  man  ;  the  author  is  ignorant  of  tho  first  prin 
ciples  of  the  military  art,  and  nearly  every  page  is  filled  with  the 
grossest  blunders. 

We  subjoin  the  titles  of  a  few  of  the  best  works  that  treat  of  strategy, 
either  directly  or  in  connection  with  military  history. 

Principes  de  la  Strategic,  $c.,  par  le  Prince  Charles,  traduit  de 
rAllemand,  3  vols.  in  8vo.  This  is  a  work  of  great  merit.  The  tech 
nical  terms,  however,  are  very  loosely  employed. 

Precis  de  I'Art  de  la  Guerre,  par  le  Baron  Jomini.  His  chapter 
on  strategy  embodies  the  principles  of  this  branch  of  the  art. 

Grundsdtze  der  Strategic,  Von  Wagner. 

Cours  Elementaire  d'Art  et  d'Histoire  Militaire,  par  Rocquan- 
court.  This  work  contains  much  valuable  information  connected  with 
the  history  of  the  art  of  war ;  but  it  is  far  too  diffuse  and  ill-arranged 
for  an  elementary  book. 

Cours  d'Art  et  d'Histoire  Militaire,  par  Jacquinot  de  Presle.  This 
work  is  especially  designed  for  cavalry  officers,  and  the  other  branches 
of  military  service  are  but  very  briefly  discussed. 

De  Vernon's  Treatise  on  the  Science  of  War  and  Fortification  con 
tains  much  valuable  information ;  but,  as  an  elementary  book,  it  has 
the  same  objections  as  that  of  Rocquancourt. 

History  of  the  Seven  Years9  War,  by  Lloyd  and  Templehoff.  The 
military  writings  of  Lloyd  and  TemplehofF  are  valuable  as  connected 
with  the  history  of  strategy  ;  but  many  of  the  principles  laid  down  by 
these  writers  are  now  regarded  as  erroneous. 

Memoires  de  Napoleon.  The  Memoirs  of  Napoleon,  as  dictated  by 
uimself  to  Gourgaud  and  Montholon,  have  been  translated  into  Eng 
lish.  It  is  hardly  necessary  to  remark  that  they  contain  all  tho  gea 


60  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

eral  principles  of  military  art  and  science.  No  military  man  si  ould 
fail  to  study  them  thoroughly.  The  matter  is  so  condensed,  and  impor 
tant  principles  are  embodied  in  so  few  words,  that  they  are  not  easily 
understood  by  the  ordinary  reader,  and  probably  will  never  be  popular 
with  the  multitude. 

Essai  general  de  Tactique,  par  Guibert.  A  work  very  popular  in 
ts  day,  but  now  far  less  valuable  than  the  writings  already  mentioned. 

Ausfuhrliche  Bcschreibung  der  Schlacht  des  Pirmasens,  von 
Gravert.  Regarded  by  military  men  as  a  valuable  historical  fragment. 

Memoires  sur  les  Campagnes  en  Espagne.     Souchet. 

Memoires  de  Gouvion  St.  Cyr. 

Stalistique  de  la  Guerre,  par  Reveroni  St.  Cyr. 

Premiere  Campagnes  de  la  Revolution,  par  Grimoard. 

Victoires  et  Conquetes.     Beauvais. 

Campagnes  de  Suwarrow.    Laverne. 

Histoire  de  la  Guerre  de  la  Peninsule.     Foy. 

Precis  des  Evenements  Militaires.     Mathieu  Dumas. 

Histoire  de  Napoleon  et  de  la  Grande  Armee  en  1812.     Se'gur 

Memoires  sur  la  Guerre  de  1809.     Pelet. 

La  Campagne  de  1814.     Koch. 

Vom  Kriege — Die  Feldzugge,  fyc.    Clause witz. 

La  Revolution,  le  Consulat  et  I' Empire.     Thiers. 

Memoires  sur  la  Guerre  de  1812 — sur  la  Campagne  du  Vice  rat 
en  Italic,  en  1813  et  1814;  Histoire  de  la  Guerre  en  Allemagne  en 
1814;  Histoire  des  Campagnes  de  1814  et  1815,  en  France.  Vau- 
doncourt., 

Essai  sur  I' Art  Militaire,  tyc.    Carion — Nisas. 

Histoire  de  I' Expedition  en  Russie  en  1812.     Chambray. 

War  in  Spain,  Portugal,  and  the  South  of  France.    John  Jones. 

Peninsular  War.     Napier. 

Notices  of  the  War  of  1812.     Armstrong 

All  the  above  are  works  of  merit ;  but  none  are  more  valuable  to 
the  military  man  than  the  military  histories  of  Jomini  and  Ks 
with  their  splendid  diagrams  and  maps. 


FORTIFICATIONS.  61 


CHAPTER    III. 

FORTIFICATIONS. 

Fortifications,  or  engineering,  may  be  considered  with 
reference  to  the  defence  of  states  and  the  grand  operation 
of  armies ;  or  with  reference  to  the  details  of  the  con 
struction,  and  attack,  and  defence  of  forts,  and  the  influ 
ence  of  field-works  on  the  tactical  manoeuvres  of  armies. 
It  is  proposed  to  speak  here  only  of  its  general  character, 
as  a  branch  of  the  military  art,  without  entering  into  any 
professional  discussion  of  details. 

The  connection  of  fortification  and  strategy  may  be  con 
sidered  under  two  distinct  heads  :  1st,  the  choice  of  sites 
for  constructing  fortresses  for  defence  ;  3d,  their  influence 
in  offensive  operations,  and  the  determination  of  the  ques 
tion  whether  they  can  be  passed  with  safety,  or  whether 
the  attacking  force  will  be  under  the  necessity  of  be 
sieging  them. 

The  centre  and  extremities  of  a  base  of  operations  should 
always  be  secured  either  by  natural  or  artificial  obstacles. 
This  base  is  generally  chosen  so  that  fortifications  will 
be  necessaiy  for  strengthening  only  a  part  of  the  line. 
But  if  a  frontier,  like  the  side  of  France  towards  Belgium, 
be  destitute  of  natural  obstacles,  the  artificial  means  01 
defence  must  be  proportionally  increased.  Great  care 
should  be  taken  that  permanent  fortifications  be  made 
only  on  such  places  as  may  favor  military  operations.  If 
otherwise,  the  troops  detached  from  the  active  army  for 
garrisoning  them,  will  only  tend  to  weaken  this  force 
without  any  corresponding  advantages.  In  this  way,  for 
tifications  may  become  actually  injurious  to  defence.  A 


62  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

number  of  the  European  fortresses  which  were  built  be 
fore  the  subject  of  strategy  was  properly  understood,  are 
now  regarded  as  utterly  useless,  from  their  ill-advised  po 
sitions. 

Whether  a  fortress  may  be  safely  passed  with  merely 
blockading  or  observing  it,  depends  very  much  upon  the 
nature  of  the  war,  and  the  numbers  and  position  of  the 
defensive  army.  The  allies,  in  1814,  invading  France 
with  a  million  of  soldiers,  assisted  by  the  political  diver 
sion  of  factions  and  Bourbonists  within  the  kingdom,  and 
treason  in  the  frontier  fortresses,  and  even  in  the  ranks 
of  Napoleon's  army,  could  conduct  their  military  opera 
tions  on  a  very  different  plan  from  that  which  would  be 
adopted  by  either  Austria,  Prussia,  Russia,  England,  Spain, 
Portugal,  Holland,  Italy,  and  the  German  powers,  if  singly 
waging  war  with  the  French.  Napoleon  sometimes  de 
tached  a  corps  to  observe  a  fortress  which  threatened  his 
line  of  operations  or  of  mancEuvre ;  at  others,  he  delayed 
his  advance  till  the  place  could  be  reduced. 

"  An  army,"  says  Jomini,  "  may  sometimes  penetrate 
between  places  on  an  open  frontier,  to  attack  the  enemy's 
forces  in  the  field,  taking  care  at  the  same  time  to  observe 
these  places ;  but  no  invading  army  can  cross  a  great 
river,  like  the  Danube,  the  Rhine,  or  the  Elbe,  without 
reducing  at  least  one  of  the  fortresses  on  that  river,  so  as 
to  secure  a  line  of  retreat ;  but  being  in  possession  of  such 
a  place,  it  can  continue  the  offensive,  while  its  materiel  de 
siege  successively  reduces  the  other  places." 

In  case  the  main  army  is  obliged  to  remain  and  cover 
the  besieging  corps,  it  should  take  some  central  position, 
where  it  can  command  all  the  avenues  of  approach,  and 
fall  with  vigor  on  the  enemy,  should  he  attempt  to  raise 
the  siege.  Napoleon's  operations  before  Mantua,  in  1796, 
S>fFer  the  finest  model  for  imitation. 

The  old  system  of  intrenched  camps  and  lines  of  con- 


FORTIFICATIONS.  63 

travallation  is  unsuited  to  the  spirit  of  modern  warfare. 
In  ancient  times,  and  more  particularly  in  the  middle 
ages,  too  much  importance  was  attached  to  tactical  posi 
tions,  and  not  enough  to  strategic  points  and  lines.  This 
gave  to  fortifications  a  character  that  never  properly  be 
longed  to  them.  From  the  middle  ages  down  to  the  pe 
riod  of  the  French  Revolution,  wars  were  carried  on 
mainly  by  the  system  of  positions — one  party  coutining 
their  operations  to  the  security  of  certain  important  places, 
while  the  other  directed  their  whole  attention  to  the  siege 
and  capture  of  these  places.  But  Carnot  and  Napoleon 
changed  this  system,  at  the  same  time  with  the  system 
of  tactics,  or  rather,  returned  from  it  to  the  old  and  true 
system  of  strategic  operations.  Some  men,  looking  merely 
at  the  fact  that  a  change  was  made,  but  without  examining 
the  character  of  that  change,  have  rushed  headlong  to  the 
conclusion  that  fortified  places  are  now  utterly  useless  in 
war,  military  success  depending  entirely  upon  a  good  sys 
tem  of  marches. 

On  this  subject,  General  Jomini,  the  great  military  his 
torian  of  the  wars  of  the  French  Revolution,  remarks  that 
"  we  should  depend  entirely  upon  neither  organized  masses, 
nor  upon  material  obstacles,  whether  natural  or  artificial. 
To  follow  exclusively  either  of  these  systems  would  be 
equally  absurd.  The  true  science  of  war  consists  in 
choosing  a  just  medium  between  the  two  extremes.  The 
wars  of  Napoleon  demonstrated  the  great  truth,  that  dis 
tance  can  protect  no  country  from  invasion,  but  that  a 
state,  to  be  secure,  must  have  a  good  system  of  fortresses, 
and  a  good  system  of  military  reserves  and  military  insti 
tutions." 

In  all  military  operations  time  is  of  vast  importance. 
If  a  single  division  of  an  army  can  be  retarded  for  a  few 
hours  only,  it  not  unfrequently  decides  the  fate  of  the 
campaign.  Had  the  approach  of  Blucher  been  delayed 


64  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

for  a  few  liours,  Napoleon  must  have  been  victorious  ai 
the  battle  of  AVaterloo.  An  equilibrium  can  seldom  be 
sustained  for  more  than  six  or  seven  hours  between 
forces  on  the  field-  of  battle  ;  but  in  this  instance,  the 
state  of  the  ground  rendered  the  movements  so  slow  as 
to  prolong  the  battle  for  about  twelve  hours ;  thus  ena 
bling  the  allies  to  effect  a  concentration  in  time  to  save 
Wellington. 

Many  of  Napoleon's  brilliant  victories  resulted  from 
merely  bringing  troops  to  bear  suddenly  upon  some  de 
cisive  point.  Rivoli  in  1796-7,  Marengo  in  1800,  Ulm 
in  1805,  Jena  in  1806,  Ratisbon  in  1809,  Brienne  in 
1814,  and  Ligny  in  1815,  are  familiar  examples.  But  this 
concentration  of  forces,  even  with  a  regular  army,  cannot 
be  calculated  on  by  the  general  with  any  degree  of  cer 
tainty,  unless  his  communications  are  perfectly  secure. 
And  this  difficulty  is  very  much  increased  where  the 
troops  are  new  and  undisciplined.  When  a  country  like 
ours  is  invaded,  large  numbers  of  such  troops  must  sud 
denly  be  called  into  the  field.  Not  knowing  the  designs 
of  the  invaders,  much  time  will  be  lost  in  marches  and 
countermarches  ;  and  if  there  be  no  safe  places  of  resort 
the  operations  must  be  indecisive  and  insecure. 

To  a  defensive  army  fortifications  are  valuable  as 
points  of  repose,  upon  which  the  troops,  if  beaten,  may 
fall  back,  and  shelter  their  sick  and  wounded,  collect 
their  scattered  forces,  repair  their  materials,  and  draw 
together  a  new  supply  of  stores  and  provisions  ;  and  as 
rallying  points,  where  new  troops  may  be  assembled  with 
safety,  and  the  army,  in  a  few  days,  be  prepared  to  again 
meet  the  enemy  in  the  open  field.  Without  these  de 
fences,  undisciplined  and  inexperienced  armies,  when 
once  routed,  can  seldom  be  rallied  again,  except  with 
great  losses.  But  when  supported  by  forts,  they  can  se 
lect  their  opportunity  for  fighting,  and  offer  or  refuse 


FORTIFICATIONS.  65 

battle  according  to  the  probability  of  success  ;  and,  hav 
ing  a  safe  place  of  retreat,  they  are  far  less  influenced  by 
fear  in  the  actual  conflict. 

The  enemy,  on  the  other  hand,  being  compelled  either 
to  besiege  or  observe  these  works,  his  army  will  be  sep 
arated  from  its  magazines,  its  strength  and  efficiency 
diminished  by  detachments,  and  his  whole  force  exposed 
to  the  horrors  of  partisan  warfare.  It  has  therefore  been 
estimated  by  the  best  military  writers,  that  an  army  sup 
ported  by  a  judicious  system  of  fortifications,  can  repel  a 
land  force  six  times  as  large  as  itself. 

Every  government  should  prepare,  in  time  of  peace,  its 
most  prominent  and  durable  means  of  defence.  By  se 
curing  in  a  permanent  manner  its  important  points,  it  will 
enable  a  small  force  to  retain  possession  of  these  places 
against  a  greatly  superior  army,  for  a  considerable  length 
of  time.  This  serves  the  same  purpose  as  a  battle  gain 
ed ;  for,  in  the  beginning  of  a  war  of  invasion,  the 
economy  of  time  is  of  the  utmost  importance  to  the  de 
fensive  party,  enabling  it  to  organize  and  prepare  the 
great  military  resources  of  the  state. 

In  all  mountainous  frontiers,  or  sides  of  states  border 
ing  on  large  rivers,  or  chains  of  lakes,  there  will  neces 
sarily  be  but  few  points  by  which  an  invader  can  pene 
trate  into  the  interior  of  the  country.  Let  us  suppose 
that,  for  a  frontier  of  moderate  extent,  there  are  five 
passes,  or  avenues  through  which  the  enemy  may  ap 
proach  the  interior.  To  effectually  defend  these  ap 
proaches  against  the  invading  army  will  require,  for  each, 
an  army  of  ten  thousand  men.  Not  being  able  to  decide 
positively  on  the  plans  of  the  enemy,  all  these  communi 
cations  must  be  defended  at  the  same  time.  This  re 
quires  a  defending  army  of  fifty  thousand  men.  Let  us 
now  suppose  each  of  these  passes  to  be  fortified  in  such 
a  way,  that  one  thousand  men  will  be  able  to  hold  the 


66  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

enemy  in  check,  and  force  him  to  resort  to  the  operations 
of  a  siege  ;  or,  at  least,  to  retard  his  advance  till  an 
active  army  can  be  organized  in  the  interior,  and  pre 
pared  to  meet  him  in  the  field.  We  here  see  that  five 
thousand  men,  by  means  of  fortifications,  can  accomplish 
the  same  defensive  object  as  fifty  thousand  men  without 
these  artificial  means  of  security. 

But  let  us  enter  a  little  more  into  the  details  of  frontier 
defences,  and  examine  the  character  of  the  several  sys 
tems  which  have  been  successively  proposed  or  adopted. 
Frontiers  are  divided  into  four  distinct  classes,  according 
as  the  state  may  be  open  on  one  or  more  sides,  or  bound 
ed  by  mountains,  large  rivers  and  lakes,  or  by  the  sea. 

An  open  frontier  is  the  most  difficult  of  defence  ;  and 
while  there  exists  a  perfect  uniformity  among  military 
men  upon  the  vast  importance  of  fortifying  such  a  fron 
tier,  there  is  an  equal  diversity  of  opinion  respecting  the 
best  manner  of  arranging  these  works.  We  shall  here 
mention  three  general  systems  of  arranging  forts  for  the 
defence  of  an  open  country,  each  of  which  has  been  ad 
vocated  at  different  times,  and  afterwards  received  vari 
ous  modifications  and  additions.  These  three  systems 
comprise  the  main  features  of  all  others  worthy  of  much 
consideration.  They  are  : — 

1st.  The  system  of  continuous  lines,  proposed  by  Mont- 
alembert. 

2d.  A  system  of  three  lines  of  detached  works,  strongly 
recommended  by  D'Arcon  and  others. 

3d.  A  system  proposed  by  Vauban,  and  advocated  by 
Rogniat,  consisting  of  lines  of  very  strong  works,  placed 
at  considerable  distances  from  each  other  and  covering 
large  intrenched  camps. 

The  first  of  these  systems  was  proposed  in  1790,  and 
for  a  time  attracted  considerable  notice  in  France,  but 
has  long  since  been  discarded,  as  being  utterly  incompat- 


FORTIFICATIONS.  67 

ible  with  the  principles  of  the  military  art.  A  writer, 
however,  of  some  pretensions  in  this  country,  recom 
mends  its  adoption  for  the  defence  of  Baltimore  and  the 
shores  of  the  Chesapeake.  The  same  author  would  dis 
pense  entirely  with  our  present  system  of  fortifications 
on  the  sea-coast,  and  substitute  in  their  place  wooden 
Martello  towers !  This  would  be  very  much  like  build 
ing  120  gun  ships  at  Pittsburg  and  Memphis,  for  the  de 
fence  of  the  Ohio  and  the  Mississippi  rivers,  and  sending 
out  duck-boats  to  meet  the  enemy  on  the  Atlantic  ! 

In  the  second  system,  the  works  on  the  extreme  fron 
tier  are  to  be  placed  about  thirty  or  forty  miles  ap"art,  and 
those  of  the  second  and  third  lines  respectively  thirty  or 
forty  miles  in.  rear  of  the  first  and  second  lines,  and  op 
posite  the  intervals. 

In  the  third  system,  first  recommended  by  Vauban  and 
more  recently  by  Rogniat,  the  works  are  to  be  arranged  in 
the  same  manner  as  in  that  of  D'Arcon,  but  the  distance  be 
tween  them  is  to  be  from  seventy  to  one  hundred  miles,  and 
each  fort  arranged  for  covering  a  large  intrenched  camp. 

Either  of  these  last  two  systems  is  well  suited  to  the 
defence  of  an  open  frontier.  The  former  is  applied  to 
the  side  of  France  towards  Belgium,  and  the  latter,  with 
certain  modifications,  to  the  defence  of  Western  Ger 
many.  The  first  line  of  fortifications  on  the  northern 
frontier  of  France  consists  of  Dunkirk,  Lille,  Valen 
ciennes,  Conde",  Quesiioy,  Rocroi,  Charlemont,  Mezieres, 
and  Sedan  ;  the  second  line,  of  Calais,  Andres,  St.  Omer, 
B'thune,  Arras,  Douai,  Chambrai,  Landrecies,  and  Aves- 
nes  ;  the  third  line,  of  Boulogne,  Montreuil,  Hesdin,  Abbe 
ville,  Amiens,  Bapaume,  Peronne,  Ham,  and  Laon. 

For  mountainous  frontiers  it  is  deemed  necessary  to 
secure  all  the  important  passes  with  small  redoubts  or 
military  works,  and  to  defend  with  strong  forts  the  grand 
interior  strategic  points  on  which  these  communications 


68  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

are  directed.  For  a  frontier  of  moderate  extent  there 
may  be  some  six  or  eight  gorges  in  the  mountains  by 
which  an  army  might  penetrate  ;  but  it  will  always  be 
found  that  these  roads  concentrate  on  two  or  three  points 
in  the  great  valleys  below.  Take,  for  example,  the  fron 
tier  of  France  towards  Switzerland  and  Italy.  The  passes 
of  the  mountains  are  secured  by  the  little  works  of  Fort 
L'Ecluse,  Fort  Pierre-chatel,  Fort  Barraux,  Briancon, 
Mont  Dauphin,  Colmars,  Entrevaux,  and  Antibes  ;  while 
Besancon,  Grenoble,  and  Toulon,  form  a  second  line  ; 
and  Lyons  a  grand  central  depot. 

Where  a  great  river  or  chain  of  lakes  forms  the  boun-, 
dary  of  a  state,  the  system  of  defence  will  be  much  the 
same  as  that  of  an  open  land  frontier,  the  works  of  the 
first  line  being  made  to  secure  the  great  bridges  or  ferries 
by  which  the  enemy  might  effect  a  passage  ;  those  of  the 
second  line,  to  cover  the  passes  of  the  highlands  that 
generally  approach  more  or  less  near  the  great  water 
course  ;  and  those  of  the  third  line,  far  enough  in  rear  to 
protect  the  great  internal  communications  of  the  country. 
Let  us  take,  for  example,  the  side  of  France  bordering  on 
the  Rhine.  Wissembourg  and  Lauterbourg,  Fort  Louis. 
Haguenau,  Strasbourg,  Schelstadt,  Neuf-Brisach,  and  Hu- 
neguen,  cover  the  several  passages  of  the  river ;  while 
Bitche,  Phalsbourg,  and  Befort  form  a  second  line  ;  Thion- 
ville,  Metz,  and  Toul,  a  third  line  ;  and  Verdun  a  grand 
central  dep3t. 

The  following  are  the  principal  objects  proposed  to  be 
accomplished  by  fortifications  on  a  sea-coast. 

1st.  To  close  all  important  harbors  to  an  enemy,  and 
secure  them  to  the  navy  of  the  country. 

2d.  To  prevent  the  enemy  from  forming  an  establish 
ment  on  our  shores,  from  which,  by  his  naval  superiority, 
he  might  destroy  our  commerce  and  keep  the  whole  fron 
tier  in  continual  alarm. 


FORTIFICATIONS.  69 

3d.  To  cover  our  great  cities  against  a  maritime  attack 
and  bombardment. 

4th.  To  cover  our  ship-yards  and  great  naval  depots. 

5th.  To  prevent,  as  much  as  possible,  the  great  ave 
nues  of  interior  navigation  from  being  blockaded  by  naval 
means  at  their  entrance  into  the  ocean. 

6th.  To  give  to  our  navy  facilities  for  protecting  our 
coast  trade  from  the  enemy's  ships  of  war,  and  our  inter 
nal  communications,  which  lie  near  the  coast,  from  mari 
time  descents. 

Let  us  notice  how  France  has  attempted  to  accomplish 
this  object.  The  Mediterranean  frontier  has  Fort  Quarre, 
Fort  St.  Marguerite,  St.  Tropez,  Brigancon,  the  forts  of 
Point  Man,  of  FErtissac,  and  of  Langoustier,  Toulon, 'St. 
Nicholas,  Castle  of  If,  Marseilles,  Tour  de  Boue,  Aigues- 
Montes,  Fort  St.  Louis,  Fort  Brescou,  Narbonne,  Cha 
teau  de  Salces,  Perpignan,  Collioure,  Fort  St.  Elme,  and 
Port  Vendre.  Toulon  is  the  great  naval  depot  for  this 
frontier,  and  Marseilles  the  great  commercial  port.  Both 
are  well  secured  by  strong  fortifications.  The  Atlantic 
frontier  has  Bayonne ;  the  forts  of  Royan,  Grave,  Medoc, 
Pate,  &c.,  on  the  Gironde ;  Rochefort,- with  the  forts  of 
Chapus,  Lapin,  Aix,  Oleron,  &c.,  to  cover  the  roadstead; 
La  Rochelle,  with  the  forts  of  the  Isle  of  Re  ;  Sables, 
with  the  forts  of  St.  Nicholas,  and  Des  Moulines,  Isle 
Dieu,  Belle  Isle,  Fort  du  Pilier,  Mindin,  "Ville  Martin; 
Quiberon,  with  Fort  Penthievre  ;  L'Orient,  with  its  harbor 
defences  ;  Fort  Cigogne  ;  Brest,  with  its  harbor  defences  ; 
St.  Malo,  with  Forts  Cezembre,  La  Canchee,  L'Anse  du 
Verger,  and  Des  Rimains  ;  Cherbourg,  with  its  defensive 
forts  and  batteries  ;  Havre,  Dieppe,  Boulogne,  Calais,  and 
Dunkirk.  Cherbourg,  Brest,  and  Rochefort,  are  great 
naval  depots;  and  Havre,  Nantes,  and  Bordeaux,  the 
principal  commercial  ports.  Many  of  the  works  above 
enumerated  are  small  in  extent  and  antiquated  in  their 


70  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

construction,  and  some  of  them  quite  old  and  dilapidated 
nevertheless,  they  have  heretofore  been  found  sufficient 
for  the  defence  of  the  naval  depots  and  commercial  sea 
ports  of  France  against  the  superior  naval  forces  of  her 
neighbor. 

Omitting  for  the  present  all  discussion  of  seacoast  de 
fences,  let  us  examine  more  particularly  the  character 
and  influence  of  fortifications  on  land  frontiers. 

All  military  writers  agree  that  fortifications  have  here 
tofore  exerted  a  great,  and  frequently  a  decisive,  influence 
on  the  operations  of  a  war.  Those  of  France  are  fre 
quently  referred  to  as  proofs  of  this  influence.  But,  while 
all  are  disposed  to  allow  that  these  works  contributed 
much  in  former  times  to  the  defence  of  states,  yet  some 
have  said  that  modern  improvements  in  the  mode  of  at 
tack  have  rendered  forts  far  less  valuable  than  formerly. 

Such,  however,  is  not  the  case.  Improvements  in  the 
mode  of  attack  have  not  kept  pace  with  the  facilities  of 
locomotion  ;  and,  although  fortifications  do  not  now  usually 
sustain  a  siege  of  as  many  days  as  in  former  times,  still, 
as  compared  with  the  relative  lengths  of  campaigns  in 
ancient  and  modern  wars,  the  proportional  length  of  sieges 
is  now  even  greater  than  formerly.  When  the  same  is 
accomplished  in  a  campaign  of  seven  weeks  as  was  for 
merly  done  in  a  war  of  seven  years,  it  is  not  necessary 
that  fortified  places  should  hold  out  a  very  long  trine.  A 
place  that  can  sustain  a  siege  of  a  month  is  now  deemed 
sufficiently  strong  for  ordinary  campaigns  ;  for  by  the  end 
of  that  time  the  defensive  army  will  either  be  destroyed, 
or  be  able  to  come  to  its  succor.  In  either  case  a  longer 
defence  would  not  be  required. 

A  reference  to  the  most  important  sieges  of  the  last 
century  or  two  will  show  that  forts  are,  on  an  average, 
capable  of  sustaining  a  siege  for  more  than  that  length  of 
time. 


FORTIFICATIONS.  71 

Lille,  in  1708,  held  the  allies  in  check  for  a  whole 
year;  and  again,  in  1792,  compelled  the  Austrians  to 
raise  the  siege  after  an  unsuccessful  attack  of  fifteen  days, 

Antwerp,  in  1585,  sustained  a  siege  of  fourteen  months 
against  greatly  superior  forces  ;  in  1814  Carnot  defended 
the  citadel  of  this  place  for  four  months,  and  until  an  ar 
mistice  had  been  concluded  between  the  contending  par 
ties  ;  in  1832,  it  sustained,  with  a  garrison  of  only  4,500 
men  and  145  pieces  of  ordnance,  a  siege  of  twenty-five 
days,  against  a  force  of  55,000  men  and  223  cannon. 

Namur,  near  the  end  of  the  seventeenth  century,  sus 
tained  a  siege  of  ten  weeks. 

Ismail,  in  1790,  sustained  a  siege  of  more  than  two 
months  against  the  Russians. 

Maestricht,  in  1793,  sustained  a  siege  of  nearly  two 
weeks  ;  and  again,  in  1794,  sustained  a  blockade  and 
siege  of  nearly  two  months. 

Magdeburg,  in  the  thirty  years'  war,  resisted  the  army 
of  Wallenstein  for  seven  months;  and  in  1813-14,  al 
though  garrisoned  by  only  4,000  men,  it  for  a  long  time 
resisted  the  overwhelming  forces  of  the  allies. 

Dantzic,  at  the  same  time,  sustained  a  siege  against 
superior  forces  for  more  than  nine  months. 

Landau,  in  1793,  sustained  a  siege  of  nine  months. 

Valenciennes  and  Mayence,  in  1793,  each  sustained  a 
siege  of  about  three  months. 

Charleroi,  Fort  Vauban,  and  L'Ecluse,  in  1794,  each 
sustained  a  siege  of  about  thirty  days. 

Quesnoy,  in  1794,  sustained  a  siege  of  about  three 
weeks. 

Rosas,  in  1795,  sustained  a  siege  of  some  seventy  days. 

Mantua,  in  1796-7,  protected  from  invasion,  for  eight 
months,  the  Tyrol  and  the  heart  of  the  Austrian  mon 
archy. 

Kehl  and  Huninguen,  in   1796,  sheltered  Moreau  for 


72  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

three  months   against   all  the   efforts  of  the    Archduke 
Charles. 

St.  Jean  d'Acre,  in  1799,  sustained  a  siege  of  sixty 
days  of  open  trench. 

Ulm,  in  1800,  held  Moreau  in  check  for  more  than  a 
month. 

Genoa,  in  1800,  sustained  a  blockade  of  sixty  and  a 
siege  of  forty  days. 

Saragossa  in  1808  sustained  a  close  siege  of  near  two 
months  ;  and  in  1809  it  was  again  besieged  for  two 
months. 

Rosas  in  1808  sustained  a  siege  of  thirty  days. 

Gerona  in  1809  sustained  a  siege  and  blockade  of 
seven  months,  nearly  four  of  them  being  of  open  trench. 

Mequinenza  (a  very  small  work)  in  1810  sustained  a 
siege  of  more  than  two  weeks. 

Astorga  in  1810  sustained  a  siege  of  thirty  days; 
twenty-four  being  of  open  trench. 

Lerida  in  1810  sustained  a  siege  of  thirty  days,  two 
weeks  being  of  open  trench. 

Ciudad  Rodrigo  in  1810  sustained  a  siege  of  two 
months. 

Almeida  in  1810  sustained  a  siege  of  more  than  a 
month. 

Tortosa  in  1810  sustained  a  siege  of  six  months. 

Tarragona  in  1811  sustained  a  siege  of  nearly  two 
months. 

Badajos  in  1811  sustained  a  siege  of  more  than  forty 
days  open  trench. 

Lerida  in  1811  sustained  a  siege  of  two  weeks  open 
trench. 

in  1811  sustained  a  siege  of  a  month. 
in  1811-12  sustained  a  siege  of  two  months. 

CiirLlt»<I  Rodrigo  in  1812  sustained  a  blockade  of  seve 
ral  months,  and  a  close  siege  of  two  weeks. 


FORTIFICATIONS.  73 

Badajos  in  1812  sustained  twenty-one  days  of  open 
trenches. 

Burgos  in  1812  sustained  thirty-three  days  of  open 
trenches. 

St.  Sebastian  in  1813  sustained  a  siege  and  blockade 
of  nearly  three  months,  with  fifty-nine  days  of  open 
trenches. 

Pampeluna  in  1813  sustained  a  siege  of  more  than 
four  months. 

Monzon  in  1813-14  also  sustained  a  siege  of  more 
than  four  months. 

This  list  might  be  increased  with  numerous  other  ex 
amples,  to  show  that  even  poorly  fortified  towns  are 
capable  of  defending  themselves,  on  an  average,  for  more 
than  a  month.  These  examples,  be  it  remembered,  are 
nearly  all  taken  from  a  period  of  history  since  any  mate 
rial  improvements  have  been  made  in  the  art  of  attack. 
Since  the  time  of  Vauban  the  improvements  in  attack 
have  not  kept  pace  with  the  increased  means  of  defence. 
Moreover,  these  examples  are  taken  from  the  sieges  of 
towns  defended  mainly  by  old  and  antiquated  works,  and 
entirely  incapable  of  offering  the  same  resistance  as  de 
tached  fortifications,  with  all  the  modern  improvements. 

The  value  of  fortifications,  as  land  defences,  is  suf 
ficiently  proved  by  showing  their  general  capability  of 
resisting  an  invader,  even  for  a  limited  period ;  thus  af 
fording  us  time  and  opportunity  to  provide  other  means 
of  security.  But  it  must  not  be  inferred  that  forts  be 
sieged  en  rdgle  will  necessarily  fall  after  so  many  days. 
Such  is  far  from  being  the  case.  The  besieged  have 
usually  great  advantages  over  the  besiegers  ;  and  unless 
the  latter  are  vastly  superior  in  number,  or  the  work  is  of 
a  very  inferior  character,  or  the  garrison  is  destitute  of 
the  requisite  means  and  energy  to  resist  an  attack,  they 
will  not  be  taken. 

7 


74  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

Mezieres  was  not  taken  in  1520  ;.  nor  Marseilles  in 
1524;  nor-Peronne  in  1536;  nor  Landrecies  in  1543; 
nor  Metz  in  1552  ;  nor  Montauban  in  1621  ;  nor  Lerida 
in  1647;  nor  Maestricht  in  1676;  nor  Vienna  in  1529, 
and  again  in  1683  ;  nor  Turin  in  1706  ;  nor  Conde  in 
1744  ;  nor  Lille  in  1792  ;  nor  Landau  in  1793  ;  nor  Ulm 
in  1800;  nor  Saragossa  in  1808;  nor  Burgos  in  1812. 
This  list  might  be  extended  almost  indefinitely  with  the 
-names  of  places  that  could  be  reduced  neither  by  force 
nor  by  starvation. 

But,  as  has  already  been  noticed,  some  have  asserted 
that  fortifications  have  become  of  little  comparative  im- 
•portance,  under  the  new  system  of  warfare  introduced 
during  the  wars  of  the  French  Revolution.  On  this  sub 
ject  let  us  consult  the  opinions  of  the  best  military  judges 
of  the  present  century. 

Napoleon  says  of  fortifications,  "  they  are  an  excellent 
means  of  retarding,  fettering,  enfeebling,  and  disquieting 
a  conquering  foe." 

"  The  possession  of  strategic  points,"  says  the  Arch 
duke  Charles,  "  is  decisive  in  military  operations  ;  and 
the  most  efficacious  means  should,  therefore,  be  employed 
to  defend  points  whose  preservation  is  the  country's  safe 
guard.  This  object  is  accomplished  by  fortifications,  in 
asmuch  as  they  can  resist,  for  a  given.time,  with  a  small 
number  of  troops,  every  effort  of  a  much  largei  force  ; 
fortifications  should,  therefore,  be  regarded  as  the  basis 
of  a  good  system  of  defence."  "  It  should  be  a  maxim 
of  state  policy  in  every  country,  to  fortify,  in  time  of 
peace,  all  such  points,  and  to  arrange  them  with  great 
care,  so  that  they  can  be  defended  by  a  small  number  of 
troops.  For  the  enemy,  knowing  the  difficulty  of  getting 
possession  of  these  works,  will  look  twice  before  he  in 
volves  himself  in  a  war."  "  Establishments  which  can 
secure  strategic  advantages  are  not  the  works  of  a  mo- 


FORTIFICATIONS.  75 

ment ;  they  require  time  and  labor.  He  who  has  the 
direction  of  the  military  forces  of  a  state,  should,  in  time 
of  peace,  prepare  for  war."  "  The  proper  application  or 
neglect  of  these  principles  will  decide  the  safety  or  the 
ruin  of  the  state."  "Fortifications  arrest  the  enemy  in 
the  pursuit  of  his  object,  and  direct  his  movements  on 
less  important  points ; — he  must  either  force  these  for 
tified  lines,  or  else  hazard  enterprises  upon  lines  which 
offer  only  disadvantages.  In  fine,  a  country  secured  by 
a  system  of  defences  truly  strategic,  has  no  cause  to  fear 
either  the  invasion  or  the  yoke  of  the  enemy ;  for  he  can 
advance  to  the  interior  of  the  country  only  through  great 
trouble  and  ruinous  efforts.  Of  course,  lines  of  fortifica 
tions  thus  arranged  cannot  shelter  a  state  against  all  re 
verses  ;  but  these  reverses  will  not,  in  this  case,  be 
attended  by  total  ruin  ;  for  they  cannot  take  from  the 
state  the  means  nor  the  time  for  collecting  new  forces ; 
nor  can  they  ever  reduce  it  to  the  cruel  alternative  of 
submission  or  destruction." 

"  Fortifications,"  says  Jomini,  "  fulfil  two  objects  of 
capital  importance, — 1st.  The  protection  of  the  frontiers  ; 
and  2d.  Assisting  the  operations  of  the  army  in  the  field." 
"  Every  part  of  the  frontiers  of  a  state  should  be  secured 
by  one  or  two  great  places  of  refuge,  secondary  places, 
and  even  small  posts  for  facilitating  the  active  operations 
of  the  armies.  Cities  girt  with  walls  and  slight  ditches 
may  often  be  of  great  utility  in  the  interior  of  a  country, 
as  places  of  deposite,  where  stores,  magazines,  hospitals, 
&c.,  may  be  sheltered  from  the  incursions  of  the  enemy's 
light  troops.  These  works  are  more  especially  valuable 
where  such  stores,  in  order  not  to  weaken  the  regulai 
army  by  detachments,  are  intrusted  to  the  care  of  raw 
and  militia  forces."  It  is  not  supposed  that  any  system 
of  fortifications  can  hermetically  close  a  frontier ;  "  but, 
although  they  of  themselves  can  rarely  present  an  abso- 


76  MILITARY"   ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

lute  obstacle  to  the  advance  of  the  hostile  army,  yet  it  is 
indisputable  that  they  straiten  its  movements,  change  the 
direction  of  its  marches,  and  force  it  into  detachments  ; 
while,  on  the  contrary,  they  afford  all  the  opposite  advan 
tages  to  the  defensive  army ;  they  protect  its  marches, 
favor  its  debouches,  cover  its  magazines,  its  flanks,  and 
its  movements,  and  finally  furnish  it  with  a  place  of 
refuge  in  time  of  need." 

These  opinions  were  uttered,  be  it  remembered,  long 
since  the  period  at  which  modern  military  quacks  date  the 
downfall  of  fortifications  as  inland  defences,  by  men,  too, 
who  were  not  engineers,  and  consequently  had  no  profes 
sional  predilections  in  favor  of  fortifications.  The  Arch 
duke  Charles,  as  a  general,  knew  no  rival  but  Napoleon, 
and  General  Jomini  is  universally  regarded  as  the  first 
military  historian  of  the  age.  The  truth  of  their  remarks 
on  fortifications  is  most  fully  confirmed  by  the  military 
histories  of  Germany  and  France. 

For  a  long  period  previous  to  the  Thirty  Years'  War,  its 
strong  castles  and  fortified  cities  secured  the  German  em 
pire  from  attacks  from  abroad,  except  on  its  extensive 
frontier,  which  was  frequently  assailed,  but  no  enemy  was 
able  to  penetrate  to  the  interior  till  a  want  of  union  among 
its  own  princes  opened  its  strongholds  to  the  Swedish 
conqueror ;  nor  then,  did  the  cautious  Gustavus  Adolphus 
venture  far  into  its  territories  till  he  had  obtained  posses 
sion  of  all  the  military  works  that  might  endanger  his  re 
treat. 

Again,  in  the  Seven  Years'  War,  when  the  French  neg 
lected  to  secure  their  foothold  in  Germany,  by  placing  in 
a  state  of  defence  the  fortifications  that  fell  into  their 
power,  the  first  defeat  rendered  their  ground  untenable, 
and  threw  them  from  the  Elbe  back  upon  the  Rhine  and 
the  Mayne.  They  afterwards  took  the  precaution  to  for 
tify  their  positions,  and  to  secure  their  magazines  under 


FORTIFICATIONS.  77 

shelter  of  strong  places,  and,  consequently,  were  enabled 
to  maintain  themselves  in  the  hostile  country  till  the  end 
of  the  war,  notwithstanding  the  inefficiency  of  their  gen 
erals,  the  great  reverses  they  sustained  in  the  field,  the 
skill  and  perseverance  of  the  enemy  they  were  contending 
with,  and  the  weak  and  vacillating  character  of  the  cabi 
net  that  directed  them. 

But  this  system  of  defence  was  not  so  carefully  main 
tained  in  the  latter  part  of  the  eighteenth  century,  for  at 
the  beginning  of  the  French  Revolution,  says  Jomini, 
"  Germany  had  too  few  fortifications ;  they  were  generally 
of  a  poor  character,  and  improperly  located."  France,  on 
the  contrary,  was  well  fortified :  and  although  without 
armies,  and  torn  in  pieces  by  domestic  factions,  (we  here 
use  the  language  of  the  Archduke,)  "  she  sustained  her 
self  against  all  Europe  ;  and  this  was  because  her  govern- 
ment,  since  the  reign  of  Louis  XIII.,  had  continually  la 
bored  to  put  her  frontiers  into  a  defensive  condition  agreeably 
to  the  principles  of  strategy ;  starting  from  such  a  system 
for  a  basis,  she  subdued  every  country  on  the  continent 
that  was  not  thus  fortified  ;  and  this  reason  alone  will  ex 
plain  how  her  generals  sometimes  succeeded  in  destroy 
ing  an  army,  and  even  an  entire  state,  me-rely  by  a  strate 
gic  success." 

This  may  be  illustrated  by  reference  to  particular  cam 
paigns.  In  1792,  when  the  Duke  of  Brunswick  invaded 
France,  she  had  no  armies  competent  to  her  defence. 
Their  numbers  upon  paper  were  somewhat  formidable,  it 
is  true,  but  the  license  of  the  Revolution  had  so  loosened 
the  bonds  of  discipline  as  to  effect  an  almost  complete 
disorganization.  "  It  seemed,  at  this  period,"  says  the 
historian,  "  as  if  the  operations  of  the  French  generals 
were  dependent  upon  the  absence  of  their  enemies  :  the 
moment  they  appeared,  the  operations  were  precipitately 
abandoned."  But  France  had  on  her  eastern  frontier  a 


78  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

triple  line  of  good  fortresses,  although  her  miserable  sol 
diery  were  incapable  of  properly  defending  them.  The 
several  works  of  the  first  and  second  lines  fell,  one  after 
another,  before  the  slow  operations  of  a  Prussian  siege, 
and  ihe  Duke  of  Brunswick  was  already  advancing  upon 
the  third,  when  Dumourier,  with  only  twenty-five  thousand 
men,  threw  himself  into  this  line,  and  by  a  well-conducted 
war  of  positions,  placing  his  raw  and  unsteady  forces  be 
hind  unassailable  intrenchments,  succeedec^  in  repelling  a 
disciplined  army  nearly  foj^r  times  as  numerous  as  h:s 
own.  Had  no  other  obstacle  than  the  French  troops  been 
interposed  between  Paris  and  the  Prussians,  all  agree  that 
France  must  have  fallen. 

In  the  campaign  of  1793,  the  French  army  in  Flanders 
were  beaten  in  almost  every  engagement,  and  their  forces 
reduced  to  less  than  one  half  the  number  of  the  allies. 
The  French  general  turned  traitor  to  his  country,  and  the 
National  Guards  deserted  their  colors  and  returned  to 
France.  The  only  hope  of  the  Republicans,  at  this  crisis, 
was  Vauban's  line  of  Flemish  fortresses.  These  alone 
saved  France.  The  strongholds  of  Lille,  Conde,  Valen 
ciennes,  Quesnoy,  Landrecies,  &c.,  held  the  Austrians  in 
check  till  the  Trench  could  raise  new  forces  and  reorganize 
their  armj .  "  The  important  breathing-time  which  the 
sieges  of  these  fortresses,"  says  an  English  historian, 
"  afforded  to  the  French,  and  the  immense  advantage 
which  they  derived  from  the  new  levies  which  they  re 
ceived,  and  fresh  organization  which  they  acquired  during 
that  important  period,  is  a  signal  proof  of  the  vital  impor 
tance  of  fortresses  in  contributing  to  national  defence. 
Napoleon  has  not  hesitated  to  ascribe  to  the  three  months 
thus  gained  the  salvation  of  France.  It  is  to  be  constantly 
recollected  that  the  Republican  armies  were  then  totally 
Unable  to  keep  the  field  ;  that  behind  the  frontier  fortresses 
There  was  neither  a  defensive  position,  nor  a  corps  to  re- 


FORTIFICATIONS.  79 

inforce  them ;  and  that  if  driven  from  their  vicinity,  the 
capital  was  taken  and  the  war  concluded." 

In  the  following  year,  1794,  when  France  had  com 
pleted  her  vast  armaments,  and,  in  her  turn,  had  become 
the  invading  power,  the  enemy  had  no  fortified  towns  to 
check  the  progress  of  the  Republican  armies  ;  which, 
based  on  strong  works  of  defence,  in  a  few  weeks  over 
ran  Flanders,  and  drove  the  allies  beyond  the  Rhine. 

In  the  campaign  of  1796,  when  the  army  of  Moreau 
had  been  forced  into  a  precipitate  retreat  by  the  admira 
ble  strategic  operations  of  the  Archduke  Charles,  the 
French  forces  owed  their  safety  to  the  fortifications  on 
the  Rhine.  These  works  arrested  the  enemy's  pursuit 
and  obliged  him  to  resort  to  the  tedious  operations  of 
sieges  ;  and  the  reduction  of  the  French  advanced  posts 
alone,  Kehl  and  Huninguen,  poorly  as  they  were  defended, 
employed  all  the  resources  of  the  Austrian  army,  and  the 
skill  of  their  engineers,  from  early  in  October  till  late  in 
February.  Kehl  was  at  first  assaulted  by  a  force  four 
times  as  numerous  as  the  garrison ;  if  the  enemy  had 
succeeded,  he  would  have  cut  off'  Moreau's  retreat,  and 
destroyed  his  army.  Fortunately  the  place  was  strong 
enough  to  resist  all  assaults  ;  and  Moreau,  basing  himself 
on  the  fortresses  of  Alsace,  his  right  covered  by  Hunin 
guen,  Neuf-Brisach,  and  Befort,  and  his  left  by  the  iron 
barrier  of  the  Netherlands,  effectually  checked  the  waves 
of  Austrian  success. 

Let  us  now  turn  to  the  campaigns  of  Napoleon.  In  his 
first  campaign  in  Italy,  1796,  the  general  was  directed 
"  to  seize  the  forts  of  Savona,  compel  the  senate  to  furnish 
him  with  pecuniary  supplies,  and  to  surrender  the  keys  of 
Gavi,  a  fortress  perched  on  the  rocky  height  commanding 
the  pass  of  the  Bocchetta."  Setting  out  from  Savona,  he 
crossed  the  mountains  at  a  weak  point  between  the  Alps 
and  the  Apennines,  and  succeeded  in  piercing  the  enemy's 


80  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

line  of  defence.  The  king  of  Sardinia,  jealous  of  Aus* 
trian  influence,  had  refused  to  permit  the  Austrian  army 
to  garrison  his  line  of  fortifications.  Napoleon,  profiting 
by  his  victorious  attitude,  the  mutual  jealousy  of  Austria 
and  Sardinia,  and  the  intrigues  of  his  diplomatists,  soon 
gained  possession  of  these  important  works.  "  These 
Sardinian  fortresses"  he  wrote  to  the  Directory,  "  at  once 
put  the  Republicans  in  possession  of  the  keys  of  the  Penin 
sula"  Basing  himself  on  Coni,  Mondovi,  Ceva,  Gavi, 
and  Alessandria,  with  Tortosa  as  his  depot  of  magazines, 
he  advanced  against  Lombardy.  Now  basing  himself  on 
the  Adda  and  Po,  with  the  fortress  of  Pizzighettone  as  the 
depot  of  his  magazines,  he  advanced  upon  the  line  of  the 
Adige.  Pechiera  became  his  next  depot,  and  he  now  had 
four  fortresses  in  echelon  between  him  and  his  first  depot 
of  magazines ;  and,  after  the  fall  of  Mantua,  basing  him 
self  on  the  Po,  he  advanced  against  the  States  of  the 
Church,  making  Ferrara  and  then  Ancona,  his  places  of 
depot. 

From  the  solid  basis  of  the  fortresses  of  Piedmont  and 
Lombardy,  "  he  was  enabled  to  turn  his  undivided  atten 
tion  to  the  destruction  of  the  Austrians,  and  thus  commence, 
with  some  security,  that  great  career  of  conquest  which 
he  already  meditated  in  the  imperial  dominions."  In  this 
campaign  of  1797,  after  sec*aring  his  base,  he  fortified 
Palma-Nuova,  Osapo,  &c.,  repaired  the  old  fortifications 
of  Klagenfurth,  and,  as  he  advanced,  established,  to  use 
his  own  words,  "  a  good  point  d'appui  at  every  five  or  six 
marches." 

Afterwards,  when  the  Austrians  had  nearly  wrested 
Italy  from  the  weak  grasp  of  Napoleon's  successors,  the 
French  saved  their,  army  in  the  fortress  of  Genoa  and  be 
hind  the  line  of  the  Var,  which  had  been  fortified  with 
care  in  1794-5.  Numerous  attempts  were  made  to  force 
this  line,  the  advanced  post  of  Fort  Montauban  being  sev- 


FORTIFICATIONS.  81 

eral  times  assaulted  by  numerous  forces.  But  the  Aus 
trian  columns  recoiled  from  its  murderous  fire  of  grape 
and  musketry,  which  swept  off  great  numbers  at  every 
discharge.  Again  the  assault  was  renewed  with  a  vast 
superiority  of  numbers,  and  again  "  the  brave  men  who 
headed  the  column  almost  perished  at  the  foot  of  the  in- 
trenchment ;  and,  after  sustaining  a  heavy  loss,  they  were 
compelled  to  abandon  the  enterprise. 

While  the  forces  on  the  Yar  thus  stayed  the  waves  of 
Austrian  success,  Massena,  in  the  fortifications  of  Genoa, 
sustained  a  blockade  of  sixty,  and  a  siege  of  forty  days, 
against  an  army  five  times  as  large  as  his  own ;  and 
when  forced  to  yield  to  the  stern  demands  of  famine,  he 
almost  dictated  to  the  enemy  the  terms  of  the  treaty. 
These  two  defences  held  in  check  the  elite  of  the  Aus 
trian  forces,  while  the  French  reserve  crossed  the  Alps, 
seized  the  important  points  of  the  country,  and  cut  off 
the  Austrian  line  of  retreat.  "  But  even  after  the  victory 
of  Marengo,"  says  Napoleon,  "  I  did  not  consider  the 
whole  of  Italy  reconquered,  until  all  the  fortified  places 
between  me  and  the  Mincio  should  be  occupied  by  my 
troops.  I  gave  Melas  permission  to  return  to  Mantua,  on 
condition  of  his  surrendering  all  these  fortresses." 

He  now  directed  Chasseloup  de  Laubat  and  his  en 
gineers  to  repair  and  remodel  the  fortifications  of  Verona, 
Legnano,  Pechiera,  Mantua,  the  line  of  the  Adda,  Milan, 
Alessandria,*  Roco  d'Aufo,  Genoa,  and  several  smaller 
works  ;  thus  forming  a  quadruple  line  of  defence  against 
Austrian  aggression  in  Italy.  These  works  were  of  great 
service  to  the  French  in  1805,  enabling  Massena  with 
fifty  thousand  men  to  hold  in  check  the  Archduke  Charles 
with  more  than  ninety  thousand,  while  Napoleon's  grand 

*  More  than  twenty  millions  of  money  were  appropriated  for  this 
place  alone. 


82  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

army,  starting  from  the  solid  base  of  the  Rhine,  traversed 
Germany  and  seized  upon  the  capital  of  Austria. 

The  neglect  of  the  Prussians  to  place  their  country  in 
a  state  of  military  defence,  previous  to  declaring  war 
against  Napoleon  in  1806,  had  a  most  disastrous  influ 
ence  upon  the  campaign.  Napoleon,  on  the  other  hand, 
occupied  and  secured  all  the  important  military  positions 
which  he  had  captured  in  the  preceding  campaign.  "  The 
Prussians,"  said  he,  "  made  no  preparations  for  putting 
into  a  state  of  defence  the  fortifications  on  their  first  line, 
not  even  those  within  a  few  marches  of  our  cantonments. 
While  I  was  piling  up  bastion  upon  bastion  at  Kehl,  Cas- 
sel,  and  Wesel,  they  did  not  plant  a  single  palisade  at 
Magdeburg,  npr  put  in  battery  a  single  cannon  at  Span- 
dau."  The  works  on  the  three  great  lines  of  the  Oder, 
the  Elbe,  and  the  Weser,  had  they  been  properly  re 
paired,  garrisoned,  and  defended,  were  sufficient  to  have 
held  in  check  the  French,  even  after  the  great  victory  of 
Jena,  till  the  newly-organized  forces,  acting  in  concert 
with  the  Russian  army,  could  re-establish  the  Prussian 
monarchy  in  its  ancient  greatness.  Profiting  by  the 
neglect  of  the  Prussians,  Napoleon  seized  upon  the  great 
defensive  works  of  the  country,  which,  to. his  great  joy, 
were  readily  surrendered  into  his  hands  by  the  old  and 
inefficient  generals  who  commanded  them ;  and  French 
garrisons  were  almost  immediately  established  in  the  for 
tresses  of  Stettin,  Custrin,  Glogau,  Magdeburg,  Spandau, 
Hameln,  Nieubourg,  &c.  "  Spandau,"  said  he  in  the 
19th  Bulletin,  "is  an  inestimable  acquisition.  In  our 
hands  it  could  sustain  two  months  of  operations.  But 
such  was  the  general  confusion,  that  the  Prussians  had 
not  even  armed  its  batteries."  The  possession  of  these 
fortifications  inclined  the  scale  at  Eylau.  All  the  histo 
rians  of  the  war  notice  their  influence  on  the  campaigns 
wf  Friedland  and  Tilsit. 


FORTIFICATIONS.  83 

These  Prussian  fortresses  were  retained  by  Napoleon 
at  the  treaty  of  Tilsit.  The  campaign  of  1809  proved 
the  wisdom  of  this  policy,  as  they  effectually  prevented 
Prussia  from  joining  Austria  in  rekindling  the  flames  of 
war.  And  again  in  1813,  these  works  might  have  pro 
duced  a  decided  influence  on  the  campaign,  had  not  the 
political  perfidy  of  Austria,  and  the  treason  of  the  French 
generals,  prevented  Napoleon  from  profiting  by  the  ad 
vantages  of  his  position. 

The  influence  of  the  fortifications  of  Spain  upon  the 
Peninsular  campaigns  has  often  been  alluded  to  by  his 
torians.  Those  works  which  had  been  given  up  to  Na 
poleon  previous  to  the  opening  of  hostilities,  contributed 
very  much  to  the  success  of  his  arms ;  while  those  which 
had  been  retained  by  Spain  and  her  allies  contributed  in 
an  equal  degree  to  fetter  and  embarrass  his  operations. 
Some  of  these,  like  Saragossa,  Tarragona,  Gerona,  Tor- 
tosa,  &c.  &c.,  with  their  broken  walls  and  defective  ar 
maments,  kept  the  enemy  in  check  for  months ;  and,  by 
compelling  the  French  to  resort  to  the  tedious  operations 
of  sieges,  did  much  to  weaken  the  French  power  in  the 
Peninsula. 

The  influence  of  the  fortifications  of  the  French  fron 
tiers  in  furnishing  a  secure  basis  for  the  successful  oper 
ations  of  Napoleon  into  the  enemy's  territory,  has  al 
ready  been  noticed.  If  these  fortresses  of  France,  after 
the  disasters  of  1812  and  '13,  failed  to  save  the  nation, 
the  cause  must  be  sought  for  in  the  peculiar  features  of 
the  invasion  itself,  rather  than  any  lack  of  military  influ 
ence  in  the  French  defences.  As  has  been  already  re 
marked,  a  million  of  disciplined  men,  under  consummate 
leaders,  were  here  assailing  a  single  state,  impoverished 
by  the  fatal  war  in  Russia,— torn  in  pieces  by  political 
factions, — deserted  by  its  sworn  allies, — its  fortresses 
basely  betrayed  into  the  enemy's  hands,  and  its  military 


84  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

power  paralyzed  by  the  treason  of  generals  with  theii 
entire  armies.  Its  only  hope  was  in  the  fortresses  which 
had  remained  faithful ;  and  Napoleon  said  at  St.  Helena, 
that  if  he  had  collected  together  the  garrisons  of  these 
few  fortresses  and  retired  to  the  Rhine,  he  could  have 
crushed  the  allies  even  after  their  entrance  into  Paris. 
But  political  considerations  prevented  the  operation. 

Again  in  1815,  Napoleon,  even  after  the  defeat  of  Wa 
terloo,  possessed  lines  of  defence  sufficiently  strong  to 
resist  all  attempts  at  invasion.  But  again  the  want  of 
co-operation  on  the  part  of  the  government  at  Paris,  and 
the  treason  of  his  own  generals,  forced  his  second  abdica 
tion.  If  he  had  retained  the  command  of  the  army,  and 
the  nation  had  seconded  his  efforts,  the  allies  would  never 
have  reached  Paris.  But  the  new  government  presented 
the  disgraceful  spectacle  of  opening  the  way  for  the  ene 
mies  of  their  country.  "  France,"  said  Napoleon,  "  will 
eternally  reproach  the  ministry  with  having  forced  her 
whole  people  to  pass  under  the  Caudine-forks,  by  order 
ing  the  disbanding  of  an  army  that  had  for  twenty-five 
years  been  its  country's  glory,  and  by  giving  up  to  our  as 
tonished  enemies  our  still  invincible  fortresses" 

History  fully  supports  Napoleon's  opinion  of  the  great 
danger  of  penetrating  far  into  a  hostile  country  to  attack 
the  capital,  even  when  that  capital  is  without  fortifications. 
The  fatal  effects  of  such  an  advance,  without  properly  se 
curing  the  means  of  retreat,  is  exemplified  by  his  own 
campaign  of  1812,  in  Russia.  If,  after  the  fall  of  Smo 
lensk,  he  had  fortified  that  place  and  Yitepsk,  which  by 
their  position  closed  the  narrow  passage  comprised  be 
tween  the  Dnieper  and  the  Dwina,  he  might  in  all  proba 
bility,  on  the  following  spring,  have  been  able  to  seize 
upon  Moscow  and  St.  Petersburg.  But  leaving  the  hos 
tile  army  of  Tschkokoff  in  his  rear,  he  pushed  on  to  Mos 
cow,  and  when  the  conflagration  of  that  city  cut  off  his 


FORTIFICATIONS.  85 

hopes  of  winter  quarters-there,  and  the  premature  rigor 
of  the  season  destroyed  the  horses  of  his  artillery  and 
provision-trains,  retreat  became  impossible,  and  the  awful 
fate  of  his  immense  army  was  closed  by  scenes  of  horror 
to  which  there  is  scarcely  a  parallel  in  history.  This 
point  might  be  still  further  illustrated  by  the  Russian  cam 
paign  of  Charles  XII.,  in  1708-9,  the  fatal  advance  of  the 
French  army  on  Lisbon,,  in  the  Peninsular  war,  and  other 
examples  of  the  same  character. 

Even  single  works  sometimes  effect  the  object  of  lines 
of  fortifications,  and  frustrate  the  operations  of  an  entire 
army.  Thus,  Lille  suspended  for  a  whole  year  the  oper 
ations  of  Prince  Eugene  and  Marlborough ;  the  siege  of 
Landrecies  gave  Villars  an  opportunity  of  changing  the 
fortunes  of  the  war;  Pavia,  in  1525,  lost  France  her 
monarch,  the  flower  of  her  nobility,  and  her  Italian  con 
quests  ;  Metz,  in  1552,  arrested  the  entire  power  of 
Charles  V.,  and  saved  France  from  destruction ;  Prague, 
in  1757,  brought  the  greatest  warrior  of  his  age  to  the 
brink  of  ruin ;  St.  Jean  d'Acre,  in  1799,  stopped  the  suc 
cessful  career  of  Napoleon;  Burgos,  in  1812,  saved  the 
beaten  army  of  Portugal,  enabled  them  to  collect  their 
scattered  forces,  and  regain  the  ascendancy ;  Strasburg 
has  often  been  the  bulwark  of  the  French  against  Ger 
many,  saving  France  from  invasion,  and  perhaps  subjuga 
tion. 

In  nearly  the  language  of  Napoleon,  (Memoirs,  vol.  IX.,) 
If  Vienna  had  been  fortified  in  1805,  the  battle  of  Uln? 
would  not  have  decided  the  fate  of  the  war.  Again,  in 
1809,  if  this  capital  had  been  fortified,  it  would  have  en 
abled  the  Archduke  Charles,  after  the  disaster  of  Eckmuhl, 
by  a  forced  retreat  on  the  left  of  the  Danube,  to  form  a 
junction  with  the  forces  of  General  Hiller  and  the  Arch 
duke  John. 

If  Berlin  had  been  fortified  in  1806,  the  army  routed  at 


86  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE, 

Jena  would  have  rallied  there  and  been  joined  "by  the 
Russians.  If  Madrid  had  been  strongly  fortified  in  1808, 
the  French  army,  after  the  victories  of  Espinosa;  Tudela, 
Burgos,  and  Sommo-Sierra,  would  not  have  marched  to 
wards  that  capital,  leaving  in  rear  of  Salamanca  and  Val- 
ladolid,  both  the  English  army  of  General  Moore  and  the 
Spanish  army  of  Romana.  If  Moscow  had  been  fortified 
in  1812,  its  conflagration  would  have  been  avoided,  for, 
with  strong  defensive  works,  and  the  army  of  Kutusoff 
encamped  on  its  ramparts,  its  capture  would  have  been 
impossible. 

Had  not  Constantinople  been  well  fortified,  the  empire 
of  Constantine  must  have  terminated  in  the  year  700, 
whereas  the  standard  of  the  Prophet  was  not  planted 
there  until  1440.  This  capital  was  therefore  indebted  to 
its  walls  for  eight  hundred  years  of  existence.  During 
this  period  it  was  besieged  fifty-three  times,  but  only  one 
of  these  sieges  was  successful.  The  French  and  Vene 
tians  took  it,  but  not  without  a  very  severe  contest. 

Paris  has  often  owed  its  safety  to  its  walls.  In  885 
the  Normans  besieged  it  for  two  years  without  effect.  In 
1358  the  Dauphin  besieged  it  in  vain.  In  1359  Edward, 
king  of  England,  encamped  at  Montrouge,  devastated  the 
country  to  its  walls,  but  recoiled  from  before  it,  and  re 
tired  to  Chartres.  In  1429  it  repulsed  the  attack  of 
Charles  VII.  In  1464  the  Count  of  Charlerois  surrounded 
the  city,  but  was  unsuccessful  in  his  attacks.  In  1472  it 
repulsed  the  army  of  the  Duke  of  Bourgone,  who  had  al 
ready  ravaged  its  precincts.  In  1536,  when  attacked  by 
Charles  V.,  it  again  owed  its  safety  to  its  walls.  In  1588 
and  1589  it  repulsed  the  armies  of  Henry  III.  and  Henry 
IV.  In  1636  and  several  succeeding  years  the  inhabitant? 
of  Paris  owed  their  safety  to  its  walls.  If  this  capital 
had  been  strongly  fortified  in  1814  and  1815,  the  allied 
armies  would  not  have  dared  to  attempt  its  investment. 


FORTIFICATIONS.  87 

But  it  is  deemed  unnecessary  to  further  specify  exam 
ples  ;  the  whole  history  of  modern  warfare  is  one  con 
tinued  proof  of  the  importance  of  fortifications  as  a 
means  of  national  defence,  and  as  an  auxiliary  in  offen 
sive  military  operations.  Our  illustrations  have  been 
mostly  drawn  from  European  wars,  but  our  own  brief 
history,  as  will  be  shown  hereafter,  is  not  without  its 
proofs. 

The  use  and  importance  of  field-fortifications,  intrench 
ed  camps,  &c.,  as  well  as  the  class  of  military  works 
called  coast-defences,  will  be  discussed  hereafter.* 

*  The  use  of  fortifications  in  the  defence  of  states  is  discussed  by 
Ternay,  Vauban,  Cormontaigne,  Napoleon,  the  Archduke  Charles, 
Jomini,  Fallot,  and,  incidentally,  by  most  of  the  military  historians  of 
the  wars  of  the  French  Revolution.  The  names  of  such  standard 
works  as  give  the  detailed  arrangements  of  fortifications  will  be  men 
tioned  hereafter 


88  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE, 


CHAPTER   IV. 

LOGISTICS. 

III.  WE  have  defined  logistics  to  be  that  branch  of  the 
military  art  which  embraces  all  the  practical  details. of 
moving  and  supplying  armies.  The  term  is  derived  from 
the  title  of  a  French  general  officer,  (major-gen&ral  des 
logis,)  who  was  formerly  charged  with  directing  the 
marches,  encampments,  and  lodging  of  the  troops.  It 
has  been  still  further  extended  by  recent  military  writers, 
and  many  of  them  now  regard  logistics  as  a  distinct  and 
important  branch  of  the  art. 

We  shall  here  consider  logistics  as  including  the  mili 
tary  duties  ordinarily  attributed  to  the  pay,  subsistence, 
clothing,  medical,  hospital,  and  transportation  depart 
ments  ;  in  fine,  of  all  the  civil  and  civico-military  corps 
of  the  army.  We  shall  therefore  discuss  under  this  head, 
the  preparation  of  all  the  necessary  materials  for  fitting 
out  troops  for  a  campaign  and  for  putting  them  in  motion ; 
the  regulating  of  marches,  convoys,  the  means  of  trans 
port  for  provisions,  hospitals,  munitions,  ami  supplies  of 
all  kinds ;  the  preparation  and  protection  of  magazines ; 
the  laying  out  of  camps  and  cantonments  ;  in  fine,  every 
thing  connected  with  preparing,  moving,  and  guarding  the 
impedimenta  of  an  army. 

The  officers  connected  with  this  branch  of  service 
must  consult  with  the  engineers  in  every  thing  relating 
to  the  defence  of  their  depots,  magazines,  camps,  canton 
ments,  communications,  and  the  passage  of  rivers,  and  in 
all  that  relates  to  their  connection  with  the  attack  and 
defence  of  places  :  but  in  all  that  relates  to  strategy  aad 


LOGISTICS.  89 

tactics  they  must  receive  instructions  directly  from  the 
chief  of  the  staff  of  the  army,  who  will  have  the  general 
direction  of  every  thing  connected  with  logistics.  Before 
commencing  the  operations  of  the  campaign,  or  beginning 
the  execution  of  the  plans  decided  upon  at  head-quarters, 
this  officer  should  satisfy  himself  respecting  the  condition 
of  the  various  materials  belonging  to  the  different  depart 
ments  of  the  army ; — the  horses  and  horse  equipments, 
carriages,  caissons,  ponton  and  artillery  equipages,  siege 
equipages,  moveable  hospitals,  engineer  and  artillery  uten 
sils,  clothing,  and  munitions  of  all  kinds  ;  he  must  supply 
whatever  may  be  wanting,  and  provide  means  for  the 
transportation  of  every  thing. 

Subsistence, — The  art  of  subsisting  troops  during  active 
operations  in  a  hostile  country,  is  one  of  the  most  diffi 
cult  subjects  connected  with  war;  and  it  is  a  question 
well  worthy  of  study,  both  for  the  statesman  and  the  war 
rior,  how  Darius  and  Xerxes,  Philip  and  Alexander,  in 
ancient  times — and  the  Greek  emperors  and  the  barba 
rians — and,  later  still,  the  crusaders  of  the  middle  ages, 
contrived  to  support  the  immense  masses  of  men  which 
they  led  to  war. 

Csesar  has  said  that  war  should  be  made  to  support 
war;  and  some  modern  generals  have  acted  upon  this 
principle  to  the  extreme  of  supporting  their  armies  en 
tirely  at  the  expense  of  the  country  passed  over.  Others 
have  adopted  either  in  part  or  entirely  the  principle  of 
regular  magazines. 

Louis  XIV.  and  Frederick  II.  fought  mostly  on  their 
own  frontiers,  and  followed  the  system  of  regular  depSts 
and  supplies.  But  the  revolutionary  armies  of  France 
made  war  without  magazines,  subsisting,  sometimes  on 
the  inhabitants,  sometimes  by  requisitions  levied  on  the 
country  passed  over,  and  at  others  by  pillage  and  maraud 
ing.  Napoleon  found  little  difficulty  in  supporting  an 


90  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

army  of  a  hundred  or  a  hundred  and  twenty  thousand  men 
in  Italy,  Suabia,  and  on  the  rich  borders  of  the  Rhine  and 
the  Danube ;  but  in  Spain,  Poland,  and  Russia,  the  sub 
ject  of  subsistence  became  one  of  extreme  embarrass 
ment. 

All  depots  of  provisions  and  other  supplies  for  an  army 
are  denominated  magazines ;  these  are  divided  into  prin 
cipal,  secondary,  and  provisional.  The  first  are  usually  on 
the  base  of  operations  ;  the  second,  on  the  line  of  opera 
tions  ;  and  the  last  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  troops, 
and  contain  supplies  for  a  few  days  only. 

The  system  of  magazines  is  objected  to  by  some,  be 
cause  it  fetters  the  movements  of  an  army,  and  makes  its 
military  operations  subordinate  to  the  means  of  supply. 
Moreover,  as  the  movements  of  an  army  must  be  so  ar 
ranged  as  to  cover  these  magazines,  their  establishment 
at  given  points  reveals  to  the  enemy  our  plan  of  cam 
paign. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  system  of  requisitions,  either  for 
immediate  supplies  or  for  secondary  magazines,  gives  far 
greater  velocity  and  impetuosity  to  an  active  army ;  and 
if  it  be  so  regulated  as  to  repress  pillage,  and  be  levied 
with  uniformity  and  moderation,  it  may  be  relied  on  with 
safety  in  well-cultivated  countries;  but  in  more  barren 
and  less  populous  districts,  an  army  without  magazines, 
especially  in  case  of  a  prolonged  stay  or  a  forced  retreat, 
will  be  exposed  to  great  suffering  and  loss,  if  not  to  total 
destruction. 

Before  commencing  a  campaign  the  general  should 
make  himself  acquainted  with  all  the  resources  of  the 
country  to  be  passed  over — determine  the  amount  of  sup 
plies  which  it  may  be  necessary  to  take  with  him,  and 
the  amount  that  can  be  obtained  by  requisitions;  these 
requisitions  being  levied  in  a  uniform  and  legal  manner, 
and  through  the  existing  local  authorities. 


LOGISTICS.  91 

In  great  wars  of  invasion  it  is  sometimes  impracticable, 
at  least  for  a  time,  to  provide  for  the  immense  forces 
placed  on  foot,  by  any  .regular  system  of  magazines  or  of 
ordinary  requisitions :  in  such  cases  their  subsistence  is 
entirely  intrusted  to  the  troops  themselves,  who  levy  con 
tributions  wherever  they  pass.  The  inevitable  conse 
quences  of  this  system  are  universal  pillage  and  a  total 
relaxation  of  discipline  ;  the  loss  of  private  property  and 
the  violation  of  individual  rights,  are  followed  by  the 
massacre  of  all  straggling  parties,  and  the  ordinary  peace 
ful  and  non-combatant  inhabitants  are  converted  into  bit 
ter  and  implacable  enemies. 

In  this  connection  the  war  in  the  Spanish  peninsula  is 
well  worthy  of  study.  At  the  beginning  of  this  war  Na 
poleon  had  to  choose  between  methodical  operations,  with 
provisions  carried  in  the  train  of  his  army,  or  purchased 
of  the  inhabitants  and  regularly  paid  for ;  and  irregular 
warfare,  with  forced  requisitions — war  being  made  to  sup 
port  war.  The  question  was  thoroughly  discussed. 

On  the  one  hand,  by  sacrificing  three  or  four  millions 
of  francs  from  the  French  treasury,  he  would  have  been 
able  to  support  his  troops  without  requisitions,  would  have 
maintained  good  order  and  discipline  in  his  armies,  and. 
by  the  distribution  of  this  money  among  a  people  poor 
and  interested,  he  would  have  made  many  partisans.  He 
could  then  have  offered  them,  with  a  firm  and  just  hand, 
the  olive  or  the  sword.  But  then  the  drafts  upon  the 
French  treasury,  had  the  war  been  a  protracted  one, 
would  have  been  enormous  for  the  support  of  an  army  of 
200,000  men  in  Spain.  Moreover,  the  hostile  and  insur 
rectionary  state  of  the  local  authorities  rendered  regular 
and  legal  requisitions  almost  impossible ;  and  the  want 
of  navigable  rivers,  good  roads,  and  suitable  transport, 
rendered  problematical  the  possibility  of  moving  a  suffi 
cient  quantity  of  stores  in  an  insurrectionary  country. 


92  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

Besides,  no  great  detachments  could  have  been  made  to 
regulate  the  administration  of  the  provinces,  or  to  pursue 
the  insurgent  corps  into  the  fastnesses  of  the  mountains. 
In  fine,  by  this  system,  he  would  have  effected  a  military 
occupation  of  Spain  without  its  subjugation. 

On  the  other  hand,  by  marching  rapidly  against  all  or 
ganized  masses,  living  from  day  to  day  upon  the  local  re 
sources  of  the  country,  as  he  had  done  in  Italy,  sparing 
his  reserves  for  the  occupation  and  pacification  of  the 
conquered  provinces  ;  this  mode  promised  more  prompt 
and  decisive  results  than  the  other.  Napoleon,  therefore, 
determined  to  adopt  it  for  his  active  masses,  employing 
the  system  of  magazines  and  regular  requisitions  so  far  as 
practicable.  In  favorable  parts  of  the  country,  Soult  and 
Souchet,  with  smaller  armies,  succeeded  in  obtaining  in 
this  way  regular  supplies  for  a  considerable  length  of 
time,  but  the  others  lived  mainly  by  forced  requisitions 
levied  as  necessity  required.  This  sometimes  gave  place 
to  great  excesses,  but  these  were  principally  the  faults 
of  subordinate  officers  who  tolerated  them,  rather  than 
of  Napoleon,  who  punished  such  breaches  of  discipline, 
when  they  were  known  to  him,  with  great  severity.  He 
afterwards  declared  that,  "  had  he  succeeded  he  would 
have  indemnified  the  great  mass  of  the  Spanish  people  for 
their  losses,  by  the  sale  of  the  hoarded  wealth  of  the 
clergy,  which  would  have  rendered  the  church  less  pow 
erful,  and  caused  a  more  just  division  of  property ;  thus 
the  evil  of  the  war  would  have  been  forgotten  in  the 
happy  triumph  of  public  and  private  interest  over  the  in 
terest  of  an  ambitious  and  exclusive  clergy." 

The  following  maxims  on  subsistence  have  the  sanction 
of  the  best  military  writers  : 

1st.  Regular  magazines  should  be  formed,  so  far  as 
practicable,  for  the  supplies  of  an  army ;  the  levying  of 
requisitions  being  resorted  to  only  where  the  nature  of 


LOGISTICS.  93 

the  war,  and  the  requisite  rapidity   of  marches,  render 
these  absolutely  necessary  to  success. 

2d.  Depats  should  be  formed  in  places  strengthened  by 
nature  or  art,  defended  by  small  corps,  or  garrisons,  and 
situated  in  positions  least  liable  to  attack. 

3d.  All  great  depots  should  be  placed  on  navigable 
rivers,  canals,  railways,  or  practical  roads,  communicating 
with  the  line  of  operations,  so  that  they  may  be  transported 
with  ease  and  rapidity,  as  the  army  advances  on  this  line. 

4th.  An  army  should  never  be  without  a  supply  for  ten 
or  fifteen  days,  otherwise  the  best  chances  of  war  may 
be  lost,  and  the  army  exposed  to  great  inconveniences. 
Templehoff.says  that  the  great  Frederick,  in  the  cam 
paign  of  1757,  always  carried  in  the  Prussian  provision- 
train  bread  for  six,  and  flour  for  nine  days,  and  was  there 
fore  never  at  a  loss  for  means  to  subsist  his  forces,  in 
undertaking  any  sudden  and  decisive  operation.  The 
Roman  soldier  usually  carried  with  him  provisions  for  fif 
teen  days.  Napoleon  says,  "  Experience  has  proved  tha 
an  army  ought  to  carry  with  it  a  month's  provisions,  ten 
days'  food  being  carried  by  the  men  and  baggage-horses 
and  a  supply  for  twenty  days  by  the  train  of  wagons ;  so 
that  at  least  four  hundred  and  eighty  wagons  would  be 
required  for  an  army  of  forty  thousand  men  ;  two  hundred 
and  forty  being  regularly  organized,  and  two  hundred  and 
forty  being  obtained  by  requisition.  For  this  purpose 
there  would  be  a  battalion  of  three  companies  for  the  mili 
tary  stores  of  each  division,  each  company  having  its  estab 
lishment  for  forty  wagons,  twenty  being  furnished  by  the 
commissariat,  and  twenty  obtained  by  requisition.  This 
gives  for  each  division  one  hundred  and  twenty  wagons, 
and  for  each  army,  four  hundred  and  eighty.  Each  bat 
talion  for  a  provision-train  should  have  two  hundred  and 
ten  men." 

5th.  An  army,  while  actually  in  motion,  can  find  tern- 


94  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

porary  resources,  unless  in  a  sterile  country,  or  one  al 
ready  ravaged  by  war,  or  at  the  season  of  the  year  when 
the  old  crops  are  nearly  exhausted  and  the  new  ones  not 
ready  for  harvest :  but,  even  supposing  the  army  may  in 
this  way  be  partially  or  wholly  supplied,  while  in  motion, 
it  nevertheless  frequently  happens  that  it  may  remain  for 
some  days  in  position,  (as  the  French  at  Austerlitz  and 
Ulm ;)  a  supply  of  hard  bread  for  some  ten  days  will 
therefore  be  important  to  subsist  the  army  till  a  regular 
commissariat  can  be  established. 

6th.  "  Supplies  of  bread  and  biscuit,"  says  Napoleon, 
"  are  no  more  essential  to  modern  armies  than  to  the  Ro 
mans  ;  flour,  rice,  and  pulse,  may  be  substituted  in  marches 
without  the  troops  suffering  any  harm.  It  is  an  error  to 
suppose  that  the  generals  of  antiquity  did  not  pay  great 
attention  to  their  magazines  ;  it  may  be  seen  in  Caesar's 
Commentaries,  how  much  he  was  occupied  with  this  care 
in  his  several  campaigns.  The  ancients  knew  how  to 
avoid  being  slaves  to  any  system  of  supplies,  or  to  being 
obliged  to  depend  on  the  purveyors ;  but  all  the  great 
captains  well  understood  the  art  of  subsistence." 

Forage  is  a  military  term  applied  to  food  of  any  kind  for 
horses  or  cattle, — as  grass,  hay,  corn,  oats,  &c.;  and  also 
to  the  operation  of  collecting  such  food.  Forage  is  of  two 
kinds,  green  and  dry ;  the  former  being  collected  directly 
from  the  meadows  and  harvest-fields,  and  the  latter  from 
the  barns  and  granaries  of  the  farmers,  or  the  storehouses 
of  the  dealers. 

The  animals  connected  with  an  army  may  be  subsisted  by 
regular  magazines,  by  forced  requisitions,  or  by  authorized 
foraging*  As  has  already  been  remarked,  it  is  not  always 
politic,  or  even  possible,  to  provide  regular  magazines  for  the 
entire  supplies  of  an  army  during  the  active  operations  of  a 

*  This  term  is  sometimes,  though  improperly,  applied  to  the  opera 
tion  of  forcibly  collecting  food  for  the  troops. 


LOGISTICS.  95 

campaign.  On  account  of  the  great  expense  and  difficulty  of 
transporting  forage,  the  general  of  an  army  is  more  fre 
quently  under  the  necessity  of  resorting  to  requisitions,  or 
forced  contributions  as  they  are  called,  and  to  foraging, 
for  the  subsistence  of  his  animals,  than  to  provide  food  for 
his  men.  Nor  are  requisitions  and  foragings  for  this  ob 
ject  so  objectionable  as  in  the  other  case,  being  far  less 
likely  to  produce  general  want  and  distress  among  the 
non-combatant  inhabitants. 

The  commanding  officer  of  troops  should  always  use  his 
best  endeavors  to  obtain  his  forage  by  purchase  of  the  in 
habitants,  or  by  requisitions  on  the  local  authorities  ;  and 
even  where  these  means  are  impracticable,  the  foraging 
parties  should  be  strictly  directed  to  make  their  levies 
with  uniformity  and  due  moderation.  Accurate  accounts 
should  be  kept  of  the  kinds  and  quantities  of  all  produce 
and  other  property  taken,  so  that  it  may  be  regularly  dis 
tributed  and  accounted  for.  Under  no  circumstances 
should  individuals  be  permitted  to  appropriate  to  them 
selves  more  than  their  pro  rata  allowance  Foraging  par 
ties  may  sometimes  attain  their  object  in  a  peaceful  man 
ner,  by  representing  to  the  inhabitants  the  nature  of  their 
instructions  and  the  necessity  of  obtaining  immediate  sup 
plies.  Even  where  no  recompense  is  proposed,  it  may 
be  well  to  offer  certificates  to  the  effect  that  such  arti 
cles  have  been  taken  for  the  use  of  the  army.  These 
certificates,  even  when  of  no  value  in  themselves,  fre 
quently  tend  to  appease  excited  passions  and  allay  insur 
rections.  In  defensive  war,  carried  on  in  one's  own  coun 
try,  it  is  often  necessary  to  seize  upon  private  property  and 
appropriate  it  to  the  public  service  :  in  all  such  cases  the 
certificates  of  the  foraging  officers  become  proofs  of  indi 
vidual  claims  against  the  government. 

No  foraging  party  should  ever  be  sent  out  till  after  the 
country  has  been  properly  reconnoitred.  A  good  military 


96  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

escort  and  vanguard  should  always  accompany  and  pre 
cede  the  foragers,  for  protection  against  the  enemy's  light 
cavalry  and  an  insurgent  militia.  Trustworthy  troops  must 
be  placed  in  the  villages  and  hamlets  of  the  country  to  be 
foraged,  in  order  to  prevent  the  foragers  from  engaging  in 
irregular  and  unauthorized  pillage.  Officers  of  the  staff 
arid  administrative  corps  are  sent  with  the  party  to  see  to 
the  proper  execution  of  the  orders,  and  to  report  any  irreg 
ularities  on  the  part  of  the  troops.  In  case  any  corps  en 
gage  in  unauthorized  pillage,  due  restitution  should  be 
made  to  the  inhabitants,  and  the  expense  of  such  restitu 
tion  deducted  from  the  pay  and  allowances  of  the  corps 
by  whom  such  excess  is  committed.  A  few  examples  of 
this  kind  of  justice  will  soon  restore  discipline  to  the  ar 
my,  and  pacify  the  inhabitants  of  the  country  occupied. 

Experience  is  the  best  guide  in  estimating  the  amount 
of  hay  or  grain  that  may  be  taken  from  a  given  field :  the 
produce  of  an  acre  is,  of  course,  very*different  for  different 
soils  and  climates.  In  distributing  the  burdens  to  the  sev 
eral  pack-horses  and  wagons  employed  in  conveying  the 
forage  to  the  army,  it  is  important  for  the  foraging  officers 
to  know  the  relative  weight  and  bulk  of  each  article. 

Ordinary  pressed  hay  in  this  country  will  average 

about       .     .     .     .     .     .  12  Ibs.  per  cubic  foot. 

Wheat       .     .     .  weighs  .     .  60  Ibs.  per  bushel. 

Rye       ...."..  56    "  " 

Maize  or  Indian  corn "       .     .  56    "  " 

Barley  ...."..  50    " 

Oats      ...."..  35    "  " 

Meal,  flour,  and  ground  feed  of  all  kinds,  are  purchased 
by  the  pound. 

As  it  would  be  exceedingly  dangerous  to  send  forward 
the  regular  train  of  the  army  for  the  conveyance  of  forage 
collected  by  these  foraging  parties,  the  country  wagons 


LOGISTICS.  97 

and  pack-horses  are  usually  pressed  into  service  for  this 
purpose. 

Troops  of  horse  are  sometimes  sent  into  the  vicinity  of 
meadows  and  grain-fields  for  temporary  subsistence :  in 
such  cases  the  horses  and  cattle  may  be  farmed  in  the 
neighborhood,  and  the  grass  and  grain  issued  in  regular  ra 
tions,  immediately  as  taken  from  the  field  ;  but  in  no  case 
should  the  animals  be  turned  out  to  pasture. 

In  a  country  like  ours,  where  large  bodies  of  new  and 
irregular  forces  are  to  be  suddenly  called  into  the  field  in 
case  of  war,  it  is  important  to  establish  very  rigid  rules  in 
relation  to  forage  and  subsistence  ;  otherwise  the  opera 
tions  of  such  troops  must  be  attended  with  great  waste  of 
public  and  private  property,  the  want  of  means  of  subsist 
ence,  the  consequent  pillage  of  the  inhabitants,  and  a 
general  relaxation  of  discipline.  Regular  troops  are  far 
less  liable  to  such  excesses  than  inexperienced  and  un 
disciplined  forces. 

Marches. — Marches  are  of  two  kinds :  1  st.  Route  marches, 
— 2d.  Marches  within  reach  of  the  enemy.  The  former  be- 
ong  to  the  domain  of  strategy  ;  the  latter  to  that  of  tactics  ; 
both,  however,  are  connected  with  logistics  in  every  thing 
that  concerns  the  means  of  their  execution. 

When  an  army  is  moving  on  a  line  of  operations,  it 
should  be  in  as  many -columns  as  the  facility  of  subsist 
ence,  celerity  of  movement,  the  nature  of  the  roads,  &c., 
may  require.  Large  columns  cannot  move  with  the  same 
rapidity  as  smaller  ones,  nor  can  they  be  so  readily  sub 
sisted.  But  when  an  army  is  within  striking  distance  of 
the  enemy,  concentration  becomes  more  important  than 
celerity,  and  the  forces  must  be  kept  in  mass,  or  at  least 
whhin  supporting  distances  of  each  other.  We  find  only 
two  instances  in  the  Seven  Years'  War,  in  which  Frederick 
attempted  attacks  by  several  columns  at  considerable  dis 
tances  from  each  other ;  arid  in  both  these  instances  (at 

9 


98  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

Torgau  and  at  Namiest,  against  Laudon,  during  the  siege 
of  Olmutz)  he  was  unsuccessful.  His  usual  mode  was  to 
bring  his  columns  near  together  as  he  approached  the 
enemy,  and  to  form  his  troops  into  line  at  the  moment  of 
attack.  Such  was  his  order  of  march  at  Prague,  Kollin, 
Rosbach,  Leuthen,  Zornsdorf,  and  Kunersdorf.  The 
following  is  one  of  Frederick's  orders  respecting  marches, 
(October  2d,  1760.) 

"The  army  will,  as  usual,  march  in  three  columns  by 
lines.  The  first  column  will  consist  of  the  first  line  ;  the 
second,  of  the  second  line  ;  and  the  third,  of  the  reserve. 
The  wagons,  and  hospital  wagons,  of  regiments,  will  fol 
low  their  corps.  The  batteries  of  heavy  calibre  will  fol 
low  the  infantry  brigades  to  which  they  are  assigned.  On 
passing  woods,  the  regiments  of  cavalry  will  march  be 
tween  two  infantry  corps.  • 

"  Each  column  will  have  a  vanguard  of  one  light  battal 
ion  and  ten  squadrons  of  hussars  or  dragoons.  They  will 
be  preceded  by  three  wagons  carrying  plank-bridges. 
The  rear-guard  is  charged  with  taking  up  these  bridges 
after  the  army  has  defiled  over  them. 

"  The  parks  will  be  divided  among  the  columns,  to 
avoid  the  embarrassment  resulting  from  a  great  many 
wagons  being  together  in  a  body. 

"  If  any  thing  should  happen  to  the  second  and  third 
columns,  the  king  will  be  instantly  apprized  of  it ;  he  will 
be  found  at  the  head  of  the  first  column.  Should  any 
thing  occur  to  the  rear-guard,  the  same  will  be  instantly 
communicated  to  Lieutenant-general  Zeithen,  who  will  be 
with  the  rear- guard  of  the  first  column. 

'•  The  officers  will  take  care  that  the  soldiers  march 
with  equal  step,  and  that  they  do'  not  stray  to  the  right  or 
left,  and  thus  uselessly  fatigue  themselves  and  K'se  their 
distances. 

1  When  orders  are  given  to  form  the  line,  th    Dragons 


LOGISTICS.  99 

'  will  file  out  of  the  columns  to  the  left,  and  will  march  to 
be  parked,"  &c. 

The  position  of  the  baggage,  when  near  the  enemy, 
will  depend  on  the  nature  of  the  march.  If  the  march  be 
to  the  front,  it  will  be  in  rear  of  the  column ;  if  the  march 
be  by  the  flank,  and  the  enemy  be  on  the  outer  flank,  the 
baggage  will  be  on  the  inner  one,  most  remote  from  danger; 
if  the  march  be  in  retreat,  the  baggage  will  be  in  advance 
of  the  army.  In  either  case  it  should  be  strongly  guarded. 

It  was  in  direct  violation  of  this  rule  that  General  Hull, 
in  the  campaign  of  1812,  on  reaching  the  Miami  of  the 
Lake,  (Maumee,)  embarked  his  baggage,  stores,  sick,  con 
valescent,  and  "  even  the  instructions  of  his  government 
and  the  returns  of  his  army,"  on  board  the  Cuyahoga 
packet,  and  dispatched  them  for  Detroit,  while  the  army, 
with  ftie  same  destination,  Resumed  its  march  by  land. 
The  result  of  thus  sending  his  baggage,  stores,  official 
papers,  &c.,  without  a  guard,  and  on  the  flank  nearest  the 
enemy,  was  just  what  might  have  been  anticipated : — in 
attempting  to  pass  the  British  post  of  Maiden  the  whole 
detachment  was  attacked  and  captured,  "  by  a  subaltern 
and  six  men,  in  a  small  and  open  boat." 

To  prevent  a  surprise,  detachments  of  light  troops  should 
be  always  thrown  out  in  front,  on  the  flanks,  and  in  rear 
of  the  column,  denominated  from  their  position,  Advanced- 
Guard,  Flankers,  and  Rear-Guard.  These  scan  the  coun 
try  which  is  to  be  passed  over  by  the  column,  watch  the 
enemy's  motions,  and  give  notice  of  his  approach  in  time 
to  allow  the  main  force  to  choose  a  suitable  field  of  battle, 
and  to  pass  from  the  order  of  march  to  that  of  combat. 
The  strength  and  composition  of  these  detachments  de 
pend  upon  the  nature  of  the  ground,  and  the  character 
and  position  of  the  enemy.  In  case  of  an  attack  they 
retire  slowly,  and  on  joining  the  main  body,  take  iheir 
assigned  position  in  the  line  of  battle. 


100  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

In  an  open  country  the  order  of  march  presents  but" 
little  difficulty  ;  but  in  a  broken  country,  and  especially  in 
the  vicinity  of  the  enemy,  a  march  cannot  be  conducted 
with  too  many  precautions.  Before  engaging  in  a  defile 
it  should  be  thoroughly  examined,  and  sufficient  detach 
ments  sent  out  to  cover  the  main  body  from  attack  while 
effecting  the  passage.  A  neglect  of  these  precautions  has 
sometimes  led  to  the  most  terrible  disasters. 

In  military  operations  very  much  depends  upon  the 
rapidity  of  marches.  The  Roman  infantry,  in  Scipio's 
campaigns  in  Africa,  frequently  marched  a  distance  of 
twenty  miles  in  five  hours,  each  soldier  carrying  from  fifty 
to  eighty  pounds  of  baggage.  Septimius  Severus,  Gibbon 
states,  marched  from  Vienna  to  Rome,  a  distance  of  eight 
hundred  miles,  in  forty  days.  Caesar  marched  from  Rome 
to  the  Sierra-Morena,  in  Spain,  a  distance  of  four  hundred 
and  fifty  leagues,  in  twenty-three  days  ! 

Napoleon  excelled  all  modern  generals  in  the  celerity 
of  his  movements.  Others  have  made  for  a  single  day 
as  extraordinary  marches  as  the  French,  but  for  general 
activity  during  a  campaign  they  have  no  rivals  in  modern 
history.  A  few  examples  of  the  rapidity  of  their  move 
ments  may  not  be  without  interest. 

In  1797  a  part  of  Napoleon's  army  left  Verona  after 
having  fought  the  battle  of  St.  Michaels,  on  the  13th  of 
January,  then  marched  all  night  upon  Rivoli,  fought  in 
the  mountains  on  the  14th,  returned  to  Mantua  on  the 
15th,  and  defeated  the  army  of  Provera  on  the  morning  of 
the  16th, — thus,  in  less  than  four  days,  having  marched 
near  fifty  leagues,  fought  three  battles,  and  captured  more 
than  twenty  thousand  prisoners  !  Well  might  he  write  to 
the  Directory  that  his  soldiers  had  surpassed  the  much 
vaunted  rapidity  of  Caesar's  legions. 

In  the  campaign  of  1800,  Macdonald,  wishing  to  pre 
vent  the  escape  of  London,  in  a  single  day  marched  forty 


LOGISTICS.  101 

miles,  crossing  rivers,  and  climbing  mountains  and  gla 
ciers. 

In  1805  the  grand  French  army  broke  up  their  camp  at 
Boulogne,  in  the  early  part  of  September,  and  in  two 
weeks  reached  their  allotted  posts  on  the  Rhine,  averag 
ing  daily  from  twenty-five  to  thirty  miles. 

During  the  same  campaign  the  French  infantry,  pursu 
ing  the  Archduke  Ferdinand  in  his  retreat  from  Ulm, 
marched  thirty  miles  a  day  in  dreadful  weather,  and  over 
roads  almost  impassable  for  artillery. 

Again,  in  the  campaign  of  1806,  the  French  infantry 
pursued  the  Prussians  at  the  rate  of  from  twenty-five  to 
thirty  miles  per  day. 

In  1808  the  advanced  posts  of  Napoleon's  army  pursued 
Sir  John  Moore's  army  at  the  rate  of  twenty-five  miles  a 
day,  in  the  midst  of  winter.  Napoleon  transported  an 
army  of  fifty  thousand  men  from  Madrid  to  Astorga  with 
nearly  the  same  rapidity,  marching  through  deep  snows, 
across  high  mountains,  and  rivers  swollen  by  the  winter 
rains.  The  activity,  perseverance,  and  endurance  of  his 
troops,  during  these  ten  days' march,  are  scarcely  equalled 
in  history. 

In  1812,  the  activity  of  the  French  forces  under  Clau- 
sel  was  truly  extraordinary.  After  almost  unheard-of 
efforts  at  the  battle  of  Salamanca,  he  retreated  forty  miles 
in  a  little  more  than  twelve  hours  ! 

In  1814,  Napoleon's  army  marched  at  the  rate  of  ten 
leagues  a  day,  besides  fighting  a  battle  every  twenty-four 
hours.  Wishing  to  form  a  junction  with  other  troops,  for 
the  succor  of  Paris,  he  marched  his  army  the  distance  of 
seventy-five  miles  in  thirty-six  hours ;  the  cavalry  march 
ing  night  and  day,  and  the  infantry  travelling  en  poste. 

On  his  return  from  Elba,  in  1815,  his  guards  marched 
fifty  miles  the  first  day  after  landing ;  reached  Grenoblo 
through  a  rough  and  mountainous  country,  a  distance  of 


102  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

two  hundred  miles,  in  six  days,  and  reached  Paris,  a  dis 
tance  of  six  hundred  miles,  in  less  than  twenty  days  ! 

The  inarches  of  the  allied  powers,  during  the  wars  of 
the  French  Revolution,  were  much  less  rapid  than  those 
ol  the  armies  of  Napoleon.  Nevertheless,  for  a  single 
day  the  English  and  Spaniards  have  made  some  of  the 
most  extraordinary  marches  on  record. 

In  1  809,  on  the  day  of  the  battle  of  Talavera,  General 
Crawford,  fearing  that  Wellington  was  hard  pressed,  made 
a  forced  march  with  three  thousand  men  the  distance  of 
sixty-two  miles  in  twenty-six  hours  ! 

The  Spanish  regiment  of  Romana,  in  their  march  from 
Jutland  to  Spain,  marched  the  extraordinary  distance  of 
fifty  miles  in  twenty-one  hours. 

Cavalry,  for  a  single  day,  will  march  a  greater  distance 
than  infantry ;  but  for  a  campaign  of  several  months  the 
infantry  will  march  over  the  most  ground.  In  the  Russian 
campaign  of  Napoleon,  his  cavalry  failed  to  keep  pace 
with  the  infantry  in  his  forced  march  on  Moskwa.  But 
in  the  short  campaigns  of  1805  and  1806,  the  cavalry  of 
Murat  displayed  the  most  wonderful  activity,  and  effected 
more  extraordinary  results  than  any  mounted  troops  of 
modern  ages. 

The  English  cavalry,  however,  have  made  one  or  two 
short  marches  with  a  rapidity  truly  extraordinary. 

In  1803  Wellington's  cavalry  in  India  marched  the  dis 
tance  of  sixty  miles  in  thirty-two  hours. 

But  the  march  of  the  English  cavalry  under  Lord  Lake, 
before  the  battle  of  Furruckabad,  is,  if  we  can  trust  the 
English  accounts,  still  more  extraordinary  than  any  thing 
recorded  of  the  Romans  or  the  French — it  is  said  that  he 
marched  seventy  miles  in  twenty-four  hours  ! !  ! 

As  a  general  rule,  troops  marching  for  many  days  in 
succession  will  move  at  the  rate  of  from  fifteen  to  twenty 
miles  per  day.  In  forced  marches,  or  in  pursuit  of  a  fly- 


LOGISTICS.  103 

ing  enemy,  they  will  average  from  twenty  to  twenty-five 
miles  per  day.  And  for  only  two  or  three  days  in  succes 
sion,  with  favorable  roads,  thirty  miles  per  day  may  be 
calculated  on.  Marches  beyond  this  are  unusual,  and, 
when  they  do  occur,  are  the  result  of  extraordinary  cir 
cumstances. 

Convoy. — A  convoy  consists  of  provisions,  military  mu 
nitions,  &c.,  sent  from  one  point  to  another,  under  the 
charge  of  a  detachment  of  troops,  called  an  escort.  When 
regular  depots  and  magazines  are  established,  with  proper 
relations  to  the  line  of  operations,  convoys  requiring  par 
ticular  escorts  are  seldom  necessary,  because  the  position 
of  the  army  will  cover  the  space  over  which  the  magazines 
are  to  be  moved.  But  in  the  immediate  vicinity  of  the  en 
emy,  or  in  a  country  whose  inhabitants  are  hostile  or  in 
surrectionary,  precautions  of  this  kind  should  always  be 
resorted  to. 

The  size  and  composition  of  the  escort  must  depend 
upon  the  nature  of  the  country  and  the  imminence  of  the 
danger.  The  ground  to  be  passed  over  should  be  previ 
ously  reconnoitred,  and  the  line  of  march  be  taken  up  only 
after  the  most  satisfactory  reports  When  once  put  ii*  mo 
tion,  the  convoy  should  be  thoroughly  hemmed  in  by  flank 
ers,  to  give  warning  to  the  escort  of  the  approach  of  the 
enemy.  Small  parties  of  cavalry  are  detached  on  all  sides, 
but  particularly  in  advance.  The  main  body  of  the  escort 
is  concentrated  on  the  most  exposed  point  of  the  convoy, 
while  the  other  sides  are  guarded  by  subdivisions.  In 
case  of  an  attack  by  a  large  party,  the  baggage  wagons 
may  be  formed  into  a  kind  of  defensive  field-work,  which, 
with  one  or  two  pieces  of  light  artillery,  can  in  this  way 
resist  a  pretty  strong  effort  to  destroy  or  carry  away  the 
convoy. 

As  a  general  rule,  it  is  better  to  supply  the  wants  of  an 
army  by  small  successive  convoys  than  by  periodical  and 


104  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

large  ones.  Even  should  some  of  the  former  be  captured, 
their  loss  would  not  be  materially  felt ;  but  a  large  period 
ical  convoy  offers  so  great  a  temptation  to  the  enterprise 
of  the  enemy,  and  is  so  difficult  to  escort,  that  he  will  ven 
ture  much  to  destroy  it,  and  its  loss  may  frustrate  our  plans 
of  a  siege  or  of  an  important  military  operation.  If  the 
Prussian  army,  when  besieging  Olmutz,  had  observed  this 
rule,  the  capture  of  a  convoy  would  not  have  forced  them 
to  raise  the  siege  and  to  retreat. 

Napoleon  estimates  that  an  army  of  100,000  men  in  po 
sition  will  require  the  daily  arrival  of  from  four  to  five  hun 
dred  wagon  loads  of  provisions. 

The  difficulty  of  moving  provisions,  baggage,  &c.,  in  a 
retreat,  is  always  very  great,  and  the  very  best  generals 
have  frequently  failed  on  this  point.  Indeed,  the  best  con 
certed  measures  will  sometimes  fail,  amid  the  confusion 
and  disorder  consequent  upon  a  retreat  with  an  able  and 
active  enemy  in  pursuit.  In  such  a  case,  the  loss  of  the 
provision-trains  in  a  sterile  or  unfriendly  country  may  lead 
to  the  most  terrible  disasters.  We  will  allude  to  two  ex 
amples  of  this  kind  :  the  retreat  of  the  English  from  Spain 
in  1809,  and  that  of  the  French  from  Russia  in  1812. 

When  Sir  John  Moore  saw  that  a  retreat  had  become 
necessary  to  save  his  army  from  entire  destruction,  he  di 
rected  all  the  baggage  and  stores  to  be  taken  to  the  rear, 
and  every  possible  arrangement  to  be  made  for  their  pres 
ervation  and  for  the  regular  supplies  of  the  army.  But  the 
want  of  discipline  in  his  troops,  and  more  especially  the 
want  of  a  proper  engineer  organization  to  prepare  the  re 
quisite  means  for  facilitating  his  own  marches,  and  impe 
ding  the  enemy's  pursuit,  prevented  his  plans  from  being 
fully  carried  into  execution.  Much  suffering  and  great 
losses  were  consequently  inflicted  upon  his  troops  ;  a  large 
portion  of  his  baggage  and  military  stores  was  captured, 
and  even  the  treasure  of  his  army,  amounting  to  some 


LOGISTICS.  105 

200,000  dollars,  was  abandoned  through  the  ignorance  and 
carelessness  of  the  escorting  officer. 

In  Napoleon's  march  into  Russia,  his  plans  had  been  so 
admirably  combined,  that  from  Mentz  to  Moscow  not  a  sin 
gle  estafette  or  convoy,  it  is  said,  was  carried  off  in  this 
campaign ;  nor  was  there  a  day  passed  without  his  re 
ceiving  intelligence  from  France.  When  the  retreat  was 
begun,  (after  the  burning  of  Moscow,)  he  had  six  lines 
of  magazines  in  his  rear  ;  the  1st,  at  Smolensk,  ten  days' 
march  from  Moscow ;  those  of  the  2d  line  at  Minsk  and 
Wilna,  eight  marches  from  Smolensk;  those  of  the  3d  line  at 
Kowno,  Grodno,  and  Bialystok ;  those  of  the  4th  line  at 
Elbing,  Marienwerder,  Thorn,  Flock,  Modlin,  and  War 
saw  ;  those  of  the  5th  line  at  Dantzic,  Bamberg,  and  Po- 
sen ;  those  of  the  6th  line  at  Stettin,  Custrin,  and  Glogau. 
When  the  army  left  Moscow  it  carried  with  it  provisions 
sufficient  for  twenty  days,  and  an  abundance  of  ammuni 
tion,  each  piece  of  artillery  being  supplied  with  three 
hundred  and  fifty  rounds  ;  but  the  premature  cold  weather 
destroyed  thirty  thousand  horses  in  less  than  three  days, 
thus  leaving  the  trains  without  the  means  of  transportation 
or  suitable  escorts  for  their  protection :  the  horrible  suf 
ferings  of  the  returning  army  now  surpassed  all  descrip 
tion. 

The  officer  selected  to  escort  convoys  should  be  a  man 
of  great  prudence,  activity,  and  energy,  for  frequently  very 
much  depends  upon  the  safe  and  timely  arrival  of  the  pro 
visions  and  military  stores  which  he  may- have  in  charge. 

Castrametation. — Castrametation  is,  strictly  speaking, 
the  art  of  laying  out  and  disposing  to  advantage  the  sev 
eral  parts  of  the  camp  of  an  army.  The  term  is  some 
times  more  extensively  used  to  include  all  the  means  for 
lodging  and  sheltering  the  soldiers  during  a  campaign,  and 
all  the  arrangements  for  cooking,  &c.,  either  in  the  field 
or  in  winter  quarters.  A  camp,  whether  composed  of  tents 


106  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

or  barracks,  or  merely  places  assigned  for  bivouacking, 
must  be  divided  and  arranged  in  such  a  way  that  the  sev- 
etal  divisions  shall  be  disposed  as  they  are  intended  to  be 
drawn  up  in  order  of  battle  ;  so  that,  on  any  sudden  alarm, 
the  troops  can  pass  from  it  promptly,  and  form  their  line 
of  battle  without  confusion.  Suitable  places  must  also  bo 
assigned  for  cooking,  for  baggage,  and  for  provisions,  mil 
itary  stores,  and  ammunitions. 

The  extent  of  the  color  front  of  a  camp  depends  much 
on  the  character  of  the  ground  and  the  means  of  defence, 
but  as  a  general  rule,  it  should  never  exceed  the  position 
which  the  army  would  occupy  in  the  line  of  battle.  The 
different  arms  should  be  encamped  in  the  same  order  as 
that  of  battle  ;  this  order  of  course  depending  on  the  na 
ture  of  the  battle-ground.  A  corps  d'armee  is  composed 
of  battalions  of  infantry,  squadrons  of  cavalry,  batteries  of 
artillery,  and  companies  of  engineer  troops,  and  the  art  of 
encampments  consists  in  arranging  each  of  these  ele 
ments  so  as  to  satisfy  the  prescribed  conditions. 

The  choice  of  ground  for  a  camp  must  be  governed, 
1st,  by  the  general  rules  respecting  military  positions, 
and,  2d,  by  other  rules  peculiar  to  themselves,  for  they 
may  be  variously  arranged  in  a  manner  more  or  less  suit 
able  on  the  same  position. 

That  the  ground  be  suitable  for  defence,  is  the  first  and 
highest  consideration. 

It  should  also  be  commodious  and  dry  :  moist  ground  in 
the  vicinity  of  swamps  and  stagnant  waters,  would  endan 
ger  the  health  of  the  army  :  for  the  same  reason  it  should 
not  be  subject  to  overflow  or  to  become  marshy  by  heavy 
rains,  and  the  melting  of  snow. 

The'  proximity  of  good  roads,  canals,  or  navigable 
streams,  is  important  for  furnishing  the  soldiers  with  all 
the  necessaries  of  life. 

The  proximity  of  woods  is  also  desirable  for  furnishing 


LOGISTICS.  107 

firewood,  materials  for  huts,  for  repairs  of  military  equip* 
ments,  for  works  of  defence,  &c. 

Good  water  within  a  convenient  distance,  is  also  an  es 
sential  element  in  the  choice  of  ground  for  a  camp  ;  with 
out  this  the  soldiers'  health  is  soon  undermined.  The 
proximity  of  running  streams  is  also  important  for  the  pur 
poses  of  washing  and  bathing,  and  for  carrying  off  the 
filth  of  the  camp. 

The  camp  should  not  be  so  placed  as  to  be  enfiladed  or 
commanded  by  any  point  within  long  cannon  range  ;  if 
bordering  on  a  river  or  smaller  stream,  there  should  be 
space  enough  between  them  to  form  in  order  bf  battle ; 
the  communications  in  rear  should  offer  the  means  of  re 
treating  in  case  of  necessity,  but  should  not  afford  facilities 
to  the  enemy  to  make  his  attack  on  that  side. 

If  the  camp  is  to  be  occupied  for  a  considerable  length 
of  time,  as  for  cantonments  or  winter-quarter  S,  the  greater 
must  be  the  care  in  selecting  its  position  and  in  the  ar 
rangement  for  the  health  and  comfort  of  the  soldiers.  In 
the  latter  case,  (of  winter-quarters,)  the  engineer's  art 
should  always  be  called  in  play  to  form  intrenchments, 
lines  of  abattis,  inundations,  &c.,  to  render  the  position 
as  difficult  of  access  to  the  enemy  as  possible. 

A  bivouac  is  the  most  simple  kind  of  camp.  It  consists 
merely  of  lines  of  fires,  and  huts  for  the  officers  and  sol 
diers.  These  huts  may  be  made  of  straw,  of  wood  ob 
tained  from  the  forest,  or  by  dismantling  houses  and  other 
buildings  in  the  vicinity  of  the  camp,  and  .stripping  them 
of  their  timbers,  doors,  floors,  &c.  Troops  may  be  kept 
in  bivouac  for  a  few  days,  when  in  the  vicinity  of  the  en 
emy,  but  the  exposure  of  the  soldier  in  ordinary  bivouacs, 
especially  in  the  rainy  seasons  or  in  a  rigorous  climate, 
is  exceedingly  destructive  of  human  life,  and  moreover 
,eads  to  much  distress  to  the  inhabitants  of  the  country 
occupied,  in  the  destruction  of  their  dwellings  and  the 


108  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

most  common  necessaries  of  life.  If  the  position  is  to 
be  occupied  for  any  length  of  time,  the  huts  should  be  ar 
ranged  like  tents,  according  to  a  regular  system,  and  made 
comfortable  for  the  troops.  Such  should  always  be  the 
system  adopted  in  camps  of  practice  or  manoeuvre,  in  can 
tonments,  winter-quarters,  or  in  intrenched  positions. 

We  have  adopted  in  our  service  the  system  of  encamp 
ing  in  tents.  These  may  do  very  well  under  the  ordinary 
circumstances  ;  but  in  the  active  operations  of  a  campaign 
Jhey  are  exceedingly  objectionable,  as  greatly  encumber 
ing  the  baggage-trains.  It  would  seem  preferable  to  re 
sort  to  bivouacs  for  the  temporary  camp  of  a  single  night, 
and  to  construct  a  regular  system  of  huts  where  a  position 
is  to  be  occupied  for  any  length  of  time.  This  may  be 
regarded  as  a  general  rule,  but  in  certain  countries  and 
climates,  the  tent  becomes  almost  indispensable. 

Napoleon's  views  on  this  subject  are  certainly  interest 
ing,  if  not  decisive  of  the  question :  "  Tents,"  says  he, 
"  are  not  wholesome.  It  is  better  for  the  soldier  to  bi 
vouac,  because  he  can  sleep  with  his  feet  towards  th« 
fire  ;  he  may  shelter  himself  from  the  wind  with  a  few 
boards  or  a  little  straw.  The  ground  upon  which  he  lies 
will  be  rapidly  dried  in  the  vicinity  of  the  fire.  Tents 
are  necessary  for  the  superior  officers,  who  have  occasion 
to  read  and  consult  maps,  and  who  ought  to  be  ordered 
never  to  sleep  in  a  house — a  fatal  abuse,  which  has  given 
rise  to  so  many  disasters.  All  the  European  nations  have 
so  far  followed  the  example  of  the  French  as  to  discard 
their  tents  ;  and  if  they  be  still  used  in  camps  of  mere  pa 
rade,  it  is  because  they  are  economical,  sparing  woods, 
thatched  roofs,  and  villages.  The  shade  of  a  tree,  against 
the  heat  of  the  sun,  and  any  sorry  shelter  whatever,  against 
the  rain,  are  preferable  to  tents.  The  carriage  of  the 
tents  for  each  battalion  would  load  five  horses,  who  would 
be  much  better  employed  in  carrying  provisions.  Tents 


LOGISTICS.  109 

are  a  subject  of  observation  for  the  enemies'  spies  and 
officers  of  the  staff:  they  give  them  an  insight  into  your 
numbers,  and  the  position  that  you  occupy ;  and  this  in 
convenience  occurs  every  day,  and  every  instant  in  the 
day.  An  army  ranged  in  two  or  three  lines  of  bivouac  is 
only  to  be  perceived  at  a  distance  by  the  smoke,  which 
the  enemy  may  mistake  for  the  vapor  of  the  atmosphere. 
It  is  impossible  to  count  the  number  of  fires  ;  it  is  easy, 
however,  to  count  the  number  of  tents,  and  to  trace  out 
the  position  that  they  occupy." 

The  guarding  of  camps  is  a  very  important  matter,  and 
requires  much  attention. 

The  camp-guard  consists  of  one  or  two  rows  of  senti 
nels  placed  around  the  camp,  and  relieved  at  regular  in 
tervals.  The  number  of  rows  of  sentinels,  and  the  dis 
tance  between  each  man,  will  depend  upon  the  character 
of  the  ground  and  the  degree  of  danger  apprehended. 

Detachments  of  infantry  and  cavalry,  denominated  pic- 
quets,  are  also  thrown  out  in  front  and  on  the  flanks,  which, 
in  connection  with  the  camp-guards,  serve  to  keep  good 
order  and  discipline  in  and  around-  the  camp,  to  prevent 
desertions,  intercept  reconnoitering  parties,  and  to  give 
timely  notice  of  the  enemy's  approach. 

Still  larger  detachments,  denominated  grand-guards,  are 
posted  in  the  surrounding  villages,  farm-houses,  or  small 
field-works,  which  they  occupy  as  outposts,  and  from  which 
they  can  watch  the  movements  of  the  enemy,  and  prevent 
any  attempts  to  surprise  the  camp.  They  detach  patrols, 
videttes,  and  sentries,  to  furnish  timely  notice  of  danger. 
They  should  never  be  so  far  from  the  camp  as  to  be  be 
yond  succor  in  case  of  sudden  attack.  Outposts,  when 
too  far  advanced,  are  sometimes  destroyed  without  being 
able  to  give  notice  of  the  enemy's  approach. 

In  encamping  troops  in  winter-quarters,  it  is  sometimes 
necessary  to  scatter  them  over  a  considerable  extent  of 


110  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

ground,  in  order  to  facilitate  their  subsistence.  In  such 
a  case,  the  arrangement  of  guards  requires  the  utmost 
care.  A  chain  of  advanced  posts  should  be  placed  several 
miles'  distance  from  the  line  of  camp  ;  these  posts  should 
be  supported  by  other  and  larger  detachments  in  their 
rear,  and  concentrated  on  fewer  points  ;  and  the  whole 
country  around  should  be  continually  reconnoitered  by 
patrols  of  cavalry. 

The  manner  in  which  Napoleon  quartered  and  wintered 
his  army  on  the  Passarge,  in  1806-7,  furnishes  a  useful 
lesson  to  military  men,  both  in  the  matters  of  encampment 
and  subsistence.  An  immense  army  of  men  were  here 
quartered  and  subsisted,  in  a  most  rigorous  climate,  with 
a  not  over  fertile  soil,  in  the  midst  of  hostile  nations,  and 
in  the  very  face  of  a  most  powerful  enemy. 

A  Roman  army  invariably  encamped  in  the  same  order, 
its  troops  being  always  drawn  up  in  the  same  battle  array. 
A  Roman  staff-officer  who  marked  out  an  encampment, 
performed  nothing  more  than  a  mechanical  operation  ;  he 
had  no  occasion  for  much  genius  or  experience.  The 
form  of  the  camps  was  a  square.  In  later  times,  they 
sometimes,  in  imitation  of  the  Greeks,  made  them  circular, 
or  adapted  them  to  the  ground.  The  camp  was  always 
surrounded  with  a  ditch  and  rampart,  and  divided  into  two 
parts  by  a  broad  street,  and  into  subdivisions  by  cross- 
streets  and  alleys.  Each  tent  was  calculated  to  hold  ten 
privates  and  a  petty  officer. 

In  the  middle  ages,  the  form  of  the  camp  did  not  differ 
very  essentially  from  that  of  the  Romans,  the  variation 
consisting  principally  in  the  interior  arrangements,  these 
arrangements  being  made  to  correspond  to  the  existing 
mode  of  forming  a  line  of  battle.  The  details  of  this  sys 
tem  may  be  found  in  the  military  work  of  Machiavelli. 

The  art  of  fixing  a  camp  in  modern  times  is  the  same 
as  taking  up  a  line  of  battle  on  the  same  position.  Of 


LOGISTICS.  Ill 

course  all  the  projectile  machines  must  be  in  play  and 
favorably  placed.  The  position  must  neither  be  com 
manded,  out-fronted,  nor  surrounded  ;  but  on  the  contrary 
ought,  as  far  as  possible,  to  command  and  out-front  the 
enemy's  position.  But  even  in  the  same  position  there 
are  numerous  modes  of  arranging  an  encampment,  or  of 
forming  a  line  of  battle,  and  to  select  the  best  of  these 
modes  requires  great  experience,  coup  d'&il,  and  genius. 
In  relation  to  this  point  Napoleon  makes  the  following 
remarks  : — 

"  Ought  an  army  to  be  confined  to  one  single  encamp 
ment,  or  ought  it  to  form  as  many  as  it  has  corps  or  di 
visions  ?  At  what  distance  ought  the  vanguard  and  the 
flankers  to  be  encamped  ?  What  frontage  and  what  depth 
ought  to  be  given  to  the  camp  ?  Where  should  the  caval 
ry,  the  artillery,  and  the  carriages  be  distributed  ?  Should 
the  army  be  ranged  in  battle  array,  in  several  lines  ?  and 
if  it  should,  what  space  should  .there  be  between  those 
lines  1  Should  the  cavalry  be  in  reserve  behind  the  in 
fantry,  or  should  it  be  placed  upon  the  wings  ?  As  every 
piece  has  sufficient  ammunition  for  keeping  up  its  fire 
twenty-four  hours,  should  all  the  artillery  be  brought  into 
action  at  the  beginning  of  the  engagement,  or  should  half 
of.it  be  kept  in  reserve  ? 

"  The  solution  of  these  questions  depends  on  the  follow 
ing  circumstances: — 1st.  On  the  number  of  troops,  and 
the  numbers  of  infantry,  artillery,  and  cavalry,  of  which 
the  army  is  composed.  2d.  On  the  relation  subsisting 
between  the  two  armies.  3d.  On  the  quality  of  the  troops. 
4th.  On  the  end  in  view.  5th.  On  the  nature  of  the  field. 
And  6th.  On  the  position  occupied  by  the  enemy,  and  on 
the  character  of  the  general  who  commands  them.  Noth 
ing  absolute  either  can  or  ought  to  be  prescribed  on  this 
head.  In  modem  warfare  there  is  no  natural  order  of 
battle, 


112  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

"  The  duty  to  be  performed  by  the  commander  of  an 
army  is  more  difficult  in  modern  armies,  than  it  was  in 
those  of  the  ancients.  It  is  also  certain  that  his  influence 
is  more  efficacious  in  deciding  battles.  In  the  ancient 
armies  the  general-in-chief,  at  a  distance  of  eighty  or  a 
hundred  toises  from  the  enemy,  was  in  no  danger ;  and 
yet  he  was  conveniently  placed,  so  as  to  have  an  oppor 
tunity  of  directing  to  advantage  all  the  movements  of  his 
forces.  In  modern  armies,  a  general-in-chief,  though  re 
moved  four  or  five  hundred  toises,  finds  himself  in  the 
midst  of  the  fire  of  the  enemy's  batteries,  and  is  very 
much-  exposed;  and  still  he  is  so  distant  that  several 
movements  of  the  enemy  escape  him.  In  every  engage 
ment  he  is  occasionally  obliged  to  approach  within  reach 
of  small-arms.  The  effect  of  modern  arms  is  much  in 
fluenced  by  the  situation  in  which  they  are  placed.  A 
battery  of  guns,  with  a  great  range  and  a  commanding 
position  that  takes  the  enemy  obliquely,  may  be  decisive 
of  a  victory.  Modern  fields  of  battle  are  much  more  ex 
tended  than  those  of  the  ancients,  whence  it  becomes 
necessary  to  study  operations  on  a  large  scale.  A  much 
greater  degree  of  experience  and  military  genius  is  re 
quisite  for  the  direction  of  a  modern  army  than  was  ne 
cessary  for  an  ancient  one." 

Figure  9  represents  a  camp  (on  favorable  ground)  of  a 
grand-division  of  an  army,  composed  of  two  brigades  or 
twelve  battalions  of  infantry,  twelve  squadrons  of  cavalry, 
five  batteries  of  artillery,  and  three  companies  of  engi 
neers. 

Figure  10  represents  the  details  of  a  camp  of  a  bat 
talion  of  infantry  composed  of  eight  companies. 

Figure  1 1  is  the  camp  of  a  squadron  of  cavalry. 

Figure  12  is  the  camp  of  two  batteries  of  foot  artillery, 
or  two  companies  of  foot  engineers. 

Figure  13  is  the  camp  of  two  batteries  of  mounted  ar- 


LOGISTICS.  113 

tillery,  or  two  companies  of  mounted  sappers  and  pon- 
toniers. 

On  undulating  or  broken  ground  the  arrangement  and 
order  of  the  general  camp,  as  well  as  the  details  of  the 
encampment  of  each  arm,  would  admit  of  much  variation.* 

*  There  are  many  valuable  remarks  on  the  various  subjects  com 
prised  under  the  head  of  logistics,  in  the  works  of  Jornini,  Grimoard, 
Thiebault,  Boutourlin,  Guibert,  Laroche  Amyon,  Bousmard,  Ternay, 
Vauchelle,  Odier,  Audouin,  Bardin,  Chemevrieres,  Daznan,  Ballyet, 
Dremaux,  Dupre  d'Aulnay,  Morin,  and  in  the  published  regulations 
and  orders  of  the  English  army. 


114  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 


CHAPTER  V. 

TACTICS. 

IV.  TACTICS. — We  have  defined  tactics  to  be  the  art 
of  bringing  troops  into  action,  or  of  moving  them  in  the 
presence  of  the  enemy ; — that  is,  within  his  view,  and 
within  the  reach  of  his  artillery.  This  branch  of  the 
military  art  has  usually  be'en  divided  into  two  parts  :  1st. 
Grand  Tactics,  or  the  tactics  of  battles  ;  and  2d.  Elemen 
tary  Tactics,  or  tactics  of  instruction.* 

A  battle  is  a  general  action  between  armies.  If  only  a 
small  portion  of  the  forces  are  engaged  it  is  usually  de 
nominated  a  combat,  an  affair,  an  action,  a  skirmish,  &c., 
according  to  the  character  of  the  conflict.  The  art  of 
combining  and  conducting  battles  of  all  descriptions  has 
been  designated  by  the  name  of  Grand  Tactics. 

Battles  may  be  arranged  into  three  classes;   1st.  De- 

*  "  It  does  not  come  within  the  view  of  this  work  to  say  any  thing  of 
the  merely  mechanical  part  of  the  art  ;  because  it  must  be  taken  for 
granted,  that  every  man  who  accepts  the  command  of  an  army 
knows  at  least  the  alphabet  of  his  trade.  If  he  does  not,  (unless  his 
enemy  be  as  ignorant  as  himself,)  ^defeat  and  infamy  await  him. 
Without  understanding  perfectly  what  are  called  the  evolutions,  how 
is  it  possible  that  a  general  can  give  to  his  own  army  that  order  of 
battle  which  shall  be  most  provident  and  skilful  in  each  particular 
case  in  which  he  may  be  placed  ?  How  know  which  of  these  evolu 
tions  the  enemy  employs  against  him  ?  and,  of  course,  how  decide  on 
a  counter-movement  which  may  be  necessary  to  secure  victory  or 
avoid  defeat?  The  man  who  shall  take  the  command  of  an  army 
without  perfectly  understanding  this  elementary  branch,  is  no  less 
presumptuous  than  he  who  should  pretend  to  <!each  Greek  without 
knowing  even  his  letters.  If  we  have  such  generals,  let  them,  for 
their  own  sakes,  if  not  for  their  country's,  put  themselves  immediately 
to  school." 


TACTICS.  115 

fensive  battles,  or  those  given  in  a  chosen  position^  by  an 
army  waiting  the  attack  of  the  enemy.  2d.  Offensive 
battles,  or  those  made  by  an  army  which  attacks  the  en 
emy  in  position.  3d.  The  mixed  or  unforeseen  battles, 
given  by  two  armies  meeting  while  on  the  march. 

I.  When  an  army  awaits  the  attack,  it  takes  its  posi 
tion  and  forms  its  line  of  battle  according  to  the  nature  of 
the  ground  and  the  supposed  character  and  strength  of 
the  enemy's  forces.  Such  is  usually  the  case  when  an 
army  wishes  to  cover  a  siege,  protect  a  capital,  guard 
depots  of  provisions  and  military  stores,  or  some  import 
ant  strategic  point.  The  general  relations  of  positions 
with  strategy  and  engineering  have  already  been  consid 
ered  ;  we  will  now  discuss  merely  their  relations  to  bat 
tles. 

The  first  condition  to  be  satisfied  by  a  tactical  position 
is,  that  its  debouches  shall  be  more  favorable  for  falling 
on  the  enemy  when  he  has  approached  to  the  desired 
point,  than  those  which  the  enemy  can  have  for  attacking 
our  line  of  battle.  2d.  The  artillery  should  have  its  full 
effect  upon  all  the  avenues  of  approach.  3d.  We  should 
have  good  ground  for  manreuvring  our  own  troops  un 
seen,  if  possible,  by  the  enemy.  4th.  We  should  have  a 
full  view  of  the  enemy's  mano3uvres  as  he  advances  to 
the  attack.  5th.  We  should  have  the  flanks  of  our  line 
well  protected  by  natural  or  artificial  obstacles.  6th.  We 
should  have  some  means  of  effecting  a  retreat  without 
exposing  our  army  to  destruction. 

It  is  very  seldom  that  all  these  conditions  can  be  satis 
fied  at  the  same  time ;  and  sometimes  the  very  means  of 
satisfying  one,  may  be  in  direct  violation  of  another.  A 
river,  a  forest,  or  a  mountain,  which  secures  a  flank  of  a 
line  of  battle,  may  become  an  obstacle  to  a  retreat,  should 
the  defensive  forces  be  thrown  back  upon  that  wing. 
Again,  the  position  may  be  difficult  of  attack  in  front  or 


116  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

on  the  wings,  and  at  the  same  time  unfavorable  for  re 
treat.  Such  was  Wellington's  position  at  Waterloo.  The 
park  of  Hougomont,  the  hamlet  of  Haye  Sainte,  and  the 
marshy  rivulet  of  Papelotte,  were  serious  obstacles  against 
the  attacking  force  ;  but  the  marshy  forest  of  Soignies  in 
rear,  with  but  a  single  road,  cut  off  all  hope  of  retreat. 

II.  According  to  the  strategic  relations  of  the  contend 
ing  forces  in  a  campaign,  will  it  be  determined  whether 
we  are  to  await  the  enemy,  or  to  seek  him  out  and  attack 
him  wherever  he  may  be  found.     We  may  sometimes  be 
obliged  to  make  the  attack  at  all  hazards,  for  the  purpose 
of  preventing  the  junction  of  two   corps,  or  to   cut  off 
forces  that  may  be  separated  from  the  main  body  by  a 
river,  &c.     As  a  general  rule  the  attacking  force  has  a 
moral  superiority  over  the  defensive,  but  this  advantage 
is  frequently  more  than  counterbalanced  by  other  condi 
tions. 

The  main  thing  in  an  offensive  battle  is  to  seize  upon 
the  decisive  point  of  the  field.  This  point  is  determined 
by  the  configuration  of  the  ground,  the  position  of  the 
contending  forces,  the  strategic  object  of  the  battle ;  or, 
by  a  combination  of  these.  For  example,  when  one  wing 
of  the  enemy  rests  on  a  height  that  commands  the  re 
mainder  of  his  line,  this  would  seem  the  decisive  point  to 
be  attacked,  for  its  occupation  would  secure  the  greatest 
advantages  ;  but  this  point  may  be  so  very  difficult  of  ac 
cess,  or  be  so  related  to  the  strategic  object  as  to  render 
its  attack  out  of  the  question.  Thus  it  was  at  the  battle 
of  Bautzen :  the  left  of  the  allies  rested  on  the  mountains 
of  Bohemia,  which  were  difficult  of  attack,  but  favorable 
for  defence  ;  moreover,  their  only  line  of  retreat  was  on 
the  right,  which  thus  became  the  point  of  attack  for  the 
French,  although  the  topographical  and  tactical  key  of  the 
field  was  on  the  left. 

III.  It  frequently  happens  in  modern  warfare  that  bat- 


TACTICS.  117 

ties  result  from  the  meeting  of  armies  in  motion,  both 
parties  acting  on  the  offensive.  Indeed,  an  army  that  is 
occupying  a  defensive  position  may,  on  the  approach  of 
the  enemy,  advance  to  meet  him  while  on  the  march. 
Battles  of  this  kind  may  partake  of  the  mixed  character 
of  offensive  and  defensive  actions,  or  they  m&y  be  of  the 
nature  of  a  surprise  to  both  armies.  To  this  class  belong 
the  battles  of  Rosbach,  Eylau,  Lutzen,  Luzzara,  Abens- 
berg,  &c. 

Surprises  were  much  more  common  in  ancient  than  in 
modern  times,  for  the  noise  of  musketry  and  the  roar  of 
artillery,  belonging  to  the  posts  or  wings  assailed,  will 
prevent  any  general  surprise  of  an  army.  Moreover,  the 
division  into  separate  masses,  or  corps  d'armee,  will  ne 
cessarily  confine  the  surprise  to  a  part,  at  most,  of  the 
forces  employed.  Nevertheless,  in  the  change  given  to 
military  terms,  a  surprise  may  now  mean  oniy  an  unex 
pected  combination  of  mano3uvres  for  an  attack,  rather 
than  an  actual  falling  upon  troops  unguarded  or  asleep. 
In  this  sense  Marengo,  Lutzen,  Eylau,  &c.  are  numbered 
with  surprises.  Benningsen's  attack  on  Murat  at  Zaran- 
tin  in  1812  was  a  true  surprise,  resulting  from  the  gross 
negligence  and  carelessness  of  the  king  of  Naples. 

An  order  of  battle  is  the  particular  disposition  given  to 
the  troops  for  a  determined  manoeuvre  on  the  field  of  bat 
tle.  A  line  of  battle  is  the  general  name  applied  to  troops 
drawn  up  in  their  usual  order  of  exercise,  without  any 
determined  manoeuvre  ;  it  may  apply  to  defensive  posi 
tions,  or  to  offensive  operations,  where  no  definitive  object 
has  been  decided  on.  Military  writers  lay  down  twelve 
orders  of  battle,  viz.:  1st.  The  simple  parallel  order; 
2d.  The  parallel  order  with  a  crotchet ;  3d.  The  parallel 
order  reinforced  on  one  or  both  wings  ;  4th.  The  parallel 
order  reinforced  on  the  centre  ;  5th.  The  simple  oblique 
order ;  6th.  The  oblique  order  reinforced  on  the  assailing 


118  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

wing ;  7th.  The  perpendicular  order  on  one  or  both  wings ; 
8th.  The  concave  order;  9th.  The  convex  order;  10th. 
The  order  by  echelon  on  one  or  both  wings  ;  llth.  The 
order  by  echelon  on  the  centre  ;  12th.  The  combined  or 
ders  of  attack  on'  the  centre  and  one  wing  at  the  same 
time. 

(Figure  14.)*  The  simple  parallel  order  is  the  worst  pos 
sible  disposition  for  a  battle,  for  the  two  parties  here  fight 
with  equal  chances,  and  the  combat  must  continue  till  ac 
cident,  superior  numbers,  or  mere  physical  strength  de 
cides  the  day ;  skill  can  have  little  or  no  influence  in 
such  a  contest. 

(Figure  15.)  The  parallel  order  with  a  crotchet  on 
the  flank,  is  sometimes  used  in  a  defensive  position,  and 
also  in  the  offensive  with  the  crotchet  thrown  forward. 
Malplaquet,  Nordlingen,  Prague,  and  Kolin,  are  examples 
of  this  order.  Wellington,  at  Waterloo,  formed  the  paral 
lel  order  with  the  retired  crotchet  on  the  right  flank. 

(Figure  1.6.)  A  line  of  battle  parallel  to  the  enemy's, 
if  strongly  reinforced  on  one  point,  is  according  to  cor 
rect  principles,  and  may  in  certain  cases  secure  the  vic 
tory  ;  but  it  has  many  inconveniences.  The  weak  part 
of  the  line  being  too  near  the  enemy,  may,  notwithstand 
ing  its  efforts  to  the  contrary,  become  engaged,  and  run 
the  risk  of  a  defeat,  and  thereby  counterbalance  the  ad 
vantages  gained  by  the  strong  point.  Moreover,  the  rein 
forced  part  of  the  line  will  not  be  able  to  profit  by  its 
success  by  taking  the  enemy's  line  in  flank  and  rear, 
without  endangering  its  connection  with  the  rest  of  the 
line. 

*  In  the  plans,  B  is  the  army  in  position,  and  A  the  attacking  force 
arranged  according  to  the  different  orders  of  battle.  To  simplify  the 
drawings,  a  single  line  represents  the  position  of  an  army,  whereas,  in 
practice,  troops  are  usually  drawn  up  in  three  lines.  Each  figure  ro- 
Dresents  a  grand  division  of  twelve  battalions. 


TACTICS.  119 

(Figure  17)  represents  the  parallel  order  reinforced  on 
the  centre.  The  same  remarks  are  applicable  to  this  as  to 
the  preceding. 

These  two  orders  were  frequently  used  by  the  ancients  ; 
as  at  the  battle  of  Zama,  for  example  ;  and  sometimes  by 
modern  generals.  Turenne  employed  one  of  them  at  Ens- 
heim. 

(Figure  18)  is  the  simple  oblique  order. 

(Figure  19)  is  the  oblique  order,  with  the  attacking  wing 
reinforced.  This  last  is  better  suited  for  an  inferior  army 
in  attacking  a  superior,  for  it  enables  it  to  carry  the  mass 
of  its  force  on  a  single  point  of  the  enemy's  line,  while  the 
weak  wing  is  not  only  out  of  reach  of  immediate  attack, 
but  also  holds  the  remainder  of  the  enemy's  line  in  check 
by  acting  as  a  reserve  ready  to  be  concentrated  on  the  fa 
vorable  point  as  occasion  may  require. 

The  most  distinguished  examples  under  this  order  are 
the  battles  of  Leuctra  and  Mantinea,  under  the  celebrated 
Epaminondas  ;  Leuthen,  under  Frederick  ;  the  Pyramids, 
Marengo,  and  Jena,  under  Napoleon. 

(Figure  20.)  An  army  may  be  perpendicular  upon  a  flank 
at  the  beginning  of  a  battle,  as  was  the  army  of  Frederick 
at  Rosbach,  and  the  Russian  army  at  Kunersdorff;  but 
this  order  must  soon  change  to  the  oblique.  An  attack 
upon  both  wings  can  only  be  made  when  the  attacking 
force  is  vastly  superior.  At  Eylau,  Napoleon  made  a  per 
pendicular  attack  on  one  wing  at  the  same  time  that  he 
sought  to  pierce  the  enemy's  centre. 

(Figure  21.)  The  concave  order  may  be  used  with  ad 
vantage  in  certain  cases,  and  in  particular  localities.  Han 
nibal  employed  it  at  the  battle  of  Cannoe,  the  English  at 
Crecy  and  Agincourt,  and  the  Austrians  at  Essling,  in 
1809. 

(Figure  22.)  The  convex  order  is  sometimes  formed  to 
cover  a  defile,  to  attack  a  concave  line,  or  to  oppose  an 


120  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

attack  before  or  after  the  passage  of  a  river.  The  Ro 
mans  formed  this  order  at  the  battle  of  Cosilinum ;  the 
French  at  Ramilies  in  1706,  at  Fleurus  in  1794,  at  Ess- 
ling  in  1809,  and  at  the  second  and  third  days  of  Leipsic 
in  1813,  and  at  Brienne  in  1814. 

(Figure  23.)  The  order  by  echelon  on  one  wing  may  be 
frequently  employed  with  advantage  ;  but  if  the  echelon  be 
made  on  both  wings,  there  is  the  same  objection  to  its  use  as 
to  the  perpendicular  order  on  both  wings.  At  Dresden,  Na 
poleon  attacked  both  wings  at  the  same  time  ;  this  is  the 
only  instance  in  his  whole  history  of  a  similar  attack,  and 
this  was  owing  to  peculiar  circumstances  in  the  ground 
and  in  the  position  of  his  troops. 

(Figure  24.)  The  echelon  order  on  the  centre  alone  may 
be  employed  with  success  against  an  army  formed  in  a 
thin  or  too  extended  line  of  battle,  for  it  would  be  pretty 
certain  to  penetrate  and  break  the  line. 

The  echelon  order  possesses  in  general  very  great  ad 
vantages.  The  several  corps  composing  the  army  may 
manoeuvre  separately,  and  consequently  with  greater  ease. 
Each  echelon  covers  the  flank  of  that  which  precedes  it ; 
and  all  may  be  combined  towards  a  single  object,  and  ex 
tended  with  the  necessary  ensemble.  At  the  battle  of  the 
Pyramids,  Napoleon  formed  the  oblique  order  in  echelon 
by  squares.  Portions  of  his  forces  were  arranged  in  eche 
lon  in  some  of  his  other  battles. 

(Figure  25.)  The  combined  order  in  columns  on  the 
centre  and  one  extremity  at  the  same  time,  is  better  suited 
than  either  of  the  preceding  for  attacking  a  strong  contig 
uous  line.  Napoleon  employed  this  order  at  Wagram, 
Ligny,  Bautzen,  Borodino,  arid  Waterloo. 

It  is  impossible  to  lay  down,  as  a  general  rule,  which 
of  these  orders  of  battle  should  be  employed,  or  that  either 
should  be  exclusively  followed  throughout  the  whole  bat 
tle.  The  question  must  be  decided  by  the  general  him 


TACTICS.  121 

self  on  the  ground,  where  all  the  circumstances  may  be 
duly  weighed.  An  order  well  suited  to  one  position  might 
be  the  worst  possible  in  another.  Tactics  is  in  this  re 
spect  the  very  reverse  of  strategy — the  latter  being  subject 
to  more  rigid  and  invariable  rules. 

But  whatever  the  plan  adopted  by  the  attacking  force, 
it  should  seek  to  dislodge  the  enemy,  either  by  piercing 
or  turning  his  line.  If  it  can  conceal  its  real  intentions, 
and  deceive  him  respecting  the  true  point  of  attack,  suc 
cess  will  be  more  certain  and  decisive.  A  turning  ma 

o 

noeuvre  may  frequently  be  employed  with  advantage  at  the 
same  time  with  the  main  attack  on  the  line.  The  opera 
tions  of  Davoust  at  Wagram,  and  Richepanse  at  Hohen- 
linden,  are  good  examples  under  this  head.  The  ma 
noeuvre  is,  however,  a  difficult  one,  and  unless  executed 
with  skill,  may  lead  to  disasters  like  the  turning  manoeuvres 
of  the  Austrians  at  Rivoli  and  Austerlitz,  and  of  the  French 
under  Jourdan  at  Stackach,  and  under  Marmont  at  Sala 
manca. 

We  will  now  discuss  the  particular  manner  of  arranging 
he  troops  on  the  line  of  battle,  or  the  manner  of  employ 
ing  each  arm,  without  entering,  however,  much  into  the 
detailed  tactics  of  formation  and  instruction. 

We  shall  begin  with  infantry,  as  the  most  important  arm 
on  the  battle-field. 

There  are  four  different  ways  of  forming  infantry  for 
battle  :  1st,  as  tirailleurs,  or  light  troops  ;  2d,  in  deployed 
lines ;  3d,  in  lines  of  battalions,  ployed  on  the  central  di 
vision  of  each  battalion,  or  formed  in  squares  ;  4th,  in  deep 
masses. 

These  different  modes  of  formation  are  reduced  to  four 
separate  systems  :  1st,  the  thin  formation  of  two  deployed 
lines  ;  2d,  a  line  of  battalions  in  columns  of  attack  on  the 
centre,  or  in  squares  by  battalions  ;  3d,  a  combination  of 
these  two,  or  the  first  line  deployed,  and  the  second  in 

11 


122  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

columns  of  attack  ;  and  4th,  the  deep  formation  of  heavy 
columns  of  several  battalions.  The  tirailleurs  are  merely 
accessories  to  the  main  forces,  and  are  employed  to  fill 
up  intervals,  to  protect  the  march  of  the  columns,  to  an 
noy  the  enemy,  and  to  manoeuvre  on  the  flanks. 

1st.  Formerly  the  line  of  battle  for  infantry  was  very  gen 
erally  that  of  two  deployed  lines  of  troops,  as  shown  in  Fig. 
26.  But  reason  and  experience  have  demonstrated  that 
infantry  in  this  thin  or  light  order  can  only  move  very 
slowly  ;  that  in  attempting  rapid  movements  it  breaks  and 
exhibits  great  and  dangerous  undulations,  and  would  be 
easily  pierced  through  by  troops  of  a  deeper  order.  Hence 
it  is  that  the  light  formation  is  only  proper  when  the  in 
fantry  is  to  make  use  of  its  fire,  and  to  remain  almost  sta 
tionary. 

2d.  If  the  formation  of  a  line  of  battalions  in  columns 
of  attack  be  employed-,  the  depth  and  mobility  will  depend 
upon  the  organization  or  habitual  formation  of  this  arm. 

In  our  service  a  battalion  is  supposed  to  be  composed 
of  ten  companies,  each  formed  in  three  ranks.  The  two 
flank  companies  are  designed  for  tirailleurs.  This  would 
give  a  column  of  four  divisions,  and  consequently  twelve 
files  deep ;  and  as  only  two  of  these  files  could  employ 
their  fire,  there  would  be  much  too  large  a  portion  of  non- 
combatants  exposed  to  the  enemy's  artillery.  In  practice, 
however,  we  employ  the  two-rank  formation,  which,  if  the 
flank  companies  be  detached,  would  give  a  column  of  at 
tack  eight  files  in  depth,  which  is  not  objectionable.  If 
however,  the  flank  companies  should  be  present  in  the 
battalion,  the  depth  of  the  column  would  still  be  ten  files. 

In  the  French  service,  each  battalion  is  composed  of 
four  divisions,  formed  in  either  two  or  three  ranks.  The 
two-rank  formation  is  the  one  habitually  employed.  If  all 
the  companies  be  present,  and  the  formation  in  three  ranks, 
the  depth  of  column  will  be  twelve  files  ;  if  in  two  ranks 


TACTICS.  123 

the  depth  will  be  eight,  files.  If  the  flank  companies  be 
detached,  the  depth  of  column  will  be,  for  three  ranks  nine 
files,  and  for  two  ranks  six  files.  (Figs.  27  and  28.) 

In  the  Russian  service  each  battalion  has  four  divisions 
of  three  ranks  each.  But  the  third  rank  is  employed  as 
tirailleurs,  which  gives  a  depth  of  column  of  eight  files. 
The  employment  of  the  third  rank  for  tirailleurs  is  deemed 
objectionable  on  account  of  the  difficulty  of  rallying  them 
on  the  column.  For  this  reason,  the  best  authorities  pre 
fer  detaching  an  entire  division  of  two  companies. 

The  formation  of  squares  is  exceedingly  effective  in  an 
open  country,  and  against  an  enemy  who  is  superior  in 
cavalry.  Formerly  very  large  squares  were  employed, 
but  they  are  now  formed  either  by  regiment  or  by  battal 
ion.  The  former  are  deemed  best  for  the  defensive,  and 
the  latter  for  offensive  movements.  The  manner  of  ar 
ranging  these  is  shown  in  Figure  29. 

3d.  The  mixed  system,  or  the  combination  of  the  two 
preceding,  has  sometimes  been  employed  with  success. 
Napoleon  used  this  formation  at  Tagliamento,  and  the 
Russians  at  Eylau.  Each  regiment  \vas  composed  of 
three  battalions,  the  first  being  deployed  in  line,  and  the 
other  two  formed  in  columns  of  attack  by  division  in  rear 
of  the  two'  extremities,  as  shown  in  Fig.  30.  It  may  in 
some  cases  be  better  to  place  the  second  and  third  bat 
talions  in  line  with  the  first,  and  on  the  two  extremities  of 
this  battalion,  in  order  to  prolong  the  line  of  fire.  The 
centre  of  the  line  of  each  regiment  would  be  less  strong, 
however,  than  when  the  two  battalions  by  column  are 
placed  in  rear  of  the  other  which  is  deployed.  This 
mixed  system  of  formation  has  many  advocates,  and  in 
certain  situations  may  be  employed  with  great  advantage. 

4th.  The  deep  order  of  heavy  columns  of  several  bat 
talions  is  objectionable  as  an  habitual  formation  for  battle, 
inasmuch  as  it  exposes  large  masses  of  men  to  the  ravages 


124  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

of  artillery,  and  diminishes  the  mobility  and  impulsion  of 
an  attack  without  adding  greatly  to  its  force.  Macdonald 
led  a  column  of  this  kind  at  the  battle  of  Wagram  with 
complete  success,  although  "he  experienced  enormous 
losses.  But  Ney's  heavy  columns  of  attack  at  Waterloo 
failed  of  success,  and  suffered  terribly  from  the  concentric 
fire  of  the  enemy's  batteries. 

Whenever  deep  columns  are  employed,  Jomini  recom 
mends  that  the  grand-division  of  twelve  battalions  should 
have  one  battalion  on  each  flank,  (Fig.  31,)  marching  by 
files,  in  order  to  protect  its  flanks  from  the  enemy's  at 
tacks.  Without  this  defence  a  column  of  twelve  bat 
talions  deep  becomes  an  inert  mass,  greatly  exposed  to  be 
thrown  into  disorder  or  broken,  as  was  the  column  of  Fon- 
tenoy,  and  the  Macedonian  phalanx  by  Paulus  Emillus. 
A  grand-division  is  sometimes  arranged  in  two  columns 
by  brigade,  as  is  represented  in  Figure  32.  These  are  less 
heavy  than  a  single  column  of  grand-division  by  battalion, 
but  are  subject  to  nearly  the  same  objections. 

All  offensive  operations  on  the  field  of  battle  require 
mobility,  solidity,  and  impulsion ;  while,  on  the  other  hand, 
all  defensive  operations  should  combine  solidity  with  the 
greatest  possible  amount  ofjire. 

Troops  in  motion  can  make  but  little  use  of  their  fire 
arms,  whatever  may  be  their  formation.  If  in  very  large 
masses,  they  move  slower  and  are  more  exposed  ;  but  the 
moral  effect  of  these  large  moveable  columns  is  such,  that 
they  frequently  carry  positions  without  ever  employing 
their  fire.  The  French  columns  usually  succeeded  against 
the  Austrian  and  Prussian  infantry,  but  the  English  in 
fantry  could  not  so  easily  be  driven  from  their  ground ; 
hey  also  employed  their  fire  to  greater  advantage,  as  was 
shown  at  Talavera,  Busaco,  Fuente  de  Honore,  Albuera 
and  Waterloo.  The  smaller  columns  and  the  mixed  for 
mation  were  always  most  successful  against  such  troops. 


TACTICS.  125 

From  these  remarks  we  must  conclude — 1st,  That  the 
very  thin  as  well  as  the  very  deep  formation  is  objec 
tionable  under  ordinary  circumstances,  and  can  seldom  be 
.  employed  with  safety. 

2d.  That  the  attack  by  battalions  in  columns  by  division 
is  the  best  for  carrying  a  position  ;  the  column  should, 
however,  be  diminished  in  depth  as  much  as  possible,  in 
order  both  to  increase  its  own  fire  and  to  diminish  its  ex 
posure  to  the  fire  of  the  enemy  ;  moreover,  it  should  be 
well  covered  by  tirailleurs  and  supported  by  cavalry. 

3d.  That  the  mixed  formation  of  the  first  line  deployed 
and  the  second  in  columns  of  battalion  by  division  is  the 
best  for  defence. 

4th.  That  either  of  the  last  two  may  be  employed  in 
the  offensive  or  defensive,  according  to  the  nature  of  the 
ground,  the  character  of  the  general,  and  the  character 
and  position  of  the  troops.  Squares  are  always  good 
against  cavalry. 

Troops  should  be  habituated  to  all  these  formations,  and 
accustomed  to  pass  rapidly  from  one  to  another  in  the 
daytime  or  at  night.  None,  however,  but  disciplined 
troops  can  do  this  :  hence  the  great  superiority  of  regulars 
on  the  field  of  battle,  where  skilful  manoeuvres  frequently 
effect  more  than  the  most  undaunted  courage. 

The  arm  next  in  importance  on  the,  battle-field  is  cav 
alry.  The  principal  merit  of  this  arm  consists  in  its  velo 
city  and  mobility.  Cavalry  has  little  solidity,  and  cannot 
of  itself  defend  any  position  against  infantry  ;  but  in  con 
nection  with  the  other  arms,  it  is  indispensable  for  begin 
ning  a  battle,  for  completing  a  victory,  and  for  reaping 
its  full  advantage  by  pursuing  and  destroying  the  beaten 
foe. 

There  are  four  different  modes  of  forming  cavalry,  the 
same  as  for  infantry  :  1st,  in  deployed  lines ;  2d,  a  line  of 
regiments  in  column  of  attack  on  the  centre  ;  3d,  the 


126  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

mixed  formation  ;  and  4th,  the  deep  formation  of  several 
columns. 

1st.  The  thin  formation  was  deemed  objectionable  for 
infantry,  on  account  of  its  liability  to  be  penetrated  by 
cavalry.  The  same  objection  does  not  hold  so  forcibly 
with  respect  to  this  latter  arm  ;  but  full  lines  are  deemed 
less  advantageous  than  lines  deployed  checker-wise  or  in 
echelon.  In  either  case  the  distance  between  the  lines 
should  be  sufficient  to  prevent  the  second  line  from  com 
ing  in  contact  with  the  first,  in  case  the  latter  receives  a 
slight  check.  This  distance  need  not  be  so  great  in  lines 
deployed  checker-wise,  as  when  they  are  full,  or  in  ech 
elon. 

2d.  The  second  system  of  formation,  that  is,  a  line  of 
columns  of  attack  on  the  central  division  for  infantry,  is 
by  battalion,  but  for  cavalry,  by  regiment.  If  the  regiment 
is  composed  of  eight  squadrons,  the  column  will  contain 
four  lines,  two  squadrons  forming  a  division ;  but  if  com 
posed  of  only  six  squadrons,  the  column  will  contain  only 
three  lines,  and  consequently  will  be  six  files  in  depth. 
In  either  case  the  distance  between  the  lines  should  be 
that  of  a  demi-squadron,  when  the  troops  are  drawn  up  in 
battle  array ;  but  when  charging,  the  divisions  may  close 
to  a  less  distance. 

3d.  In  forming  a  grand  division  of  two  brigades,  by  the 
third  or  mixed  system,  two  regiments  may  be  deployed 
in  the  first  line,  and  three  formed  in  columns  of  attack  in 
rear  of  the  flanks  and  centre,  as  is  shown  in  Fig.  33,  the 
sixth  being  held  in  reserve.  This  formation  is  deemed  a 
good  one. 

4th.  The  fourth  system,  of  deep  columns  of  cavalry,  is 
entirely  unsuited  for  the  charge,  and  this  formation  can 
only  be  employed  for  troops  drawn  up  in  reserve. 

The  flanks  of  lines  or  columns  of  cavalry  are  always 
much  exposed,  and  squadrons  should  therefore  be  formed 


TACTICS.  127 

in  echelon  on  the  right  and  left,  and  a  little  in  rear  of  the 
main  body,  in  order  to  protect  the  flanks  from  the  attacks 
of  the  enemy's  horse.  Irregular  cavalry  is  usually  em 
ployed  for  this  purpose. 

In  the  formation  of  a  grand  division  in  line  of  battle, 
care  should  be  taken  not  to  give  too  great  an  extent  to  the 
command  of  the  generals  of  brigade.  If  the  formation  be 
in  two  lines,  neither  brigade  should  form  an  entire  line, 
but  each  should  form  a  wing  of  the  division,  two  regiments 
of  the  same  brigade  being  placed  in  rear  of  each  other. 
This  rule  is  an  important  one,  and  should  never  be  ne 
glected. 

It  may  also  be  laid  down  as  a  maxim,  in  the  formation 
of  cavalry  on  the  battle-field,  that  the  first  line  after  the 
charge,  even  if  most  successful,  may  require  reforming  in 
rear  of  the  second  line,  and  that  this  last  should  be  pre 
pared  to  act  in  the  front  line  after  the  first  onset.  The 
success  of  the  battle  frequently  depends  upon  the  charge 
of  the  final  reserve  of  cavalry  on  the  flanks  of  lines  already 
engaged. 

It  is  on  account  of  this  frequent  manoeuvring  of  the  cav 
alry  on  the  battle-field,  its  reforming  for  repeated  charges, 
that  great  bodies  deployed  in  full  lines  are  principally  ob 
jected  to.  They  cannot  be  handled  with  the  facility  and 
rapidity  of  columns  of  regiments  by  divisions.  The  at 
tack  of  Nansouty's  cavalry,  formed  in  this  way,  on  the 
Prussian  cavalry,  deployed  in  advance  of  Chateau-Thierry, 
in  1814,  is  a  good  proof  of  this. 

Cavalry  may  be  brought  to  a  charge — 1st,  in  columns  ; 
2d,  in  line  ;  and  3d,  in  route,  or  at  random,  (a  la  deban* 
dade.)  These  may  also  be  varied  by  charging  either  at  a 
trot  or  a  gallop.  All  these  modes  have  been  employed 
with  success.  In  a  regular  charge  in  line  the  lance  offers 
great  advantages ;  in  the  melee  the  sabre  is  the  best  weap 
on  ;  hence  some  military  writers  have  proposed  arming 


128  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

the  front  rank  with  lancesy  and  the  second  with  sabres, 
The  pistol  and  the  carabine  are  useless  in  the  charge,  but 
may  sometimes  be  employed  with  advantage  against  con 
voys,  outposts,  and  light  cavalry ;  to  fire  the  carabine  with 
any  effect,  the  troop  must  be  at  a  halt.  In  all  charges  in 
line,  especially  against  cavalry,  the  fast  trot  is  deemed 
preferable  to  the  gallop,  on  account  of  the  difficulty  of 
keeping  up  the  alignment  when  the  speed  is  increased. 
Lances  are  utterly  useless  in  a  melee,  and  in  employing 
troops  armed  in  this  way,  it  is  of  the  greatest  importance 
to  keep  them  in  order  and  in  line.  In  charging  with  the 
sabre  against  artillery  the  gallop  may  sometimes  be  em 
ployed,  for  velocity  here  maybe  more  important  than  force. 

We  will  now  consider  the  formation  and  use  of  artillery 
on  the  field  of  battle.  It  may  be  laid  down  as  a  funda 
mental  principle,  that  the  fire  of  artillery  should  be  di 
rected  on  that  part  of  the  enemy's  line  which  we  design 
to  pierce  ;  for  this  fire  will  not  only  weaken  this  point, 
but  will  also  aid  the  attack  of  the  cavalry  and  infantry 
when  the  principal  efforts  are  directed  towards  the  in 
tended  point. 

In  the  defence, the  artillery  is  usually  distributed  through 
out  the  whole  line,  on  ground  favorable  for  its  fire ;  but 
the  reserve  should  be  so  placed  that  it  can  easily  be 
brought  to  bear  on  the  point  where  the  enemy  will  be 
most  likely  to  direct  his  principal  attack. 

Artillery  placed  on  a  plain,  or  with  ground  slightly  in 
clined  in  front,  and  using  the  point-blank  or  ricochet  fire, 
is  the  most  effective  ;  very  high  points  are  unfavorable 
If  possible,  the  concentric  fire  should  be  employed  against 
the  enemy's  columns  of  attack.  The  position  of  the  Eng 
lish  artillery  on  the  field  of  Waterloo,  and  the  use  of  the 
concentric  fire,  furnishes  one  of  the  best  examples  for  the 
disposition  of  this  arm  to  be  found  in  moderm  military 
history. 


TACTICS.  129 

The  proper  use  of  artillery  on  the  battle-field  is  against 
the  enemas  infantry  and  cavalry,  consequently  only  a 
small  part  of  it  should  be  employed  to  respond  to  the  fire 
of  the  enemy's  batteries  ;  not  more  than  one  third  at  most 
can  be  spared  for  this  object. 

If  possible,  batteries  should  be  established  so  as  to  take 
the  enemy's  line  in  flank,  either  by  an  oblique  or  enfilading 
fire.  A  direct  fire  against  columns  of  attack,  with  a  few 
light  pieces  thrown  out  to  take  it  in  flank  at  the  same  time, 
will  always  be  advantageous.  A  direct  and  flank  fire  was 
employed  with  success  by  Kleist  against  the  column  of 
Ney  at  the  battle  of  Bautzen ;  the  French  marshal  was 
forced  to  change  his  direction. 

Batteries  should  always  be  well  secured  on  the  flanks, 
and  constantly  sustained  by  infantry  or  cavalry.  If  at 
tacked  by  cavalry,  the  artillery  should  keep  up  its  fire  as 
long  as  possible,  first  with  ball,  and  then  with  grape  when 
the  enemy  arrives  within  a  suitable  distance.  The  same 
rule  will  apply  to  attacks  of  infantry,  except  that  the  fire 
of  solid  shot  at  a  great  distance  is  much  less  effective  than 
against  mounted  troops. 

The  engineer  troops  are  employed  on  the  field  of  battle 
principally  by  detachments,  acting  as  auxiliaries  to  the 
other  arms.  Each  regiment  of  infantry  should  have  a  de 
tachment  of  sappers  armed  with  axes  to  act  as  pioneers, 
for  the  removal  of  obstacles  that  may  impede  its  advance. 
These  sappers  are  of  the  utmost  importance,  for  without 
them  an  entire  column  might  be  checked  and  thrown  into 
confusion  by  impediments  which  a  few  sappers  with  their 
axes  would  remove  in  a  very  short  time.  Detachments  of 
engineer  troops  must  also  act  in  concert  with  the  cavalry 
and  artillery  for  the  same  purpose  as  above.  In  establish 
ing  the  batteries  of  artillery,  in  opening  roads  for  their  ma 
noeuvres,  and  in  arranging  material  obstacles  for  their  de 
fence,  the  axes,  picks,  and  shovels  of  the  sappers  are  of 


130  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

infinite  value.  Field-works,  bridges,  and  bridge-defences, 
frequently  have  a  decisive  influence  upon  the«  result  of  a 
battle,  but  as  these  are  usually  arranged  previous  to  the  ac 
tion,  they  will  be  discussed  in  another  place.  In  the  at 
tack  and  defence  of  these  field-works,  the  engineer  troops 
play  a  distinguished  part.  The  consideration  of  this  part 
of  the  subject,  though  perhaps  properly  belonging  to 
the  tactics  of  battles,  will  also  be  postponed  to  another 
occasion. 

We  will  now  discuss  the  employment  of  the  combined 
arms  on  the  field  of  battle. 

Before  the  French  Revolution,  all  the  infantry,  formed 
by  regiments  and  brigades,  was  united  in  a  single  body 
and  drawn  up  in  two  lines.  The  cavalry  was  placed  on 
the  two  flanks,  and  the  artillery  distributed  along  the  en 
tire  line.  In  moving  by  wings,  they  formed  four  columns, 
two  of  cavalry  and  two  of  infantry :  in  moving  by  a  flank, 
they  formed  only  two  very  long  columns  ;  the  cavalry, 
however,  sometimes  formed  a  third  and  separate  column 
in  flank  movements,  but  this  disposition  was  rarely  made. 

The  French  Revolution  introduced  the  system  of  grand 
divisions  composed  of  the  four  arms  combined ;  each  di 
vision  moved  separately  and  independently  of  the  other. 
In  the  wars  of  the  Empire,  Napoleon  united  two  or  more 
of  these  divisions  into  a  corps  d'armee^  which  formed  a 
wing,  the  centre,  or  reserve  of  his  grand  army.  In  addition 
to  these  divisions  and  corps  tfarmee,  he  had  large  reserves 
of  cavalry  and  artillery,  which  were  employed  as  distinct 
and  separate  arms. 

If  the  forces  be  sufficiently  numerous  to  fight  by  corps 
d'armee,  each  corps  should  have  its  own  reserve,  inde 
pendent  of  the  general  reserve  of  the  army.  Again,  if  the 
forces  be  so  small  as  to  act  by  grand  divisions  only,  each 
division  should  then  have  its  separate  reserve. 

An  army,  whether  composed  of  separate  corps  or  of 


TACTICS.  131 

grand  divisions,  usually  forms,  on  the  iield  of  battle,  a  cen 
tre,  two  wings,  and  a  reserve.  Each  corps  or  division 
acts  by  itself,  with  its  infantry,  cavalry,  artillery,  and  en 
gineer  troops.  The  reserve  of  cavalry  may  be  formed  in 
rear  of  the  centre  or  one  of  the  wings.  In  small  forces 
of  fifty  or  sixty  thousand  men,  the  cavalry  may  act  with 
advantage  on  the  wings,  in  the  manner  of  the  ancients. 
If  the  reserve  of  this  arm  be  large  enough  to  form  three 
separate  bodies,  it  may  itself  very  properly  be  formed  into 
a  centre  and  wings.  If  it  be  formed  into  two  columns 
only,  they  may  be  placed  in  rear  of  the  openings  between 
the  centre  and  the  wings  of  the  main  force.  The  reserve 
of  artillery  is  employed  either  to  reinforce  the  centre  or 
a  wing,  and  in  the  defensive  is  frequently  distributed 
throughout  the  whole  line  of  battle.  In  offensive  opera 
tions,  it  may  be  well  to  concentrate  as  much  fire  as  possi 
ble  on  the  intended  point  of  attack.  The  mounted  artil 
lery  either  acts  in  concert  with  the  cavalry,  or  is  used  to 
reinforce  that  arm ;  the  light-foot  acts  with  the  infantry, 
and  the  batteries  of  heavy  calibre  are  distributed  along 
the  line,  or  concentrated  on  some  important  point  where 
their  fire  may  be  most  effectual.  They  reach  the  enemy's 
forces  at  a  distance,  and  arrest  the  impulsion  of  his  attack. 
They  may  also  be  employed  to  draw  the  fire  of  his  artil 
lery  ;  but  their  movements  are  too  slow  and  difficult  for  a 
reserve. 

The  order  of  succession  in  which  the  different  arms 
are  engaged  in  a  battle,  depends  upon  the  nature  of  the 
ground  and  other  accidental  circumstances,  and  cannot  be 
determined  by  any  fixed  rules.  The  following,  however, 
is  most  frequently  employed,  and  in  ordinary  cases  may 
be  deemed  good. 

The  attack  is  first  opened  by  a  cannonade  ;  light  troops 
are  sent  forward  to  annoy  the  enemy,  and,  if  possible,  to 
pick  off  his  artillerists.  The  main  body  then  advances  in 


132  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE, 

two  lines  :  the  first  displays  itself  in  line  as  it  arrives 
nearly  within  the  range  of  grape-shot;  the  second  line  re 
mains  in  columns  of  attack  formed  of  battalions  by  division, 
at  a  distance  from  the  first  sufficient  to  be  beyond  the 
reach  of  the  enemy's  musketry,  but  near  enough  to  sup 
port  the  first  line,  or  to  cover  it,  if  driven  back.  The 
artillery,  in  the  mean  time,  concentrates  its  fire  on  some 
weak  point  to  open  a  way  for  the  reserve,  which  rushes 
into  the  opening  and  takes  the  enemy  in  flank  and  rear. 
The  cavalry  charges  at  the  opportune  moment  on  the 
flank  of  the  enemy's  columns  or  penetrates  an  opening  in 
his  line,  and  cutting  to  pieces  his  staggered  troops,  forces 
them  into  retreat,  and  completes  the  victory.  During  this 
time  the  whole  line  of  the  enemy  should  be  kept  occupied, 
so  as  to  prevent  fresh  troops  from  being  concentrated  on 
the  threatened  point. 

The  following  maxims  on  battles  may  be  studied  with 
advantage: — 1st.  General  battles  are  not  to  be  fought  but 
under  the  occurrence  of  one  of  the  following  circum 
stances  :  when  you  are,  from  any  cause,  decidedly  supe 
rior  to  the  enemy ;  when  he  is  on  the  point  of  receiving 
reinforcements,  which  will  materially  effect  your  relative 
strength ;  when,  if  not  beaten  or  checked,  he  will  deprive 
you  of  supplies  or  reinforcements,  necessary  to  the  con 
tinuance  or  success  of  your  operations ;  and,  generally, 
when  the  advantage  of  winning  the  battle  will  be  greater 
than  the  disadvantage  of  losing  it. 

2d.  Whatever  may  be  your  reason  for  risking  a  general 
battle,  you  ought  to  regard  as  indispensable  preliminaries, 
— a  thorough  knowledge  of  the  ground  on  which  you  are  to 
act ;  an  ample  supply  of  ammunition ;  the  most  perfect 
order  in  your  fire-arms  ;  hospital  depots  regularly  estab 
lished,  with  surgeons,  nurses,  dressings,  &c.,  sufficient 
for  the  accommodation  of  the  wounded ;  points  of  ren 
dezvous  established  and  known  to  the  commanders  of 


.  TACTICS.  133 

corps ;  and  an  entire  possession  of  the  passes  in  your 
own  rear. 

3d.  The  battle  being  fought  and  won,  the  victory  must 
be  followed  up  with  as  much  alacrity  and  vigor,  as  though 
nothing  had  been  gained, — a  maxim  very  difficult  of  ob 
servance,  (from  the  momentary  disobedience  which  per 
vades  all  troops  flushed  with  conquest,)  but  with  which 
an  able  general  will  never  dispense.  No  one  knew  better 
the  use  of  this  maxim  than  Napoleon,  and  no  one  was  a 
more  strict  and  habitual  observer  of  it. 

4th.  The  battle  being  fought  and  lost,  it  is  your  first 
duty  to  do  away  the  moral  effect  of  defeat, — the  want  of 
that  self-respect  and  self-confidence,  which  are  its  imme 
diate  followers,  and  which,  so  long  as  they  last,  are  the 
most  powerful  auxiliaries  of  your  enemy.  It  is  scarcely 
necessary  to  remark  that,  to  effect  this  object, — to  re- 
inspire  a  beaten  army  with  hope,  and  to  reassure  it  of 
victory, — we  must  not  turn  our  backs  on  an  enemy,  without 
sometimes  presenting  to  him  our  front  also  ; — we  must  not 
confide  our  safety  to  mere  flight,  but  adopt  such  measures 
as  shall  convince  him  that  though  wounded  and  overpow 
ered,  we  are  neither  disabled  nor  dismayed  ;  and  that  we 
still  possess  enough  both  of  strength  and  spirit  to  punish 
his  faults,  should  he  commit  any.  Do  you  operate  in  a 
covered  or  mountainous  country? — avail  yourself  of  its 
ridges  and  woods  ;  for  by  doing  so  you  will  best  evade 
the  pressure  of  his  cavalry.  Have  you  defiles  or  villages 
to  pass  ? — seize  the  heads  of  these,  defend  them  obsti 
nately,  and  make  a  show  of  fighting  another  battle.  In  a 
word,  let  no  error  of  your  enemy,  nor  any  favorable  inci 
dent  of  the  ground,  escape  your  notice  or  your  use.  It  is 
by  these  means  that  your  enemy  is  checked,  and  your 
troops  inspirited ;  and  it  was  by  these  that  Frederick 
balanced  his  surprise  at  Hohenkirchen,  and  the  defeat  of 
his  plans  before  Olmutz.  The  movement  of  our  own 


134  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

Washington,  after  losing  the  battle  of  Brandy  wine,  was 
of  this  character.  He  hastily  recrossed  the  Schuylkill 
with  the  profpssed  intention  of  seeking  the  enemy  and 
renewing  the  combat,  which  was  apparently  prevented 
only  by  a  heavy  and  incessant  fall  of  rain.  A  rumor  was 
now  raised  that  the  enemy,  while  refusing  his  left  wing, 
was  rapidly  advancing  upon  his  right,  to  intercept  our 
passage  of  the  river,  and  thus  gain  possession  of  Phil 
adelphia.  This  report  justified  a  retreat,  which  drew 
from  the  General  repeated  assurances,  that  in  quitting  his 
present  position  and  giving  to  his  march  a  retrograde  di 
rection,  it  was  not  his  object  to  avoid,  but  to  follow  and 
to  fight  the  enemy.  This  movement,  though  no  battle 
ensued,  had  the  effect  of  restoring  the  confidence  as  well 
of  the  people  as  of  the  army.* 

*  There  are  innumerable  works  in  almost  every  language  on  ele 
mentary  tactics ;  very  few  persons,  however,  care  to  read  any  thing 
further  than  the  manuals  used  in  our  own  service.  Our  system  of 
infantry,  cavalry,  and  artillery  tactics  is  generally  taken  from  the 
French  ;  and  also  the  course  of  engineer  instruction,  so  far  as  matured, 
for  sappers,  miners,  and  pontoniers,  is  based  on  the  French  manuals 
for  the  varied  duties  of  this  arm. 

On  Grand  Tactics,  or  Tactics  of  Battles,  the  military  and  historical 
writings  of  General  Jomini  abound  in  most  valuable  instructions.  Na 
poleon's  memoirs,  and  the  writings  of  Rocquancourt,  Hoyer,  Decker, 
Okouneff,  Rogniat,  Jocquinot-de-Presle,  Guibert,  Duhesme,  Gas- 
sendi,  Warnery,  Baron  Bohan,  Lindneau,  Maiseroy,  Miller,  and  Ter- 
nay,  are  considered  as  being  among  the  best  authorities. 


MILITARY  POLITY  135 


CHAPTER   VI. 

MILITARY  POLITY  AND  THE  MEANS    OF  NATIONAL  DEFENCE. 

Military  Polity, — In  deciding  upon  a  resort  to  arms, 
statesmen  are  guided  by  certain  general  rules  which  have 
been  tacitly  adopted  in  the  intercourse  of  nations  :  so  also 
both  statesmen  and  generals  are  bound  by  rules  similarly 
adopted  for  the  conduct  of  hostile  forces  while  actually 
engaged  in  military  operations. 

In  all  differences  between  nations,  each  state  has  a  right 
to  decide  for  itself  upon  the  nature  of  its  means  of  redress 
for  injuries  received.  Previous  to  declaring  open  and 
public  war,  it  may  resort  to  some  other  forcible  means  of 
redress,  short  of  actual  war.  These  are  : — 

1st.  Laying  an  embargo  upon  the  property  of  the  of 
fending  nation. 

2d.  Taking  forcible  possession  of  the  territory  or  prop 
erty  in  dispute. 

3d.  Resorting  to  some  direct  measure  of  retaliation. 

4th.  Making  reprisals  upon  the  persons  and  things  of 
the  offending  nation. 

It  is  not  the  present  purpose  to  discuss  these  several 
means  of  redress,  nor  even  to  enter  into  any  examinatior 
of  the  rights  and  laws  of  public  war,  when  actually  de 
clared  ;  it  is  intended  to  consider  here  merely  such  mili 
tary  combinations  as  are  resorted  to  by  the  state  in  prep 
aration  for  defence,  or  in  carrying  on  the  actual  operations 
of  a  war" 

In  commencing  hostilities  against  any  other  power,  we 
must  evidently  take  into  consideration  all  the  political  and 


136  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

\ 

physical  circumstances  of  the  people  with  whom  we  are 
to  contend  :  we  must  regard  their  general  character  for 
courage  and  love  of  country ;  their  attachment  to  their 
government  and  political  institutions ;  the  character  of  their 
rulers  and  their  generals  ;  the  numbers,  organization,  and 
discipline  of  their  armies  ;  and  particularly  the  relations 
between  the  civil  and  military  authorities  in  the  state,  for 
if  the  latter  be  made  entirely  subordinate,  we  may  very 
safely  calculate  on  erroneous  combinations.  We  must 
also  regard  their  passive  means  of  resistance,  such  as 
their  system  of  fortifications,  their  military  materials  and 
munitions,  their  statistics  of  agriculture,  commerce,  and 
manufactures,  and  especially  the  geographical  position  and 
physical  features  of  their  country.  No  government  can 
neglect,  with  impunity,  these  considerations  in  its  prepar 
ations  for  war,  or  in  its  manner  of  conducting  military 
operations. 

Napoleon's  system  of  carrying  on  war  against  the  weak, 
effeminate,  and  disorganized  Italians  required  many  modi 
fications  when  directed  against  the  great  military  power 
of  Russia.  Moreover,  the  combinations  of  Eylau  and 
Friedland  were  inapplicable  to  the  contest  with  the  mad 
dened  guerrillas  of  Minos,  animated  by  the  combined 
passions  of  hatred,  patriotism,  and  religious  enthusiasm. 

Military  power  may  be  regarded  either  as  absolute  or 
relative  :  the  absolute  force  of  a  state  depending  on  the 
number  of  its  inhabitants  and  the  extent  of  its  revenues  ; 
the  relative  force,  on  its  geographical  and  political  posi 
tion,  the  character  of  its  people,  and  the  nature  Of  its 
government.  Its  military  preparations  should  evidently 
be  in  proportion  to  its  resources.  Wealth  constitutes  both 
the  apprehension  and  the  incentive  to  invasion.  Where 
two  or  more  states  have  equal  means  of  war,  wiTL  incen 
tives  very  unequal,  an  equilibrium  cannot  exist ;  for  dan 
ger  and  temptation  are  no  longer  opposed  to  each  other. 


MILITARY  POLITY.  137 

The  preparation  of  states  may,  therefore,  be  equal  with 
out  being  equivalent,  and  the  smaller  of  the  two  may  be 
most  liable  to  be  drawn  into  a  war  without  the  means  of 
sustaining  it. 

The  numerical  relation  between  the  entire  population 
of  a  state,  and  the  armed  forces  which  it  can  maintain, 
must  evidently  vary  with  the  wealth  and  pursuits  of  the 
people.  Adam  Smith  thinks  that  a  country  purely  agri 
cultural  may,  at  certain  seasons,  furnish  for  war  one-fifth, 
or  ev.en  in  case  of  necessity  one-fourth,  of  its  entire  popu 
lation.  A  commercial  or  manufacturing  country  would  be 
unable  -to  furnish  any  thing  like  so  numerous  a  military 
force.  On  this  account  small  agricultural  states  are  some 
times  able  to  bring  into  the  field  much  larger  armies  than 
their  more  powerful  neighbors.  During  the  Seven  Years' 
War,  Frederick  supported  an  army  equal  to  one-twentieth 
of  the  entire  Prussian  population,  and  at  the  close  of  this 
memorable  contest  one-sixth  of  the  males  capable  of  bear 
ing  arms  had  actually  perished  on  the  field  of  battle. 

But  the  number  of  troops  that  may  be  brought  into  the 
field  in  times  of  great  emergency  is,  of  course,  much 
greater  than  can  be  supported  during  a  long  war,  or  as  a 
part  of  a  permanent  military  establishment.  Montesquieu 
estimates  that  modern  nations  are  capable  of  supporting, 
without  endangering  their  power,  a  permanent  military 
force  of  about  one-hundredth  part  of  their  population. 
This  ratio  differs  but  little  from  that  of  the  present  mili 
tary  establishments  of  the  great  European  powers. 

Great  Britain,  with  a  population  of  about  twenty-rive 
millions,  and  a  general  budget  of  $250,000,000,  supports 
a  military  and  naval  force  of  about  150,000  effective  and 
100,000  non-effective  men,  250,000  in  all,  at  an  annual 
expense  of  from  seventy  to  eighty  millions  of  dollars. 

Russia,  with  a  population  of  about  seventy  millions, 
.supports  an  active  army  of  632,000  men,  with  an  im- 


138  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

mense  reserve,  at  an  expense  of  about  $65,000,000,  out 
of  a  general  budget  of  $90,000,000  ;  that  is,  the  expense 
of  her  military  establishment  is  to  her  whole  budget  as  7 
to  10. 

Austria,  with  a  population  of  thirty-five  millions,  has  an 
organized  peace  establishment  of  370,000,  (about  250.000 
in  active  service,)  and  a  reserve  of  260,000,  at  an  ex 
pense  of  $36,000,000,  out  of  a  general  budget  of 
$100,000,000. 

Prussia,  with  a  population  of  about  fifteen  millions,  has 
from  100,000  to  120,000  men  in  arms,  with  a  reserve  of 
200,000,  at  an  annual  expense  of  more  than  $18,000,ODO, 
out  of  a  general  budget  of  about  $38,000,000. 

France,  with  a  population  of  near  thirty-five  millions, 
supports  a  permanent  establishment  of  about  350,000 
men,  at  an  expense  of  seventy  or  eighty  millions  of  dol 
lars,  out  of  a  total  budget  of  $280,000,000.  France  has 
long  supported  a  permanent  military  force  of  from  one- 
hundredth  to  one  hundred-and-tenth  of  her  population,  at 
an  expense  of  from  one-fourth  to  one-fifth  of  her  whole 
budget.  The  following  table,  copied  from  the  "  Specta- 
teur  Militaire,"  shoAvs  the  state  of  the  army  at  six  differ 
ent  periods  between  1788  and  1842.  It  omits,  of  course, 
the  extraordinary  levies  of  the  wars  of  the  Revolution 
and  of  the  Empire. 


MILITARY  POLITY. 

Table. 


139 


Budget. 

Army. 

Dates. 

Population. 

Of  Stute. 

Of  the  Ar 

Peace 

War 

Remarks. 

my. 

Estab. 

E>ttb. 

Livres. 

Livres. 

Men. 

Men. 

1788 

24,000,000 

500,000,000 

100,000,000 

180,000 

300,000 

1814 

28,000,000 

Francs. 
800,000,000 

Francs. 
180,000,000 

255,000 

340,000 

$  Ordinance 
\    of  1814. 

C  Report  of 

1823 

31,000,000 

900,000,000 

200,000,000 

280,000 

390,000 

<    Minister 

(    or  War. 

(  Report  of 

1830 

32,000,000 

1,000,000,000 

220,000,000 

312,000 

500,000 

{    Minister 

(    of  War. 

1840 

34,000,000 

1,170,000,000 

242,000,000 

312,000 

- 

S  Budget  of 
)    1840. 

!  Estimated 

1842 

35,000,000 

1,200,000,000 

285,000,000 

370,000 

520,000 

Expenses 

of  1842. 

From  these  data  we  see  that  the  great  European  powers 
at  the  present  day  maintain,  in  time  of  peace,  military  es 
tablishments  equal  to  about  one-hundredth  part  of  their 
entire  population. 

The  geographical  position  of  a  country  also  greatly  in 
fluences  the  degree  and  character  of  its  military  prepar 
ation.  It  may  be  bordered  on  one  or  more  sides  by 
mountains  and  other  obstacles  calculated  to  diminish  the 
probability  of  invasion  ;  or  the  whole  frontier  may  be  wide 
open  to  an  attack :  the  interior  may  be  of  such  a  nature  as 
to  furnish  security  to  its  own  army,  and  yet  be  fatal  to  the 
enemy  should  he  occupy  it ;  or  it  may  furnish  him  advan 
tages  far  superior  to  his  own  country.  It  may  be  an  island 
in  the  sea,  and  consequently  exposed  only  to  maritime  de 
scents — events  of  rare  occurrence  in  modern  times. 

Again,  a  nation  may  be  placed  between  others  who  are 
interested  in  its  security,  their  mutual  jealousy  preventing 
the  molestation  of  the  weaker  neighbor.  On  the  other 
hand,  its  political  institutions  may  be  such  as  to  compel 


140  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

the  others  to  unite  in  attacking  it  in  order  to  secure  them 
selves.  The  republics  of  Switzerland  could  remain  un 
molested  in  the  midst  of  powerful  monarchies  ;  but  revolu 
tionary  France  brought  upon  herself  the  armies  of  all 
Europe. 

Climate  has  also  some  influence  upon  military  charac 
ter,  but  this  influence  is  far  less  than  that  of  education  and 
discipline.  Northern  nations  are  said  to  be  naturally  more 
phlegmatic  and  sluggish  than  those  of  warmer  climates  ; 
and  yet  the  armies  of  Gustavus  Adolphus,  Charles  XII., 
and  Suwarrow,  have  shown  themselves  sufficiently  active 
and  impetuous,  while  the  Greeks,  Romans,  and  Spaniards, 
in  the  times  of  their  glory,  were  patient,  disciplined,  and 
indefatigable,  notwithstanding  the  reputed  fickleness  of 
ardent  temperaments. 

For  any  nation  to  postpone  the  making  of  military  prep 
arations  till  such  time  as  they  are  actually  required  in 
defence,  is  to  waste  the  public  money,  and  endanger  the 
public  safety.  The  closing  of  an  avenue  of  approach,  the 
security  of  a  single  road  or  river,  or  even  the  strategic 
movement  of  a  small  body  of  troops,  often  effects,  in  the 
beginning,  what  afterwards  cannot  be  accomplished  by 
large  fortifications,  and  the  most  formidable  armies.  Had 
a  small  army  in  1812,  with  a  well-fortified  dep5t  r,n  Lake 
Champlain,  penetrated  into  Canada,  and  cut  off  all  rein 
forcements  and  supplies  by  way  of  Quebec,  that  country 
would  inevitably  have  fallen  into  our  possession.  In  the 
winter  of  1806-7,  Napoleon  crossed  the  Vistula,  and  ad 
vanced  even  to  the  walls  of  Konigsberg,  with  the  Aus- 
trians  in  his  rear,  and  the  whole  power  of  Russia  before 
him.  If  Austria  had  pushed  forward  one  hundred  thou 
sand  men  from  Bohemia,  on  the  Oder,  she  would,  in  i.\\ 
probability,  says  the  best  of  military  judges,  Jomini,  have 
struck  a  fatal  blow  to  the  operations  of  Napoleon,  and  his 
army  must  have  been  exceedingly  fortunate  even  to  regain 


MILITARY   POLITY.  141 

the  Rhine.  But  Austria  preferred  remaining  neutral  till 
she  could  increase  her  army  to  four  hundred  thousand  men. 
She  then  took  the  offensive,  and  was  beaten  ;  whereas, 
with  one  hundred  thousand  men  brought  into  action  at  the 
favorable  moment,  she  might,  most  probably,  have  decided 
the  fate  of  Europe. 

"  Defensive  war,"  says  Napoleon,  "  does  not  preclude 
attack,  any  more  than  offensive  war  is  exclusive  of  de 
fence,"  for  frequently  the  best  way  to  counteract  the  ene 
my's  operations,  and  prevent  his  conquests,  is,  at  the  very 
outset  of  the  war,  to  invade  and  cripple  him.  But  this 
can  never  be  attempted  with  raw  troops,  ill  supplied  with 
the  munitions  of  war,  and  unsupported  by  fortifications. 
Such  invasions  must  necessarily,  fail.  Experience  in  the 
wars  of  the  French  revolution  has  demonstrated  this  ;  and 
even  our  own  short  history  is  not  without  its  proof.  In 
1812,  the  conquest  of  Canada  was  determined  on  some 
time  before  the  declaration  of  war  ;  an  undisciplined  army, 
without  preparation  or  apparent  plan,  was  actually  put  in 
motion,  eighteen  days  previous  to  this  declaration,  for  the 
Canadian  peninsula.  With  a  disciplined  army  of  the  same 
numbers,  with  an  efficient  and  skilful  leader,  directed 
against  the  vital  point  of  the  British  possessions  at  a  time 
when  the  whole  military  force  of  the  provinces  did  not 
exceed  three  thousand  men,  how  different  had  been  the 
result  ! 

While,  therefore,  the  permanent  defences  of  a  nation 
must  be  subordinate  to  its  resources,  position,  and  charac 
ter,  they  can  in  no  case  be  dispensed  with.  No  matter 
how  extensive  or  important  the  temporary  means  that 
may  be  developed  as  necessity  requires,  there  must  be 
some  force  kept  in  a  constant  state  of  efficiency,  in  order 
to  impart  life  and  stability  to  the  system.  The  one  can 
never  properly  replace  the  other ;  for  while  the  former 
constitutes  the  basis,  the  latter  must  form  the  main  body 


142  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

of  the  military  edifice,  which,  by  its  strength  and  durabili 
ty,  will  offer  shelter  and  protection  to  the  nation ;  or.  it 
the  architecture  and  materials  be  defective,  crush  and  de 
stroy  it  in  its  fall. 

The  permanent  means  of  military  defence  employed  by 
modern  nations,  are — 

1st.    An  army ;    2d.  A  navy ;    3d.  Fortifications. 

The  first  two  of  these  could  hardly  be  called  permanent, 
if  we  were  to  regard  their  personnel;  but  looking  upon 
them  as  institutions  or  organizations,  they  present  all  the 
characteristics  of  durability.  They  are  sometimes  sub 
jected  to  very  great  and  radical  changes  ;  by  the  hot-house 
nursing  of  designing  ambition  or  rash  legislation,  they 
may  become  overgrown  and  dangerous,  or  the  storms  of 
popular  delusion  may  overthrow  and  apparently  sweep 
them  away.  But  they  will  immediately  spring  up  again 
in  some  form  or  other,  so  deeply  are  they  rooted  in  the 
organization  of  political  institutions. 

Its  army  and  navy  should  always  be  kept  within  the 
limits  of  a  nation's  wants  ;  but  pity  for  the  country  which 
reduces  them  in  number  or  support  so  as  to  degrade  their 
character  or  endanger  their  organization.  "  A  govern 
ment,"  says  one  of  the  best  historians  of  the  age,  "  which 
neglects  its  army,  under  whatever  pretext,  is  a  govern 
ment  culpable  in  the  eyes  of  posterity,  for  it  is  preparing 
humiliations  fopits  flag  and  its  country,  instead  of  laying 
the  foundation  for  its  glory." 

One  of  our  own  distinguished  cabinet  ministers  remarks, 
that  the  history  of  our  relations  with  the  Indian  tribes  from 
the  beginning  to  the  present  hour,  is  one  continued  proof 
of  the  necessity  of  maintaining  an  efficient  military  force 
in  time  of  peace,  and  that  the  treatment  we  received  for  a 
long  series  of  years  from  European  powers,  was  a  most 
humiliating  illustration  of  the  folly  of  attempting  to  dis 
pense  with  these  means  of  defence. 


MILITARY  POLITY.  143 

"Twice,"  says  he,  "we  were  compelled  to  maintain, 
by  open  war,  our  quarrel  with  the  principal  aggressors. 
After  many  years  of  forbearance  and  negotiation,  our 
claims  in  other  cases  were  at  length  amicably  settled; 
but  in  one  of  the  most  noted  of  these  cases,  it  was  not 
without  much  delay  and  imminent  hazard  of  war  that  the 
execution  of  the  treaty  was  finally  enforced.  No  one  ac-. 
quainted  with  these  portions  of  our  history,  can  hesitate 
to  ascribe  much  of  the  wantonness  and  duration  of  the 
wrongs  we  endured,  to  a  knowledge  on  the  part  of  our 
assailants  of  the  scantiness  and  inefficiency  of  our  military 
and  naval  force. 

"  If,"  said  Mr.  Calhoun,  "  disregarding  the  sound  dic 
tates  of  reason  and  experience,  we,  in  peace,  neglect  our 
military  establishment,  we  must,  with  a  powerful  and  skil 
ful  enemy,  be  exposed  to  the  most  distressing  calamities." 

These  remarks  were  made  in  opposition  to  the  reduc 
tion  of  our  military  establishment,  in  1821,  be'low  the 
standard  of  thirteen  thousand.  Nevertheless,  the  force 
was  reduced  to  about  six  or  seven  thousand  ;  and  we  were 
soon  made  to  feel  the  consequences.  It  is  stated,  in  a  re 
port  of  high  authority,  that  if  there  had  been  two  regi 
ments  available  near  St.  Louis,  in  1832,  the  war  with 
Black  Hawk  would  have  been  easily  avoided ;  and  that  it 
cannot  be  doubted  that  the  scenes  of  devastation  and  sav 
age  warfare  which  overspread  the  Floridas  for  nearly 
seven  years  would  also  have  been  avoided,  and  some 
thirty  millions  have  been  saved  the  country,  if  two  regi 
ments  had  been  available  at  the  beginning  of  that  con 
flict.* 

*  We  may  now  add  to  these  remarks,  that  if  our  government  had 
occupied  the  country  between  the  Nueces  and  the  Rio  Grande  with  a 
well-organized  army  of  twelve  thousand  men,  war  with  Mexico  might 
have  been  avoided  ;  but  to  push  forward  upon  Matamoras  a  small 
force  of  only  two  thousand,  in  the  very  face  of  a  large  Mexican  anny 


144  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

We  must,  in  this  country,  if  we  heed  either  the  dictates 
of  reason  or  experience,  maintain  in  time  of  peace  a  skele 
ton  military  and  naval  force,  capable  of  being  greatly  ex 
panded,  in  the  event  of  danger,  by  the  addition  of  new 
troops. 

Much  energy  and  enterprise  will  always  be  imparted  to 
\/  an  army  or  navy  by  the  addition  of  new  forces.  The 
strength  thus  acquired  is  sometimes  in  even  a  far  greater 
ratio  than  the  increase  of  numbers.  But  it  must  be  re 
membered  that  these  new  elements  are,  of  themselves,  far 
inferior  to  the  old  ones  in  discipline,  steady  courage,  and 
perseverance.  No  general  can  rely  on  the  accuracy  of 
their  movements  in  the  operations  of  a  campaign,  and 
they  are  exceedingly  apt  to  fail  him  at  the  critical  moment 
on  the  field  of  battle.  The  same  holds  true  with  respect 
to  sailors  inexperienced  in  the  discipline  and  duties  of  a 
man-of-war.  There  is  this  difference,  however  :  an  army 
usually  obtains  its  recruits  from  men  totally  unacquainted 
with  military  life,  while  a  navy,  in  case  of  sudden  in 
crease,  is  mainly  supplied  from  the  merchant  marine  with 
professional  sailors,  who,  though  unacquainted  with  the 
use  of  artillery,  &c.,  on  ship-board,  are  familiar  with  all 
the  other  duties  of  sea  life,  and  not  unused  to  discipline. 
Moreover,  raw  seamen  and  marines,  from  being  under  the 
immediate  eye  of  their  oflicers  in  time  of  action,  and  with 
out  the  possibility  of  escape,  fight  much  better  than  troops 
of  the  same  character  on  land.  If  years  are  requisite  to 
make  a  good  sailor,  surely  an  equal  length  of  time  is 
necessary  to  perfect  the  soldier  ;  and  no  less  skill,  prac 
tice,  and  professional  study  are  required  for  the  proper 
direction  of  armies  than  for  the  management  of  fleets. 

was  holding  out  to  them  the  strongest  inducements  to  attack  us.  The 
temporary  economy  of  a  few  thousands  in  reducing  our  military  estab 
lishment  to  a  mere  handful  of  men,  again  results  in  a  necessary  ex 
penditure  of  many  millions  of  dollars  and  a  large  sacrifice  of  human  life. 


MILITARY    POLITY.  145 

But  some  have  said  that  even  these  skeletons  of  mili 
tary  and  naval  forces  are  entirely  superfluous,  and  that  a 
brave  and  patriotic  people  will  make  as  good  a  defence 
against  invasion  as  the  most  disciplined  and  experienced. 
Such  views  are  frequently  urged  in  the  halls  of  congress, 
and  some  have  even  attempted  to  confirm  them  by  histori 
cal  examples. 

There  are  instances,  it  is  true,  where  disorganized  and 
frantic  masses,  animated  by  patriotic  enthusiasm,  have 
gained  the  most  brilliant  victories.  Here,  however,  ex 
traordinary  circumstances  supplied  the  place  of  order,  and 
produced  an  equilibrium  between  forces  that  otherwise 
would  have  been  very  unequal ;  but  in  almost  every  in 
stance  of  this  kind,  the  loss  of  the  undisciplined  army  has 
been  unnecessarily  great,  human  life  being  substituted  for 
skill  and  order.  But  victory,  even  with  such  a  drawback, 
cannot  often  attend  the  banners  of  newly  raised  and  disor 
derly  forces.  If  the  captain  and  crew  of  a  steamship  knew 
nothing  of  navigation,  and  had  never  been  at  sea,  and  the 
engineer  was  totally  unacquainted  with  his  profession, 
could  we  expect  the  ship  to  cross  the  Atlantic  in  safety, 
and  reach  her  destined  port  ?  Would  we  trust  our  lives 
and  the  honor  of  our  country  to  their  care  ?  Would  we 
not  say  to  them,  "  First  make  yourselves  acquainted  with 
the  principles  of  your  profession,  the  use  of  the  compass, 
and  the  means  of  determining  whether  you  direct  your 
course  upon  a  ledge  of  rocks  or  into  a  safe  harbor  ?"  War 
is  not,  as  some  seem  to  suppose,  a  mere  game  of  chance. 
Its  principles  constitute  one  of  the  most  intricate  of  mod 
ern  sciences  ;  and  the  general  who  understands  the  art  of 
rightly  applying  its  rules,  and  possesses  the  means  of  car 
rying  out  its  precepts,  may  be  morally  certain  of  success. 

History  furnishes  abundant  proofs  of  the  impolicy  of  re 
lying  upon  undisciplined  forces  in  the  open  field.  Almost 
every  page  of  Napier's  classic  History  of  the  Peninsular 

13 


146  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

War  contains  striking  examples  of  the  useless  waste  of 
human  life  and  property  by  the  Spanish  militia ;  while, 
with  one  quarter  as  many  regulars,  at  a  small  fractional 
part  of  the  actual  expense,  the  French  might  have  been 
expelled  at  the  outset,  or  have  been  driven,  at  any  time 
afterwards,  from  the  Peninsula. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  French  Revolution  the  regular 
army  was  abolished,  and  the  citizen-soldiery,  who  were 
established  on  the  14th  of  July,  1789,  relied  on  exclusively 
for  the  national  defence.  "  But  these  three  millions  of 
national  guards,"  says  Jomini,  "though  good  supporters  of 
the  decrees  of  the  assembly,  were  nevertheless  useless  for 
reinforcing  the  army  beyond  the  frontiers,  and  utterly  in 
capable  of  defending  their  own  firesides."  Yet  no  one  can 
question  their  individual  bravery  and  patriotism  ;  for,  when 
reorganized,  disciplined,  and  properly  directed,  they  put 
to  flight  the  best  troops  in  Europe.  At  the  first  outbreak 
of  this  revolution,  the  privileged  classes  of  other  countries, 
upholding  crumbling  institutions  and  rotten  dynasties, 
rushed  forth  against  the  maddened  hordes  of  French  de 
mocracy.  The  popular  power,  springing  upward  by  its 
own  elasticity  when  the  weight  of  political  oppression  was 
removed,  soon  became  too  wild  and  reckless  to  establish 
itself  on  any  sure  basis,  or  even  to  provide  for  its  own  pro 
tection.  If  the  attacks  of  the  enervated  enemies  of  France 
were  weak,  so  also  were  her  own  efforts  feeble  to  resist 
these  attacks.  The  republican  armies  repelled  the  ill- 
planned  and  ill-conducted  invasion  by  the  Duke  of  Bruns 
wick  ;  but  it  was  by  the  substitution  of  human  life  for  prep 
aration,  system,  and  skill ;  enthusiasm  supplied  the  place 
of  discipline  ;  robbery  produced  military  stores  ;  and  the 
dead  bodies  of  her  citizens  formed  epaulements  against  the 
enemy.  Yet  this  was  but  the  strength  of  weakness  ;  the 
aimless  struggle  of  a  broken  and  disjointed  government; 
and  the  new  revolutionary  power  was  fast  sinking  away 


MILITARY    POLITY.  147 

before  the  combined  opposition  of  Europe,when  the  great 
genius  of  Napoleon,  with  a  strong  arm  and  iron  rule,  seiz 
ing  upon  the  scattered  fragments,  and  binding  them  to 
gether  into  one  consolidated  mass,  made  France  victorious, 
and  seated  himself  on  ftie  throne  of  empire. 

No  people  in  the  world  ever  exhibited  a  more  general 
and  enthusiastic  patriotism  than  the  Americans  during  the 
war  of  our  own  Revolution.  And  yet  our  army  received, 
even 'at  that  time,  but  little  support  from  irregular  and 
militia  forces  in  the  open  field.  Washington's  opinions 
on  this  subject  furnish  so  striking  a  contrast  to  the  con 
gressional  speeches  of  modern  political  demagogues,  who, 
with  boastful  swaggers,  would  fain  persuade  us  that  we 
require  no  organization  or  discipline  to  meet  the  veteran 
troops  of  Europe  in  the  open  field,  and  who  would  hurry 
us,  without  preparation,  into  war  with  the  strongest  mili 
tary  powers  of  the  world — so  striking  is  the  contrast  be 
tween  the  assertions  of  these  men  and  the  letters  and  re 
ports  of  Washington,  that  it  may  be  well  for  the  cool  and 
dispassionate  lover  of  truth  to  occasionally  refresh  his 
memory  by  reference  to  the  writings  of  Washington. 
The  following  brief  extracts  are  from  his  letters  to  the 
President  of  Congress,  December,  1776  : 

"  The  saving  in  the  article  of  clothing,  provisions,  and 
a  thousand  other  things,  by  having  nothing  to  do  with  the 
militia,  unless  in  cases  of  extraordinary  exigency,  and 
such  as  could  not  be  expected  in  the  common  course  of 
events,  would  amply  support  a  large  army,  which,  well 
officered,  would  be  daily  improving,  instead  of  continuing 
a  destructive,  expensive,  and  disorderly  mob.  In  my 
opinion,  if  any  dependence  is  placed  on  the  militia  another 
year,  Congress  will  be  deceived.  When  danger  is  a  little 
removed  from  them  they  will  not  turn  out  at  all.  When 
it  comes  home  to  them,  the  well-affected,  instead  of  flying 
to  arms  to  defend  themselves,  are  busily  employed  in  re- 


148  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

moving  their  families  and  effects ;  whue  the  disaffected 
are  concerting  measures  to  make  their  submission,  and 
spread  terror  and  dismay  all  around,  to  induce  others  to 
follow  their  example.  Daily  experience  and  abundant 
proofs  warrant  this  information.  Short  enlistments,  and  a 
mistaken  dependence  upon  our  militia,  have  been  the  ori 
gin  of  all  our  misfortunes,  and  the  great  accumulation  of 
our  debt.  The  militia  come  in,  you  cannot  tell  how  ;  go, 
you  cannot  tell  when ;  and  act,  you  cannot  tell  where ; 
consume  your  provisions,  exhaust  your  stores,  and  leave 
you  at  last,  at  a  critical  moment." 

These  remarks  of  Washington  will  not  be  found  too  se 
vere  if  we  remember  the  conduct  of  our  militia  in  the  open 
field  at  Princeton,  Savannah  River,  Camden,  Guilford 
Court-House,  &c.,  in  the  war  of  the  Revolution;  the 
great  cost  of  the  war  of  1812  as  compared  with  its  milita 
ry  results  ;  the  refusal  of  the  New  England  militia  to 
march  beyond  the  lines  of  their  own  states,  and  of  the 
New- York  militia  to  cross  the  Niagara  and  secure  a  vic 
tory  already  won  ;  or  the  disgraceful  flight  of  the  Southern 
militia  from  the  field  of  Bladensburg. 

But  there  is  another  side  to  this  picture.  If  our  militia 
have  frequently  failed  to  maintain  their  ground  when  drawn 
up  in  the  open  field,  we  can  point  with  pride  to  their  brave  and 
successful  defence  of  Charleston,  Mobile,  New  Orleans, 
Fort  M'Henry,  Stonington,  Niagara,  Plattsburg,  in  proof 
of  what  may  be  accomplished  by  militia  in  connection  with 
fortifications. 

These  examples  from  our  history  must  fully  demonstrate 
the  great  value  of  a  militia  when  properly  employed  as  a  de 
fence  against  invasion,  and  ought  to  silence  the  sneers  of 
those  who  would  abolish  this  arm  of  defence  as  utterly  use- 
ess.  In  the  open  field  militia  cannot  in  general  be  manceu- 
vredto  advantage ;  Avhereas,inthe  defence  of  fortified  places 
their  superior  intelligence  and  activity  not  unfrequently  ren- 


MEANS  OF  NATIONAL  DEFENCE.  149 

der  them  even  more  valuable  than  regulars.  And  in  reading 
the  severe  strictures  of  Washington,  Greene,  Morgan,  and 
others,  upon  our  militia,  it  must  be  remembered  that  they 
were  at  that  time  entirely  destitute  of  important  works  of 
defence  ;  and  the  experience  of  all  other  nations,  as  well 
as  our  own,  has  abundantly  shown,  that  a  newly-raised 
force  cannot  cope,  in  the  open  field,  with  one  subordinate 
and  disciplined.  Here  science  must  determine  the  contest. 
Habits  of  strict  obedience,  and  of  simultaneous  and  united 
action,  are  indispensable  to  carry  out  what  the  higher 
principles  of  the  military  profession  require.  New  and 
undisciplined  forces  are  often  confounded  at  the  evolutions, 
and  strategic  and  tactical  combinations  of  a  regular  army, 
and  lose  all  confidence  in  their  leaders  and  in  themselves. 
But,  when  placed  behind  a  breastwork,  they  even  over 
rate  their  security.  They  can  then  coolly  look  upon  the 
approaching  columns,  and,  unmoved  by  glittering  armor 
and  bristling  bayonets,  will  exert  all  their  skill  in  the  use 
of  their  weapons.  The  superior  accuracy  of  aim  which 
the  American  has  obtained  by  practice  from  his  early 
youth,  has  enabled  our  militia  to  gain,  under  the  protection 
of  military  works,  victories  as  brilliant  as  the  most  veteran 
troops.  The  moral  courage  necessary  to  await  an  attack 
behind  a  parapet,  is  at  least  equal  to  that  exerted  in  the 
open  field,  where  movements  generally  determine  the  vic 
tory.  To  watch  the  approach  of  an  enemy,  to  see  him 
move  up  and  display  his  massive  columns,  his  long  array 
of  military  equipments,  his  fascines  and  scaling-ladders, 
his  instruments  of  attack,  and  the  professional  skill  with 
which  he  wields  them,  to  hear  the  thunder  of  his  batteries, 
spreading  death  all  around,  and  to  repel,  hand  to  hand, 
those  tremendous  assaults,  which  stand  out  in  all  their 
horrible  relief  upon  the  canvass  of  modern  warfare,  re 
quires  a  heart  at  least  as  brave  as  the  professional  war 
rior  exhibits  in  the  pitched  battle. 


150  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

Bu.  we  must  not  forget  that  to  call  this  force  into  the 
open  field, — to  take  the  mechanic  from  his  shop,  the  mer 
chant  from  his  counter,  the  farmer  from  his  plough, — will 
necessarily  be  attended  with  an  immense  sacrifice  of 
human  life.  The  lives  lost  on  the  battle-field  are  not  the 
only  ones  ;  militia,  being  unaccustomed  to  exposure,  and 
unable  to  supply  their  own  wants  with  certainty  and  regu 
larity,  contract  diseases  which  occasion  in  every  cam 
paign  a  most  frightful  mortality. 

There  is  also  a  vast  difference  in  the  cost  of  support- 
.  ing  regulars  and  militia  forces.  The  cost  of  a  regular 
army  of  twenty  thousand  men  for  a  campaign  of  six 
months,  in  this  country,  has  been  estimated,  from  data  in 
the  War-office,  at  a  hundred  and  fifty  dollars  per  man ; 
while  the  cost  of  a  militia  force,  under  the  same  circum 
stances,  making  allowance  for  the  difference  in  the  ex 
penses  from  sickness,  waste  of  camp-furniture,  equip 
ments,  &c.,  will  be  two  hundred  and  fifty  dollars  per 
man.  But  in  short  campaigns,  and  in  irregular  warfare, 
like  the  expedition  against  Black  Hawk  and  his  Indians 
in  the  Northwest,  and  during  the  hostilities  in  Florida, 
"  the  expenses  of  the  militia/'  says  Mr.  Secretary  Spen 
cer,  in  a  report  to  congress  in  1842,  "  invariably  exceed 
those  of  regulars  by  at  least  three  hundred  per  cent"  It  is 
further  stated  that  "fifty-fve  thousand  militia  were  called 
into  service  during  the  Black  Hawk  and  Florida  wars, 
and  that  thirty  millions  of  dollars  have  been  expended  in 
these  conflicts  /"  When  it  is  remembered  that  during  these 
border  wars  our  whole  regular  army  did  not  exceed 
twelve  or  thirteen  thousand  men,  it  will  not  be  difficult  to 
perceive  why  our  military  establishment  was  so  enor 
mously  expensive.  Large  sums  were  paid  to  sedentary 
militia  who  never  rendered  the  slightest  service.  Again, 
during  our  late  war  with  Great  Britain,  of  less  than  three 
years'  duration,  two  hundred  and  eighty  thousand  muskets 


MEANS  OF  NATIONAL  DEFENCE.  151 

were  lost, — the  average  cost  of  which  is  stated  at  twelve 
dollars, — making  an  aggregate  loss,  in  muskets  alone,  of 
three  millions  and  three  hundred  and  sixty  thousand  dollars, 
during  a  service  of  about  two  years  and  a  half; — result 
ing  mainly  from  that  neglect  and  waste  of  public  property 
which  almost  invariably  attends  the  movements  of  newly- 
raised  and  inexperienced  forces.  Facts  like  these  should 
awaken  us  to  the  necessity  of  reorganizing  and  disci 
plining  our  militia.  General  Knox,  when  Secretary  of 
War,  General  Harrison  while  in  the  senate,  and  Mr. 
Poinsett  in  1841,  each  furnished  plans  for  effecting  this 
purpose,  but  the  whole  subject  has  been  passed  by  with 
neglect. 

Permanent  fortifications  differ  in  many  of  their  features 
from  either  of  the  two  preceding  elements  of  national 
defence.  They  are  passive  in  their  nature,  yet  possess 
all  the  conservative  properties  of  an  army  or  navy,  and 
through  these  two  contribute  largely  to  the  active  opera 
tions  of  a  campaign.  When  once  constructed  they  re 
quire  but  very  little  expenditure  for  their  support.  In  time 
of  peace  they  withdraw  no  valuable  citizens  from  the 
useful  occupations  of  life.  Of  themselves  they  can  never 
exert  an  influence  corrupting  to  public  morals,  or  danger 
ous  to  public  liberty ;  but  as  the  means  of  preserving 
peace,  and  as  obstacles  to  an  invader,  their  influence  and 
power  are  immense.  While  contributing  to  the  economi 
cal  support  of  a  peace  establishment,  by  furnishing  drill- 
grounds,  parades,  quarters,  &c. ;  and  to  its  efficiency  still 
more,  by  affording  facilities  both  to  the  regulars  and  mi 
litia  for  that  species  of  artillery  practice  so  necessary  in 
the  defence  of  water  frontiers ;  they  also  serve  as  safe 
depots  of  arms  and  the  immense  quantity  of  materials  and 
military  munitions  so  indispensable  in  modern  warfare. 
These  munitions  usually  require  much  time,  skill,  and 
expense  in  their  construction,  and  it  is  of  vast  import- 


152  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

ance  that  they  should  be  preserved  with  the  utmost 
care. 

Maritime  arsenals  and  depots  of  naval  and  military 
stores  on  the  sea-coast  are  more  particularly  exposed  to 
capture  and  destruction.  Here  an  enemy  can  approach 
by  stealth,  striking  some  sudden  and  fatal  blow  before 
any  effectual  resistance  can  be  organized.  But  in  addi 
tion  to  the  security  afforded  by  harbor  fortifications  to 
public  property  of  the  highest  military  value,  they  also 
serve  to  protect  the  merchant  shipping,  and  the  vast 
amount  of  private  wealth  which  a  commercial  people  al 
ways  collect  at  these  points.  They  furnish  safe  retreats, 
and  the  means  of  repair  for  public  vessels  injured  in  bat 
tle,  or  by  storms,  and  to  merchantmen  a  refuge  from  the 
dangers  of  sea,  or  the  threats  of  hostile  fleets.  Moreover, 
they  greatly  facilitate  our  naval  attacks  upon  the  enemy's 
shipping ;  and  if  he  attempt  a  descent,  their  well-directed 
fire  will  repel  his  squadrons  from  our  harbors,  and  force 
his  troops  to  land  at  some  distant  and  unfavorable  position. 

The  three  means  of  permanent  defence  which  have 
been  mentioned,  are,  of  course,  intended  to  accomplish 
the  same  general  object ;  but  each  has  its  distinct  and 
proper  sphere  of  action,  and  neither  can  be  regarded  as 
antagonistic al  to  the  others.  Any  undue  increase  of  one, 
at  the  expense  of  the  other  two,  must  necessarily  be  fol 
lowed  by  a  corresponding  diminution  of  national  strength. 
We  must  not  infer,  however,  that  all  must  be  maintained 
upon  the  same  footing.  The  position  of  the  country  and 
the  character  of  the  people  must  determine  this. 

England,  from  her  insular  position  and  the  extent  of 
her  commerce,  must  maintain  a  large  navy  ;  a  large  army 
is  also  necessary  for  the  defence  of  her  own  coasts  and 
the  protection  of  her  colonial  possessions.  Her  men-of- 
war  secure  a  safe  passage  for  her  merchant-vessels,  and 
transport  her  troops  in  safety  through  all  seas,  and  thus 


MEANS  OF  NATIONAL  DEFENCE.  153 

contribute  much  to  the  acquisition  and  security  of  colonial 
territory.  The  military  forces  of  the  British  empire 
amount  to  about  one  hundred  and  fifty  thousand  men,  and 
the  naval  forces  to  about  seven  hundred  vessels  of  war,* 
carrying  in  all  some  fifteen  thousand  guns  and  forty  thou 
sand  men.  France  has  less  commerce,  and  but  few  colo 
nial  possessions.  She  has  a  great  extent  of  seacoast,  but 
her  fortifications  secure  it  from  maritime  descents ;  her 
only  accessible  points  are  on  the  land  frontiers.  Her 
army  and  navy,  therefore,  constitute  her  principal  means 
of  defence.  Her  army  numbers  some  three  hundred  and 
fifty  thousand  men,  and  her  navy  about  three  hundred  and 
fifty  vessels,*  carrying  about  nine  thousand  guns  and  thirty 
thousand  men.  Russia,  Austria,  Prussia,  Sweden,  and 
other  continental  powers,  have  but  little  commerce  to  be 
protected,  while  their  extensive  frontiers  are  greatly  ex 
posed  to  land  attacks :  their  fortifications  and  armies, 
therefore,  constitute  their  principal  means  of  defence. 
But  for  the  protection  of  their  own  seas  from  the  inroads 
of  their  powerful  maritime  neighbor,  Russia  and  Austria 
support  naval  establishments  of  a  limited  extent.  Russia 
has,  in  all,  some  one  hundred  and  eighty  vessels  of  war, 
and  Austria  not  quite  half  that  number.* 

The  United  States  possess  no  colonies  ;  but  they  have 
a  seacoast  of  more  than  three  thousand  miles,  with  numer 
ous  bays,  estuaries,  and  navigable .  rivers,  which  expose 
our  most  populous  cities  to  maritime  attacks.  The  north 
ern  land  frontier  is  two  thousand  miles  in  extent,  and  in 
the  west  our  territory  borders  upon  the  British  and  Mexi 
can  possessions  for  many  thousand  miles  more.  Within 
these  limits  there  are  numerous  tribes  of  Indians,  who  re 
quire  the  watchful  care  of  armed  forces  to  keep  them  at 
peace  among  themselves  as  well  as  with  us.  Our  author- 

*  These  numbers  include  all  vessels  of  war,  whether  in  commission, 
building,  or  in  ordinary. 


154  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

ized  military  establishment  amounts  to  7,590  men,  and 
our  naval  establishment  consists  of  seventy-seven  vessels 
of  all  classes,  carrying  2,345  guns,  and  8,724  men.* 
This  is  certainly  a  very  small  military  and  naval  force  for 
the  defence  of  so  extended  and  populous  a  country,  espe 
cially  one  whose  political  institutions  and  rapidly-increas 
ing  power  expose  it  to  the  distrust  and  jealousy  of  most 
other  nations. 

The  fortifications  for  the  defence  of  our  sea-coast  and 
land  frontiers  will  be  discussed  hereafter.! 

*  Since  these  pages  were  put  in  the  hands  of  the  printer,  the  above 
numbers  have  been  nearly  doubled,  this  increase  having  been  made 
with  special  reference  to  the  present  war  with  Mexico. 

t  Jomini's  work  on  the  Military  Art  contains  many  valuable  re 
marks  on  this  subject  of  Military  Polity  :  also  the  writings  of  Clause- 
witz,  Dupin,  Lloyd,  Chambray,  Tranchant  de  Laverne,  and  Rud- 
torfer.  Several  of  these  questions  are  also  discussed  in  Rocquancourt, 
Carion-Nisas,  De  Vernon,  and  other  writers  on  military  history.  The 
several  European  Annuaires  Militaires,  or  Army  Registers,  and  the 
French  and  German  military  periodicals,  contain  much  valuable  mat 
ter  connected  with  military  statistics. 


REA.-COAST  DEFENCES.  155 


CHAPTER    VII. 

SEA-COAST    DEFENCES. 

THE  principal  attacks  which  we  have  had  to  sustain, 
either  as  colonies  or  states,  from  civilized  foes,  have  come 
from  Canada.  As  colonies  we  were  continually  encoun 
tering  difficulties  and  dangers  from  the  French  posses 
sions.  In  the  war  of  the  Revolution,  it  being  one  of  na 
tional  emancipation,  the  military  operations  were  more 
general  throughout  the  several  states  ;  but  in  the  war  of 
1812  the  attacks  were  confined  to  the  northern  frontier 
and  a  few  exposed  points  along  the  coast.  In  these  two 
contests  with  Great  Britain,  Boston,  New  York,  Philadel 
phia,  Baltimore,  Washington,  Charleston,  Savannah,  Mo 
bile,  and  New  Orleans,  being  within  reach  of  the  British 
naval  power,  and  offering  the  dazzling  attraction  of  rich 
booty,  have  each  been  subjected  to  powerful  assaults. 

Similar  attacks  will  undoubtedly  be  made  in  any  future 
war  with  England.  An  attempt  at  permanent  lodgment 
would  be  based  either  on  Canada  or  a  servile  insurrection 
in  the  southern  states.  The  former  project,  in  a  military 
point  of  view,  offers  the  greatest  advantages,  but  most 
probably  the  latter  would  also  be  resorted  to  for  effecting 
a  diversion,  if  nothing  more.  But  for  inflicting  upon  us  a 
sudden  and  severe  injury  by  the  destruction  of  large 
amounts  of  public  and  private  property,  our  seaport  towns 
offer  inducements  not  likely  to  be  disregarded.  This 
mode  of  warfare,  barbarous  though  it  be,  will  certainly  at 
tend  a  conflict  with  any  great  maritime  power.  How 


156  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

can  we  best  prepare  in  time  of  peace  to  repel  these 
attacks  ? 

Immediately  after  the  war  of  1812  a  joint  commission 
of  our  most  distinguished  military  and  naval  officers  was 
formed,  to  devise  a  system  of  defensive  works,  to  be  erect 
ed  in  time  of  peace  for  the  security  of  the  most  important 
and  the  most  exposed  points  on  our  sea-coast.  It  may  be 
well  here  to  point  out,  in  very  general  terms,  the  positions 
and  character  of  these  works,  mentioning  only  such  as 
have  been  completed,  or  are  now  in  course  of  construction, 
and  such  as  are  intended  to  be  built  as  soon  as  Congress- 

o 

shall  grant  the  requisite  funds.  There  are  other  works 
projected  for  some  future  period,  but  as  they  do  not  belong 
to  the  class  required  for  immediate  use,  they  will  not  be 
referred  to. 

MAINE. 

Beginning  at  the  northeastern  extremity  of  our  coast, 
we  have,  for  Eastport  and  Wiscasset,  projected  works 
estimated  to  carry  about  fifty  guns.  Nothing  has  yet 
been  done  to  these  works. 

Next  Portland,  with  works  carrying  about  forty  or  fifty 
guns,  and  Fort  Penobscot  and  batteries,  carrying  about 
one  hundred  and  fifty  guns.  These  are  only  partly  built. 

NEW  HAMPSHIRE. 

Defences  of  Portsmouth  and  the  vicinity,  about  two 
hundred  guns.  These  works  are  also  only  partly  built. 

MASSACHUSETTS. 

Projected  works  .east  of  Boston,  carrying  about  sixty 
guns.  These  are  not  yet  commenced. 

Works  for  defence  of  Boston  Harbor  carry  about  five 
hundred  guns.  These  are  nearly  three-quarters  completed. 
Those  of  Ne  w  Bedford  harbor  carry  fifty  guns :  not  yet  begun. 


SEA-COAST  DEFENCES.  157 


RHODE  ISLAND. 

Newport  harbor, — works  carry  about  five  hundred  guns, 
nearly  completed. 

CONNECTICUT. 

New  London  harbor,  New  Haven,  and  the  Connecticut 
river.  The  first  of  these  nearly  completed  ;  the  two  latter 
not  yet  begun. 

NEW  YORK. 

The  works  projected  for  the  defence  of  New  York  har 
bor  are  estimated  to  carry  about  one  thousand  guns.  These 
works  are  not  yet  one-half  constructed. 

PENNSYLVANIA. 

The-works  projected  for  the  defence  of  the  Delaware 
Bay  and  Philadelphia  will  carry  about  one  hundred  and 
fifty  guns.  They  are  not  one-quarter  built. 

MARYLAND  AND  VIRGINIA. 

Baltimore  and  Annapolis — these  works  will  carry  some 
two  hundred  and  fifty  guns.  The  works  for  the  Chesa 
peake  Bay  will  carry  about  six  hundred  guns  ;  arid  those 
for  the  Potomac  river  about  eighty  guns.  These  are  more 
than  one-half  completed. 

NORTH  CAROLINA. 

The  works  at  Beaufort  and  Smithville  carry  about  one 
hundred  and  fifty  guns.  They  are  essentially  completed. 

SOUTH   CAROLINA. 

The  works  for  the  defence  of  Charleston  carry  some 
two  hundred  guns.  They  are  one-half  constructed. 


158  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 


GEORGIA. 


The  defences  of  Savannah  carry  about  two  hundred  guns 
and  are  nearly  three-quarters  finished. 


FLORIDA. 


The  works  projected  for  the  defence  of  St.  Augustine, 
Key  West,  Tortugas,  and  Pensacola  will  carry  some  eight 
or  nine  hundred  guns.  Those  at  St.  Augustine  and  Pen 
sacola  are  essentially  completed,  but  those  at  Key  West 
and  Tortugas  are  barely  begun. 


ALABAMA. 


The  works  for  the  defence  of  Mobile  will  carry  about  one 
hundred  and  sixty  guns.  These  are  nearly  constructed. 

LOUISIANA. 

The  works  for  the  defence  of  New  Orleans  will  carry 
some  two  hundred  and  fifty  or  three  hundred  guns ;  they 
are  nearly  completed. 

The  works  north  of  the  Chesapeake  cost  about  three 
thousand  dollars  per  gun ;  those  south  of  that  point  about 
six  thousand  dollars  per  gun.  This  difference  in  cost  is 
due  in  part  to  the  character  of  the  soil  on  which  the  forti 
fications  are  built,  and  in  part  to  the  high  prices  paid  in 
the  south  for  materials  and  workmanship. 

Having  pointed  out  the  character  and  condition  of  our 
system  of  sea-coast  defences,  let  us  briefly  examine  how 
far  these  works  may  be  relied  on  as  a  means  of  security 
against  a  maritime  descent. 

To  come  to  a  proper  conclusion  on  this  subject,  let  us 
first  examine  the  three  or  four  great  maritime  descents  at 
tempted  by  the  English  during  the  wars  of  the  French  Rev 
olution  ;  a  period  at  which  the  great  naval  superiority  of 


SEA-COAST  DEFENCES.  159 

England  over  other  nations,  gave  her  the  title  of  mistress 
of  the  seas.  Let  us  notice  what  have  been  the  results  of 
the  several  attempts  made  by  this  power  at  maritime  inva 
sions,  and  the  means  by  which  such  attacks  have  been 
repelled. 

In  1795,  a  maritime  expedition  was  fitted  out  against 
Quiberon,  at  an  expense  of  eight  millions  of  dollars. 
This  port  of  the  French  coast  had  then  a  naval  defence 
of  near  thirty  sail,  carrying  about  sixteen  hundred  guns. 
Lord  Bridport  attacked  it  with  fourteen  sail  of  the  line, 
five  frigates,  and  some  smaller  vessels,  about  fifteen  hun 
dred  guns  in  all,  captured  a  portion  of  the  fleet,  and  forced 
the  remainder  to  take  shelter  under  the  guns  of  the  forti 
fications  of  L'Orient.  The  French  naval  defence  being 
destroyed,  the  British  now  entered  Quiberon  without  op 
position.  This  bay  is  said  by  Brenton,  in  his  British 
Naval  History,  to  be  "  the  finest  on  the  coast  of  France, 
or  perhaps  in  the  world,  for  landing  an  army."  Besides 
these  natural  advantages  in  favor  of  the  English,  the  in 
habitants  of  the  surrounding  country  were  in  open  insur 
rection,  ready  to  receive  the  invaders  with  open  arms.  A 
body  of  ten  thousand  troops  were  landed,  and  clothing, 
arms,  &c.,  furnished  to  as  many  more  royalist  troops  ;  but 
the  combined  forces  failed  in  their  attack  upon  St.  Barbe, 
and  General  Hoche,  from  his  intrenchments,  with  seven 
thousand  men,  held  in  check  a  body  of  eighteen  thousand, 
penned  up,  without  defences,  in  the  narrow  peninsula. 
Reinforced  by  a  new  debarkation,  the  allies  again  at 
tempted  to  advance,  but  were  soon  defeated,  and  ultimate 
ly  almost  entirely  destroyed. 

In  1799,  the  English  and  Russians  made  a  descent  up 
on  Holland  with  fourteen  ships  of  the  line  and  ten  frig 
ates,  carrying  about  eleven  hundred  guns  and  a  great  num 
ber  of  transports,  with  an  army  of  thirty-six  thousand  men. 
The  Dutch  naval  defences  consisted  of  eight  ships  of  the 


160  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

line,  three  fifty-four  gun  ships,  eight  forty-eight  gun  ships 
and  eight  smaller  frigates,  carrying  in  all  about  twelve  hun 
dred  guns  ;  but  this  force  contributed  little  or  nothing  to 
the  defence,  and  was  soon  forced  to  hoist  the  hostile  flag. 
The  defensive  army  was  at  first  only  twelve  thousand,  but 
the  Republicans  afterwards  increased  it  to  twenty-two 
thousand,  and  finally  to  twenty-eight  thousand  men.  But 
notwithstanding  this  immense  naval  and  military  superior 
ity,  and  the  co-operation  of  the  Orange  party  in  assisting 
the  landing  of  their  troops,  the  allies  failed  to  get  posses 
sion  of  a  single  strong  place  ;  and  after  a  loss  of  six  thou 
sand  men,  were  compelled  to  capitulate.  "Such,"  says 
Alison,  "  was  the  disastrous  issue  of  the  greatest  expedi 
tion  which  had  yet  sailed  from  the  British  harbors  during 
the  war." 

In  1801,  Nelson,  with  three  ships  of  the  line,  two  frig 
ates,  and  thirty-five  smaller  vessels,  made  a  desperate  at 
tack  upon  the  harbor  of  Boulogne,  but  was  repulsed  with 
severe  loss. 

Passing  over  some  unimportant  attacks,  we  come  to  the 
descent  upon  the  Scheldt,  or  as  it  is  commonly  called,  the 
Walcheren  expedition,  in  1809.  This  expedition,  though 
a  failure,  has  often  been  referred  to  as  proving  the  expe 
diency  of  maritime  descents.  The  following  is  a  brief 
narrative  of  this  expedition  : — 

Napoleon  had  projected  vast  fortifications,  dock-yards, 
and  naval  arsenals  at  Flushing  and  Antwerp  for  the  pro 
tection  of  a  maritime  force  in  the  Scheldt.  But  no  soonei 
was  the  execution  of  this  project  begun,  than  the  English 
fitted  out  an  expedition  to  seize  upon  the  defences  of  the 
Scheldt,  and  capture  or  destroy  the  naval  force.  Flush 
ing,  at  the  mouth  of  the  river,  was  but  ill-secured,  and 
Antwerp,  some  sixty  or  seventy  miles  further  up  the  river, 
was  entirely  defenceless  ;  the  rampart  was  unarmed  with 
eannon,  dilapidated,  and  tottering,  and  its  garrison  consisted 


SEACOAST  DEFENCES.  161 

of  only  about  two  hundred  invalids  and  recruits.  Napo 
leon's  regular  army  was  employed  on  the  Danube  and  in 
the  Peninsula.  The  British  attacking  force  consisted  of 
thirty-seven  ships  of  the  line,  twenty-three  frigates,  thirty- 
three  sloops  of  war,  twenty-eight  gun,  mortar,  and  bomb 
vessels,  thirty-six  smaller  vessels,  eighty-two  gun-boats,  in 
numerable  transports,  with  over  forty  thousand  troops,  and 
an  immense  artillery  train  ;  making  in  all,  says  the  English 
historian,  "  an  hundred  thousand  combatants."  A  landing 
was  made  upon  the  island  of  Walcheren,  and  siege  laid  to 
Flushing,  which  place  was  not  reduced  till  eighteen  days 
after  the  landing  ;  the  attack  upon  the  water  was  made  by 
seven  or  eight  ships  of  the  line,  and  a  large  flotilla  of  bomb 
vessels,  but  produced  no  effect.  The  channel  at  the  mouth 
of  the  river  was  too  broad  to  be  defended  by  the  works  of 
Flushing,  and  the  main  portion  of  the  fleet  passed  out  of 
reach  of  the  guns,  and  ascended  the  Scheldt  part  way  up 
to  Antwerp.  But  in  the  mean  time,  the  fortifications  of 
that  place  had  been  repaired,  and,  after  a  fruitless  opera 
tion  of  a  whole  month  in  the  river,  the  English  were 
gradually  forced  to  retreat  to  Walcheren,  and  finally  to 
evacuate  their  entire  conquest. 

The  cost  of  the  expedition  was  immense,  both  in  treas 
ure  and  in  life.  It  was  certainly  very  poorly  managed. 
But  we  cannot  help  noticing  the  superior  value  of  fortifi 
cations  as  a  defence  against  such  descents.  They  did 
much  to  retard  the  operations  of  the  enemy  till  a  defensive 
army  could  be  raised.  The  works  of  Flushing  were  never 
intended  to  close  up  the  Scheldt,  and  of  course  could  not 
intercept  the  passage  of  shipping ;  but  they  were  not  re 
duced  by  the  English  naval  force,  as  has  sometimes  been 
alleged.  Col.  Mitchel,  of  the  English  service,  says  that 
the  fleet  "  kept  up  so  tremendous  a  fire  upon  the  batteries, 
that  the  French  officers  who  had  been  present  at  Auster- 
litz  and  Jena  declared  that  the  cannonade  in  these  battles 


162  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

had  been  a  mere  jeu  cCenfans  in  comparison.  Yet  what 
was  the  effect  produced  on  the  defences  of  the  place  by 
this  lire,  so  "formidable,  to  judge  by  the  sound  alone  ? 
The  writer  can  answer  the  question  with  some  accuracy, 
for  he  went  along  the  entire  sea-line  the  very  day  after 
the  capitulation,  and  found  no  part  of  the  parapet  injured 
so  as  to  be  of  the  slightest  consequence,  and  only  one  sol 
itary  gun  dismounted,  evidently  by  the  bursting  of  a  shell, 
and  which  could  not,  of  course,  have  been  thrown  from  the 
line  of  battle  ships,  but  must  have  been  thrown  from  the 
land  batteries."* 

But  it  may  be  said  that  although  great  naval  descents 
on  a  hostile  coast  are  almost  always  unsuccessful,  never 
theless  a  direct  naval  attack  upon  a  single  fortified  posi 
tion  will  be  attended  with  more  favorable  results ;  and 
that  our  seaport  towns,  however  fortified,  will  be  exposed 
to  bombardment  and  destruction  by  the  enemy's  fleets. 
In  other  words,  that  in  a  direct  contest  between  ships  and 
forts  the  former  will  have  at  least  an  equal  chance  of 
success. 

Let  us  suppose  a  fair  trial  of  this  relative  strength. 
The  fort  is  to  be  properly  constructed  and  in  good  repair  ; 
its  guns  in  a  position  to  be  used  with  effect ;  its  garrison 
skilful  and  efficient;  its  commander  capable  and  brave. 
The  ship  is  of  the  very  best  character,  and  in  perfect 
order ;  the  crew  disciplined  and  courageous ;  its  com 
mander  skilful  and  adroit ;  the  wind,  and  tide,  and  sea — 
all  as  could  be  desired.f  The  numbers  of  the  garrison 
and  crew  are  to  be  no  more  than  requisite,  with  no  unne 
cessary  exposure  of  human  life  to  swell  the  lists  of  the 
slain.  The  issue  of  this  contest,  unless  attended  with 

*  The  batteries  constructed  in  the  siege  of  this  place  were  armed 
with  fifty-two  heavy  guns  and  mortars. 

t  These  conditions  for  a  battery  are  easily  satisfied,  but  for  the  ship, 
are  partly  dependent  on  the  elements,  and  seldom  to  be  wholly  attained. 


SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  163 

extraordinary  and   easily  distinguishable  circumstances, 
would  be  a  fair  test  of  their  relative  strength. 

What  result  should  we  anticipate  from  the  nature  of  the 
contending  forces  1  The  ship,  under  the  circumstances 
we  have  supposed,  can  choose  her  point  of  attack,  select 
ing  the  one  she  may  deem  the  most  vulnerable  ;  but  she 
herself  is  everywhere  vulnerable ;  her  men  and  guns  are 
much  concentrated,  and  consequently  much  exposed. 
But  in  the  fort  the  guns  and  men  are  more  distributed,  a 
fort  with  an  interior  area  of  several  acres  not  having  a 
garrison  as  large  as  the  crew  of  a  seventy-four-gun  ship. 
All  parts  of  the  vessel  are  liable  to  injury ;  while  the  fort 
offers  but  a  small  mark, — the  opening  of  the  embrasures, 
a  small  part  of  the  carriage,  and  now  and  then  a  head  or 
arm  raised  above  the  parapet, — the  ratio  of  exposed  sur 
faces  being  not  less  than  twenty  to  one.  In  the  vessel  the 
guns  are  fired  from  an  oscillating  deck,  and  the  balls  go 
at  random ;  in  the  fort  the  guns  are  fired  from  an  immove- 
able  platform,  and  the  balls  reach  their  object  with  uner 
ring  aim.  There  is  always  more  or  less  motion  in  the 
water,  so  that  the  ship's  guns,  though  accurately  pointed 
at  one  moment,  at  the  next  will  be  thrown  entirely  away 
from  the  object,  even  when  the  motion  is  too  slight  to  be 
otherwise  noticed ;  whereas  in  the  battery  the  guns  will 
be  fired  just  as  they  are  pointed ;  and  the  motion  of  the 
vessel  will  merely  vary  to  the  extent  of  a  few  inches  the 
spot  in  which  the  shot  is  received.  In  the  fort  the  men 
and  guns  are  behind  impenetrable  walls  of  stone  and 
earth ;  in  the  vessel  they  are  behind  frail  bulwarks, 
whose  splinters  are  equally  destructive  with  the  shoe. 
The  fort  is  incombustible ;  while  the  ship  may  readily 
be  set  on  fire  by  incendiary  projectiles.  The  ship  has 
many  points  exposed  that  may  be  called  vital  points.  By 
losing  her  rudder,  or  portions  of  her  rigging,  or  of  her 
spars,  she  may  become  unmanageable,  and  unable  to  use 


164  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

her  strength ;  she  may  receive  shots  under  water,  and  be 
liable  to  sink ;  she  may  receive  hot  shot,  and  be  set  on 
fire  :  these  damages  are  in  addition  to  those  of  having  her 
guns  dismounted  and  her  people  killed  by  shots  that  pierce 
her  sides  and  scatter  splinters  from  her  timbers  ;  while 
the  risks  of  the  battery  are  confined  to  those  mentioned 
above — namely,  the  risk  that  the  gun,  the  carriage,  or  the 
men  may  be  struck. 

The  opinions  of  military  writers,  and  the  facts  of  his 
tory,  fully  accord  with  these  deductions  of  theory.  Some 
few  individuals  mistaking,  or  misstating,  the  facts  of  a  few 
recent  trials,  assert  that  modern  improvements  in  the  naval 
service  have  so  far  outstripped  the  progress  in  the  art  of 
land  defence,  that  a  floating  force  is  now  abundantly  able 
to  cope,  upon  equal  terms,  with  a  land  battery.  Ignorant 
and  superficial  persons,  hearing  merely  that  certain  forts 
had  recently  yielded  to  a  naval  force,  and  taking  no  trou 
ble  to  learn  the  real  facts  of  the  case,  have  paraded  them 
before  the  public  as  proofs  positive  of  a  new  era  in  mili 
tary  science.  This  conclusion,  however  groundless  and 
absurd,  has  received  credit  merely  from  its  novelty.  Let 
us  examine  the  several  trials  of  strength  which  have  taken 
place  between  ships  and  forts  within  the  last  fifty  years, 
and  see  what  have  been  the  results. 

In  1792  a  considerable  French  squadron  attacked  Ca- 
gliari,  whose  fortifications  were  at  that  time  so  dilapidated 
and  weak,  as  scarcely  to  deserve  the  name  of  defences. 
Nevertheless,  the  French  fleet,  after  a  bombardment  of 
three  days,  was  most  signally  defeated  and  obliged  to 
retire. 

In  1794  two  British  ships,  "the  Fortitude  of  seventy- 
four,  and  the  Juno  frigate  of  thirty-two  guns,"  attacked  a 
small  town  in  the  bay  of  Martello,  Corsica,  which  was 
armed  with  one  gun  in  barbette,  and  a  garrison  of  thirty 
men.  After  a  bombardment  of  two  and  a  half  hours,  these 


SEA-COAST  DEFENCES.  165 

ships  were  forced  to  haul  off  with  considerable  damage 
and  loss  of  life.  The  little  tower  had  received  no  injury, 
and  its  garrison  were  unharmed.  Here  were  one  hundred 
and  six  guns  afloat  against  one  on  shore ;  and  yet  the  latter 
was  successful. 

In  1797  Nelson  attacked  the  little  inefficient  batteries 
of  Santa  Crux,  in  Teneriffe,  with  eight  vessels  carrying 
four  hundred  guns.  But  notwithstanding  his  great  supe 
riority  in  numbers,  skill,  and  bravery,  he  was  repelled 
with  the  loss  of  two  hundred  and  fifty  men,  while  the  gar 
rison  received  little  or  no  damage.  A  single  ball  from 
the  land  battery,  striking  the  side  of  one  of  his  vessels, 
instantly  sunk  her  with  near  a  hundred  seamen  and  ma 
rines  ! 

In  1798,  a  French  flotilla  of  fifty-two  brigs  and  gunboats, 
manned  with  near  seven  thousand  men,  attacked  a  little 
English  redoubt  on  the  island  of  Marcou,  which  was  arm 
ed  with  two  thirty-two-pounders,  two  six-pounders,  four 
four-pounders,  and  two  carronades,  and  garrisoned  with 
two  hundred  and  fifty  men.  Notwithstanding  this  great 
disparity  of  numbers,  the  little  redoubt  sunk  seven  of  the 
enemy's  brigs  and  gunboats,  captured  another,  and  forced 
the  remainder  to  retreat  with  great  loss  ;  while  the  garri 
son  had  but  one  man  killed  and  three  wounded. 

In  1801,  the  French,  with  three  frigates  and  six  thou 
sand  men,  attacked  the  poorly-constructed  works  of  Porto 
Ferrairo,  whose  defensive  force  was  a  motley  garrison  of 
fifteen  hundred  Corsicans,  Tuscans,  and  English.  Here 
the  attacking  force  was  four  times  as  great  as  that  of  the 
garrison ;  nevertheless  they  were  unsuccessful  after  several 
bombardments  and  a  siege  of  five  months. 

In  July  of  the  same  year,  1801,  Admiral  Saumarez, 
with  an  English  fleet  of  six  ships  of  the  line  and  two 
smaller  vessels,  carrying  in  all  five  hundred  and  two  guns, 
attacke  1  the  Spanish  and  French  defences  of  Algesiras. 


166  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

Supposing  the  floating  forces  of  the  contending  parlies  to 
be  equal,  gun  for  gun,  (which  is  certainly  a  very  fair  es 
timate  for  the  attacking  force,  considering  the  circum 
stances  of  the  case,)  we  have  a  French  land-battery  of 
only  twelve  guns  opposed  by  an  English  floating  force  of 
one  hundred  and  ninety-six  guns.  Notwithstanding  this 
inequality  of  nearly  seventeen  to  one,  the  little  battery 
compelled  the  superior  naval  force  to  retreat  with  great 
loss. 

Shortly  after  this,  the  French  and  Spanish  fleets  at 
tacked  the  same  English  squadron  with  a  force  of  nearly 
three  to  one,  but  met  with  a  most  signal  defeat ;  'whereas 
with  a  land-battery  of  only  one  to  seventeen,  the  same 
party  had  been  victorious.  What  proof  can  be  more  de 
cisive  of  the  superiority  of  guns  on  shore  over  those 
afloat ! 

In  1 803  the  English  garrison  of  Diamond  Rock,  near 
Port  Royal  Bay,  with  only  one  hundred  men  and  some  fif 
teen  guns,  repelled  a  French  squadron  of  two  seventy- 
four-gun  ships,  a  frigate,  and  a  brig,  assisted  by  a  land 
attack  of  two  hundred  troops.  There  was  not  a  single 
man  killed  or  wounded  in  the  redoubt,  while  the  French 
lost  fifty  men !  The  place  was  afterwards  reduced  by 
famine. 

In  1806  a  French  battery  on  Cape  Licosa,  of  only  two 
guns  and  a  garrison  of  twenty-five  men,  resisted  the  at 
tacks  of  a  British  eighty-gun  ship  and  two  frigates.  The 
carriage  of  one  of  the  land-guns  failed  on  the  second 
shot,  so  that,  in  fact,  only  one  of  them  was  available  dur 
ing  the  action.  Here  was  a  single  piece  of  ordnance  and 
a  garrison  of  twenty-five  men,  opposed  to  a  naval  force  of 
over  one  hundred  and  fifty  guns  and  about  thirteen  hundred 
men.  And  what  effects  were  produced  by  this  strange 
combat  ?  The  attacking  force  lost  thirty-seven  men  killed 
and  wounded,  the  eighty-gun  ship  was  much  disabled, 


SEA-COAST  DEFENCES.  167 

while  the  fort  and  garrison  escaped  entirely  unharmed ! 
What  could  not  be  effected  by  force  was  afterwards  ob 
tained  by  negotiation. 

In  1808  a  French  land-battery  of  only  three  guns,  near 
Fort  Trinidad,  drove  off  an  English  seventy-four-gim 
ship,  and  a  bomb-vessel. 

In  1813  Leghorn,  whose  defences  were  of  a  very  me 
diocre  character,  and  whose  garrison  at  that  time  was  ex 
ceedingly  weak,  was  attacked  by  an  English  squadron  of 
six  ships,  carrying  over  three  hundred  guns,  and  a  land 
force  of  one  thousand  troops.  The  whole  attempt  was  a 
perfect  failure. 

"In  1814,  when  the  English  advanced  against  Ant 
werp,"  says  Colonel  Mitchell,  an  English  historian,  "  Fort 
Frederick,  a  small  work  of  only  two  guns,  was  establish 
ed  in  a  bend  of  the  Polder  Dyke,  at  some  distance  below 
Lillo.  The  armament  was  a  long  eighteen-pounder  and 
a  five  and  a  half  inch  howitzer.  From  this  post  the 
French  determined  to  dislodge  the  English,  and  an  eighty- 
gun  ship  dropped  down  with  the  tide  and  anchored  near 
the  Flanders  shore,  about  six  hundred  yards  from  the 
British  battery.  By  her  position  she  was  secured  from 
the  fire  of  the  eighteen-pounder,  and  exposed  to  that  of 
the  howitzer  only.  As  soon  as  every  thing  was  made 
tight  her  broadside  was  opened ;  and  if  noise  and  smoke 
were  alone  sufficient  to  ensure  success  in  war,  as  so 
many  of  the  moderns  seem  to  think,  the  result  of  this 
strange  contest  would  not  have  been  long  doubtful,  for  the 
thunder  of  the  French  artillery  actually  made  the  earth 
to  shake  again ;  but  though  the  earth  shook,  the  single 
British  howitzer  was  neither  dismounted  nor  silenced ; 
and  though  the  artillerymen  could  not,  perfectly  exposed 
as  they  were,  stand  to  their  gun  while  the  iron  hail  was 
striking  thick  and  fast  around,  yet  no  sooner  did  the  en 
emy's  fire  slacken  for  a  moment  than  they  sprang  to  their 


168  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

post,  ready  to  return  at  least  one  shot  for  eighty.  This 
extraordinary  combat  lasted  from  seven  o'clock  in  the 
morning  till  near  twelve  at  noon,  when  the  French  ship, 
having  had  forty-one  men  killed  and  wounded,  her  com 
mander  being  in  the  list  of  the  latter,  and  having  besides 
sustained  serious  damage  in  her  hull  and  rigging,  return 
ed  to  Antwerp  without  effecting  any  thing  whatever.  The 
howitzer  was  not  dismounted,  the  fort  was  not  injured, — 
there  being  in  fact  nothing  to  injure, — and  the  British  had 
only  one  man  killed  and  two  w^ounded." 

It  is  unnecessary  to  further  specify  examples  from  the 
wars  of  the  French  Revolution  ;  the  whole  history  of 
these  wars  is  one  continued  proof  of  the  superiority  of 
fortifications  as  a  maritime  frontier  defence.  The  sea- 
coast  of  France  is  almost  within  stone's  throw*  of  the 
principal  British  naval  depots  ;  here  were  large  towns  and 
harbors,  filled  with  the  rich  commerce  of  the  world,  offer 
ing  the  dazzling  attraction  of  rich  booty.  The  French 
navy  was  at  this  time  utterly  incompetent  to  their  defence  ; 
while  England  supported  a  maritime  force  at  an  annual 
expense  of  near  ninety  millions  of  dollars.  Her  largest 
fleets  were  continually  cruising  within  sight  of  these  sea 
ports,  and  not  unfrequently  attempting  to  cut  out  their 
shipping.  "  At  this  period,"  says  one  of  her  naval  histori 
ans,  "  the  naval  force  of  Britain,  so  multiplied  and  so  ex 
pert  from  long  practice,  had  acquired  an  intimate  know 
ledge  of  their  (the  French)  harbors,  their  bays  and  creeks  ; 
her  officers  knew  the  depth  of  water,  and  the  resistance 
likely  to  be  met  with  in  every  situation.",  On  the  other 
hand,  these  harbors  and  towns  were  frequently  stripped  of 
their  garrisons  by  the  necessities  of  distant  wars,  being 
left  with  no  other  defence  than  their  fortifications  and 
militia.  And  yet,  notwithstanding  all  this,  they  escaped 

*  Only  eighteen  and  a  half  miles  across  the  Channel  at  the  narrow 
est  place. 


SEA-COAST  DEFENCES.  169 

unharmed  during  the  entire  contest.  They  were  frequent 
ly  attacked,  and  in  some  instances  the  most  desperate  ef 
forts  were  made  to  effect  a  permanent  lodgment ;  but  in 
no  case  was  the  success  at  all  commensurate  with  the  ex 
pense  of  life  and  treasure  sacrificed,  and  no  permanent 
hold  was  made  on  either  the  maritime  frontiers  of  France 
or  her  allies.  This  certainly  was  owing  to  no  inferiority 
of  skill  and  bravery  on  the  part  of  the  British  navy,  as  the 
battles  of  Aboukir  and  Trafalgar,  and  the  almost  total  an 
nihilation  of  the  French  marine,  have  but  too  plainly  pro 
ven.  Why  then  did  these  places  escape  ?  We  know  of 
no  other  reason,  than  that  they  were  fortified ;  and  that  the 
French  knew  how  to  defend  their  fortifications.  The 
British  maritime  expeditions  to  Quiberon,  Holland,  Bou 
logne,  the  Scheldt,  Constantinople,  Buenos  Ayres,  &c., 
sufficiently  prove  the  ill-success,  and  the  waste  of  life  and 
treasure  with  which  they  must  always  be  attended.  But 
when  her  naval  power  was  applied  to  the  destruction  of 
the  enemy's  marine,  and  in  transporting  her  land  forces  to 
solid  bases  of  operations  on  the  soil  of  her  allies,  in  Por 
tugal  and  Belgium,  the  fall  of  Napoleon  crowned  the  glory 
of  their  achievements. 

Let  us  now  examine  the  several  British  naval  attacks 
on  our  own  forts,  in  the  wars  of  the  Revolution  and  of  1812. 

In  1776  Sir  Peter  Parker,  with  a  British  fleet  of  nine 
vessels,  carrying  about  two  hundred  and  seventy*  guns, 
attacked  Fort  Moultrie,  in  Charleston  harbor,  which  was 
then  armed  with  only  twenty-six  guns,  and  garrisoned  by 
only  three  hundred  and  seventy-five  regulars  and  a  few 
militia.  In  this  contest  the  British  were  entirely  defeated, 
and  lost,  in  killed  and  wounded,  two  hundred  and  five  men, 
while  their  whole  two  hundred  and  seventy  guns  killed 
and  wounded  only  thirty-two  men  in  the  fort.  Of  tliis 

•  *  These  vessels  rated  two  hundred  and  fifty-four  guns,  but  the  num 
ber  actually  carried  is  stated  to  have  been  two  hundred  and  seventy. 
15 


170  MILITARY   ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

trial  of  strength,  which  was  certainly  a  fair  one,  Cooperk 
in  his  Naval  History,  says  : — "  It  goes  fully  to  prove  the 
important  military  position  that  ships  cannot  withstand 
forts,  when  the  latter  are  properly  armed,  constructed,  and 
garrisoned.  General  Moultrie  says  only  thirty  rounds 
from  the  battery  were  fired,  and  was  of  opinion  that  the 
want  of  powder  alone  prevented  the  Americans  from  de 
stroying  the  men-of-war." 

In  1814  a  British  fleet  of  four  vessels,  carrying  ninety- 
two  guns,  attacked  Fort  Boyer,  a  small  redoubt,  located 
on  a  point  of  land  commanding  the  passage  from  the  Gulf 
into  the  bay  of  Mobile.  This  redoubt  was  garrisoned  by 
only  one  hundred  and  twenty  combatants,  officers  in 
cluded  ;  and  its  armament  was  but  twenty  small  pieces  of 
cannon,  some  of  which  were  almost  entirely  useless,  and 
most  of  them  poorly  mounted  "  in  batteries  hastily  thrown 
up,  and  leaving  the  gunners  uncovered  from  the  knee  up 
ward,"  while  the  enemy's  land  force,  acting  in  concert 
with  the  ships,  consisted  of  twenty  artillerists  with  a  bat 
tery  of  two  guns,  and  seven  hundred  and  thirty  marines, 
Indians,  and  negroes.  His  ships  carried  five  hundred  and 
ninety  men  in  all.  This  immense  disparity  of  numbers 
and  strength  did  not  allow  to  the  British  military  and  na 
val  commanders  the  slightest  apprehension  "  that  four 
British  ships,  carrying  ninety-two  guns,  and  a  land  force 
somewhat  exceeding  seven  hundred  combatants,  could 
fail  in  reducing  a  small  work  mounting  only  twenty  short 
carronades,  and  defended  by  a  little  more  than  a  hundred 
men,  unprovided  alike  with  furnaces  for  heating  shot,  or 
casements  to  cover  themselves  from  rockets  and  shells." 
Nevertheless,  the  enemy  was  completely  repulsed  ;  one  of 
his  largest  ships  was  entirely  destroyed,  and  85  men  were 
killed  and  wounded  on  board  the  other ;  while  our  loss 
was  only  eight  or  nine.  Here  a  naval  force  of  'five  to  one 
was  repelled  by  the  land-battery. 


SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  171 

Again,  in  1814,  a  barbette  battery  of  one  four-pounder 
and  two  eighteen-pounder  guns  at  Stonington,  repelled  a 
British  fleet  of  one  hundred  and  thirty-four  guns.  During 
the  engagement  the  Americans  exhausted  their  ammuni 
tion,  and  spiked  their  eighteen-pounders,  and  only  one  of 
them  was  afterwards  used.  Two  of  the  enemy's  ships, 
carrying  one  hundred  and  twelve  guus,  were  engaged  du 
ring  the  whole  time  of  attack,  and  during  much  of  this 
time  bombarded  the  town  from  a  position  beyond  reach  of 
the  land-battery.  They  were  entirely  too  far  off  for  the 
four-pounder  gun  to  be  of  any  use.  Supposing  the  two 
eighteen-pounders  to  have  been  employed  during  the  whole 
action,  and  also  all  the  guns  of  the  fleet,  one  eighteen- 
pounder  on  land  must  have  been  more  than  equivalent  to 
sixty-seven  guns  afloat,  for  the  ships  were  so  much  injured 
as  to  render  it  necessary  for  them  to  withdraw.  The 
British  loss  was  twenty  killed,  and  more  than  fifty  wound 
ed.  Ours  was  only  two  killed  and  six  wounded.* 

The  fleet  sent  to  the  attack  of  Baltimore,  in  1814,  con 
sisted  of  forty  sail,  the  largest  of  which  were  ships  of  the 
line,  carrying  an  army  of  over  six  thousand  combatants. 
The  troops  were  landed  at  North  Point,  while  sixteen  of 
the  bomb-vessels  and  frigates  approached  within  reach  of 
Fort  McHenry,  and  commenced  a  bombardment  which 
lasted  twenty-five  hours.  During  this  attack,  the  enemy 
threw  "  fifteen  hundred  shells,  four  hundred  of  which  ex 
ploded  within  the  walls  of  the  fort,  but  without  making 
any  impression  on  either  the  strength  of  the  work  or  the 
garrison,"  and  the  British  were  compelled  to  retire  with 
much  loss. 

In  1815,  a  squadron  of  British  ships,  stationed  off  the 
mouths  of  the  Mississippi,  for  the  purpose  of  a  blockade, 
ascended  the  river  as  high  as  Fort  St.  Philip,  which  is  a 

*  Perkins  says  two  killed  and  six  wounded.  Holmes  says  six 
wounded,  but  makes  no  mention  of  any  killed. 


172  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

small  work  capable  of  an  armament  of  only  twenty  guns 
in  all.  A  heavy  fire  of  shot  and  shells  was  continued  with 
but  few  and  short  pauses  for  nine  days  and  nights,  but 
making  no  impression  either  on  the  fort  or  garrison,  they 
retreated  to  their  former  position  at  the  mouth  of  the  river. 

There  is  but  a  single  instance  in  the  war  of  1812,  where 
the  enemy's  vessels  succeeded  in  reducing  a  fort;  and 
this  has  sometimes  been  alluded  to,  by  persons  ignorant  of 
the  real  facts  of  the  case,  as  a  proof  against  the  ability  of 
our  fortifications  to  resist  naval  attacks.  Even  if  it  were 
a  case  of  decided  failure,  would  this  single  exception  be 
sufficient  to  overthrow  the  weight  of  evidence  on  the  other 
side  ?  We  allude  to  the  reduction  of  the  so-called  Fort 
Washington  by  the  British  fleet  that  ascended  the  Poto 
mac  in  1814,  to  assist  in  the  disgraceful  and  barbarous 
operation  of  burning  the  capitol  and  destroying  the  archives 
of  the  nation.  Fort  Washington  was  a  very  small  and 
inefficient  work,  incorrectly  planned  by  an  incompetent 
French  engineer  ;  only  a  small  part  of  the  fort  was  then 
built,  and  it  has  riot  yet  been  completed.  The  portion 
constructed  was  never,  until  very  recently,  properly  pre 
pared  for  receiving  its  armament,  and  at  the  time  of  attack 
could  not  possibly  have  held  out  a  long  time.  But  no  de 
fence  whatever  was  made.  Capt.  Gordon,  with  a  squad 
ron  of  eight  sail,  carrying  one  hundred  and  seventy-three 
guns,  under  orders  "  to  ascend  the  river  as  high  as  Fort 
Washington,  and  try  upon  it  the  experiment  of  a  bombard 
rnent,"  approached  that  fort,  and,  upon  firing  a  single  shell, 
which  did  no  injury  to  either  the  fort  or  the  garrison,  the 
latter  deserted  the  works,  and  rapidly  retreated.  The 
commanding  officer  was  immediately  dismissed  for  his 
cowardice.  An  English  naval  officer,  who  was  one  of  the 
expedition,  in  speaking  of  the  retreat  of  the  garrison,  says  : 
"  We  were  at  loss  to  account  for  such  an  extraordinary 


SEA-COAST    DEFENCES.  173 

step.  The  position  was  good  and  the  capture  would  have 
cost  us  at  least  fifty  men,  and  more,  had  it  been  properly 
defended  ;  besides,  an  unfavorable  wind  and  many  other 
chances  were  in  their  favor,"  &c.  The  fleet  ascended 
the  river  to  Alexandria,  but  learning  soon  afterwards  that 
batteries  were  preparing  at  White  House  and  Indian  Head 
to  cut  off  its  retreat,  it  retired,  in  much  haste,  but  not 
without  injury. 

Some  have  also  pretended  to  find  in  modern  European 
history  a  few  examples  contradictory  of  the  relative  pow 
er  which  we  have  here  assigned  to  ships  and  forts. 
Overlooking  the  numerous  and  well-authenticated  exam 
ples,  where  forts  of  small  dimensions  and  of  small  arma 
ment  have  repelled  large  fleets,  they  would  draw  their 
conclusions  from  the  four  or  five  instances  where  fleets 
have  gained  (as  was  at  first  supposed)  a  somewhat  doubt 
ful  victory  over  forts.  But  a  careful  and  critical  examin 
ation  of  the  facts  in  these  cases,  will  show  that  even  these 
are  no  exceptions  to  the  general  rule  of  the  superiority  of 
guns  ashore  over  guns  afloat. 

The  only  instances  where  it  has  ever  been  pretended 
by  writers  of  any  note,  that  ships  have  gained  advan 
tage,  are  those  of  the  attack  on  Copenhagen  in  1801  ;  the 
passage  of  the  Dardanelles,  in  1807;  the  attack  on  Al 
giers,  in  1816  ;  the  attack  on  San  Juan  d'Ulloa,  in  1838  ; 
and  the  attack  on  St.  Jean  d'Acre,  in  1840. 

Let  us  examine  these  examples  a  little  in  detail  : — 

Copenhagen. — The  British  fleet  sent  to  attack  Copen 
hagen,  in  1801,  consisted  of  fifty-two  sail,  eighteen  of 
them  being  line-of-battle  ships,  four  frigates,  &c.  They 
sailed  from  Yarmouth  roads  on  the  12th  of  March,  passed 
the  Sound  on  the  30th,  and  attacked  and  defeated  the 
Danish  line  on  the  2d  of  April. 

The  Sound  between  Cronenberg  and  the  Swedish  coast 
is  about  two  and  a  half  miles  wide,  (vide  Fig.  34.)  The 


174  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

batteries  of  Cronenberg  and  Elsinore  were  lined  with  one 
hundred  pieces  of  cannon  and  mortars  ;  but  the  Swedish 
battery  had  been  much  neglected,  and  then  mounted  only 
six  guns.  Nevertheless,  the  British  admiral,  to  avoid  the 
damage  his  squadron  would  have  to  sustain  in  the  passage 
of  this  wide  channel,  defended  by  a  force  scarcely  supe 
rior  to  a  single  one  of  his  ships,  preferred  to  attempt  the 
difficult  passage  of  the  Belt ;  but  after  a  few  of  his  light 
vessels,  acting  as  scouts,  had  run  on  rocks,  he  returned  to 
the  Sound. 

He  then  tried  to  negotiate  a  peaceful  passage,  threaten 
ing,  however,  a  declaration  of  war  if  his  vessels  should 
be  fired  upon.  It  must  be  remembered  that  at  this  time 
England  was  at  peace  with  both  Denmark  and  Sweden, 
and  that  no  just  cause  of  war  existed.  Hence,  the  ad 
miral  inferred  that  the  commanders  of  these  batteries 
would  be  loath  to  involve  their  countries  in  a  war  with  so 
formidable  a  power  as  England,  by  commencing  hostili 
ties,  when  only  a  free  passage  was  asked.  The  Danish 
commander  replied,  that  he  should  not  permit  a  fleet  to 
pass  his  post,  whose  object  and  destination  were  unknown 
to  him.  He  fired  upon  them,  as  he  was  bound  to  do  by 
long-existing  commercial  regulations,  and  not  as  an  act  of 
hostility  against  the  English.  The  Swedes,  on  the  con 
trary,  remained  neutral,  and  allowed  the  British  vessels  to 
lie  near  by  for  several  days  without  firing  upon  them. 
Seeing  this  friendly  disposition  of  the  Swedes,  the  fleet 
neared  their  coast,  and  passed  out  of  the  reach  of  the 
Danish  batteries,  which  opened  a  fire  of  balls  and  shells  ; 
but  all  of  them  fell  more  than  two  hundred  yards  short 
of  the  fleet,  which  escaped  without  the  loss  of  a  single 
man. 

The  Swedes  excused  their  treachery  by  the  plea  that 
it  would  have  been  impossible  to  construct  batteries  at 
that  season,  and  that,  even  had  it  been  possible,  Denmark 


SEA-COAST  DEFENCES.  175 

would  not  have  consented  to  their  doing  so,  for  fear  that 
Sweden  would  renew  her  old  claim  to  one  half  of  the  rich 
duties  levied  by  Denmark  on  all  ships  passing  the  strait. 
There  may  have  been  some  grounds  for  the  last  excuse ; 
but  the  true  reason  for  their  conduct  was  the  fear  of  get 
ting  involved  in  a  war  with  England.  Napoleon  says 
that,  even  at  that  season,  a  few  days  would  have  been 
sufficient  for  placing  a  hundred  guns  in  battery,  and  that 
Sweden  had  much  more  time  than  was  requisite.  And 
with  a  hundred  guns  on  each  side  of  the  channel,  served 
with  skill  and  energy,  the  fleet  must  necessarily  have  sus 
tained  so  much  damage  as  to  render  it  unfit  to  attack 
Copenhagen. 

On  this  passage,  we  remark  :— 

1st.  The  whole  number  of  guns  and  mortars  in  the  forts 
of  the  Sound  amounted  to  only  one  hundred  and  six,  while 
the  fleet  carried  over  seventeen  hundred  guns ;  and  yet, 
with  this  immense  superiority  of  more  than  sixteen  to  one, 
the  British  admiral  preferred  the  dangerous  passage  of  the 
Belt  to  encountering  the  fire  of  these  land-batteries. 

2d.  By  negotiations,  and  threatening  the  vengeance  of 
England,  he  persuaded  the  small  Swedish  battery  to  re 
main  silent  and  allow  the  fleet  to  pass  near  that  shore,  out 
of  reach  of  Cronenberg  and  Elsinore. 

3d.  It  is  the  opinion  of  Napoleon  and  the  best  English 
writers,  that  if  the  Swedish  battery  had  been  put  in  order, 
and  acted  in  concert  with  the  Danish  works,  they  might 
have  so  damaged  the  fleet  as  to  render  it  incapable  of  any 
serious  attempt  on  Copenhagen. 

We  now  proceed  to  consider  the  circumstances  attend 
ing  the  attack  and  defence  of  Copenhagen  itself.  The 
only  side  of  the  to\vn  exposed  to  the  attack  of  heavy  ship 
ping  is  the  northern,  where  there  lies  a  shoal  extending 
out  a  considerable  distance,  leaving  only  a  very  narrow 
approach  to  the  heart  of  the  city,  (Fig.  35  )  On  the  most 


176  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

advanced  part  of  this  shoal  are  the  Crown-batteries,  car 
rying  in  all  eighty-eight  guns.*  The  entrance  into  the 
Baltic  between  Copenhagen  and  Salthorn,  is  divided  into 
two  channels  by  a  bank,  called  the  Middle  Ground,  which 
is  situated  directly  opposite  Copenhagen.  To  defend  the 
entrance  on  the  left  of  the  Crown-batteries,  they  placed 
near  the  mouth  of  the  channel  four  ships  of  the  line,  one 
frigate,  and  two  sloops,  carrying  in  all  three  hundred  and 
fifty-eight  guns.  To  secure  the  port  and  city  from  bom 
bardment  from  the  King's  Channel,  (that  between  the 
Middle  Ground  and  town,)  a  line  of  floating  defences  were 
moored  near  the  edge  of  the  shoal,  and  manned  princi 
pally  by  volunteers.  This  line  consisted  of  old  hulls  of 
vessels,  block-ships,  prames,  rafts,  &c.,  carrying  in  all  six 
hundred  and  twenty-eight  guns — a  force  strong  enough  to 
prevent  the  approach  of  bomb-vessels  and  gunboats,  (the 
purpose  for  which  it  was  intended,)  but  utterly  incapable 
of  contending  with  first-rate  ships  of  war ;  but  these  the 
Danes  thought  would  be  deterred  from  approaching  by  the 
difficulties  of  navigation.  These  difficulties  were  cer 
tainly  very  great ;  and  Nelson  said,  beforehand,  that  "  the 
wind  which  might  carry  him  in  would  most  probably  not 
bring  out  a  crippled  ship."  Had  the  Danes  supposed  it 
possible  for  Nelson  to  approach  with  his  large  vessels, 
the  line  of  floating  defences  would  have  been  formed 
nearer  Copenhagen,  the  right  supported  by  batteries  raised 
on  the  isle  of  Amack.  "  In  that  case,"  says  Napoleon, 
"  it  is  probable  that  Nelson  would  have  failed  in  his 
attack ;  for  it  would  have  been  impossible  for  him  to  pass 
between  the  line  and  shore  thus  lined  with  cannon."  As 
it  was,  the  line  was  too  extended  for  strength,  and  its  right 
too  far  advanced  to  receive  assistance  from  the  battery  of 

*  Some  writers  say  only  sixty-eight  or  seventy ;  but  the  English 
writers  generally  say  eighty-eight.  A  few,  (apparently  to  increase 
the  brilliancy  of  the  victory,)  make  this  number  still  greater. 


SEA-COAST  DEFENCES.  177 

Amack.  A  part  of  the  fleet  remained  as  a  reserve,  under 
Admiral  Parker,  while  the  others,  under  Nelson,  advanced 
to  the  King's  Channel.  This  attacking  force  consisted 
of  eight  ships  of  the  line  and  thirty-six  smaller  vessels, 
carrying  in  all  eleven  hundred  guns,  (without  including 
those  in  the  six  gun-brigs,  whose  armament  is  not  given.) 
One  of  the  seventy-four-gun  ships  could  not  be  brought 
into  action,  and  two  others  grounded ;  but,  Lord  Nelson 
says,  "  although  not  in  the  situation  assigned  them,  yet 
they  were  so  placed  as  to  be  of  great  service."  This 
force  was  concentrated  upon  a  part  of  the  Danish  line  of 
floating  defences,  the  whole  of  which  was  not  only  infe 
rior  to  it  by  three  hundred  and  eighty-two  guns,  but  so 
situated  as  to  be  beyond  the  reach  of  succor,  and  without 
a  chance  of  escape.  The  result  was  what  might  have 
been  expected.  Every  vessel  of  the  right  and  centre  of 
this  outer  Danish  line  was  taken  or  destroyed,  except  one 
or  two  small  ones,  which  cut  and  run  under  protection  of 
the  fortifications.  The  left  of  the  line,  being  supported 
by  the  Crown-battery,  remained  unbroken.  A  division 
of  frigates,  in  hopes  of  providing  an  adequate  substitute 
for  the  ships  intended  to  attack  the  batteries,  ventured  to 
engage  them,  but  "  it  suffered  considerable  loss,  and,  in 
spite  of  all  its  efforts,  was  obliged  to  relinquish  this  enter 
prise,  and  sheer  off." 

The  Danish  vessels  lying  in  the  entrance  of  the  chan 
nel  which  leads  to  the  city,  were  not  attacked,  and  took 
no  material  part  in  the  contest.  They  are  to  be  reckoned 
in  the  defence  on  the  same  grounds  that  the  British  ships 
of  the  reserve  should  be  included  in  the  attacking  force. 
Nor  was  any  use  made  of  the  guns  on  shore,  for  the  ene 
my  did  not  advance  far  enough  to  be  within  their  range. 

The  Crown-battery  was  behind  the  Danish  line,  and 
mainly  masked  by  it.  A  part  only  of  its  guns  could  be 
used  in  support  of  the  left  of  this  line,  and  in  repelling  the 


178  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

direct  attacks  of  the  frigates,  which  it  did  most  effectually 
But  we  now  come  to  a  new  feature  in  this  battle.  As 
the  Danish  line  of  floating  defences  fell  into  the  hands  of 
the  English,  the  range  of  the  Crown-battery  enlarged,  and 
its  power  was  felt.  Nelson  saw  the  danger  to  which  his 
fleet  was  exposed,  and,  being  at  last  convinced  of  the 
prudence  of  the  admiral's  signal  for  retreat,  "  made  up  his 
mind  to  weigh  anchor  and  retire  from  the  engagement." 
To  retreat,  however,  from  his  present  position,  was  ex 
ceedingly  difficult  and  dangerous.  He  therefore  deter 
mined  to  endeavor  to  effect  an  armistice,  and  dispatched 
the  following  letter  to  the  prince-regent : 

"  Lord  Nelson  has  directions  to  spare  Denmark  when 
no  longer  resisting ;  but  if  the  firing  is  continued  on  the 
part  of  Denmark,  Lord  Nelson  must  be  obliged  to  set  on 
fire  all  the  floating  batteries  he  has  taken,  without  the 
power  to  save  the  brave  Danes  who  have  defended  them." 

This  produced  an  armistice,  and  hostilities  had  hardly 
ceased,  when  three  of  the  English  ships,  including  that 
in  which  Nelson  himself  was,  struck  upon  the  bank. 
"  They  were  in  the  jaws  of  destruction,  and  would  never 
have  escaped  if  the  batteries  had  continued  their  fire. 
They  therefore  owed  their  safety  to  this  armistice."  A 
convention  was  soon  signed,  by  which  every  thing  was 
left  in  statu  quo,  and  the  fleet  of  Admiral  Parker  allowed 
to  proceed  into  the  Baltic.  Edward  Baines,  the  able 
English  historian  of  the  wars  of  the  French  Revolution, 
in  speaking  of  Nelson's  request  for  an  armistice,  says : 
"  This  letter,  which  exhibited  a  happy  union  of  policy  and 
courage,  was  written  at  a  moment  when  Lord  Nelson  per 
ceived  that,  in  consequence  of  the  unfavorable  state  of  the 
wind,  the  admiral  was  not  likely  to  get  up  to  aid  the  enter 
prise  ;  that  the  principal  batteries  of  the  enemy,  and  the 
ships  at  the  mouth  of  the  harbor,  were  yet  untouched ;  that 
two  of  his  own  division  had  grounded,  and  others  were 


SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  179 

likely  to  share  the  same  fate."  Campbell  says  these  bat 
teries  and  ships  "  were  still  unconquered.  Two  of  his  [Nel 
son's]  own  vessels  were  grounded  and  exposed  to  a  heavy 
fire ;  others,  if  the  battle  continued,  might  be  exposed  to 
a  similar  fate,  while  he  found  it  would  be  scarcely  prac 
ticable  to  bring  off  the  prizes  under  the  fire  of  the  bat 
teries." 

With  respect  to  the  fortifications  of  the  town,  a  chroni 
cler  of  the  times  says  they  were  of  no  service  while  the 
action  lasted.  "  They  began  to  fire  when  the  enemy  took 
possession  of  the  abandoned  ships,  but  it  was  at  the  same 
time  the  parley  appeared."  The  Danish  commander, 
speaking  of  the  general  contest  between  the  two  lines, 
says  :  "  The  Crown-battery  did  not  come  at  all  into  action." 
An  English  writer  says  distinctly :  "  The  Avorks  (fortifi 
cations)  of  Copenhagen  were  absolutely  untouched  at  the 
close  of  the  action."  Colonel  Mitchel,  the  English  his 
torian,  says  :  "  Lord  Nelson  never  fired  a  shot  at  the  town 
or  fortifications  of  Copenhagen  ;  he  destroyed  a  line  of 
block-ships,  prames,  and  floating  batteries  that  defended 
the  sea  approach  to  the  town ;  and  the  Crown  Prince, 
seeing  his  capital  exposed,  was  willing  to  finish  by  armi 
stice  a  war,  the  object  of  which  was  neither  very  popular 
nor  well  understood.  What  the  result  of  the  action  be 
tween  Copenhagen  and  the  British  fleet  might  ultimately 
have  been,  is  therefore  altogether  uncertain.  THE  BOM 
BARDMENT  OF  COPENHAGEN  BY  NELSON,  as  it  is  generally 
styled,  is  therefore,  like  most  other  oracular  phrases  of  the 
day,  a  mere  combination  of  words,  without  the  slightest 
meaning." 

The  British  lost  in  killed  and  wounded  nine  hundred 
and  forty-three  men ;  and  the  loss  of  the  Danes,  accord 
ing  to  their  own  account,  which  is  confirmed  by  the  French, 
was  but  very  little  higher.  The  English,  however,  say  it 
amounted  to  sixteen  or  eighteen  hundred ;  but  let  the  loss 


180  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

be  what  it  may,  it  was  almost  exclusively  confined  to  the 
floating  defences,  and  can  in  no  way  determine  the  rela 
tive  accuracy  of  aim  of  the  guns  ashore  and  guns  afloat. 

The  facts  and  testimony  we  have  adduced,  prove  incon- 
testably — 

1st.  That  of  the  fleet  of  fifty-two  sail  and  seventeen 
hundred  guns  sent  by  the  English  to  the  attack  upon  Co 
penhagen,  two  ships  carrying  one  hundred  and  forty-eight 
guns  were  grounded  or  wrecked  ;  seven  ships  of  the  line, 
and  thirty-six  smaller  vessels,  carrying  over  one  thousand 
guns,  were  actually  brought  into  the  action  ;  while  the  re 
mainder  were  held  as  a  reserve  to  act  upon  the  first  fa 
vorable  opportunity. 

2d.  That  the  Danish  line  of  floating  defences,  con 
sisting  mostly  of  hulls,  sloops,  rafts,  &c.,  carried  only  six 
hundred  and  twenty-eight  guns  of  all  descriptions  ;  that 
the  fixed  batteries  supporting  this  line  did  not  carry  over 
eighty  or  ninety  guns  at  most ;  and  that  both  these  land 
and  floating  batteries  were  mostly  manned  and  the  guns 
served  by  volunteers. 

3d.  That  the  fixed  batteries  in  the  system  of  defence 
were  either  so  completely  masked,  or  so  far  distant,  as  to 
be  useless  during  the  contest  between  the  fleet  and  float 
ing  force. 

4th.  That  the  few  guns  of  these  batteries  which  were 
rendered  available  by  the  position  of  the  floating  de 
fences,  repelled,  with  little  or  no  loss  to  themselves,  and 
some  injury  to  the  enemy,  a  vastly  superior  force  of  fri 
gates  which  attacked  them. 

5th.  That  the  line  of  floating  defences  was  conquered 
and  mostly  destroyed,  wliile  the  fixed  batteries  were  unin 
jured. 

6th.  That  the  fortifications  of  the  city  and  of  Amack 
fcland  were  not  attacked,  and  had  no  part  in  the  contest. 

7th.  That,  as  soon  as  the   Crown-batteries  were  un« 


SEA-COAST  DEFENCES.  181 

masked  and  began  to  act,  Nelson  prepared  to  retreat,  but, 
on  account  of  the  difficulty  of  doing  so,  he  opened  a  par 
ley,  threatening,  with  a  cruelty  unworthy  of  the  most  bar 
barous  ages,  that,  unless  the  batteries  ceased  their  fre  upon 
his  ships,  he  would  burn  all  the  floating  defences  with  the 
Danish  prisoners  in  his  possession ;  and  that  this  armist:  ce 
was  concluded  just  in  time  to  save  his  own  ships  from 
destruction. 

8th.  That,  consequently,  the  battle  of  Copenhagen  can 
not  be  regarded  as  a  contest  between  ships  and  forts,  or  a 
triumph  of  ships  over  forts  :  that,  so  far  as  the  guns  on 
shore  were  engaged,  they  showed  a  vast  superiority  over 
those  afloat — a  superiority  known  and  confessed  by  the 
English  themselves. 

Constantinople.— The  channel  of  the  Dardanelles  is 
about  twelve  leagues  long,  three  miles  wide  at  its  en 
trance,  and  about  three-quarters  of  a  mile  at  its  narrowest 
point.  Its  principal  defences  are  the  outer  and  inner  cas 
tles  of  Europe  and  Asia,  and  the  castles  of  Sestos  and 
Abydos.  Constantinople  stands  about  one  hundred  miles 
from  its  entrance  into  the  Sea  of  Marmora,  and  at  nearly 
the  opposite  extremity  of  this  sea.  The  defences  of  the 
channel  had  been  allowed  to  go  to  decay  ;  but  few  guns 
were  mounted,  and  the  forts  were  but  partially  garrisoned. 
In  Constantinople  not  a  gun  was  mounted,  and  no  prepar 
ations  for  defence  were  made  ;  indeed,  previous  to  the 
approach  of  the  fleet,  the  Turks  had  not  determined 
whether  to  side  with  the  English  or  the  French,  and  even 
then  the  French  ambassador  had  the  greatest  difficulty  in 
persuading  them  to  resist  the  demands  of  Duckforth. 

The  British  fleet  consisted  of  six  sail  of  the  line,  two 
frigates,  two  sloops,  and  several  bomb-vessels,  carrying 
eight  hundred  and  eighteen  guns,  (besides  those  in  the 
bomb-ships.)  Admiral  Duckforth  sailed  through  the  Dar 
danelles  on  the  19th  of  February,  1807,  with  little  or  no 


182  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

opposition.  This  being  a  Turkish  festival  day,  the  sol 
diers  of  the  scanty  garrison  were  enjoying  the  festivities 
of  the  occasion,  and  none  were  left  to  serve  the  few  guns 
of  the  forts  which  had  been  prepared  for  defence.  But 
while  the  admiral  was  waiting  on  the  Sea  of  Marmora  for 
the  result  of  negotiations,  or  for  a  favorable  wind  to  make 
the  attack  upon  Constantinople,  the  fortifications  of  this 
city  were  put  in  order,  and  the  Turks  actively  employed, 
under  French  engineers  and  artillery  officers,  in  repair 
ing  the  defences  of  the  Straits.  Campbell,  in  his  Naval 
History,  says  : — "  Admiral  Duckforth  now  fully  perceived 
the  critical  situation  in  which  he  was  placed.  He  might, 
indeed,  succeed,  should  the  weather  become  favorable,  in 
bombarding  Constantinople  ;  but  unless  the  bombardment 
should  prove  completely  successful  in  forcing  the  Turks  to 
pacific  terms,  the  injury  he  might  do  to  the  city  would  not 
compensate  for  the  damage  which  his  fleet  must  necessarily 
sustain.  With  this  damaged  and  crippled  fleet,  he  must  re- 
pass  the  Dardanelles,  now  rendered  i?ifinitcly  stronger  than 
they  were  when  he  came  through  them" 

Under  these  circumstances  the  admiral  determined  to 
retreat ;  and  on  the  3d  of  April  escaped  through  the  Dar 
danelles,  steering  midway  of  the  channel,  with  a  favora 
ble  and  strong  current.  "  This  escape,  however,"  says 
Baines,  "  was  only  from  destruction,  but  by  no  means 
from  serious  loss  and  injury.  *  *  *  *  In  what  in 
stance  in  the  whole  course  of  our  naval  warfare,  have 
ships  received  equal  damage  in  so  short  a  time  as  in  this 
extraordinary  enterprise  ?"  In  detailing  the  extent  of  this 
damage,  we  will  take  the  ships  in  the  order  they  descend 
ed.  The  first  had  her  wheel  carried  away,  and  her  hull 
much  damaged,  but  escaped  with  the  loss  of  only  three 
men.  A  stone  shot  penetrated  the  second,  between  the 
poop  and  quarter  deck,  badly  injured  the  mizzen-mast,  car 
ried  away  the  wheel,  and  did  other  serious  damage,  killing 


SEA-COAST  DEFENCES.  183 

and  wounding  twenty  men.  Two  shot  struck  the  third,  car 
rying  away  her  shrouds  and  injuring  her  masts  ;  loss  in 
killed  and  wounded,  thirty.  The  fourth  had  her  mainmast 
destroyed,  with  a  loss  of  sixteen.  The  fifth  had  a  large  shot, 
six  feet  eight  inches  in  circumference,  enter  her  lower 
deck ;  loss  fifty-five.  The  sixth,  not  injured.  The  seventh,  a 
good  deal  damaged,  with  a  loss  of  seventeen.  The  eighth 
had  no  loss.  The  ninth  was  so  much  injured  that,  "  had 
there  been  a  necessity  for  hauling  the  wind  on  the  oppo 
site  tack,  she  must  have  gone  down :"  her  loss  was  eight. 
The  tenth  lost  twelve.  The  eleventh  was  much  injured, 
with  a  loss  of  eight — making  a  total  loss  in  repassing  the 
Dardanelles,  of  one  hundred  and  sixty-seven  ;  and  in  the 
whole  expedition  two  hundred  and  eighty-one,  exclusive 
of  two  hundred  and  fifty  men  who  perished  in  the  burning 
of  the  Ajax. 

Such  was  the  effect  produced  on  the  British  fleet,  sail 
ing  with  a  favorable  wind  and  strong  current  past  the  half- 
armed  and  half-manned  forts  of  the  Dardanelles.  Duck- 
forth  himself  says,  that  "had  he  remained  before  Constan 
tinople  much  longer — till  the  forts  had  been  completely  put 
in  order — no  return  would  have  been  open  to  him,  and  the 
unavoidable  sacrifice  of  the  squadron  must  have  been  the 
consequence."  Scarcely  had  the  fleet  cleared  the  Straits, 
before  it  (the  fleet)  was  reinforced  with  eight  sail  of  the 
line  ;  but,  even  with  this  vast  increase  of  strength,  the 
English  did  not  venture  to  renew  the  contest.  They  had 
effected  a  most  fortunate  escape.  General  Jomini  says 
that  if  the  defence  had  been  conducted  by  a  more  enter 
prising  and  experienced  people,  the  expedition  would 
have  cost  the  English  their  whole  squadron. 

Great  as  was  the  damage  done  to  the  fleet,  the  forts  them 

selves  were  uninjured.  The  English  say  their  own  fire  did 
no  execution,  the  shot  in  all  probability  not  even  striking 

heir  objects — "  the  rapid  change  of  position,  occasioned 


1S4  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCLE5CE. 

by  a  fair  wind  and  current,  preventing  the  certair 
aim."  The  state  of  the  batteries  when  the  fleet  first  pass 
ed,  is  thus  described  in  James's  Naval  History :  "  Some 
of  them  were  dilapidated,  and  others  but  partially  mount 
ed  and  poorly  manned."  And  Alison  says  :  <;  They  had 
been  allowed  to  fall  into  disrepair.  The  castles  of  Europe 
and  Asia,  indeed,  stood  in  frowning  majesty,  to  assert  the 
lominion  of  die  Crescent  at  the  narrowest  part  of  the  pas 
sage,  but  their  ramparts  were  antiquated,  their  guns  in 
part  dismounted,  and  such  as  remained,  though  of  enor 
mous  calibre,  little  calculated  to  answer  the  rapidity  and 
precision  of  an  English  broadside." 

Much  has  been  said  because  the  fortifications  of  the  Dar 
danelles  did  not  hermetically  seal  that  channel,  (an  object 
they  were  never  expected  to  accomplish,  even  had  they 
been  well  armed  and  well  served ;)  but  it  is  forgotten,  or 
entirely  overlooked,  that  twelve  Turkish  line-of-battle- 
ships,  two  of  them  three-deckers,  with  nine  frigates,  were  with 
their  sails  bent  and  in  apparent  readiness,  fUed  with  troops, 
and  lying  within  the  line  of  fortifications;  and  yet  this  naval 
fine  effected  little  or  nothing  against  the  invaders.  It  is 
scarcely  ever  mentioned,  being  regarded  of  little  conse 
quence  as  a  means  of  defence  ;  and  yet  the  number  of  its 
guns  and  the  expense  of  its  construction  and  support,  could 
hardly  have  fallen  short  of  the  incomplete  and  half-armed 
forts,  some  of  which  were  as  ancient  as  the  reign  of  Amurath! 

Algiers. — The  following  narrative  of  the  attack  on  Al- 
giers,  in  1816,  is  drawn  from  the  reports  of  the  English 
and  Dutch  admirals,  and  other  official  and  authentic  Eng 
lish  papers. 

The  attack  was  made  by  the  combined  fleets,  consist 
ing  of  five  sail  of  the  line,  eighteen  or  twenty  frigates  and 
smaller  vessels,  besides  five  bomb-vessels  and  several 
rocket-boats,  carrying  in  all  about  one  thousand  guns. 
Fhe  armament  of  some  of  the  smaller  vessels  is  not  given, 


SEACOAST    DEFENCES.  185 

but  the  guns  of  those  whose  armaments  are  known,  amount 
to  over  nine  hundred.  The  harbor  and  defences  of  Al 
giers  had  been  previously  sun-eyed  by  Captain  Warde, 
royal  navy,  under  Lord  Exmouth's  direction ;  and  the 
number  of  the  combined  fleet  was  arranged. according  to 
the  information  given  in  this  survey — just  so  many  ships, 
and  no  more,  being  taken,  as  could  be  employed  to  ad 
vantage  against  the  city,  without  being  needlessly  ex 
posed.  Moreover,  the  men  and  officers  had  been  selected 
and  exercised  with  reference  to  this  particular  attack. 

From  the  survey  of  Captain  Warde,  and  the  accompa 
nying  map,  it  appears  that  the  armament  of  all  the  fortifi 
cations  of  Algiers  and  the  vicinity,  counting  the  water 
fronts  and  the  parts  that  could  flank  the  shore,  was  only 
two  hundred  and  eighty-four  guns  of  various  sizes  and 
descriptions,  including  mortars.  But  not  near  all  of  these 
could  act  upon  the  fleet  as  it  lay.  Other  English  accounts 
state  the  number  of  guns  actually  opposed  to  the  fleet  at 
from  two  hundred  and  twenty  to  two  hundred  and  thirty. 
Some  of  these  were  in  small  and  distant  batteries,  whereas 
nearly  all  the  fleet  was  concentrated  on  the  mole-head 
works.  (Fig.  36.)  Supposing  only  one  broadside  of  the 
ships  to  have  been  engaged,  the  ratio  of  the  forces,  as  ex 
pressed  by  the  number  of  guns,  must  have  been  about  as 
5  to  2.  This  is  a  favorable  supposition  for  the  ships  ;  for 
we  know  that  several  of  them,  from  their  position  and  a 
change  of  anchorage,  brought  both  broadsides  to  bear; 
moreover,  at  no  one  time  could  all  the  guns  of  the  water 
fronts  of  the  batteries  bear  on  the  attacking  ships.  The 
Algerine  shipping  in  the  harbor  was  considerable,  includ 
ing  several  vessels  of  war,  but  no  use  was  made  of  them 
in  defence,  and  nearly  all  were  burnt.  The  attacking 
ships  commanded  some  of  the  batteries,  and  almost  imme 
diately  dismounted  their  guns.  The  walls  of  the  case- 
mated  works  were  so  thin  as  to  be  very  soon  battered 


186  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

down.  Most  of  the  Algerine  guns  were  badly  mounted, 
and  many  ol  them  were  useless  after  the  first  fire.  They 
had  no  furnaces  for  heating  shot,  and,  as  "  they  loaded 
their  guns  with  loose  powder,  put  in  with  a  ladle,"  they 
could  not  possibly  have  used  hot  shot,  even  had  they  con 
structed  furnaces.  The  ships  approached  the  forts,  and 
many  of  them  anchored  in  their  intended  position,  without 
a  shot  being  fired  from  the  batteries.  The  action  com 
menced  at  a  quarter  before  three,  and  did  not  entirely 
cease  till  half-past  eleven.  The  ships  then  took  advan 
tage  of  the  land  breeze,  and,  by  warping  and  towing  off, 
were  able  to  get  under  sail  and  come  to  anchor  beyond 
reach  of  the  land-batteries.  Negotiations  were  again 
opened,  and  the  Dey  surrendered  the  Christian  slaves  and 
yielded  to  the  terms  of  the  treaty. 

During  the  contest,  the  fleet  "  fired  nearly  one  hundred 
and  eighteen  tons  of  powder,  and  fifty  thousand  shot, 
(weighing  more  than  five  hundred  tons  of  iron,)  besides 
nine  hundred  and  sixty  thirteen  and  ten-inch  shells, 
(thrown  by  the  bomb-vessels,)  and  the  shells  and  rockets 
from  the  flotilla."  The  vessels  were  considerably  crip 
pled,  and  their  loss  in  killed  and  wounded  amounted  to 
eight  hundred  and  eighty-three.  The  land  batteries  were 
much  injured,  and  a  large  part  of  their  guns  dismounted. 
Their  loss  is  not  known ;  the  English  confess  they  could 
obtain  no  account  of  it,  but  suppose  it  to  have  been  very 
great.  This  seems  more  than  probable  ;  for,  besides  those 
actually  employed  in  the  defence,  large  numbers  of  people 
crowded  into  the  forts  to  witness  the  contest.  So  great 
was  this  curiosity,  that,  when  the  action  commenced,  the 
parapets  were  covered  with  the  multitude  gazing  at  the 
manoeuvres  of  the  ships.  To  avoid  so  unnecessary  and 
indiscriminate  a  slaughter,  Lord  Exmouth  (showing  a 
humanity  that  does  him  great  credit)  motioned  with  his 
hand  to  the  ignorant  wretches  to  retire  to  some  place  of 


SEA-COAST  DEFENCES  187 

safety.  This  loss  of  life  in  the  batteries,  the  burning  of 
the  buildings  within  the  town  and  about  the  mole,  the  en 
tire  destruction  of  their  fleet  and  merchant  vessels  an 
chored  within  the  mole  and  in  the  harbor,  had  a  depress 
ing  effect  upon  the  inhabitants,  and  probably  did  more  than 
the  injuries  received  by  the  batteries  in  securing  an  honor 
able  conclusion  to  the  treaty.  We  know  very  well  that 
these  batteries,  though  much  injured,  were  not  silenced 
when  Lord  Exmouth  took  advantage  of  the  land  breeze 
and  sailed  beyond  their  reach.  The  ships  retired — 1st, 
because  they  had  become  much  injured,  and  their  ammuni- 
nition  nearly  exhausted ;  2d,  in  order  to  escape  from  a 
position  so  hazardous  in  case  of  a  storm ;  and  3d,  to  get 
beyond  the  reach  of  the  Algerine  batteries.  Lord  Ex- 
mouth  himself  gives  these  as  his  reasons  for  the  retreat, 
and  says,  "  the  land  wind  saved  me  many  a  gallant  fellow." 
And  Vice-admiral  Von  de  Capellan,  in  his  report  of  the 
battle,  gives  the  same  opinion  :  "  in  this  retreat"  says  he, 
"  which,  from  wantof  wind  and  the  damage  suffered  in  the 
rigging,  was  very  slow,  the  ships  had  still  to  suffer  much 
from  the  new-opened  and  redoubled  fire  of  the  enemy's  bat 
teries  ;  at  last,  the  land  breeze  springing  up,"  &c.  An 
English  officer,  who  took  part  in  this  affair,  says :  "  It 
was  well  for  us  that  the  land  wind  came  off,  or  we  should 
never  have  got  out ;  and  God  knows  what  would  have 
been  our  fate,  had  we  remained  all  night." 

The  motives  of  the  retreat  cannot,  therefore,  be  doubt 
ed.  Had  the  Arabs  set  themselves  zealously  at  work, 
during  the  night,  to  prepare  for  a  new  contest,  by  re 
mounting  their  guns,  and  placing  others  behind  the  ruins 
of  those  batteries  which  had  fallen, — in  other  words,  had 
the  works  now  been  placed  in  hands  as  skilful  and  expe 
rienced  as  the  English,  the  contest  would  have  been  far 
from  ended.  But  (to  use  the  words  of  the  Board  of  De 
fence)  Lord  Exmouth  relied  on  the  effects  produced  on 


188  MILITARY  ART   AND  SCIENCE. 

the  people  by  his  dreadful  cannonade  ;  and  the  result 
proves  that  he  was  right.  His  anxiety  to  clear  the  ves 
sels  from  the  contest  shows  that  there  was  a  power  still 
unconquered,  which  he  thought  it  better  to  leave  to  be 
restrained  by  the  suffering  population  of  the  city,  than  to 
keep  in  a  state  of  exasperation  and  activity  by  his  pres 
ence.  What  was  this  power  but  an  unsubdued  energy  in 
the  batteries  ? 

The  true  solution  of  the  question  is,  then,  not  so  much 
the  amount  of  injury  done  on  the  one  side  or  the  other — 
particularly  as  there  was  on  one  side  a  city  to  suffer  as 
well  as  the  batteries — as  the  relative  efficiency  of  the 
parties  when  the  battle  closed.  All  political  agitation  and 
popular  clamor  aside,  what  would  have  been  the  result 
had  the  fight  been  continued,  or  even  had  Lord  Exmouth 
renewed  it  next  morning  ?  These  are  questions  that  can 
be  answered  only  on  conjecture  ;  but  the  manner  the  bat 
tle  ended  certainly  leaves  room  for  many  doubts  whether, 
had  the  subsequent  demands  of  Lord  Exmouth  been  re 
jected,  he  had  it  in  his  power  to  enforce  them  by  his 
ships ;  whether,  indeed,  if  he  had  renewed  the  fight,  he 
would  not  have  been  signally  defeated.  On  the  whole, 
we  do  not  think  that  this  battle,  although  it  stands  pre 
eminent  as  an  example  of  naval  success  over  batteries, 
presents  an  argument  to  shake  the  confidence  which  for 
tifications,  well  situated,  well  planned,  and  well  fought, 
deserve,  as  the  defences  of  a  seaboard. 

We  cannot  help  regarding  these  conclusions  as  just, 
when  we  reflect  upon  all  the  circumstances  of  the  case. 
The  high  character,  skill,  and  bravery  of  the  attacking 
force  ;  their  immense  superiority  in  number  of  guns,  with 
no  surplus  human  life  to  be  exposed ;  the  antiquated  and 
ill -managed  works  of  defence,  the  entire  want  of  skill  of 
the  Algerine  artillerists,  and  the  neglect  of  the  ordinary 
means  of  preparation  ;  the  severe  execution  which  these 


SEA-COAST  DEFENCES.  189 

ill-served  guns  did  upon  the  enemy's  ships, — an  execution 
far  more  dreadful  than  that  effected  by  the  French  or 
Dutch  fleets  in  their  best-contested  naval  battles  with  the 
ships  of  the  same  foe, — from  these  facts,  we  must  think  that 
those  who  are  so  ready  to  draw  from  this  case  conclusions 
unfavorable  to  the  use  of  land-batteries  as  a  means  of  de 
fence  against  shipping,  know  but  little  of  the  nature  of 
the  contest. 

An  English  historian  of  some  note,  in  speaking  of  this 
attack,  says : — "  It  is  but  little  to  the  purpose,  unless  to 
prove  what  may  be  accomplished  by  fleets  against  towns 
exactly  so  circumstanced,  placed,  and  governed.  Algiers 
is  situated  on  an  amphitheatre  of  hills,  sloping  down  to 
wards  the  'sea,  and  presenting  therefore  the  fairest  mark 
to  the  fire  of  hostile  ships.  But  where  is  the  capital  ex 
actly  so  situated  that  we  are  ever  likely  to  attack  ?  And 
as  to  the  destruction  of  a  few  second-rate  towns,  even 
when  practicable,  it  is  a  mean,  unworthy  species  of  war 
fare,  by  which  nothing  was  ever  gained.  The  severe  loss 
sustained  before  Algiers  must  also  be  taken  into  account, 
because  it  was  inflicted  by  mere  Algerine  artillery,  and 
was  much  inferior  to  what  may  be  expected  from  a  con 
test  maintained  against  batteries  manned  with  soldiers  in 
structed  by  officers  of  skill  and  science,  not  only  in  work 
ing  the  guns,  but  in  the  endless  duty  of  detail  necessary 
for  keeping  the  whole  of  an  artillery  material  in  a  proper 
state  of  formidable  efficiency." 

San  Juan  d'Ulloa. — The  following  facts,  relative  to  the 
attack  on  San  Juan  d'Ulloa  by  the  French,  in  1838,  ar<3 
drawn  principally  from  the  report  of  a  French  engineer 
officer  who  was  one  of  the  expedition. 

The  French  fleet  consisted  of  four  ships,  carrying  one 
hundred  and  eighty-eight  guns,  two  armed  steamboats, 
and  two  bomb-ketches  with  four  large  mortars.  The 
whole  number  of  guns,  of  whatever  description,  found  in 


190  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

the  fort  was  one  hundred  and  eighty-seven ;  a  large  por 
tion  of  these,  however,  were  for  land  defence.  (Fig.  37.) 
When  the  French  vessels  were  towed  into  the  position 
selected  for  the  attack,  "  it  was  lucky  for  us,"  says  the 
French  officer  in  his  report,  "  that  the  Mexicans  did  not  dis 
turb  this  operation,  which  lasted  nearly  two  hours,  and  that 
they  permitted  us  to  commence  the  fire."  "  We  were  exposed 
to  the  fire  of  one  twenty-four-pounder,  five  sixteen-pounders, 
seven  twelve-pounders,  one  eight-pounder,  and  five  eigh- 
teen-pounder  carronades — in  all  nineteen  pieces  only"  If 
these  be  converted  into  equivalent  twenty-four-pounders,  in 
proportion  to  the  weight  of  the  balls,  the  whole  nineteen 
guns  will  be  less  than  twelve  twenty-four  pounders.  This 
estimate  is  much  too  great,  for  it  allows  three  eight- 
pounders  to  be  equal  to  one  twenty-four-pounder,  and 
each  of  the  eighteen-pounder  carronades  to  be  three 
quarters  the  power  of  a  long  twenty-four-pounder  ;  where 
as,  at  the  distance  at  which  the  parties  were  engaged,  these 
small  pieces  were  nearly  harmless.  Two  of  the  powder 
magazines,  from  not  being  bomb-proof,  were  blown  up 
during  the  engagement,  by  which  three  of  the  nineteen 
guns  on  the  water  front  of  the  castle  were  dismounted ; 
thus  reducing  the  land  force  to  an  equivalent  of  ten  twenty- 
four-pounders.  The  other  sixteen  guns  were  still  effect 
ive  when  abandoned  by  the  Mexicans.  The  cannonade 
and  bombardment  continued  about  six  hours,  eight  thou 
sand  two  hundred  and  fifty  shot  and  shells  being  fired  at 
the  fort  by  the  French.  The  principal  injury  received  by 
the  work  was  from  the  explosion  of  the  powder  maga 
zine.  But  very  few  guns  were  dismounted  by  the  fire  of 
the  French  ships,  and  only  three  of  these  on  the  water 
front.  The  details  of  the  condition  of  the  ships  and  fort 
are  given  in  the  report  of  the  French  officer,*  but  it  is 
unnecessary  to  repeat  them  here. 
*  Yide  also  House  Doc.  No.  206,  twenty-sixth  Congress,  first  session 


SEA-COAST  DEFENCES.  191 

In  general  terms,  it  appears  from  the  above-mentioned 
report,  that  the  number  of  guns  actually  brought  into  action  by 
the  floating  force,  (counting  only  one  broadside  of  the  ship,) 
amounted  to  ninety-four  guns,  besides  four  heavy  sea-mor 
tars  ;  that  the  whole  number  so  employed  in  the  fort  was 
only  nineteen,  including  the  smallest  calibres ;  that  these  guns 
were  generally  so  small  and  inefficient,  that  their  balls 
would  not  enter  the  sides  of  the  ordinary  attacking  frigates  ; 
the  principal  injury  sustained  by  the  castle  was  produced 
by  the  explosion  of  powder  magazines  injudiciously  placed 
and  improperly  secured ;  that  the  castle,  though  built  of 
poor  materials,  was  but  slightly  injured  by  the  French  fire  f 
that  the  Mexicans  proved  themselves  ignorant  of  the  ordi 
nary  means  of  defence,  and  abandoned  their  works  when 
only  a  few  of  their  guns  had  been  dismounted ;  that  not 
withstanding  all  the  circumstances  in  favor  of  the  French, 
their  killed  and  wounded,  in  proportion  to  the  guns  acting 
against  them,  was  upwards  of  four  times  as  great  as  the 
loss  of  the  English  at  the  battle  of  Trafalgar ! 

St.  Jean  d'Acre. — The  narratives  of  the  day  contained 
most  exaggerated  accounts  of  the  English  attack  on  St. 
Jean  d'Acre  ;  now,  however,  the  principal  facts  connected 
with  this  attack  are  fully  authenticated.  For  the  amount 
of  the  fleet  we  quote  from  the  British  official  papers,  and 
for  that  of  the  fort,  from  the  pamphlet  of  Lieutenant-col 
onel  Matuszewiez.  These  statements  are  mainly  con 
firmed  by  the  narratives,  more  recently  published,  of  sev 
eral  English  and  French  eye-witnesses. 

The  fortifications  were  built  of  poor  materials,  antiqua 
ted  in  their  plans,  and  much  decayed.  Their  entire  arma 
ment  amounted  to  only  two  hundred  guns,  some  of  which 
were  merely  field-pieces.  The  water  fronts  were  armed 
with  one  hundred  cannon  and  sixteen  mortars,  those  of  the 
smaller  calibre  included.  (Fig.  38.)  When  approached  by 
the  British  fleet,  the  works  were  undergoing  repairs,  and, 


192  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

says  Commodore  Napier,  "were  fast  getting  into  a  state 
of  preparation  against  attack." 

The  British  fleet  consisted  of  eight  ships  of  the  line, 
carrying  six  hundred  and  forty-six  guns  ;  six  frigates,  car 
rying  two  hundred  and  thirty-six  guns  ;  four  steamers, 
carrying  eighteen  guns  ;  and  two  or  three  other  vessels, 
whose  force  is  not  given.  "  Only  a  few  guns,"  says  Na 
pier,  "  defended  the  approach  from  the  northward,"  and 
most  of  the  ships  came  in  from  that  direction.  The  west 
ern  front  was  armed  with  about  forty  cannon  ;  but  opposed 
to  this  were  six  ships  and  two  steamers,  carrying  about 
five  hundred  guns.  Their  fire  was  tremendous  during  the 
engagement,  but  no  breach  was  made  in  the  walls.  The 
south  front  was  armed  in  part  by  heavy  artillery  and 
in  part  by  field-pieces.  This  front  was  attacked  by  six 
ships  and  two  steamers,  carrying  over  two  hundred  guns. 
The  eastern  front  was  armed  only  with  light  artillery  ; 
against  this  was  concentrated  the  remainder  of  the  fleet, 
carrying  about  two  hundred  and  forty  guns.  The  guns  of 
the  works  were  so  poorly  mounted,  that  but  few  could  be 
used  at  all ;  and  these,  on  account  of  the  construction  of 
the  fort,  could  not  reach  the  ships,  though  anchored  close 
by  the  walls.  "  Only  five  of  their  guns,"  says  Napier, 
"  placed  in  a  flanking  battery,  were  well  served,  and  never 
missed  ;  but  they  were  pointed  too  high,  and  damaged  our 
spars  and  rigging  only."  The  stone  was  of  so  poor  a 
quality,  says  the  narrative  of  Colonel  Matuszewiez,  that 
the  walls  fired  upon  presented  on  the  exterior  a  shattered 
appearance,  but  they  were  nowhere  seriously  injured.  In 
the  words  of  Napier,  "  they  were  not  breached,  and  a  deter 
mined  enemy  might  have  remained  secure  under  the  breast 
works,  or  in  the  numerous  casemates,  without  suffering  much 
toss"  The  accidental  explosion  of  a  magazine  within  the 
fort,  containing  six  thousand  casks  of  powder,  laid  in  ruins 
a  space  of  sixty  thousand  square  yards,  opened  a  large 


SEA-COAST  DEFENCES.  193 

oreach  in  the  walls  of  the  fortifications,  partially  destroyed 
the  prisons,  and  killed  and  wounded  a  thousand  men  of 
the  garrison.  This  frightful  disaster,  says  the  French  ac 
count,  hastened  the  triumph  of  the  fleet.  The  prisoners 
and  malefactors,  thus  released  from  confinement,  rushed 
upon  the  garrison  at  the  same  time  with  the  mountaineers, 
who  had  besieged  the  place  on  the  land  side.  The  use- 
lessness  of  the  artillery,  the  breaches  of  the  fort,  the  at 
tacks  of  the  English,  all  combined  to  force  the  retreat  of 
the  garrison,  "  in  the  midst  of  scenes  of  blood  and  atro 
cious  murders." 

We  will  close  this  account  with  the  following  extract 
of  a  speech  of  the  Duke  of  Wellington,  in  the  House  of 
Lords,  Feb.  4,  1841  :  "He  had  had,"  he  said,  "a  little 
experience  in  services  of  this  nature ;  and  he  thought  it 
his  duty  to  warn  their  lordships,  on  this  occasion,  that  they 
must  not  always  expect  that  ships,  however  well  command 
ed,  or  however  gallant  their  seamen  might  be,  were  capable 
of  commonly  engaging  successfully  with  stone  walls.  He 
had  no  recollection,  in  all  his  experience,  except  the  recent 
instance  on  the  coast  of  Syria,  of  any  fort  being  taken  by 
ships,  excepting  two  or  three  years  ago,  when  the  fort  of 
San  Juan  d'Ulloa  was  captured  by  the  French  fleet.  This 
was,  he  thought,  the  single  instance  that  he  recollected, 
though  he  believed  that  something  of  the  sort  had  occur 
red  at  the  siege  of  Havana,  in  1763.  The  present 
achievement  he  considered  one  of  the  greatest  of  modern 
times.  This  was  his  opinion,  and  he  gave  the  highest 
credit  to  those  who  had  performed  such  a  service.  It  was, 
altogether,  a  most  skilful  proceeding.  He  was  greatly  sur 
prised  at  the  small  number  of  men  that  was  lost  on  board 
the  fleet;  and,  on  inquiring  how  it  happened,  he  discovered 
that  it  was  because  the  vessels  were  moored  within  one- 
third  of  the  ordinary  distance.  The  guns  of  the  fortress  were 
intended  to  strike  objects  at  a  greater  distance  ;  and  the  con 

17 


194  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

sequence  was,  that  the  shot  went  over  the  ships  that  wore 
anchored  at  one-third  the  usual  distance.  By  that  means, 
they  sustained  not  more  than  one-tenth  of  the  loss  which 
they  would  otherwise  have  experienced.  Not  less  than 
five  hundred  pieces  of  ordnance  were  directed  against  the 
walls,  and  the  precision  with  which  the  fire  was  kept  up, 
the  position  of  the  vessels,  and,  lastly,  the  blowing  up  of 
the  large  magazine — all  aided  in  achieving  this  great  vic 
tory  in  so  short  a  time.  He  had  thought  it  right  to  say 
thus  much,  because  he  wished  to  warn  the  public  against 
supposing  that  such  deeds  as  this  could  be  effected  every 
day.  He  would  repeat  that  this  was  a  singular  instance, 
in  the  achievement  of  which  undoubtedly  great  skill  was 
manifested,  but.  which  was  also  connected  with  peculiar 
circumstances,  which  they  could  not  hope  always  to  oc 
cur.  It  must  not  therefore  be  expected,  as  a  matter  of 
course,  that  all  such  attempts  must  necessarily  succeed." 

Having  completed  -our  examination  of  the  ability  of  land 
batteries  to  cope,  gun  for  gun,  with  a  naval  force,  let  us 
consider,  for  a  few  moments,  the  objection  which  is  some 
times  made  to  the  use  of  fortifications  for  the  defence  of 
the  sea-coast,  viz.  :  that  our  maritime  cities  and  arsenals  can 
be  better  and  more  economically  secured  by  a  home  squadron. 

We  have  already  alluded  to  the  impossibility  of  substi 
tuting  one  means  of  defence  for  another.  The  efficiency 
of  the  bayonet  can  in  no  way  enable  us  to  dispense  with 
artillery,  nor  the  value  of  engineer  troops  in  the  passage 
of  rivers,  and  the  attack  and  defence  of  forts,  render  cav 
alry  the  less  necessary  in  other  operations  of  a  campaign. 
To  the  navy  alone  must  we  look  for  the  defence  of  our 
shipping  upon  the  high  seas  ;  but  it  cannot  replace  fortifi 
cations  in  the  protection  of  our  harbors,  bays,  rivers,  ar 
senals,  and  commercial  towns. 

Let  us  take  a  case  in  point.  For  the  defence  of  New 
York  city,  it  is  deemed  highly  important  that  the  East 


SEA.-COAST  DEFENCES.  195 

River  should  be  closed  to  the  approach  of  a  hostile  fleet  at 
least  fifteen  or  twenty  miles  from  the  city,  so  that  an  army 
landed  there  would  have  to  cross  the  Westchester  creek, 
the  Bronx,  Harlem  river,  and  the  defiles  of  Harlem  heights 
— obstacles  of  great  importance  in  a  judicious  defence. 
Throg's  Neck  is  the  position  selected  for  this  purpose  ; 
cannon  placed  there  not  only  command  the  channel,  but, 
from  the  windings  of  the  river,  sweep  it  for  a  great  dis 
tance  above  and  below.  No  other  position,  even  in  the 
channel  itself,  possesses  equal  advantages.  Hence,  if  we 
had  only  naval  means  of  defence,  it  would  be  best,  were 
such  a  thing  possible,  to  place  the  floating  defences  tliem- 
'  selves  on  this  point.  Leaving  entirely  out  of  considera 
tion  the  question  of  relative  power,  position  alone  would 
give  the  superior  efficiency  to  the  fort.  But  there  are 
other  considerations  no  less  important  than  that  of  position. 
Fort  Schuyler  can  be  garrisoned  and  defended  in  part  by 
the  same  militia  force  which  will  be  employed  to  prevent 
the  march  of  the  enemy's  army  on  the  city.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  crews  of  the  floating  defences  must  be  seamen  ; 
they  will  consequently  be  of  less  value  in  the  subsequent 
land  operations.  Moreover,  forts,  situated  as  this  is,  can 
be  so  planned  as  to  bring  to  bear  upon  any  part  of  the 
channel  a  greater  number  of  guns  than  can  be  presented 
by  any  hostile  squadron  against  the  corresponding  portion 
of  the  fort.  This  result  can  be  obtained  with  little  diffi 
culty  in  narrow  channels,  as  is  done  in  most  of  the  other 
works  for  the  defence  of  Naw  York,  the  works  for  Boston, 
Newport,  Philadelphia,  Baltimore,  Charleston,  Savannah, 
New  Orleans,  &c.,  and  an  approximation  to  it  is  not  in 
compatible  with  the  defence  of  the  broader  estuaries,  like 
'  the  Chesapeake. 

But  we  will  suppose  that  there  are  no  such  points  of 
land,  in  the  inlets  to  our  harbors,  and  that  we  rely  for  de 
fence  upon  a  naval  force  exclusively.  Let  us  leave  out  of 


196  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

consideration  the  security  of  all  our  other  harbors  and  our 
commerce  on  the  high  seas,  and  also  the  importance  of 
having  at  command  the  means  of  attacking  the  enemy's 
coast,  in  the  absence  of  his  fleet.  We  take  the  single 
case  of  the  attack  being  made  on  New  York  harbor,  and 
that  our  whole  fleet  is  assembled  t.Tiere.  Now,  if  this 
fleet  be  equal  in  number  to  the  enemy,  the  chances  of  suc 
cess  may  be  regarded  as  equal ;  if  inferior,  the  chances 
are  against  us — for  an  attacking  force  would  probably  be 
of  picked  men  and  of  the  best  materials.  But  here  the 
consequences  of  victory  are  very  unequal :  the  enemy  can 
lose  his  squadron  only,  while  we  put  in  peril  both  our 
squadron  and  the  objects  it  is  intended  to  defend.  If  we 
suppose  our  own  naval  force  superior  to  that  of  the  enemy, 
the  defence  of  this  harbor  would  in  all  respects  be  com 
plete,  provided  this  force  never  left  the  harbor.  But,  then, 
all  the  commerce  of  the  country  upon  the  ocean  must  be 
left  to  its  fate  ;  and  no  attempt  can  be  made  to  react  of 
fensively  upon  the  foe,  unless  we  can  control  the  chances 
of  finding  the  enemy's  fleets  within  his  ports,  and  the  still 
more  uncertain  chance  of  keeping  him  there  ;  the  escape 
of  a  single  vessel  being  sufficient  to  cause  the  loss  of  our 
harbor." 

These  remarks  are  based  upon  the  supposition  that  we 
have  but  the  single  harbor  of  New  York ;  whereas  Port 
land,  Portsmouth,  Boston,  Newport,  the  Delaware,  the 
Chesapeake,  Charleston,  Savannah,  Pensacola,  Mobile, 
New  Orleans,  and  numerous  other  places,  are  equally 
open  to  attack,  and  therefore  must  be  equally  defended, 
for  we  know  not  to  which  the  enemy  will  direct  his  as 
saults.  If  he  come  to  one  of  these  in  the  absence  of  our 
fleet,  his  object  is  attained  without  resistance ;  or,  if  his 
whole  force  be  concentrated  upon  one  but  feebly  defended, 
we  involve  both  fleet  and  harbor  in  inevitable  ruin.  Could 
our  fleet  be  so  arranged  as  to  meet  these  enterprises  ? 


SEA-COAST  DEFENCES  19V 

"  As  it  cannot  be  denied  that  the  enemy  can  select  the 
point  of  attack  out  of  the  whole  extent  of  coast,  where  is 
the  prescience  that  can  indicate  the  spot  ?  And  if  it  can 
not  be  foretold,  how  is  that  ubiquity  to  be  imparted  that 
shall  always  place  our  fleet  in  the  path  of  the  advancing 
foe  ?  Suppose  we  attempt  to  cover  the  coast  by  cruising 
in  front  of  it,  shall  we  sweep  its  whole  length — a  distance 
scarcely  less  than  that  which  the  enemy  must  traverse  in 
passing  from  his  coast  to  ours  ?  Must  the  Gulf  of  Mexico 
be  swept,  as  well  as  the  Atlantic  ;  or  shall  we  give  up  the 
Gulf  to  the  enemy  ?  Shall  we  cover  the  southern  cities, 
or  give  them  up  also  1  We  must  unquestionably  do  one 
of  two  things — either  relinquish  a  great  extent  of  coast, 
confining  our  cruisers  to. a  small  portion  only,  or  include 
so  much  that  the  chances  of  intercepting  an  enemy  would 
seem  to  be  out  of  the  question." 

-"  On  the  practicability  of  covering  a  small  extent  of 
coast  by  cruising  in  front  of  it — or,  in  other  words,  the 
possibility  of  anticipating  an  enemy's  operations,  discov 
ering  the  object  of  movements  of  which  we  get  no  glimpse 
and  hear  no  tidings,  and  seeing  the  impress  of  his  foot 
steps  on  the  surface  of  the  ocean — it  may  be  well  to  con 
sult  experience." 

The  naval  power  of  Spain  under  Philip  II.  was  almost 
unlimited.  With  the  treasures  of  India  and  America  at 
his  command,  the  fitting  out  of  a  fleet  of  one  hundred  and 
fifty  or  two  hundred  sail,  to  invade  another  country,  was 
no  very  gigantic  operation.  Nevertheless,  this  naval  force 
was  of  but  little  avail  as  a  coast  defence.  Its  efficiency 
for  this  purpose  was  well  tested  in  1596.  England  and 
Holland  attacked  Cadiz  with  a  combined  fleet  of  one  hun 
dred  and  seventy  ships,  which  entered  the  Bay  of  Cadiz 
without,  on  its  approach  to  their  coast,  being  once  seen  by 
the  Spanish  navy.  This  same  squadron,  on  its  return  to 
England,  passed  along  a  great  portion  of  the  Spanish  coast 


198  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

without  ever  meeting  with  the  slightest  opposition  from 
the  innumerable  Spanish  floating  defences. 

In  1744,  a  French  fleet  of  twenty  ships,  and  a  land 
force  of  twenty-two  thousand  men,  sailed  from  Brest  to 
the  English  coast,  without  meeting  with  any  opposition 
from  the  superior  British  fleet  which  had  been  sent  out, 
under  Sir  John  Norris,  on  purpose  to  intercept  them. 
The  landing  of  the  troops  was  prevented  by  a  storm,  which 
drove  the  fleet  back  upon  the  coast  of  France  to  seek 
shelter. 

In  1755,  a  French  fleet  of  twenty-five  sail  of  the  line, 
and  many  smaller  vessels,  sailed  from  Brest  for  America. 
Nine  of  these  soon  afterwards  returned  to  France,  and 
the  others  proceeded  to  the  gulf  of  St.  Lawrence.  An 
English  fleet  of  seventeen  sail  of  the  line  and  some  frig 
ates  had  been  sent  out  to  intercept  them ;  but  the  two 
fleets  passed  each  other  in  a  thick  fog,  and  all  the  French 
vessels  except  two  reached  Quebec  in  safety. 

In  1759,  a  French  fleet,  blockaded  in  the  port  of  Dun 
kirk  by  a  British  force  under  Commodore  Bogs,  seizing 
upon  a  favorable  opportunity,  escaped  from  the  enemy, 
attacked  the  coast  of  Scotland,  made  a  descent  upon  Car- 
rickfergus,  and  cruised  about  till  February,  1760,  without 
meeting  a  single  British  vessel,  although  sixty-one  ships 
of  the  line  were  then  stationed  upon  the  coasts  of  Eng 
land  and  France,  and  several  of  these  were  actually  in 
pursuit. 

In  1796,  when  the  French  attempted  to  throw  the  army 
of  Hoche  into  Ireland,  the  most  strenuous  efforts  were 
made  by  the  British  navy  to  intercept  the  French  fleet  in 
its  passage.  The  Channel  fleet,  of  near  thirty  sail  of  the 
line,  under  Lord  Bridport,  was  stationed  at  Spithead  j 
Sir  Roger  Curtis,  with  a  smaller  force,  was  cruising  to 
the  westward ;  Vice-admiral  Colpoys  was  stationed  off 
Brest,  with  thirteen  sail  of  the  line ;  and  Sir  Edward 


SEA-COAST  DEFENCES.  199 

Pellew  (afterwards  Lord  Exmouth)  watched  the  harbor, 
with  a  small  squadron  of  frigates.     Notwithstanding  this 
triple  floating  bulwark,  as  it  was  called — one  fleet  on  the 
enemy's  coast,  a  second  in  the  Downs,  and  a  third  close  on 
their  own  shores— the  French  fleet  of  forty-four  vessels, 
carrying  a  land  force  of  twenty-five  thousand  men,  reached 
Bantry  Bay  in  safety !     This  fleet  was  eight  days  on  the 
passage,  and  three  more  in  landing  the  troops  ;  and  most 
of  the  vessels  might  have  returned  to  Brest  in  safety,  had 
it  not  been  for  disasters  by  storms,  for  only  one  of  their 
whole  number  was  intercepted  by  the  vast  naval  force 
which  England  had  assembled  for  that  express   object. 
"  The  result  of  this  expedition,"  says  Alison,  "  was  preg 
nant  with  important  instructions  to  the  rulers  of  both  coun 
tries.     To  the  French,  as  demonstrating  the  extraordinary 
risks  which  attend  a  maritime  expedition,  in  comparison 
with  a  land  campaign  ;  the  small  number  of  forces  which 
can  be  embarked  on  board  even  a  great  fleet ;   and  the 
unforeseen  disasters  which  frequently,  on  that  element, 
defeat  the  best  concerted  enterprises.     To  the  English, 
as  showing  that  the  empire  of  the  seas  does  not  always  afford 
security   against  invasion ;   that,  in  the    face   of  superior 
maritime  forces,  her  possessions  were  for  sixteen  days  at 
the  mercy  of  the  enemy  ;  and  that  neither  the  skill  of  her 
sailors  nor  the  valor  of  her  armies,  but  the  fury  of  the 
elements,  saved  them  from  danger  in  the  most  vulnerable 
part  of  their  dominions.     While  these  considerations  are 
fitted  to  abate  the  confidence  in  invasion,  they  are  calcu 
lated,  at  the  same  time,  to  weaken  an  overweening  confi 
dence  in   naval  superiority,  and  to  demonstrate  that  the 
only  base  upon  which  certain  reliance  can  be  placed,  even  by 
an  insular  power,  is  a  well-disciplined  army  and  the  patri 
otism  of  its  own  subjects" 

Subsequent  events  still  further  demonstrated  the  truth 
of  these  remarks.     In  the  following  year,  a  French  -squad- 


200  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

ron  of  two  frigates  and  two  sloops,  passed  the  British 
fleets  with  perfect  impunity,  destroyed  the  shipping  in  the 
port  of  Ilfracombe,  and  safely  landed  their  troops  on  the 
coast  of  Wales.  Again,  in  1798,  the  immense  British 
naval  force  failed  to  prevent  the  landing  of  General  Hum 
bert's  army  in  the  bay  of  Killala ;  and,  in  the  latter  part 
of  the  same  year,  a  French  squadron  of  nine  vessels  and 
three  thousand  men  escaped  Sir  J.  B.  Warren's  squadron, 
and  safely  reached  the  coast  of  Ireland.  As  a  further 
illustration,  we  quote  from  the  report  of  the  Board  of  Na 
tional  Defence  in  1839. 

The  Toulon  fleet,  in  1798,  consisting  of  about  twenty 
sail  of  the  line  and  twenty  smaller  vessels  of  war,  and 
numerous  transports,  making  in  all,  three  hundred  sail 
and  forty  thousand  troops,  slipped  out  of  port  and  sailed 
to  Malta.  "  It  was  followed  by  Nelson,  who,  thinking 
correctly  that  they  were  bound  for  Egypt,  shaped  his 
course  direct  for  Alexandria.  The  French,  steering  to 
wards  Candia,  took  the  more  circuitous  passage ;  so  that 
Nelson  arrived  at  Alexandria  before  them,  arid,  not  finding 
them  there,  returned,  by  way  of  Caramania  and  Candia, 
to  Sicily,  missing  his  adversary  in  both  passages.  Sail 
ing  again  for  Alexandria,  he  found  the  French  fleet  at 
anchor  in  Aboukir  bay,  and,  attacking  them  there,  achieved 
the  memorable  victory  of  the  Nile.  When  we  consider 
the  narrowness  of  the  sea ;  the  numerous  vessels  in  the 
French  fleet ;  the  actual  crossing  of  the  two  fleets  on  a 
certain  night ;  and  that  Nelson,  notwithstanding,  could 
see  nothing  of  the  enemy  himself,  and  hear  nothing 
of  them  from  merchant  vessels,  we  may  judge  of  the 
probability  of  waylaying  our  adversary  on  the  broad 
Atlantic. 

"  The  escape  of  another  Toulon  fleet  in  1805  ;  the  long 
search  for  them  in  the  Mediterranean  by  the  same  able 
officer ;  the  pursuit  in  the  West  Indies  ;  their  evasion  of 


SEA-COAST  DEFENCES.  201 

aim  among  the  islands ;  the  return  to  Europe ;  his  vain 
efforts  subsequently,  along  the  coast  of  Portugal,  in  the 
bay  of  Biscay,  and  oil'  the  English  channel;  and  tho 
meeting  at  last  at  Trafalgar,  brought  about  only  because 
tho  combined  fleets,  trusting  to  the  superiority  that  tho 
accession  of  several  reinforcements  had  given,  wore  wil 
ling  to  try  tho  issue  of  a  battle — these  are  instances,  of  tho 
many  that  might  bo  cited,  to  show  how  small  is  tho  proba 
bility  of  encountering  upon  tho  ocean  an  enemy  who  de 
sires  to  avoid  a  meeting,  and  how  little  tho  most  unti 
ring  zeal,  the  most  restless  activity,  tho  most  exalted  pro 
fessional  skill  and  judgment,  can  do  to  lessen  the  adverse 
chances.  For  more  than  a  year  Nelson  most  closely 
watched  his  enemy,  who  seems  to  have  got  out  of  port  as 
soon  as  ho  was  prepared  to  do  so,  and  without  attracting 
the  notice  of  any  of  tho  blockading  squadron.  When  out, 
Nelson,  perfectly  in  the  dark  as  to  tho  course  Villenouvo 
had  taken,  sought  for  him  in  vain  on  tho  coast  of  Egypt. 
Scattered  by  tempests,  the  French  fleet  again  took  refuge 
in  Toulon ;  whence  it  again  put  to  sea,  when  refitted  and 
ready,  joining  the  Spanish  fleet  at  Cadiz. 

"  On  the  courage,  skill,  vigilance,  and  judgment,  acceded 
on  all  hands  to  belong  in  a  pre-eminent  degree  to  tho  na 
val  profession  in  this  country,  this  system  of  defence  re 
lies  to  accomplish,  against  a  string  of  chances,  objects  of 
importance  so  great  that  not  a  doubt  or  misgiving  as  to  the 
result  is  admissible.  It  demands  of  tho  navy  to  do  per 
fectly,  and  without  fail,  that  which,  to  do  at  all,  seems 
impossible.  Tho  navy  is  required  to  know  the  secret 
purposes  of  the  enemy,  in  spite  of  distance,  and  the  broken 
intercourse  of  a  state  of  war,  even  before  these  purposes 
are  known  to  the  leader  who  is  to  execute  them ;  nay, 
more,  before  tho  purpose  itself  is  formed.  On  an  clement 
where  man  is  but  tho  sport  of  storms,  tho  navy  is  required 
to  lie  in  wait  for  the  foe  at  tho  exact  spot  and  moment,  in 


202  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

spite  of  weather  and  seasons  ;  to  see  him  in  spite  of  fogs 
and  darkness. 

"  Finally,  after  all  the  devices  and  reliances  of  the  sys 
tem  are  satisfactorily  accomplished,  and  all  the  difficulties 
subdued,  it  submits  to  the  issue  of  a  single  battle,  on  equal 
terms,  the  fate  of  the  war,  having  no  hope  or  reserve  beyond. 

"  The  proper  duty  of  our  navy  is,  not  coast  or  river  de 
fence  ;  it  has  a  more  glorious  sphere — that  of  the  offensive. 
In  our  last  war,  instead  of  lying  in  harbor,  and  contenting 
themselves  with  keeping  a  few  more  of  the  enemy's  ves 
sels  in  watch  over  them  than  their  own  number — instead 
of  leaving  the  enemy's  commerce  in  undisturbed  enjoy 
ment  of  the  sea,  and  our  commerce  without  countenance 
or  aid,  they  scattered  themselves  over  the  wide  surface  of 
the  ocean,  penetrated  to  the  most  remote  seas,  everywhere 
acting  with  the  most  brilliant  success  against  the  enemy's 
navigation.  And  we  believe,  moreover,  that  in  the  amount 
of  the  enemy's  property  thus  destroyed,  of  American  prop 
erty  protected  or  recovered,  and  in  the  number  of  hostile 
ships  kept  in  pursuit  of  our  scattered  vessels,  ships  evaded 
if  superior,  and  beaten  if  equal — they  rendered  benefits  a 
thousand-fold  greater,  to  say  nothing  of  the  glory  they  ac 
quired  for  the  nation,  and  the  character  they  imparted  to  it, 
than  any  that  would  have  resulted  from  a  state  of  passive- 
ness  within  the  harbors.  Confident  that  this  is  the  true 
policy  as  regards  the  employment  of  the  navy  proper,  we 
doubt  not  that  it  will  in  the  future  be  acted  on,  as  it  has 
been  in  the  past ;  and  that  the  results,  as  regards  both 
honor  and  advantage,  will  be  expanded  commensurately 
with  its  own  enlargement.  In  order,  however,  that  the 
navy  may  always  assume  and  maintain  that  active  and  en 
ergetic  deportment,  in  offensive  operations,  which  is  at  the 
same  time  so  consistent  with  its  functions,  and  so  conso 
nant  with  its  spirit,  we  have  shown  that  it  must  not  be  oc 
cupied  with  mere  coast  defence." 


SEA-COAST   DEFENCES.  203 

A  few  remarks  on  the  relative  cost  of  ships  and  forts, 
and  the  economy  of  their  support,  and  we  will  close  this 
discussion.  We  do  not  regard  this  question,  however,  as 
a  matter  of  any  great  importance,  for  it  can  seldom  be  de 
cisive  in  the  choice  of  these  two  means  of  defence.  No 
matter  what  their  relative  cost  may  be,  the  one  cannot  often 
be  substituted  for  the  other.  There  are  some  few  cases, 
however,  where  this  might  be  taken  into  consideration, 
and  would  be  decisive.  Let  us  endeavor  to  illustrate  our 
meaning.  For  the  defence  of  New  York  city,  the  Nar 
rows  and  East  River  must  be  secured  by  forts  ;  ships  can 
not,  in  this  case,  be  substituted.  But  let  us  suppose  that 
the  outer  harbor  of  New  York  furnishes  no  favorable  place 
for  the  debarkation  of  troops,  or  that  the  place  of  debarka 
tion  is  so  far  distant  that  the  troops  cannot  reach  the  city 
before  the  defensive  forces  can  be  prepared  to  repel  them. 
This  outer  harbor  would  be  of  great  importance  to  the  en 
emy  as  a  shelter  from  storms,  and  as  a  place  of  debarka 
tion  or  of  rendezvous  preparatory  to  a  forcible  passage  of 
the  Narrows  ;  while  to  us  its  possession  would  not  be  ab 
solutely  essential,  though  very  important. .  Strong  fortifi 
cations  on  Sandy  Hook,  and  one  of  the  shoals,  might  prob 
ably  be  so  constructed  as  to  furnish  a  pretty  sure  barrier 
to  the  entrance  of  this  outer  harbor ;  on  the  other  hand,  a 
naval  force  stationed  within  the  inner  harbor,  and  acting 
under  the  protection  of  forts  at  the  Narrows,  might  also 
furnish  a  good,  though  perhaps  less  certain  protection  for 
this  outer  roadstead.  Here,  then,  we  might  well  consider 
the  question  of  relative  cost  and  economy  of  support  of  the 
proposed  fortifications,  and  of  a  home  squadron  large 
enough  to  effect  the  same  object,  and  to  be  kept  continu 
ally  at  home  for  that  special  purpose.  If  we  were  to  allow 
it  to  go  to  sea  for  the  protection  of  our  commerce,  its  char 
acter  and  efficiency  as  a  harbor  defence  would  be  lost. 
We  can  therefore  regard  it  only  as  a  local  force — fixed 


204  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

within  the  limits  of  the  defence  of  this  particular  place— 
and  our  estimates  must  be  made  accordingly. 

The  average  durability  of  ships  of  war  in  the  British 
navy,  has  been  variously  stated  at  seven  and  eight  years 
in  time  of  war,  and  from  ten  to  twelve  and  fourteen  years 
in  time  of  peace.  Mr.  Perring,  in  his  "  Brief  Inquiry," 
published  in  1812,  estimates  the  average  durability  at 
about  eight  years.  His  calculations  seem  based  upon 
authentic  information.  A  distinguished  English  writer 
has  more  recently  arrived  at  the  same  result,  from  esti 
mates  based  upon  the  returns  of  the  Board  of  Admiralty 
during  the  period  of  the  wars  of  the  French  Revolution. 
The  data  in  our  own  possession  are  less  complete ;  the 
appropriations  for  building  and  repairing  having  been  so 
expended  as  to  render  it  impossible  to  draw  any  accurate 
line  of  distinction.  But,  in  the  returns  now  before  us, 
there  are  generally  separate  and  distinct  amounts  of  the 
timbers  used  for  these  two  purposes ;  and  consequently, 
so  far  as  this  (the  main  item  of  expense)  is  concerned, 
we  may  form  pretty  accurate  comparisons. 

According  to  Edge,  (pp.  20,  21,)  the  average  cost  of 
timber,  for  hulls,  masts,  and  yards,  in  building  an  English 
74  gun  ship,  is  £61,382.  Let  us  now  compare  this  cost  of 
timber  for  building,  with  that  of  the  same  item  for  repairs, 
for  the  following  fifteen  ships,  between  1800  and  1820. 
The  list  would  have  been  still  further  enlarged,  but  the 
returns  for  other  ships  during  some  portion  of  the  above 
period  are  imperfect : 


SEA-COAST  DEFENCES. 


205 


Name  of  Ship. 

No.  of 
Guns. 

When 
built. 

Repaired  from 

Cost. 

74 

_ 

1800  to  1807 

£84,720 

Ildefonso,     

74 

_ 

1807  to  1808 

85,195 

74 

_ 

1807  to  1809 

60,785 

74 

_ 

1807  to  1810 

135,397 

74 

_ 

1808  to  1811 

67,007 

74 

1800 

1809  to  1813 

124,186 

74 

1810  to  1812 

73,141 

74 

1802 

1810  to  1813 

102,295 

Donegal            

74 

1812  to  1815 

101,367 

Implacable,  

74 

_ 

1813  to  1815 

59,865 

74 

1803 

1813  to  1816 

74,184 

Northumberland,  

74 

1814  to  1815 

59,795 

Kent,          

74 

1814  to  1818 

88,357 

74 

1807 

1816  to  1818 

61,518 

Sterlin0"  Castle 

74 

1816  to  1818 

65,280 

This  table,  although  incomplete,  gives  for  the  above 
fifteen  ships,  during  a  period  of  less  than  twenty  years, 
the  cost  of  timber  alone  used  in  their  repair,  an  average 
of  about  $400,000  each.  More  timber  than  this  was 
used,  in  all  probability,  upon  the  same  vessels,  and  paid 
for  out  of  the  funds  appropriated  "  for  such  as  may  be  or 
dered  in  course  of  the  year"  to  be  repaired."  But  the 
amount  specifically  appropriated  for  timber  for  these  fif 
teen  ships,  would,  in  every  twelve  or  fifteen  years,  equal 
the  entire  first  cost  of  the  same  items.  If  we  add  to  this 
amount,  the  cost  of  labor  required  in  the  application  of 
timber  to  the  operations  of  repair,  and  take  into  consider 
ation  the  expense  of  other  materials  and  labor,  and  the 
decayed  condition  of  many  of  the  ships  at  the  end  of  this 
period,  we  should  not  be  surprised  to  find  the  whole  sum 
expended  under  these  heads  to  equal  the  first  cost,  even 
within  the  minimum  estimate  of  seven  years.  The  whole 
cost  of  timber  used  for  hulls,  masts,  and  yards,  in  build 
ing  between  1800  and  1820,  was  £18,727,551 ;  in  repairs 
and  "  ordinary  wear  and  tear,"  £17,449,780  ;  making  an 
annual  average  of  $4,560,158  for  building  timber,  and 
$4,273,371  for  that  used  in  repairs.  A  large  portion  of 


206 


MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 


the  vessels  built  were  intended  to  replace  others  which 
had  been  lost,  or  were  so  decayed  as  to  be  broken  up. 

But  it  may  be  well  to  add  here,  the  actual  supplies 
voted  for  the  sea-service,  and  for  wear  and  tear,  and  the 
extraordinary  expenses  in  building  and  repairing  of  ships 
from  1800  to  1815. 


Year. 

For  the  wear 
and  tear  of 
Ships. 

Ext.  Expenses 
for  building, 
repairing,  &c. 

For  entire  sea- 
service. 

1800 

£4,350,000 

£772,140 

£13,619,079 

1801 

5,850,000 

933,900 

16,577,037 

1802 

3,684,000 

773,500 

11,833,571 

1803 

3,120,000 

901,140 

10,211,378 

1804 

3,900,000 

948,520 

12,350,606 

1805 

4,680,000 

1,553,690 

15,035,630 

1806 

4,680,000 

1,980,830 

18,864,341 

1807 

5,070,000 

2,134,903 

17,400,337 

1808 

5,070,000 

2,351,188 

18,087,544 

1809 

3,295,500 

2,296,030 

19,578,467 

1810 

3,295,500 

1,841,107 

18,975,120 

1811 

3,675,750 

2,046,200 

19,822,000 

1812 

3,675,750 

1,696,621 

19,305,759 

1813 

3,549,000 

2,822,031 

20,096,709 

1814 

3,268,000 

2,086,274 

19,312,070 

1815 

2,386,500 

2,116,710 

19,032,700 

It  appears  from  this  table  that  the  appropriations  for  the 
service,  during  the  first  fifteen  years  of  the  present  cen 
tury,  amounted  to  a  little  less  than  ninety  millions  of  dol 
lars  per  annum ;  and  for  the  wear  and  tear  of  ships,  and 
"the  extraordinary  expenses  in  building  and  repairing 
ships,  &c.,"  the  annual  appropriations  amounted  to  near 
thirty  millions. 

Our  own  naval  returns  are  also  so  imperfect  that  it  is 
impossible  to  form  any  very  accurate  estimate  of  the  rel 
ative  cost  of  construction  and  repairs  of  our  men-of-war. 
The  following  table,  compiled  from  a  report  of  the  Secre 
tary  of  the  Navy,  in  1841,  (Senate  Doc.  No.  223,  26th 
Congress,)  will  afford  data  for  an  approximate  calcula 
tion  : — 


SEA-COAST  DEFENCES. 


207 


Name  of  Ship. 

No.  of 
Guns. 

Total  Cost  of 
building, 
exclusive  of 
armament, 
stores,  &.c.  &c. 

When 
com 
pleted. 

Cost  of  Re 
pairs,  exclu 
sive  of  ord 
nance, 
&c.  &c. 

Repaired 
between 

Delaware,  ... 

74 

$543,368  00 

1820 

$354,132  56 

1827  and  1838 

N.  Carolina,  . 

74 

431,852  00 

1825 

317,6-28  92 

1824  and  1836 

Constitution,  . 

44 

302,718  84 

1797 

266,878  34 

1833  and  1839 

United  States, 

44 

299,336  56 

1797 

571,972  77 

1821  and  18-11 

Brandy  wine,. 

44 

*299,218  12 

1825 

*377,665  95 

1826  and  1838 

Potomac,  

44 

*231,013  02 

1822 

*82,597  03 

1829  and  1835 

Concord  ,  
Falmouth,  .  .  . 

20 
20 

115,325  80 
94,093  27 

1828 

1827 

72,796  22 
130,015  43 

1832  and  1840 
1828  and  1837 

John  Adams, 

20 

1J  0,670  69 

1829 

119,641  93 

1834  and  1837 

Boston  ,  

20 

91,973  19 

1825 

189,264  37 

1826  and  1840 

St.  Louis,  .... 

20 

102,461  95 

1828 

135,458  75 

1834  and  1839 

Vincennes,  .  . 

20 

111,512  79 

1826 

178,094  81 

1830  and  1838 

Vandalia,  

20 

90,977  88 

1828 

59,181  34 

1832  and  1834 

Lexington,..  . 

20? 

114,622  35 

1826 

83,386  52 

1827  and  1837 

Warren,  

20? 

99,410  01 

1826 

152  596  03 

1830  and  1838 

Fairtield  

20 

100,490  35 

1826 

65,9  J  8  26 

1831  and  1837 

Natches,t.... 

20? 

106,232  19 

1827 

129,969  80 

1829  and  1836 

Boxer,  

10 

30,697  88 

1831 

28,780  48 

1834  and  1840 

Enterprise,... 

10 

27,938  63 

1831 

20,716  59 

1834  and  1840 

Grampus,.... 

10 

23,627  42 

1821 

96,086  36 

1825  and  1840 

Dolphin,  

10 

38,522  62 

1836 

15,013  35 

1839  and  1840 

Shark,  

10 

23,627  42 

1821 

93,395  84 

1824  and  1839 

It  appears  from  the  above  table,  that  the  cost  of  con 
structing  ships  of  the  line  is  about  $6,600  per  gun ;  of 
frigates,  $6,500  per  gun ;  of  smaller  vessels  of  war,  a 
little  less  than  $5,000  per  gun :  making  an  average  cost 
of  vessels  of  war  to  be  more  than  six  thousand  dollars  per 
gun.  And  the  expense  of  repairs  for  these  vessels  is 
more  than  seven  per  cent,  per  annum  on  their  first  cost. 

We  have  as  yet  had  but  little  experience  in  the  use  of 
war-steamers.  The  Fulton,  four  guns,  built  in  1838-'39, 
cost  three  hundred  and  thirty-three  thousand  seven  hun 
dred  and  seventy  dollars  and  seventy-seven  cents  ;  the 
Mississippi  and  Missouri,  ten  guns  each,  built  in  1841, 
cost  about  six  hundred  thousand  dollars  a  piece  ;  making 
an  average  cost  for  war-steamers  of  over  sixty  thousand 
dollars  per  gun.  The  cost  of  repairs  of  steam  ships  will 
be  much  greater  than  those  for  vessels  of  war ;  but  we 


Returns  incomplete. 


t  Broken  up  in  1840 


208  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

have  not  yet  had  sufficient  experience  to  determine  the 
exact  amount.  It  has  been  estimated,  however,  by  com 
petent  judges,  that  when  kept,  the  expense  of  repairs 
will  at  least  equal  twelve  per  cent,  of  the  first  cost.  The 
expense  of  keeping  them  in  commission  is  enormously 
great.  "  Their  engines,"  says  the  Secretary  of  the  Navy, 
in  his  annual  report  in  1 842,  "  consume  so  much  fuel  as 
to  add  enormously  to  their  expenses ;  and  the  necessity 
that  they  should  return  to  port,  after  short  intervals  of 
time,  for  fresh  supplies,  renders  it  impossible  to  send 
them  on  any  distant  service.  They  cannot  be  relied  on 
as  cruisers,  and  are  altogether  too  expensive  for  service 
in  time  of  peace.  I  have  therefore  determined  to  take 
them  out  of  commission,  and  substitute  for  them  other  and 
less  expensive  vessels." 

The  average  cost  of  permanent  fortifications  is  but 
little  more  than  three  thousand  dollars  per  gun.  And  it 
must  be  obvious,  from  the  nature  of  the  materials  of 
which  they  are  constructed,  that  the  expense  of  their 
support  must  be  inconsiderable.  It  is  true  that  for  some 
years  past  a  large  item  of  annual  expenditure  for  fortifi 
cations  has  been  under  the  head  of  "  repairs  ;"  but  much 
of  this  sum  is  for  alterations  and  enlargements  of  tempo- 
rar^  and  inefficient  works,  erected  anterior  to  the  war  of 
1812.  Some  of  it,  however,  has  been  for  actual  repairs 
of  decayed  or  injured  portions  of  the  forts  ;  these  injuries 
resulting  from  the  nature  of  the  climate,  the  foundations, 
the  use  of  poor  materials  and  poor  workmanship,  and 
from  neglect  and  abandonment.  But  if  we  include  the 
risk  of  abandonment  at  times,  it  is  estimated,  upon  data 
drawn  from  past  experience,  that  one-third  of  one  per  cent, 
per  annum,  of  the  first  cost,  will  keep  in  perfect  repair 
any  of  our  forts  that  have  been  constructed  since  the  last 
war. 

But  it  is  unnecessary  to  further  discuss  this  question 


SEA-COAST  DEFENCES.  209 

We  repeat  what  has  already  been  said,  no  matter  what 
may  be  the  relative  cost  of  ships  and  forts,  the  one,  as  a 
general  thing,  cannot  be  substituted  for  the  other.  Each 
has  its  own  sphere  of  action,  and  each  will  contribute,  in 
its  own  way,  to  the  national  defence  ;  and  any  undue  in 
crease  of  one,  at  the  expense  of  the  other,  will  be  at 
tended  by  a  corresponding  diminution  of  national  power.* 

*  For  further  information  concerning  our  system  of  sea-coast  de 
fences,  the  reader  is  referred  to  House  Doc.  206,  twenty-sixth  Con 
gress,  second  session ;  Senate  Doc.  85,  twenty-eighth  Congress,  sec 
ond  session ;  and  to  the  annual  reports  of  the  Chief  Engineer. 


210  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 


CHAPTER   VIII. 

OUR  NORTHERN  FRONTIER  DEFENCES. 

IN  discussing  engineering  as  a  branch  of  the  military 
art,  we  spoke  of  the  use  of  fortifications  on  land  frontiers, 
and  their  influence  on  the  strategic  operations  of  a  cam 
paign.  A  brief  notice  was  also  given  of  the  different  sys 
tems  that  have  been  proposed  for  arranging  these  defen 
sive  works.  Let  us  now  apply  this  discussion  to  our 
northern  frontier. 

The  principle  laid  down  by  Napoleon  and  Jomini, 
"  that  fortifications  should  always  be  constructed  on  im 
portant  strategic  points,"  is  undoubtedly  the  correct  one  : 
but  how  to  determine  these  points  is  a  question  that  will 
often  perplex  the  patience  and  try  the  skill  of  the  engi 
neer  ;  yet  determine  them  he  must,  or  his  fortifications 
will  be  worse  than  useless  ;  for  a  fort  improperly  located, 
like  a  cannon  with  its  fire  reversed  on  its  own  artillerists, 
will  be  sure  to  effect  the  destruction  of  the  very  forces  it 
was  designed  to  protect. 

The  selection  of  positions  for  fortifications  on  our 
northern  frontier  must  have  reference  to  three  distinct 
classes  of  objects,  viz. :  the  security,  first,  of  the  large 
frontier  towns,  where  much  public  and  private  property  is 
exposed  to  sudden  dashing  expeditions  of  the  foe,  made 
either  on  land  or  by  water ;  second,  of  lake  harbors,  im 
portant  as  places  of  refuge  and  security  to  our  own  ships, 
or  to  the  enemy's  fleets  while  engaged  in  landing  troops 
or  furnishing  supplies  to  an  invading  army ;  third,  of  all 
strategic  points  oil  the  probable  lines  of  offensive  or  de- 


OUR  NORTHERN  FRONTIER  DEFENCES.  .    211 

fensive  operations.  These  objects  are  distinct  in  their 
nature,  and  would  seem  to  require  separate  and  distinct 
means  for  their  accomplishment ;  nevertheless,  it  will 
generally  be  found  that  positions  selected  with  reference 
to  one  of  these  objects  equally  fulfil  the  others,  so  inti 
mately  are  they  all  connected.  To  determine  the  strategic 
points  of  a  probable  line  of  military  operations  is  there 
fore  the  main  thing  to  be  attended  to  in  locating  fortifica 
tions.  That  such  points  of  maximum  importance  are  ac 
tually  marked  out  by  the  peaceful  or  hostile  intercourse  of 
nations  cannot  be  doubted. 

The  relative  importance  of  cities  and  towns  is  less  va 
ried  by  the  fluctuations  of  commerce  on  a  land  frontier 
than  on  the  sea-coast.  The  ever-changing  system  of  "  in 
ternal  improvements,"  by  furnishing  new  highways  and 
thoroughfares  for  the  transportation  of  the  products  of 
manufacturers  and  agriculture,  either  continually  varies 
the  relative  standing  of  the  seaports  already  opened,  or 
opens  new  ones  for  the  exportation  of  these  products,  and 
the  importation  of  foreign  articles  received  in  exchange. 
But  these  "  internal  improvements"  are  seldom  carried  so 
far  as  to  connect  together  two  separate  and  distinct  coun 
tries,  and  consequently  the  principal  places  on  the  di 
viding  line  usually  retain  their  relative  importance,  no 
matter  how  often  they  may  have  declined  during  times  of 
hostility,  or  again  flourished  with  the  increased  commer 
cial  intercourse  which  results  from  peace.  The  principal 
European  places  of  traffic  near  the  frontiers  have  remained 
the  same  for  ages,  and  in  all  probability  ages  hence  the 
great  frontier  marts  will  be  nearly  the  same  as  at  present. 
This  stability  of  rank  among  border  towns  is  not  confined 
to  commercial  influence  ;  the  same  holds  true  with  re 
spect  to  that  established  by  intercourse  of  a  hostile  char 
acter.  Military  history  teaches  us  that  lines  of  hostile 
opera  ions,  and  the  fields  upon  which  the  principal  battles 


212  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE* 

between  any  two  countries  have  been  fought,  are  nearly 
the  same,  no  matter  how  remote  the  periods  of  comparison. 
These  points  and  lines,  so  important  in  commerce  as  well 
as  in  war,  result  from  the  natural  features  of  the  ground, 
and  we  ought  therefore  to  expect  that  they  would  be  as 
little  liable  to  sudden  changes  as  the  character  of  the 
earth  itself. 

From  these  remarks  it  will  readily  be  perceived  that 
there  are  three  distinct  methods  of  determining  the  strate 
gic  points  between  this  country  and  Canada:  1st,  by  an 
examination  of  the  topography  of  the  two  countries  ;  2d, 
by  tracing  out  the  main  channels  of  commercial  inter 
course  ;  3d,  by  reviewing  the  lines  of  their  military  oper 
ations.  The  last  method  is  the  least  liable  to  error,  and 
perhaps  is  the  most  e'asily  understood,  inasmuch  as  it  is 
sometimes  difficult  to  point  out  the  precise  degree  of  con 
nection  between  prospective  military  lines  and  the  chan 
nels  of  commerce,  or  to  show  why  these  two  have  a  fixed 
relation  to  the  physical  features  of  the  country.  In  the 
present  instance,  moreover,  this  method  furnishes  ample 
data  for  the  formation  of  our  decision,  inasmuch  as  the 
campaigns  between  this  country  and  Canada  have  been 
neither  few  in  number  nor  unimportant  in  their  character 
and  results. 

In  tracing  out  the  main  features  of  the  early  wars  upon 
our  northern  frontier,  it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  nearly 
the  same  portion  of  country  which  is  now  possessed  by 
the  English,  was  then  occupied  by  the  French,  and  that 
the  English  possessions  in  North  America  included  the 
present  Middle  and  Northern  States.  At  the  period  of 
the  American  revolution  the  French  and  English  had  com 
pletely  changed  ground,  the  armies  of  the  former  opera 
ting  in  the  "  States,"  while  the  English  were  in  possession 
of  Canada. 

The  first  expedition  to  be  noticed  against  that  portion  of 


OUR  NORTHERN  FRONTIER  DEFENCES.      213 

the  country,  was  conducted  by  Samuel  Argall,  who  sailed 
from  Virginia  in  1613,  with  a  fleet  of  eleven  vessels,  at- 
tacked  the  French  on  the  Penobscot,  and  afterwards  the 
St.  Croix. 

In  1654,  Sedgwick,  at  the  head  of  a  small  New  Eng 
land  army,  attacked  the  French  on  the  Penobscot,  and 
overrun  all  Arcadia. 

In  1666,  during  the  contest  between  Charles  II.  and 
Louis  XIV.,  it  was  proposed  to  march  the  New  England 
troops  across  the  country  by  the  Kennebec  or  Penobscot, 
and  attack  Quebec  ;  but  the  terrors  and  difficulties  of  cross 
ing  "  over  rocky  mountains  and  howling  deserts"  were  such 
as  to  deter  them  from  undertaking  the  campaign. 

In  1689,  Count  Frontenac,  governor  of  Canada,  made  a 
descent  into  New  York  to  assist  the  French  fleet  in  redu 
cing  that  province.  His  line  of  march  was  by  the  river 
Sorrel  and  Lake  Champlain.  An  attack  upon  Montreal 
by  the  Iroquois  soon  forced  him  to  return ;  but  in  the  fol 
lowing  January  a  party  of  French  and  Indians  left  Mon 
treal  in  the  depth  of  a  Canadian  winter,  and  after  wading, 
for  two  and  twenty  days,  with  provisions  on  their  backs, 
through  snows  and  swamps  and  across  a  wide  wilderness, 
reached  the  unguarded  village  of  Schenectady.  Here  a 
midnight  war-whoop  was  raised,  and  the  inhabitants  either 
massacred  or  driven  half-clad  through  the  snow  to  seek 
protection  in  the  neighboring  towns. 

In  1690,  a  congress  of  the  colonies,  called  to  provide 
means  for  the  general  defence,  assembled  at  New  York, 
and  resolved  to  carry  war  into  Canada :  an  army  was  to 
attack  Montreal  by  way  of  Lake  Champlain,  and  a,  fleet  to 
attempt  Quebec  by  the  St.  Lawrence.  The  former  ad 
vanced  as  far  as  the  lake,  when  the  quarrels  of  the  com 
manding  officers  defeated  the  objects  of  the  expedition. 
The  Massachusetts  fleet  of  thirty-four  vessels,  (the  largest 
carrying  forty-four  guns  each,)  and  two  thousand  men, 


214  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE 

failed  to  reduce  Quebec,  though  the  defences  of  that  place 
were  then  of  the  slightest  character,  and  armed  with  only 
twenty-three  guns. 

In  1704,  and  again  in  1707,  Port  Royal  was  attacked  by 
costly  expeditions  fitted  out  by  the  eastern  colonies  ;  and 
again,  in  1709,  a  land  force  of  fifteen  hundred  men  ad 
vanced  against  Montreal  by  Lake  Champlain;  but  nothing 
of  importance  was  effected  by  either  expedition. 

In  1711,  Lord  Bolingbroke  planned  the  conquest  of  Can 
ada.  The  land  forces,  numbering  five  thousand  men  in  all, 
were  separated  into  two  distinct  armies,  the  one  sent 
against  Detroit,  and  the  other  against  Montreal  by  Lake 
Champlain ;  while  a  fleet  of  fifteen  ships  of  war,  forty 
transports,  and  six  store-ships,  carrying  a  land  force  of 
six  thousand  five  hundred  men,  was  to  attack  Quebec. 
The  maritime  expedition  failed  to  reach  its  destination, 
and  after  losing  a  part  of  the  fleet  and  more  than  a  thou 
sand  men  in  the  St.  Lawrence,  this  part  of  the  project 
was  abandoned.  Nor  was  any  thing  important  accom 
plished  by  either  division  of  the  land  forces. 

The  same  plan  of  campaign  was  followed  in  1712.  An 
army  of  four  thousand  men  marched  against  Montreal  by 
Lake  Champlain,  but  on  hearing  of  the  failure  of  the  naval 
expedition  and  of  the  concentration  of  the  French  forces 
on  the  river  Sorel,  they  retired  towards  Albany. 

The  next  expedition  of  any  importance  was  the  naval 
one  of  1745  against  Louisburg.  For  the  attack  of  this 
place  the  colonies  raised  about  four  thousand  men,  and  one 
hundred  small  vessels  and  transports,  carrying  between 
one  hundred  and  sixty  and  two  hundred  guns.  They 
were  afterwards  joined  by  ten  other  vessels  carrying  near 
five  hundred  guns.  This  attacking  force  now,  according 
to  some  of  the  English  writers,  consisted  of  six  thousand 
provincials,  and  eight  hundred  seamen,  and  a  combined 
naval  force  of  near  seven  hundred  guns.  The  troopa 


OUR  NORTHERN  FRONTIER  DEFENCES.      215 

landed,  and  laid  siege  to  the  town.  The  garrison  of  the 
fortifications  of  Louisburg  consisted  of  six  hundred  regu 
lars  and  one  thousand ,  Breton  militia,  or,  according  to 
some  writers,  of  only  twelve  hundred  men  in  all.  The 
armament  of  these  works  was  one  hundred  and  one  cannon, 
seventy-six  swivels,  and  six  mortars.  Auxiliary  to  the 
main  works  were  an  island-battery  of  thirty  twenty-two- 
pounders,  and  a  battery  on  the  main  land  armed  with 
thirty  large  cannon.  Frequent  attempts  were  made  to 
storm  the  place,  but  the  most  persevering  efforts  were  of 
no  avail,  many  of  the  New  Englanders  being  killed  and 
wounded,  and  their  boats  destroyed,  while  the  garrison 
remained  unharmed.  At  length,  after  a  siege  of  forty- 
nine  days,  want  of  provisions  and  the  general  dissatisfac 
tion  of  the  inhabitants,  caused  the  garrison  to  surrender. 
When  the  New  Englanders  saw  the  strength  of  the  works, 
and  the  slight  impression  which  their  efforts  had  produced, 
they  were  not  only  elated  but  greatly  astonished  at  their 
success.  It  should  be  noticed,  that  in  the  above  attack 
the  number  of  guns  in  the  fleet  was  almost  three  times  as 
great  as  that  of  all  the  forts  combined ;  and  yet  the  naval 
part  of  the  attack  was  unsuccessful.  The  besieging  army 
was  more  than  four  times  as  great  as  all  the  garrisons 
combined ;  and  yet  the  place  held  out  forty -nine  days,  and 
at  last  was  surrendered  through  the  want  of  provisions 
and  the  disaffection  of  the  citizens.  This  place  was  soon 
afterwards  restored  to  the  French. 

We  see  that,  thus  far  in  these  wars,  the  English  were 
vastly  superior  in  strength  and  numbers,  yet  the  result  of 
the  several  campaigns  was  decidedly  in  favor  of  the 
French,  who  not  only  retained  their  possessions  in  the 
North,  but  extended  their  jurisdiction  to  the  mouth  of  the 
Mississippi,  and  laid  claim  to  the  whole  country  west  of 
the  Alleghany  mountains.  This  success  must  be  attribu 
ted,  not  to  any  superiority  of  the  Canadians  in  bravery, 


216  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

but  to  the  higher  military  character  of  their  governors, 
and  more  especially  to  their  fortifications,  which  were  con 
structed  in  situations  most  judiciously  selected,  to  influ 
ence  the  Indians  and  facilitate  incursions  into  the  Eng 
lish  colonies.  The  French  pursued  interior  and  central 
lines,  while  the  English  followed --exterior  and  divergent 
lines.  The  disparity  of  numbers  was  always  very  great. 
At  the  beginning  of  the  eighteenth  century,  the  whole 
population  of  the  colonies  amounted  to  upwards  of  one 
million  of  souls,  while  that  of  both  Canada  and  Louisiana 
did  not  exceed  fifty-two  thousand.  But  the  French  pos 
sessions,  though  situated  at  the  extremities  of  a  continent 
and  separated  by  an  almost  boundless  wilderness,  were 
nevertheless  connected  by  a  line  of  military  posts,  strong 
enough  to  resist  the  small  arms  that  could  then  be  brought 
against  them.  This  fort-building  propensity  of  the  French 
became  a  matter  of  serious  alarm  to  the  colonies,  and  in 
1710  the  legislature  of  New  York  especially  protested 
against  it  in  an  address  to  the  crown.  While  the  military 
art  was  stationary  in  England,  France  had  produced  her 
four  great  engineers — Errard,  Pagan,  Vauban,  and  Cor- 
montaigne  ;  and  nowhere  has  the  influence  of  their  sys 
tem  of  military  defence  been  more  strikingly  exhibited 
than  in  the  security  it  afforded  to  the  Canadian  colony, 
when  assailed  by  such  vastly  superior  British  forces. 
Still  further  accessions  were  now  made  to  these  English 
forces  by  large  reinforcements  from  the  mother  country, 
while  the  Canadians  received  little  or  no  assistance  from 
France  ;  nevertheless  they  prolonged  the  war  till  1760, 
forcing  the  English  to  adopt  at  last  the  slow  and  expen 
sive  process  of  reducing  all  their  fortifications.  This 
will  be  shown  in  the  following  outline  of  the  several  cam 
paigns. 

Very  early  in  1755,  a  considerable  body  of  men  was 
sent  from  Great  Britain  to  reinforce  their  troops  in  this 


OUR  NORTHERN  FRONTIER  DEFENCES.      2lT 

country.  These  troops  were  again  separated  into  four 
distinct  armies.  The  first,  consisting  of  near  two  thou 
sand  men,  marched  to  the  attack  of  Fort  Du  Quesne,  but 
was  met  and  totally  defeated  by  one-half  that  number  of 
French  and  Indians.  The  second  division,  of  fifteen  hun 
dred,  proceeded  to  attack  Fort  Niagara  by  way  of  Oswego, 
but  returned  without  success.  The  third,  of  three  thou 
sand  seven  hundred  men,  met  and  defeated  Dieskau's 
army  of  twelve  hundred  regulars  and  six  hundred  Cana 
dians  and  Indians,  in  the  open  field,  but  did  not  attempt 
to  drive  him  from  his  works  at  Ticonderoga  and  Crown 
Point.  The  fourth,  consisting  of  three  thousand  three 
hundred  men  and  forty-one  vessels,  laid  waste  a  portion  of 
Nova  Scotia  ;  thus  ending  the  campaign  without  a  single 
important  result.  It  was  commenced  under  favorable  aus 
pices,  with  ample  preparations,  and  a  vast  superiority  of 
force  ;  but  this  superiority  was  again  more  than  counterbal 
anced  by  the  faulty  plans  of  the  English,  and  by  the  fortifi 
cations  which  the  French  had  erected,  in  such  positions  as  to 
give  them  a  decided  advantage  in  their  military  operations. 
Washington  early  recommended  the  same  system  of  de 
fence  for  the  English  on  the  Ohio  ;  and,  after  Braddock's 
defeat,  advised  "  the  erection  of  small  fortresses  at  con 
venient  places  to  deposite  provisions  in,  by  which  means 
the  country  will  be  eased  of  an  immense  expense  in  the 
carriage,  and  it  will  also  be  a  means  of  securing  a  retreat 
if  we  should  be  put  to  the  rout  again." 

But  this  advice  of  Washington  was  unheeded,  and  the 
campaign  of  1756  was  based  upon  the  same  erroneous 
principles  as  the  preceding  one.  The  first  division,  of  three 
thousand  men,  was  to  operate  against  Fort  Du  Quesne  ;  the 
second,  of  six  thousand  men,  against  Niagara  ;  the  third,  of 
ten  thousand  men,  against  Crown  Point;  and  &  fourth,  of 
two  thousand  men,  was  to  ascend  the  Kennebec  river,  de 
stroy  the  settlements  on  the  Chaudiere,  and,  by  alarming 
19 


218  MILITARY   AKT  AND   SCIENCE. 

the  country  about  Quebec,  produce  a  diversion  in  favor  of 
the  third  division,  which  was  regarded  as  the  main  army, 
and  was- directed  along  the  principal  line  of  operations. 
The  entire  French  forces  at  this  time  consisted  of  only 
three  thousand  regulars  and  a  body  of  Canadian  militia. 
Nevertheless,  the'English,  with  forces  neaily  six  times  as 
numerous,  closed  the  campaign  without  gaming  a  single 
advantage. 

We  here  see  that  the  French,  with  very  inferior  forces, 
still  continued  successful  in  every  campaign,  uniformly 
gaining  advantage  over  their  enemy,  and  gaining  ground 
upon  his  colonies.  By  the  possession  of  Forts  William 
Henry,  Ticonderoga,  and  Crown  Point,  they  completely 
commanded  Lake  George  and  Lake  Champlain,  which  af 
forded  the  shortest  and  easiest  line  of  communication  be 
tween  the  British  colonies  and  Canada.  By  means  of 
their  forts  at  Montreal,  Frontenac,  Detroit,  &c.,  they  had 
entire  dominion  of  the  lakes  connecting  the  St.  Lawrence 
with  the  Mississippi,  and  Canada  with  Louisiana  ;  more 
over,  by  means  of  Fort  Du  Quesne  and  a  line  of  auxiliary 
works,  their  ascendency  over  the  Indians  on  the  Ohio  was 
well  secured.  But  experience  had  at  length  taught  the 
English  wherein  lay  the  great  strength  of  their  opponents, 
and  a  powerful  effort  was  now  to  be  made  to  displace  the 
French  from  their  fortresses,  or  at  least  to  counterbalance 
these  works  by  a  vast  and  overwhelming  superiority  of 
troops. 

In  1757,  a  British  fleet  of  fifteen  ships  of  the  line, 
eighteen  frigates,  and  many  smaller  vessels,  and  a  land 
force  of  twelve  thousand  effective  men,  were  sent  to  at 
tempt  the  reduction  of  the  fortifications  of  Louisburg ;  but 
they  failed  to  effect  their  object. 

In  1758  the  forces  sent  against  this  place  consisted  of 
twenty  ships  of  the  line  and  eighteen  frigates,  with  an  ar- 
mv  of  fourteen  thousand  men.  The  harbor  was  defended 


OUR  NORTHERN  FRONTIER  DEFENCES.      219 

by  only  five  ships  of  the  line,  one  fifty-gun  ship,  and  five 
frigates,  three  of  which  were  sunk  across  the  mouth  of  the 
basin.  The  fortifications  of  the  town  had  been  much  neg 
lected,  and  in  general  had  fallen  into  ruins.  The  garri 
son  consisted  of  only  two  thousand  five  hundred  regulars, 
and  six  hundred  militia.  Notwithstanding  that  the  number 
of  guns  of  the  British  fleet  exceeded  both  the  armaments 
of  the  French  ships  and  of  all  the  forts,  these  British  ships 
did  not  risk  an  attack,  but  merely  acted  as  transports  and 
as  a  blockading  squadron.  Even  the  French  naval  defence, 
and  the  outer  works  commanding  the  harbor,  were  reduced 
by  the  temporary  land-batteries  which  Wolfe  erected  ;  and 
the  main  work,  although  besieged  by  an  inequality  of  forces 
of  nearly  Jive  to  one,  held  out  for  two  months,  and  even 
then  surrendered  through  the  fears  and  petitions  of  the 
non-combatant  inhabitants,  and  not  because  it  had  received 
any  material  injury  from  the  besiegers.  The  defence, 
however,  had  been  continued  long  enough  to  prevent,  for 
that  campaign,  any  further  operations  against  Canada.  The 
whole  number  of  the  English  land  forces  in  this  campaign 
was  computed  at  fifty  thousand  men,  of  which  more  than 
forty  thousand  were  in  the  field.  The  first  division,  of 
nine  thousand  men,  was  directed  against  Fort  Du  Quesne, 
whose  garrison  did  not  exceed  as  many  hundred.  The 
second  division,  of  sixteen  thousand  effective  troops,  pro 
ceeded  against  Ticonderoga  and  Crown  Point ;  while  a 
detachment  of  three  thousand  men  captured  Fort  Fronte- 
nac,  then  garrisoned  by  only  one  hundred  and  ten  men. 
The  whole  force  of  the  French  amounted  to  only  five 
thousand  ;  the  English  attempted  to  drive  them  from  their 
works  by  storm,  but  were  repulsed  with  a  loss  of  near  two 
thousand  men,  while  their  opponents  were  scarcely  in 
jured.  The  third  division  acted,  as  has  just  been  stated, 
in  concert  with  the  naval  force  against  Louisburg. 

In  1759,  the  western  division  of  the  English  army,  con- 


220  MILITARY  ART   AND   SCIENCE. 

sisting  of  a  strong  body  of  Indians,  and  five  thousand 
troops,  wasted  the  whole  season  in  reducing  Fort  Niagara, 
which  was  garrisoned  by  only  six  hundred  men.  The 
central  column  of  thirteen  thousand  men  was  sufficiently 
successful  to  enable  it  to  winter  at  Crown  Point.  The 
eastern  division  of  eight  thousand  men  under  Wolfe  as* 
cended  the  St.  Lawrence  with  a  fleet  of  twenty-two  ships 
thirteen  frigates,  and  fourteen  sloops,  and  smaller  vessels, 
carrying  one  thousand  nine  hundred  and  ninety  guns,  and 
five  thousand  five  hundred  and  ninety  seamen.  The  naval 
defence  of  Quebec  consisted  of  eight  frigates,  carrying  two 
hundred  and  ten  guns  ;  the  land  forces  numbered  about 
nine  thousand,  and  the  fortifications  were  armed  with  nine 
ty-four  guns  and  five  mortars,  only  a  part  of  which  could 
be  brought  to  bear  upon  the  anchorage  ground.  Several 
attempts  were  made  by  the  combined  forces  to  carry  these 
works,  but  they  proved  equally  unsuccessful.  Although 
the  English  fleet  carried  twenty  times  as  many  guns  as  the 
forts,  their  inability  to  reduce  these  works  was  acknowl 
edged.  The  siege  had  continued  for  two  months,  and  still 
the  fortifications  were  uninjured.  General  Wolfe  himself 
distinctly  stated,  that,  in  any  further  attempt  to  carry  the 
place,  the  "  guns  of  the  shipping  could  not  be  of  much 
use  ;"  and  the  chief  engineer  of  the  expedition  gave  it  as 
his  opinion,  that  "  the  ships  would  receive  great  damage 
from  the  shot  and  bombs  of  the  upper  batteries,  without 
making  the  least  impression  upon  them."  Under  these 
circumstances  it  was  finally  determined  to  endeavor  to  de 
coy  Montcalm  from  his  works,  and  make  him  risk  a  battle 
in  the  open  field.  In  an  evil  hour,  the  French  consented 
to  forego  the  advantages  of  their  fortifications,  and  the 
contest  was  finally  decided  on  the  plains  of  Abraham,  with 
'brces  nearly  equal  in  number.  Both  Wolfe  and  Mont- 
calm  fell  in  this  battle,  but  the  former  on  the  field  of  vie- 
tory ;  and  five  days  afterwards  the  inhabitants  of  Quebec, 


OUR  NORTHERN  FRONTIER  DEFENCES.      221 

weakened  and  dispirited  by  their  losses,  surrendered  the 
town,  although  its  fortifications  were  still  unharmed. 

The  French,  in  this  campaign,  had  relinquished  all  idea 
of  opposing  the  enemy  in  the  open  field,  and  confined  their 
efforts  to  retard  the  advance  of  the  English  till  France 
could  send  troops  to  their  relief ;  but  no  such  relief  came  : 
and  when  the  campaign  of  1760  opened,  the  little  French 
army  was  concentrated  at  Montreal.  As  the  English  di 
visions  advanced,  one  by  Oswego,  one  by  Lake  Champlain, 
arid  the  third  by  Quebec,  they  afforded  to  the  French  a  fine 
opportunity  for  the  strategic  movement  from  a  centre  against 
converging  lines ;  but  the  garrison  was  too  weak  to  hope 
for  success  ;n  either  direction,  and  therefore  awaited  the 
enemy  within  their  works.  Montreal,  being  but  slightly 
fortified,  was  soon  reduced,  and  with  it  fell  the  French 
empire  erected  in  this  country  at  infinite  labor  and  ex 
pense. 

At  the  first  outbreak  of  the  American  Revolution,  it  was 
so  obviously  important  to  get  possession  of  the  military 
works  commanding  the  line  of  Lake  Champlain,  that  ex 
peditions  for  this  purpose  were  simultaneously  fitted  out 
by  Massachusetts  and  Connecticut.  The  garrisons  of 
these  works  were  taken  by  surprise.  This  conquest,  says 
Botta,  the  able  and  elegant  historian  of  the  Revolution, 
"  was  no  doubt  of  high  importance,  but  it  would  have  had 
a  much  greater  influence  upon  the  course  of  the  whole 
war,  if  these  fortresses,  which  are  the  bulwarks  of  the  col 
onies,  had  been  defended  in  times  following,  with  the 
same  prudence  and  valor  with  which  they  had  been  ac 
quired." 

In  the  campaign  of  1775,  an  army  of  two  thousand 
seven  hundred  and  eighty-four  effective  men,  with  a  re. 
serve  of  one  thousand  at  Albany,  crossed  the  lake  and 
approached  the  fortress  of  St.  John's  about  the  1st  of 
September.  The  work  was  garrisoned  by  only  about  five 


222  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

or  six  hundred  regulars,  and  some  two  hundred  militia. 
This  was  the  only  obstacle  to  prevent  the  advance  of  our 
army  into  the  very  heart  of  Canada  ;  to  leave  it  unreduced 
in  rear  would  cut  off  all  hope  of  retreat.  Allen  had  al 
ready  made  the  rash  and  foolish  attempt,  and  his  whole 
army  had  been  destroyed,  and  he  himself  made  prisoner. 
The  reduction  of  this  place  was  therefore  deemed  abso 
lutely  necessary,  but  was  not  effected  till  the  3d  of  Novem 
ber,  and  after  a  long  and  tedious  siege.  This  delay  decided 
the  fate  of  the  campaign ;  for,  although  Montreal  fell  im 
mediately  afterwards,  the  season  was  so  far  advanced  that 
a  large  portion  of  our  troops,  wearied  with  their  sufferings 
from  cold  and  want  of  clothing,  now  demanded  their  dis 
charge.  The  eastern  division,  of  one  thousand  men  un 
der  Arnold,  crossing  the  country  by  the  Kennebeck  and 
Chaudiere,  through  difficulties  and  suffering  almost  un 
paralleled,  arrived  opposite  Quebec  on  the  9th  of  Novem 
ber.  The  place  was  at  this  time  almost  without  defence, 
and,  had  Arnold  possessed  a  suitable  ponton  equipage,  it 
might  easily  have  been  taken  by  surprise.  But  by  the 
time  that  the  means  for  effecting  a  passage  could  be 
prepared,  and  a  junction  could  be  effected  between  the 
two  American  armies,  Quebec  was  prepared  to  sustain 
their  attack.  The  result  of  that  attack  is  too  well  known 
to  require  a  repetition  here. 

Early  the  next  season  it  was  deemed  necessary  to 
withdraw  the  American  army  from  Canada.  This  retreat 
of  undisciplined  troops,  in  the  presence  of  vastly  superior 
numbers  of  the  enemy,  would  have  been  extremely  haz 
ardous  had  it  not  been  effected  on  a  line  of  forts  which 
were  held  by  our  own  troops.  As  it  was  we  sustained  no 
considerable  loss. 

Carleton  pursued  on  rapidly,  to  co-operate  with  General 
Howe,  who  was  now  lying  at  New  York  with  over  one 
hundred  ships  and  about  thirty-five  thousand  troops ;  but 


OUR  NORTHERN  FRONTIER  DEFENCES.      223 

he  received  a  decided  check  from  the  guns  of  Ticonde- 
roga,  and  retired  again  to  Canada. 

By  the  British  plan  of  campaign  in  1777,  the  entire 
force  of  their  northern  army  was  to  concentrate  at  Al 
bany.  One  division  of  fifteen  hundred  men,  including 
Indians,  advanced  by  Oswego,  Wood  Creek,  and  the  Mo 
hawk  ;  but  Fort  Stanwix,  with  a  garrison  of  only  six 
hundred  men,  arrested  their  progress  and  forced  them  to 
return.  Another,  leaving  New  York,  ascended  the  Hud 
son  as  far  as  Esopus  ;  but  its  progress  was  so  much  re 
tarded  by  the  small  forts  and  water-batteries  along  that 
river,  that  it  would  have  been  too  late  to  assist  Burgoyne, 
even  if  it  could  possibly  have  reached  Albany.  The 
principal  division  of  the  enemy's  army,  numbering  about 
nine  thousand  men,  advanced  by  the  Champlain  route. 
Little  or  no  preparations  were  made  to  arrest  its  progress. 
The  works  of  Ticonderoga  were  so  out  of  repair  as  to  be 
indefensible  on  the  flanks.  Its  garrison  consisted  of  only 
fifteen  hundred  continental  troops,  and  about  as  many  mi 
litia,  over  whom  the  general  had  no  control.  Their  sup 
ply  of  provisions  was  exhausted,  and  only  one  man  in  ten 
of  the  militia  had  bayonets  to  their  guns.  Under  these 
circumstances  it  was  deemed  best  to  withdraw  the  garri 
son  six  days  after  the  investment.  Burgoyne  now  ad 
vanced  rapidly,  but  with  so  little  precaution  as  to  leave 
his  communications  in  rear  entirely  unprotected.  Being 
repulsed  by  the  American  forces  collected  at  Saratoga, 
his  line  of  supplies  cut  off  by  our  detached  forts,  his  pro 
visions  exhausted,  his  troops  dispirited,  and  his  Indian 
allies  having  deserted  him,  retreat  became  impossible, 
and  his  whole  army  was  forced  to  capitulate.  This  cam 
paign  closed  the  military  operations  on  our  northern  fron 
tier  during  the  war  of  the  Revolution. 

We  now  come  to  the  war  of  1812.  In  the  beginning  of 
this  war  the  number  of  British  regulars  in  the  Canadas  did 


224  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

not  exceed  three  thousand  men,  who  were  scattered  along 
a  frontier  of  more  than  nine  hundred  miles  in  extent.  In 
the  whole  of  Upper  Canada  there  were  but  seven  hundred 
and  twenty  men,  and  at  Montreal,  Three  Rivers,  and  on 
the  whole  line  of  the  Sorel  the  whole  defensive  force 
amounted  to  only  thirteen  hundred  and  thirty  men,  and  the 
garrison  of  Quebec  was  so  small,  that  no  detachment 
could  be  made  without  great  inconvenience  and  danger. 
The  fortifications  of  Isle  aux  Noix,  then  emphatically  the 
key  of  central  Canada,  was  without  a  garrison  during 
nearly  the  whole  of  the  first  campaign.  Under  these  cir 
cumstances  an  American  force  of  fifteen  hundred  or  two 
thousand  men  marching  rapidly  from  Albany,  might  readi 
ly  have  broken  the  enemy's  line  of  defence,  and  cut  off  all 
Upper  Canada  from  supplies  and  reinforcements  from 
England  by  way  of  Quebec.  Let  us  see  what  course  was 
pursued. 

On  the  1st  of  June  an  army  of  two  thousand  men  was 
collected  at  Dayton,  in  Ohio,  placed  under  the  command 
of  an  imbecile  old  officer  of  the  Revolution,  and  directed 
by  Detroit  against  the  Canadian  Peninsula.  The  dilatory 
march,  absurd  movements,  and  traitorous  surrender  of 
Hull's  army  to  a  British  force  of  three  hundred  regulars 
and  four  hundred  militia,  are  but  too  well  known.  An 
other  American*  army  of  about  ten  thousand  men  was 
afterwards  raised  in  the  west ;  the  main  division  of  this 
army  under  Harrison  marched  by  three  separate  routes  to 
invade  Canada  by  way  of  Maiden  ;  but  they  failed  to  reach 
their  destination,  and  wintered  behind  the  river  Portage. 
The  Eastern  army  was  collected  at  Albany  in  the  early 
part  of  the  summer  and  placed  under  the  command  of 
General  Dearborn,  another  old  officer  of  the  Revolution. 
Instead  of  pushing  this  force  rapidly  forward  upon  the 
strategic  line  of  Lake  Champlain,  the  general  was  directed 
to  divide  it  into  three  parts,  and  to  send  one  division 


OUR  NORTHERN  FRONTIER  DEFENCES.      225 

against  the  Niagara  frontier,  a  second  against  Kingston, 
and  a  third  against  Montreal.  These  orders  were  dis 
patched  from  Washington  the  26th  of  June,  nearly  a  month 
after  Hull  had  begun  his  march  from  Dayton.  Dearborn's 
army,  on  the  first  of  September,  consisted  of  six  thousand 
five  hundred  regulars  and  seven  thousand  militia — thirteen 
thousand  five  hundred  in  all :  six  thousand  three  hundred 
for  the  Niagara  frontier,  two  thousand  two  hundred  at 
Sacketts  Harbor,  and  five  thousand  for  Lake  Champlain. 
Even  with  this  absurd  plan  of  campaign  and  faulty  division 
of  the  forces,  we  might  have  succeeded  if  the  general  had 
acted  with  energy,  so  exceedingly  weak  were  the  Cana 
dian  means  of  defence  ;  but  instead  of  taking  advantage 
of  his  superiority  in  numbers  and  the  favorable  circum 
stances  of  the  time,  he  entered  into  an  armistice  with  the 
British  general,  and  his  whole  army  of  thirteen  thousand 
five  hundred  men  lay  inactive  till  the  13th  of  October, 
when  the  absurd  project  of  crossing  the  Niagara  at  Lewis- 
ton  failed,  because  the  New-York  militia  had  constitu 
tional  scruples  against  crossing  a  river  so  long  as  the  ene 
my  were  on  the  other  side.  The  Lake  Champlain  column, 
consisting  of  three  thousand  regulars  and  two  thousand 
militia,  a  considerable  portion  of  which  had  been  collected 
as  early  as  the  first  of  August,  had  in  four  months  advanced 
as  far  as  La  Cole  river,  a  distance  of  about  two  hundred 
miles  from  Albany.  The  unimportant  action  at  this  place 
terminated  the  campaign,  and  the  army  of  the  North  re 
turned  to  winter-quarters. 

All  the  early  part  of  the  campaign  of  1813,  on  the 
northern  frontier,  was  spent  in  a  war  of  detachments,  in 
which  our  troops  captured  Fort  George  and  York,  and 
repelled  the  predatory  excursions  of  the  enemy.  In  these 
operations  our  troops  exhibited  much  courage  and  energy, 
and  the  young  officers  who  led  them,  no  little  skill  and 
military  talent.  But  nothing  could  have  been  more  ab- 


226  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

surd  than  for  a  general,  with  superior  forces  in  the  vi 
cinity  of  an  enemy,  to  act  only  by  detachments  at  a  time 
when  his  opponents  were  daily  increasing  in  number. 
This  useless  war  of  outposts  and  detachments  was  con 
tinued  till  July,  when  General  Dearborn  was  recalled, 
and  General  Wilkinson,  another  old  officer  of  the  Revo 
lution,  put  in  his  place.  It  was  now  determined  to  make 
a  push  for  Montreal,  with  the  combined  forces  of  the 
Northern  army.  Wilkinson,  with  8,000  men,  descended 
the  St.  Lawrence,  but  did  not  reach  Prescott  till  the  6th 
of  November,  thus  affording  to  the  English  plenty  of  leis 
ure  to  prepare  for  his  reception.  Hampton,  another  old 
officer  of  the  Revolution,  ascended  Lake  Champlain  with 
another  column  of  4,000  men,  but  refused  to  form  any  co 
operation  with  Wilkinson,  and  after  the  unimportant  com 
bat  of  Chrystler's  Field,  the  whole  army  again  retired  to 
winter-quarters . 

In  the  mean  time  the  army  of  the  West,  under  Har 
rison,  who  was  assisted  by  the  military  skill  and  science 
of  M'Crea  and  Wood,  and  the  bravery  of  Croghan  and 
Johnson,  held  in  check  the  British  and  Indians ;  and  the 
battle  of  the  Thames  and  the  victory  of  Lake  Erie  form 
ed  a  brilliant  termination  to  the  campaign  in  that  quarter. 
Had  such  victories  been  gained  on  the  Montreal  or  east 
ern  portion  of  the  frontier,  they  would  have  led  to  the 
most  important  results. 

The  plan  of  operations  for  the  campaign  of  1814  was 
of  the  same  diverse  and  discordant  character  as  before. 
But  the  command  of  the  troops  had  now  fallen  into  the 
hands  of  young  and  energetic  officers  >  and  Brown,  as 
sisted  by  such  men  as  Wood,  M'Crea,  Scott,  Ripley, 
Miller,  soon  gained  the  victories  of  Fort  Erie,  Chippe- 
wa,  and  Lundy's  Lane  ;  while  M'Comb  and  M'Donough 
drove  back  the  enemy  from  the  line  of  Lake  Champlain. 
With  these  operations  terminated  the  Northern  campaign 


OtJR  NORTHERN  FRONTIER  DEFENCES.  22? 

of  1814,  the  last  which  has  been  conducted  on  that  fron 
tier. 

Let  us  now  turn  to  the  system  of  works  projected  for 
the  defence  of  this  line. 

The  first  works  are  at  the  Falls  of  St.  Mary,  on  the 
western  extremity  of  the  line. 

The  second  works  are  at  Mackinaw. 

The  third  works  are  at  the  foot  of  Lake  Huron. 

The  fourth  works  are  near  Detroit. 

The  fifth  works  are  near  Buffalo. 

The  sixth  works  are  at  the  mouth  of  the  Niagara  river. 

The  seventh  works  are  at  Oswego. 

The  eighth  works  are  at  Sacketts  Harbor. 

The  ninth  works  are  below  Ogdensburg. 

The  tenth  works  are  at  Rouse's  Point, 

The  eleventh  works  are  near  the  head-waters  of  the 
Kennebec  or  the  Penobscot. 

The  twelfth  works  are  at  Calais,  on  the  St.  Croix. 

All  these  works  are  small,  and  simple  in  their  charac 
ter,  well  calculated  to  assist  the  operations  of  armed 
forces  in  the  field,  but  incapable  of  resisting  a  protracted 
siege.  They  are  entirely  different  in  their  character  from 
those  on  the  coast,  the  latter  being  intended  principally 
for  the  use  of  our  citizen-soldiery,  in  the  defence  of  our 
seaport  towns,  while  the  former  are  intended  merely  as 
auxiliaries  to  the  operations  of  more  disciplined  troops. 

This  system  of  defence  for  our  Northern  frontier  has 
been  much  commented  on  by  men  professing  some  know 
ledge  of  the  military  art,  and  various  opinions  have  been 
advanced  respecting  its  merits.  Some  have  thought  that 
more  and  larger  works  should  be  placed  on  the  western 
extremity  of  this  line  ;  others  attach  by  far  the  greatest 
importance  to  the  central  or  Montreal  portion  of  the  fron 
tier;  while  others,  again,  attach  a  higher  value  to  tho 
eastern  extremity  of  the  line. 


228  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

These  last  would  have  us  concentrate  our  main  force! 
on  the  head-waters  of  the  Kennebec  and  the  Penobscot, 
and  then  advance  upon  Quebec,  a  distance  of  some  250 
miles,  along  the  isolated  carriage-road,  through  the  valley 
of  the  Chaudiere.  Here  is  only  a  single  road,  but  little 
travelled,  and  penetrating  a  wide  and  almost  uninhabited 
wilderness.  General  Jomini  says  emphatically,  that  a 
line  of  operations  should  always  offer  two  or  three  roads  for 
the  movement  of  an  army  in  the  sphere  of  its  enterprises, — 
an  insuperable  objection  to  the  Kennebec  route,  except 
as  a  diversion  to  the  main  attack.  But  there  are  still 
stronger  objections  to  this  route,  than  its  want  of  feasi 
bility  for  the  transportation  of  the  main  army ;  for  even 
should  that  army  succeed  in  reaching  Quebec  in  safety, 
the  expedition  would  be  entirely  without  military  results, 
unless  that,  fortress  could  be  immediately  reduced, — a 
contingency  which  would  be  extremely  doubtful  under 
the  most  favorable  circumstances  ;  and  even  should  we  be 
ever  so  fortunate  in  our  operations,  the  siege  of  such  a 
place  would  occupy  a  considerable  length  of  time.  It 
would  be  throwing  our  forces  along  the  most  difficult  line 
of  operations,  against  the  strongest  point  in  the  enemy's 
line  of  defence-,  and  making  the  success  of  the  whole 
plan  depend  upon  the  contingency  of  a  reduction,  in  a 
few  days,  of  one  of  the  strongest  fortresses  in  the  world. 
What  principle  in  military  science  would  justify  such  a 
plan  of  campaign  ?  We  are  fully  aware  of  the  great  ad 
vantages  to  be  derived  from  the  reduction  of  Quebec  ; 
and  we  are  also  aware  of  the  great  difficulties  to  be  en 
countered  in  any  attempt  to  accomplish  that  object.  It 
may,  and  probably  will  ere  long,  be  made  to  surrender  to 
our  arms  ;  but  it  would  be  utter  folly  to  base  our  military 
operations  on  the  contingency  of  a  short  and  successful 
siege.  By  advancing  upon  Montreal  by  the  Lake  Cham- 
plairi  route,  we  could  cut  off  the  Canadian  forces  in  the 


OUR  NORTHERN  FRONTIER  DEFENCES.  229 

West  from  all  reinforcements  ;  and  then,  as  circumstances 
might  direct,  could  besiege  Quebec,  or  attack  the  enemy 
in  the  field,  or  perhaps,  mano3uvring  as  the  French  did  at 
the  siege  of  Mantua,  accomplish  both  objects  at  the  same 


We  have  seen  that  it  was  one  of  Napoleon's  maxims 
that  an  army  should  choose  the  shortest  and  most  direct  line 
of  operations,  which  should  either  pierce  the  enemy's  line  of 
defence,  or  cut  off  his  communications  with  his  base.  It  is 
the  opinion  of  men  of  the  best  military  talent  in  our  army 
that  the  Lake  Champlain  line  satisfies  all  these  conditions 
at  the  same  time  ;  —  that  it  is  the  most  direct,  most  feasi 
ble,  and  most  decisive  line  which  can  be  pursued  in  case 
of  operations  against  Canada  ;  and  that  it  is  indispensable 
to  success  in  war  that  this  line  be  well  fortified  in  time 
of  peace.  All  agree  that  the  St.  Lawrence  above  Quebec 
constitutes  the  key  point  of  the  enemy's  defence,  and  the 
objective  point  towards  which  all  our  operations  should  be 
directed.  To  reach  this  point,  all  our  Boards  of  Engi 
neers  have  deemed  it  best  to  collect  our  troops  at  Albany 
and  advance  by  Lake  Champlain,  a  distance  of  only  two 
hundred  miles.  Besides  the  advantages  of  a  good  water 
communication  the  whole  distance  for  the  transportation 
of  military  stores,  there  are  several  roads  on  each  side, 
all  concentrating  on  this  line  within  our  own  territory. 
It  has  already  been  shown  by  the  brief  sketch  of  our  nor 
thern  wars,  that  this  line  has  been  the  field  of  strife  and 
blood  for  fifteen  campaigns.  Nature  has  marked  it  out  as 
our  shortest  and  easiest  line  of  intercourse  with  Canada, 
both  in  peace  and  war.  Military  diversions  will  always 
be  made  on  the  eastern  and  western  extremities  of  this 
frontier,  and  important  secondary  or  auxiliary  operations 
be  carried  on  by  the  eastern  and  western  routes  ;  but  until 
we  overthrow  the  whole  system  of  military  science  as 
established  by  the  Romans,  revived  by  Frederick,  ani 


230  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

practised  and  improved  by  Napoleon,  the  central  and  inte 
rior  line,  under  all  ordinary  circumstances,  will  furnish  the 
greatest  probabilities  of  success. 

If  the  line  of  Lake  Champlain  is,  as  we  have  endeav 
ored  to  show,  the  most  important  line  in  the  north,  its 
security  by  fortifications  is  a  matter  of  the  greatest  inter 
est.  The  works  recommended  by  the  Board,  consist  of  a 
single  fort,  costing  $600,000,  at  Rouse's  Point,  on  the 
extreme  frontier,  and  unfortified  depots  at  Plattsburg  and 
Albany.  But  is  this  sufficient  to  accomplish  the  object? 
If  the  hostile  army  should  pass  the  extreme  frontier  bar 
rier,  what  is  to  retard  his  advance, — what  defensive  works 
are  to  protect  the  debouche  of  the  Northern  canal,  or  even 
to  save  the  great  central  depot  ?  We  know  of  no  foreign 
engineer  who  has  recommended  less  than  three  lines  of 
fortifications  for  the  security  of  a  land  frontier ;  and  Na 
poleon,  the  Archduke  Charles,  and  General  Jomini,  agree 
in  recommending  at  least  this  number  of  lines.  There 
may  be  circumstances  that  render  it  unnecessary  to  resort 
to  a  three-fold  defence  throughout  the  whole  extent  of  our 
northern  frontier ;  but  upon  our  main  line  of  communica 
tion  with  Canada, — a  line  of  maximum  importance  both  to 
us  and  to  the  enemy,  we  know  of  no  reason  for  violating 
the  positive  rules  of  the  art, — rules  which  have  been  estab 
lished  for  ages,  and  sanctioned  by  the  best  engineers  and 
greatest  generals  of  modern  times. 

Ticonderoga  has  more  than  once  stayed  the  waves  of 
northern  invasion ;  and  we  know  of  no  change  in  the  art 
of  war,  or  in  the  condition  of  the  country,  that  renders 
less  important  than  formerly  the  advantages  of  an  inter 
mediate  point  of  support  between  Albany  and  the  Cana 
dian  lines.  Indeed  it  would  seem  that  the  connection  of 
the  Hudson  with  the  lake  by  the  northern  canal  had  even 
increased  the  value  of  such  a  point. 

It  would  seem,  moreover,  that  the  great  value  of  a  cen- 


OUR  NORTHERN  FRONTIER  DEFENCES.      231 

tral  depot  near  Albany  would  warrant  a  resort  to  the  best 
means  of  security  which  can  be  afforded  by  defensive 
works.  Here  we  already  have  one  of  our  largest  arsenals 
of  construction  ;  here  are  to  be  located  magazines  for  the 
collection  and  deposite,  in  time  of  peace,  of  gunpowder ; 
here,  in  time  of  war,  is  to  be  formed  the  grand  military 
depot  for  our  whole  northern  armies  ;  and  here  is  the 
point  of  junction  of  the  lines  of  communication  of  our 
northern  and  eastern  states,  and  the  great  central  rallying- 
point  where  troops  are  to  be  collected  for  the  defence  of 
our  northern  frontier,  or  for  offensive  operations  against 
Canada.  Such  a  place  should  never  be  exposed  to  the 
coup-de-main  of  an  enemy.  The  chance  operations  of  a 
defensive  army  are  never  sufficient  for  the  security  of 
so  important  a  position.  We  do  not  here  pretend  to  say 
what  its  defences  should  be.  Perhaps  strong  t&tes-de-pont 
on  the  Mohawk  and  Hudson  rivers,  and  detached  works 
on  the  several  lines  of  communication,  may  accomplish  the 
desired  object ;  perhaps  more  central  and  coinpact  works 
may  be  found  necessary.  But  we  insist  on  the  importance 
of  securing  this  position  by  some  efficient  means.  The 
remarks  of  Napoleon,  (which  have  already  been  given,) 
on  the  advantages  to  be  derived  from  fortifying  such  a 
central  place,  where  the  military  wealth  of  a  nation  can 
be  secured,  are  strikingly  applicable  to  this  case. 

But  let  us  look  for  a  moment  at  what  is  called  the  west" 
ern  plan  of  defence  for  our  northern  frontier. 

Certain  writers  and  orators  of  the  •western  states,  in 
their  plans  of  military  defence,  would  have  the  principal 
fortifications  of  the  northern  frontier  established  on  Lake 
Erie,  the  Detroit  river,  the  St.  Clair,  and  Lake  Huron  ; 
and  the  money  proposed  for  the  other  frontier  and  coast 
works,  expended  in  establishing  military  and  naval  depots 
at  Memphis  and  Pittsburg,  and  in  the  construction  of  a 
ship-canal  from  the  lower  Illinois  to  Lake  Michigan,— for 


232  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

the  purpose  of  obtaining  the  naval  control  of  the  northern 
lakes. 

It  is  said  that  British  military  and  steam  naval  forces 
will  ascend  the  St.  Lawrence  to  Lake  Ontario ;  that  to 
counteract  these  operations  we  must  build  an  opposition 
steam-navy  at  Pittsburg  and  Memphis,  and  collect  our 
.troops  on  the  Ohio  and  Mississippi,  ascend  the  Mississippi 
and  Illinois,  Lake  Michigan,  Lake  Huron,  and  the  Geor 
gian  Bay,  cross  over  to  the  Ottawa  by  French  river  and 
Lake  Nipissing,  or  Moon  river  and  the  Muskago,  then  de 
scend  the  Ottawa  river  to  Montreal.  But  as  there  might 
be  some  difficulty  in  conveying  their  war-steamers  over 
some  twelve  or  fifteen  portages  between  the  Georgian  Bay 
and  the  Ottawa,  and  as  the  upper  waters  of  that  river  are 
not  navigable  by  such  craft,  it  has,  by  some  of  the  military 
writers  before  alluded  to,  been  deemed  preferable  to  de 
scend  Lake  Huron,  St.  Clair  river  and  lake,  run  the 
gauntlet  past  the  British  forts  on  the  Detroit,  descend 
Lake  Erie,  and  the  Niagara*  into  Lake  Ontario,  so  as  to 
meet  the  English  as  they  come  steaming  up  the  St.  Law 
rence  ! 

It  is  agreed  upon  all  sides  that  the  British  must  first 
collect  their  forces  at  Quebec,  and  then  pass  along  the 
line  of  the  St.  Lawrence  and  Lake  Ontario  to  reach  the 
Niagara  and  Detroit  frontiers.  Our  boards  of  engineers 
have  deemed  it  best  to  collect  troops  on  the  Champlain 
line,  and,  by  penetrating  between  Montreal  and  Quebec, 
separate  the  enemy's  forces  and  cut  off  all  the  remainder 
of  Canada  from  supplies  and  reinforcements  from  England. 
But  it  has  been  discovered  by  certain  western  men  that 
to  cut  the  trunk  of  a  tree  is  not  the  proper  method  of  fell 
ing  it :  we  must  climb  to  the  top  and  pinch  the  buds,  or,  at 


*  How  they  are  to  pass  the  Falls  was  not  determined  either  by 
Harry  Bluff  or  the  Memphis  Convention. 


OUR  NORTHERN  MILITARY  DEFENCES.  233 

most,  cut  off  a  few  of  the  smaller  limbs.  To  blow  up  a 
house,  we  should  not  place  the  mine  under  the  foundation, 
but  attach  it  to  one  of  the  shingles  of  the  roof!  We  have 
already  shown  that  troops  collected  at  Albany  may  reach 
the  great  strategic  point  on  the  St..  Lawrence  by  an  easy 
and  direct  route  of  two  hundred  miles ;  but  forces  collected 
at  Pittsburg  and  Memphis  must  pass  over  a  difficult  and 
unfrequented  route  of  two  thousand  miles. 

Our  merchant  marine  on  the  lakes  secures  to  us  a  na 
val  superiority  in  that  quarter  at  the  beginning  of  a  war ; 
and  our  facilities  for  ship-building  are  there  equal  if  not 
superior  to  any  possessed  by  the  enemy.  The  only  way, 
therefore,  in  which  our  ascendency  on  the  lakes  can  be 
lost,  is  by  the  introduction  of  steam  craft  from  the  Atlan 
tic.  The  canals  and  locks  constructed  for  this  object  will 
pass  vessels  of  small  dimensions  and  drawing  not  over 
eight  and  a  half  feet  water. 

How  are  we  to  prevent  the  introduction  of  these  Atlan 
tic  steamers  into  our  lakes  ?  Shall  we,  at  the  first  opening 
of  hostilities,  march  with  armed  forces  upon  the  enemy's 
line  of  artificial  communication  and  blow  up  the  locks  of 
their  ship-canals,  thus  meeting  the  enemy's  marine  at  the 
very  threshold  of  its  introduction  into  the  interior  seas ; 
or  shall  we  build  opposition  steam-navies  at  Pittsburg  and 
Memphis,  some  two  thousand  miles  distant,  and  then  ex 
pend  some  forty  or  fifty  millions*  in  opening  an  artificial 


*  The  construction  of  the  Illinois  ship-canal,  for  vessels  of  eight  and 
a  half  feet  draught,  is  estimated  at  fifteen  millions ;  to  give  the  same 
draught  to  the  Mississippi  and  lower  Illinois,  would  require  at  least  ten 
millions  more  ;  a  ship  canal  of  the  corresponding  draught  around  Nia 
gara  Falls,  will  cost,  say,  ten  millions  ;  the  navy  yard  at  Memphis,  with 
docks,  storehouses,  &c.,will  cost  about  two  millions,  and  steamers  sent 
thence  to  the  lakes  will  cost  about  fifty  thousand  dollars  per  gun.  On 
the  other  hand,  the  military  defences  which  it  is  deemed  necessary  to 
erect  in  time  of  peace  for  the  securitv  of  the  Champlain  frontier,  will 


234  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

channel  to  enable  them  to  reach  Lake  Ontario,  after  its 
borders  have  been  laid  waste  by  the  hostile  forces  ?  Very 
tew  disinterested  judges  would  hesitate  in  forming  their 
opinion  on  this  question.* 

cost  only  about  two  thousand  dollars  per  gun  ;  the  whole  expenditure 
not  exceeding,  at  most,  two  millions  of  dollars ! 

It  is  not  to  be  denied  that  a  water  communication  between  the  Mis 
sissippi  and  the  northern  lakes  will  have  great  commercial  advantages, 
and  that,  in  case  of  a  protracted  war,  auxiliary  troops  and  military 
stores  may  be  drawn  from  the  valley  of  the  Mississippi  to  assist  the 
North  and  East  in  preventing  any  great  accessions  to  the  British  mili 
tary  forces  in  the  Canadas.  We  speak  only  of  the  policy  of  expending 
vast  sums  of  money  on  this  military  (?)  project,  to  the  neglect  of  mat 
ters  of  more  immediate  and  pressing  want.  We  have  nothing  to  say 
of  its  character  as  a  commercial  project,  or  of  the  ultimate  military  ad 
vantages  that  might  accrue  from  such  a  work.  We  speak  only  of  the 
present  condition  and  wants  of  the  country,  and  not  of  what  that  con 
dition  and  those  wants  may  be  generations  hence  !  . 

*  There  are  no  books  devoted  exclusively  to  the  subjects  embraced 
in  this  chapter ;  but  the  reader  will  find  many  remarks  on  the  northern, 
frontier  defences  in  the  histories  of  the  war  of  1812,  in  congressional 
reports,  (vide  House  Doc.  206,  XXVIth  Congress,  2d  session  ;  and 
Senate  Doc.,  No.  85,  XXVIIIth  Congress,  2d  session,)  and  hi  numerous 
pamphlets  and  essays  that  have  appeared  from  the  press  within  the 
last  few  years. 


STAFF  AND  ADMINISTRATIVE  CORPS.  235 


CHAPTER   IX. 

A.RMY  ORGANIZATION STAFF  AND  ADMINISTRATIVE   CORPS. 

BY  the  law  of  the  12th  of  December,  1790,  on  the  or 
ganization  of  the  public  force  of  France,  the  Army  was 
denned,  "  A  standing  force  drawn  from  the  public  force, 
and  designed  to  act  against  external  enemies."  [Une 
force  habituette  extraite  de  la  force  publique,  et  destinee  es- 
sentiellement  a  agir  contre  les  ennemis  du  dehors.] 

In  time  of  peace,  the  whole  organized  military  force  of 
the  State  is  intended  when  we  speak  of  the  army ;  but  in 
time  of  war  this  force  is  broken  up  into  two  or  more  frac 
tions,  each  of  which  is  called  an  army.  These  armies  are 
usually  named  from  the  particular  duty  which  may  be  as 
signed  to  them — as,  army  of  invasion,  army  of  occupation, 
army  of  observation,  army  of  reserve,  fyc. ;  or  from  the 
country  or  direction  in  which  they  operate — as,  army  of  the 
North,  of  the  South,  of  Mexico,  of  Canada,  of  the  Rhine,  dfc.; 
or  from  the  general  who  commands  it — as,  the  army  of 
Soult,  army  of  Wellington,  army  of  Blucher,  fyc. 

All  modern  armies  are  organized  on  the  same  basis. 
They  are  made  up  of  a  Staff  and  Administrative  depart 
ments,  and  four  distinct  arms — Infantry,  Cavalry,  Artil 
lery,  and  Engineers  ;  each  having  distinct  duties,  but  all 
combining  to  form  one  and  the  same  military  body.  In 
the  actual  operations  of  a  campaign,  these  forces  are  form 
ed  into  corps  d'armee,  each  corps  d'armee  being  composed 
of  two  or  more  grand-divisions ;  each  grand-division,  of 
two  or  more  brigades';  and  each  brigade,  of  several  com 
panies,  squadrons,  or  batteries. 


236  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

In  speaking  of  an  army  in  the  field,  it  is  sometimes  sup 
posed  to  be  divided  into  two  classes  of  men — the  Staff 
.and  the  line.  We  here  include  in  the  first  class — 

All  officers,  of  whatever  arm,  above  the  rank  of  colonel ; 

All  officers  of  the  staff  corps  of  whatever  grade,  and 

All  officers  attached  to  the  staff  as  aides,  &c. ; 

All  officers  of  the  administrative  departments  ; 

All  officers  of  artillery  and  engineer  staffs ; 

The  corps  of  geographical  or  topographical  engineers, 
and 

The  guards. 

In  the  second  class  are  included  all  troops,  of  what 
ever  arm,  which  belong  to  the  active  army,  in  infantry, 
cavalry,  artillery,  and  engineers.  All  troops  on  detached 
service,  such  as  recruiting,  guarding  posts  and  depots,  es 
corting  convoys,  &c.,  as  well  as  all  sedentary  corps,  gar 
risons  of  fortified  places,  &c.,  are  not  regarded  in  this 
classification  as  composing  any  part  of  the  line  of  the 
army. 

Troops  of  the  line  is  a  term  applied  only  to  such  troops 
as  form  the  principal  line  on  the  battle-field,  viz  : — The 
heavy  infantry  and  heavy  cavalry.  These  are  technically 
called  infantry  of  the  line,  and  cavalry  of  the  line.  In  this 
sense  of  the  term,  light  infantry,  light  cavalry  or  dragoons, 
artillery,  and  engineers,  are  not  classed  as  troops  of  the 
line.  But  this  distinction  is  now  pretty  much  fallen  into 
disuse,  and  the  division  of  an  army  into  Staff  and  Admin 
istrative  departments,  and  four  arms  of  service — Infan 
try,  Cavalry,  Artillery,  and  Engineers — is  now  regarded 
as  the  most  convenient,  from  being  precise  and  definite  in 
its  meaning. 

The  general  staff  of  an  army  includes  all  general  offi 
cers  of  the  army,  and  such  officers  of  lower  grades  as  are 
attached  to  this  general  duty,  instead  of  serving  with 
troops,  or  on  special  administrative  duty.  The  general 


STAFF  AND  ADMINISTRATIVE  CORPS.       237 

officers  are — 1st,  the  generalissimo,  or  commander-in-chief ; 
2d,  generals,  or  marshals,  as  they  are  called  in  France,  or 
field-marshals  and  generals  of  infantry  and  cavalry  >  as 
they  are  called  in  England  and  the  northern  states  of  Eu 
rope/  3d,  lieutenant-generals',  4th,  generals  of  division, 
or  major-generals,  as  they  are  called  in  England  ;  5th,  gen 
erals  of  brigade,  or  brigadier-generals,  as  they  are  sometimes 
called  ; — colonels,  majors,  captains,  lieutenants,  ensigns, 
and  cornets  or  cadets,  are  also  either  attached  to  the  staff. 
or  form  a  part  of  the  staff  corps.  The  titles  of  "  adjutant- 
general,"  and  of  "  inspector-general,"  are  given  to  staff 
officers  selected  for  these  special  services,  either  in  the 
general  staff  or  in  the  several  corps  tfarmee.  No  special 
rank  is  attached  to  these  offices  themselves,  and  the  grade 
of  those  who  hold  them  is  fixed  by  some  special  rule,  or 
by  their  general  rank  in  the  army. 

In  the  war  of  the  Revolution,  Washington  held  the  rank 
of  General,  and  in  1798  the  rank  of  Lieutenant-general. 
In  the  war  of  1812,  the  highest  grade  held  by  any  of  oui 
officers  was  that  of  General  of  Division,  or  Major-general, 
as  it  was  called.  The  highest  grade  in  our  army  at  the 
present  time  is  called  Major-general — a  title  that  properly 
belongs,  not  to  the  general  of  an  army,  but  to  the  chief  of 
staff.  Hamilton  had  this  title  when  chief  of  Washington's 
staff;  Berthier  and  Soult  when  chief  of  Napoleon's  staff, 
the  former  till  the  close  of  the  campaign  of  1814,  and  the 
latter  in  the  Waterloo  campaign.  General  Jomini  first 
greatly  distinguished  himself  as  chief  of  Ney's  staff,  and 
afterwards  on  the  staff  of  the  Emperor  of  Russia.  Other 
generals  have  owed  much  of  their  success  to  the  chiefs  of 
their  staff: — Pichegru  to  Regnier,  Moreau  to  Dessoles, 
Kutusof  to  Toll,  Barclay  to  Diebitsch,  and  Blucher  to 
Sharnharst  and  Gneisenau. 

The  generalissimo  or  commander-in-chief  of  an  army  is 
the  person  designated  by  the  law  of  the  land  to  take  charge 


238  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

of  the  organized  military  forces  of  the  state.  In  this  coim 
try  the  President,  through  his  Secretary  of  War,  exercises 
this  general  command.  In  England,  Wellington  acts  in 
the  capacity  of  commander-in-chief  of  all  the  British  mili 
tary  forces.  In  France,  the  Minister  of  War,  under  the 
king,  has  this  general  direction.  In  other  European  ser 
vices,  some  prince  of  the  blood,  or  distinguished  general, 
exercises  the  functions  of  generalissimo. 

An  active  army  in  the  field  should  be  commanded  by  a 
general,  or,  as  is  done  in  some  European  countries,  by 
a  marshal.  These  may  be  regarded  as  of  assimilated  rank. 

A  corps  d'armee  should  be  commanded  by  a  Lieutenant' 
general.  This  rule  is  almost  universal  in  Europe.  The 
number  of  marshals  in  France  under  Napoleon  was  so 
great,  that  officers  of  this  grade  were  often  assigned  to 
corps  d'armee. 

A  grand  division  of  an  army  should  be  commanded  by  a 
General  of  Division.  In  England,  the  assimilated  grade  is 
that  of  major-general,  and  in  France  at  the  present  time, 
the  younger  lieutenant-generals,  or  the  marechaux-de-camp, 
command  divisions. 

A  brigade  should  be  commanded  by  a  Brigadier-general. 
At  the  present  time  in  the  French  service,  marechaux-de- 
camp  act  as  commanders  of  brigades. 

The  several  corps  d'armee  are  designated  by  numbers, 
1st,  2d,  3d,  &c.,  and  in  the  same  way  the  several  divisions 
in  each  corps  d'armee,  and  the  se  'eral  brigades  in  each  di 
vision. 

When  the  number  of  troops  are  placed  on  a  war  footing, 
each  corps  d'armee  ordinarily  contains  from  twenty  to  thirty 
thousand  men. 

The  command  of  these  several  corps  d'a^mee,  divi 
sions,  and  brigades,  is  taken  by  the  officers  of  the  corre 
sponding  grades  according  to  seniority  of  rank,  and  with 
out  reference  to  arms,  unless  otherwise  directed  by  the 


STAFF  AND  ADMINISTRATIVE  CORPS.  239 

generalissimo,  who  should  always  have  the  power  to  des 
ignate  officers  for  special  commands. 

The  chief  of  staff  of  an  army  is  usually  selected  from 
the  grade  next  below  that  of  the  general  commanding,  and 
receives  the  title,  for  the  time  being,  which  is  used  to 
designate  this  special  rank.  In  some  European  armies, 
and  formerly  in  our  own  service,  this  officer  was  called 
major-general.  In  France,  if  the  generalissimo  commands 
in  person,  a  marshal  is  made  chief  of  staff  with  the  tem- 
poray  title  of  major-general ;  but  if  a  marshal  commands 
the  army,  a  lieutenant-general  or  marechal-de-camp  be- 
comes.chief  of  staff  with  the  title  of  aide-major-general 
The  chiefs  of  staff  of  corps  d'armee  and  of  divisions,  are  se 
lected  in  precisely  the  same  way. 

The  position  assigned  by  the  commanding  general  for  the 
residence  of  his  staff,  is  denominated  the  General  Head- 
Quarter  of  the  army ;  that  of  a  corps  d'armce  staff,  the  Head- 
Quarters  of  [1st  or  2d,  &c.]  corps  d'armee;  that  of  a  divi 
sion,  the  Head-Quarters  of  [1st  or  2d,  &c.]  division,  [1st 
or  2d,  &c.]  corps  d'armee. 

The  petty  staffs  of  regiments,  squadrons,  &c.,  consisting 
of  an  adjutant,  sergeant-major,  &c.,  are  especially  organ 
ized  by  the  commandants  of  the  regiments,  &c.,  and  have 
no  connection  whatever  with  the  general  staff  of  an  army. 
Of  course,  then,  they  are  not  embraced  in  the  present 
discussion. 

The  subordinate  officers  of  the  staff  of  an  army,  in  time 
of  war4  are  charged  with  important  and  responsible  duties 
connected  with  the  execution  of  the  orders  of  their  re 
spective  chiefs.  But  in  time  of  peace,  they  are  too  apt  to 
degenerate  into  fourth-rate  clerks  of  the  Adjutant-general's 
department,  and  mere  military  dandies,  employing  their 
time  in  discussing  the  most  unimportant  and  really  con 
temptible  points  of  military  etiquette,  or  criticising  the 
letters  and  dispatches  of  superior  officers,  to  see  whether 


2-40  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

the  wording  of  the  report  or  the  folding  of  the  letter  exact 
ly  corresponds  to  the  particular  regulation  applicable  to 
the  case.  Such  was  the  character  given  to  the  first  staff  of 
Wellington,  and  a  similar  class  of  men  composed  the  staff 
of  the  army  of  Italy  when  it  was  abolished  by  Napoleon 
and  a  new  one  formed  in  its  place.  There  are  also  some 
officers  of  this  stamp  in  our  own  service,  but  they  are  re 
garded  by  the  army  with  universal  contempt.  The  staff 
of  our  army  requires  a  new  and  different  organization,  and 
should  be  considerably  enlarged. 

The  following  is  the  composition  of  a  regularly  organ 
ized  general  staff  in  the  French  service  for  an  army  of 
forty  or  fifty  thousand  men  divided  into  two  corps  d'armee 
and  a  reserve. 

1st.  The  marshal  (or  general)  commanding-in-chief ; 
and  one  colonel  or  lieutenant-colonel,  one  major,  three 
captains  and  three  subalterns,  as  aides-de-camp. 

2d.  A  lieutenant-general  as  chief-of-staff,  with  the  title 
of  major-general^  assisted  by  one  colonel  or  lieutenant-co 
lonel,  three  majors,  five  captains,  and  one  subaltern,  as 
aides-de-camp. 

3d.  Three  lieutenant-generals,  commanding  the  corps 
d'armee  and  reserve.  Each  of  these  will  be  assisted  by 
aides  in  the  same  way  as  the  major-general,  and  each  will 
also  have  his  regularly-organized  staff  of  corps  d'armee, 
with  a  general  of  division  or  general  of  brigade  as  chief. 

4th.  Six  or  nine  generals  commanding  divisions,  each 
having  his  own  disti'nct  and  separately  organized  staff.  In 
the  French  army,  the  staff  of  an  officer  commanding  a  di 
vision  is  composed  of  one  colonel,  two  majors,  three  cap 
tains,  and  six  subalterns. 

5th.  Twelve  or  more  generals  of  brigade,  each  having 
one  captain,  and  one  subaltern  for  aides. 

6th.  There  is  also  attached  to  the  staff  of  the  general- 
in-chief  of  the  army,  the  commandants  of  artillery  and  en- 


STAFF  AND  ADMINISTRATIVE  CORPS.      241 

gineers,  with  several  subordinates,  inspector-generals,  and 
the  ranking  officers  of  each  of  the  administrative  depart 
ments,  with  their  assistants. 

The  generals  select  their  aides  and  assistants  from  the 
staff  corps,  or  from  either  of  the  four  arms  of  service. 

The  troops  of  these  arms  may  be  distributed  as  follows : 

52  battalions  of  infantry.                    .             .  .         35,000  men. 
42  squadrons  of  horse,           .                          .  .           6,500  " 
13  batteries  of  artillery,  (4  mounted  and  9  foot,)  .           2,500  " 
5  companies  of  sappers,  2  of  pontoniers,*  and  1  of  arti 
ficers,               .             .  .           1,500  " 


45,500     " 

If  we  add  to  these  the  staff,  and  the  several  officers  and 
employes  of  the  administrative  departments,  we  have  an 
army  of  nearly  fifty  thousand  men. 

This,  it  will  be  remembered,  is  the  organization  of  an 
army  in  the  field  ;  in  the  entire  military  organization  of  a 
state,  the  number  of  staff  officers  will  be  still  higher. 

In  1788,  France,  with  a  military  organization  for  about 
three  hundred  and  twenty  thousand  men,  had  eighteen  mar 
shals,  two  hundred  and  twenty-five  lieutenant-generals, 
five  hundred  and  thirty-eight  mar  echaux*  de-camp,  and  four 
hundred  and  eighty-three  brigadiers.  A  similar  organiza 
tion  of  the  general  staff  was  maintained  by  Napoleon.  At 
present  the  general  staff  of  the  French  army  consists  of 
nine  marshals,  (twelve  in  time  of  war  ;)  eighty  lieutenant- 
generals  in  active  service,  fifty-two  in  reserve,  and  sixty- 
two  en  retraite — one  hundred  and  ninety-four  in  all ;  one 
hundred  and  sixty  marechaux-de-camp  in  active  service 
eighty-six  in  reserve,  and  one  hundred  and  ninety  en  re 
traite — four  hundred  and  thirty-six  in  all.  The  officers  of 
the  staff-corps  are  :  thirty  colonels,  thirty  lieutenant-colo- 

«  One  bridge-equipage  is  required  for  each  corps  d'armee. 
21 


242  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

nels,  one  hundred  majors,  three  hundred  captains,  and  one 
hundred  lieutenants.  Those  of  other  European  armies  are 
organized  on  the  same  basis. 

It  will  be  seen  from  these  remarks  that  the  organization 
of  our  own  general  staff  is  exceedingly  defective,  and  en 
tirely  unsuited  to  the  object  for  which  it  is  created.  We 
have  two  brigadier-generals  for  the  command  of  two  bri 
gades,  and  one  general  of  division,  with  the  title  of  major- 
general,  who  acts  in  the  fourfold  capacity  of  general  com 
manding  the  army,  lieutenant-general,  general  of  division, 
and  chief  of  staff  of  the  army.  But  as  it  is  impossible 
with  this  number  to  maintain  a  proper  organization,  the 
President  (with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate) 
has,  from  time  to  time,  increased  this  number  to  three  ma 
jor-generals,  and  nine  brigadier-generals,  and  numerous 
officers  of  staff  with  lower  grades.  Nearly  all  these  officers 
are  detached  from  their  several  regiments  and  corps,  thus  in 
juring  the  efficiency  of  regiments  and  companies  ;  and  we 
have  in  our  service,  by  this  absurd  mode  of  supplying  the 
defects  of  our  system  of  organization  by  brevet  rank,  the 
anomaly  of  officers  being  generals,  and  at  the  same  time  not 
generals  ;  of  holding  certain  ranks  and  grades,  and  yet  not 
holding  these  ranks  and  grades  !  Let  Congress  do  away 
this  absurd  and  ridiculous  system,  and  establish  a  proper 
and  efficient  organization  of  the  general  staff,  and  restore 
the  grades  of  general  and  lieutenant-general.  In  the  war 
of  1812,  instead  of  resorting  to  a  proper  organization  when 
an  increase  of  the  general  staff  was  required,  we  merely 
multiplied  the  number  of  major-generals  and  generals  of  bri 
gade  by  direct  appointment,  or  by  conferring  brevet  rank. 
It  is  now  conceded  that  there  never  was  a  more  inefficient 
general  staff  than  that  with  which  our  army  was  cursed 
during  the  war ;  and  the  claims  of  brevet  rank  have  ever 
since  been  a  source  of  endless  turmoils  and  dissatisfaction, 
driving  from  the  army  many  of  its  noblest  ornaments 


STAFF  AND  ADMINISTRATIVE  CORPS.  243 

In  the  event  of  another  war,  it  is  to  be  hoped  that  Con 
gress  will  not  again  resort  to  the  ruinous  system  of  1812. 
Possibly  it  may  by  some  be  objected  to  the  creation  of 
generals,  lieutenant-generals,  &c.,  that  it  increases  the 
expense  of  the  army  and  the  number  of  its  officers.  This 
need  not  be.  The  number,  pay,  &c.,  may  remain  the 
same,  or  nearly  the  same,  as  at  present.  But  by  increas 
ing  the  grades  you  avoid  in  a  considerable  measure  the 
difficulties  of  seniority  claims  and  brevet  rank — the  prin 
cipal  curses  of  our  present  system.  If  we  merely  in 
crease  the  number  of  each  existing  grade,  giving  a  part 
of  these  rank  above  their  name  and  office,  we  merely 
multiply  evils.  But  we  will  leave  this  subject  for  the 
present,  and  recur  to  the  general  discussion  of  staff  du 
ties 

The  following  remarks  of  Jomini  on  the  importance  of 
the  staff  of  an  army  are  worthy  of  attention.  "  A  good 
staff,"  says  he,  "  is,  more  than  all,  indispensable  to  the 
constitution  of  an  army ;  for  it  must  be  regarded  as  the 
nursery  where  the  commanding  general  can  raise  his 
principal  supports — as  a  body  of  officers  whose  intelli 
gence  can  aid  his  own.  When  harmony  is  wanting  be 
tween  the  genius  that  commands,  and  the  talents  of  those 
who  apply  his  conceptions,  success  cannot  be  sure  ;  for  the 
most  skilful  combinations  are  destroyed  by  faults  in  exe 
cution.  Moreover,  a  good  staff  has  the  advantage  of  being 
more  durable  than  the  genius  of  any  single  man ;  it  not 
only  remedies  many  evils,  but  it  may  safely  be  affirmed 
that  it  constitutes  for  the  army  the  best  of  all  safeguards. 
The  petty  interests  of  coteries,  narrow  views,  and  mis 
placed  egotism,  oppose  this  last  position  :  nevertheless, 
every  military  man  of  reflection,  and  every  enlightened 
statesman,  will  regard  its  truth  as  beyond  all  dispute  ;  for 
l  well-appointed  staff  is  to  an  army  what  a  skilful  minis 
ter  is  to  a  monarchy — it  seconds  the  views  of  the  chief, 


244  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

even  though  it  be  in  condition  to  direct  all  things  of  it 
self;  it  prevents  the  commission  of  faults,  even  though 
the  commanding  general  be  wanting  in  experience,  by 
furnishing  him  good  councils.  How  many  mediocre  men 
of  both  ancient  and  modern  times,  have  been  rendered 
illustrious  by  achievements  which  were  mainly  due  to 
their  associates  !  Reynie.r  was  the  chief  cause  of  the 
victories  of  Pichegru.  in  1794;  and  Dessoles,  in  like 
manner,  contributed  to  the  glory  of  Moreau.  Is  not  Gen 
eral  Toll  associated  with  the  successes  of  Kutusof  ?  Die- 
bitsch  with  those  of  Barclay  and  Witgenstein  1  Gneise- 
nau  and  Muffling  with  those  of  Blucher  ?  Numerous 
other  instances  might  be  cited  in  support  of  these  asser 
tions. 

"  A  well-established  staff  does  not  always  result  from  a 
good  system  of  education  for  the  young  aspirants  ;  for 
a  man  may  be  a  good  mathematician  and  a  fine  scholar, 
without  being  a  good  warrior.  The  staff  should  always 
possess  sufficient  consideration  and  prerogative  to  be 
sought  for  by  the  officers  of  the  several  arms,  and  to 
draw  together,  in  this  way,  men  who  are  already  known 
by  their  aptitude  for  war.  "Engineer  and  artillery  officers 
will  no  longer  oppose  the  staff,  if  they  reflect  that  it  will 
open  to  them  a  more  extensive  field  for  immediate  dis 
tinction,  and  that  it  will  eventually  be  made  up  exclu 
sively  of  the  officers  of  those  two  corps  who  may  be 
placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  commanding  general,  and 
who  are  the  most  capable  of  directing  the  operations  of 
war." 

"  At  the  beginning  of  the  wars  of  the  Revolution,"  says 
this  able  historian  elsewhere,  "  in  the  French  army  the 
general  staff,  which  is  essential  for  directing  the  opera 
tions  of  war,  had  neither  instruction  nor  experience." 
The  several  adjutant-generals  attached  to  the  army  of 
Italy  were  so  utterly  incompetent,  that  Napoleon  became 


STAFF  AND  ADMINISTRATIVE  CORPS.       245 

prejudiced  against  the  existing  staff-corps,  and  virtually 
destroyed  it,  drawing  his  staff-officers  from  the  other 
corps  of  the  army.  In  his  earlier  wars,  a  large  portion 
of  staff  duties  were  assigned  to  the  engineers  ;  but  in  his 
later  campaigns  the  officers  of  this  corps  were  particu 
larly  required  for  the  sieges  carried  on  in  Germany  and 
Spain,  and  considerable  difficulty  was  encountered  in 
finding  suitable  officers  for  staff  duty.  Some  of  the  de 
fects  of  the  first  French  staff-corps  were  remedied  in  the 
latter  part  of  Napoleon's  career,  and  in  1818  it  was  re 
organized  by  Marshal  Saint-Cyr,  and  a  special  school  es 
tablished  for  its  instruction. 

Some  European  nations  have  established  regular  staff- 
corps,  from  which  the  vacancies  in  the  general  staff  are 
filled ;  others  draw  all  their  staff-officers  from  the  corps 
of  the  army.  A  combination  of  the  two  systems  is  pre 
ferred  by  the  best  judges.  Jomini  recommends  a  regular 
staff-corps,  with  special  schools  for  its  instruction ;  but 
thinks  that  its  officers  should  be  drawn,  at  least  in  part, 
from  the  other  corps  of  the  army :  the  officers  of  engi 
neers  and  artillery  he  deems,  from  their  instruction,  to  be 
peculiarly  qualified  for  staff  duty.  The  policy  of  holding 
double  rank  at  the  same  time  in  the  staff  and  in  the  corps 
of  the  army,  as  is  done  in  our  service,  is  pronounced  by 
all  competent  judges  as  ruinous  to  an  army,  destroying 
at  the  same  time  the  character  of  the  staff  and  injuring 
the  efficiency  of  the  line. 

The  following  remarks  on  the  character  and  duties  of 
general-officers  of  an  army,  made  at  the  beginning  of  the 
war  of  1812,  are  from  the  pen  of  one  of  the  ablest  mili 
tary  writers  this  country  has  yet  produced  : — 

"  Generals  have  been  divided  into  three  classes, — • 
Theorists,  who  by  study  and  reflection  have  made  them 
selves  acquainted  with  all  the  rules  or  maxims  of  the  art 
they  profess ;  Martinets,  Avho  have  confined  their  atten- 


246  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

tion  merely  to  the  mechanical  part  of  the  trade ;  and 
Practical  men,  who  have  no  other  or  better  guide  than 
their  own  experience,  in  either  branch  of  it.  This  last 
description  is  in  all  services,  excepting  our  own,  the 
most  numerous,  but  with  us  gives  place  to  a  fourth  class, 
viz.,  men  destitute  alike  of  theory  and  of  experience. 

"  Self-respect  is  one  thing,  and  presumption  another. 
Without  the  former,  no  man  ever  became  a  good  officer ; 
under  the  influence  of  the  latter,  generals  have  commit 
ted  great  faults.  The  former  is  the  necessary  result  of 
knowledge  ;  the  latter  of  ignorance.  A  man  acquainted 
with  his  duty  can  rarely  be  placed  in  circumstances  new, 
surprising,  or  embarrassing ;  a  man  ignorant  of  his  duty 
will  always  find  himself  constrained  to  guess,  and  not 
knowing  how  to  be  right  by  system,  will  often  be  wrong 
by  chance. 

"  These  remarks  are  neither  made  nor  offered  as  ap 
plying  exclusively  to  the  science  of  war.  They  apply  to 
all  other  sciences  ;  but  in  these,  errors  are  comparatively 
harmless.  A  naturalist  may  amuse  himself  and  the  pub 
lic  with  false  and  fanciful  theories  of  the  earth ;  and  a 
metaphysician  may  reason  very  badly  on  the  relations 
and  forms  of  matter  and  spirit,  without  any  ill  effect  but 
to  make  themselves  ridiculous.  Their  blunders  but  make 
us  merry ;  they  neither  pick  pockets,  nor  break  legs,  nor 
destroy  lives ;  while  those  of  a  general  bring  after  them 
evils  the  most  compounded  and  mischievous, — the  slaugh 
ter  of  an  army — the  devastation  of  a  state — the  ruin  of  an 
empire ! 

"  In  proportion  as  ignorance  may  be"  calamitous,  the 
reasons  for  acquiring  instruction  are  multiplied  and 
strengthened.  Are  you  an  honest  man  ?  You  will  spare 
neither  labor  nor  sacrifice  to  gain  a  competent  knowledge 
of  your  duty.  Are  you  a  man  of  honor  ?  You  will  be 
careful  to  avoid  self-reproach.  Does  your  bosom  glow 


STAFF  AND  ADMINISTRATIVE   CORPS.  247 

with  the  holy  fervor  of  patriotism?  You  will  so  accom 
plish  yourself  as  to  avoid  bringing  down  upon  your  coun 
try  either  insult  or  injury. 

"  Nor  are  the  more  selfish  impulses  without  a  similar 
tendency.  Has  hunger  made  you  a  soldier  ?  Will  you 
not  take  care  of  your  bread !  Is  vanity  your  principle  of 
action  ?  Will  you  not  guard  those  mighty  blessings,  your 
epaulets  and  feathers !  Are  you  impelled  by  a  love  of 
glory  or  a  love  of  power  ?  And  can  you  forget  that  these 
coy  mistresses  are  only  to  be  won  by  intelligence  and 
good  conduct  ? 

"  But  the  means  of  instruction,  say  you,  where  are 
they  to  be  found  1  Our  standing  army  is  but  a  bad  and 
ill-organized  militia,  and  our  militia  not  better  than  a  mob. 
Nor  have  the  defects  in  these  been  supplied  by  Lycees, 
Prytanees,  and  Polytechnic  schools.  The  morbid  patri 
otism  of  some,  and  the  false  economy  of  others,  have 
nearly  obliterated  every  thing  like  military  knowledge 
among  us. 

"  This,  reader,  is  but  one  motive  the  more  for  reinsta 
ting  it.  Thanks  to  the  noble  art  of  printing !  you  still 
have  books  which,  if  studied,  will  teach  the  art  of  war. 

"  Books !  And  what  are  they  but  the  dreams  of  pe 
dants  ?  They  may  make  a  Mack,  but  have  they  ever 
made  a  Xenophon,  a  Caesar,  a  Saxe,  a  Frederick,  or  a 
Bonaparte  ?  Who  would  not  laugh  to  hear  the  cobbler  of 
Athens  lecturing  Hannibal  on  the  art  of  war  ? 

"  True ;  but  as  you  are  not  Hannibal,  listen  to  the 
cobbler.  Xenophon,  Caesar,  Saxe,  Frederick,  and  Napo 
leon,  have  all  thought  well  of  books,  and  have  even  com 
posed  them.  Nor  is  this  extraordinary,  since  they  are 
but  the  depositories  of  maxims  which  genius  has  sug 
gested,  and  experience  confirmed ;  since  they  both  en 
lighten  and  shorten  the  road  of  the  traveller,  and  render 
he  labor  and  genius  of  past  ages  tributary  to  our  own. 


248  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

These  teach  most  emphatically,  that  the  secret  of  suc 
cessful  war  is  not  to  be  found  in  mere  legs  and  arms,  but 
in  the  head  that  shall  direct  them.  If  this  be  either  un- 
gifted  by  nature,  or  uninstructed  by  study  and  reflection, 
the  best  plans  of  manoeuvre  and  campaign  avail  nothing. 
The  two  last  centuries  have  presented  many  revolutions 
in  military  character,  all  of  which  have  turned  on  this 
principle.  It  would  be  useless  to  enumerate  these.  We 
shall  quote  only  the  greatest  and  the  last — The  troops  of 
Frederick  !  How  illustrious  under  him  !  How  contempt 
ible  under  his  successors  !  Yet  his  system  was  there  ; 
his  double  lines  of  march  at  full  distance ;  his  oblique 
order  of  battle  ;  his  simple  lines  of  manoeuvre  in  the 
presence  of  an  enemy ;  his  wise  conformation  of  an  etat- 
major ; — all,  in  short,  that  distinguished  his  practice  from 
that  of  ordinary  men,  survived  him ;  but  the  head  that 
truly  comprehended  and  knew  how  to  apply  these,  died 
with  Frederick.  What  an  admonition  does  this  fact  pre 
sent  for  self-instruction, — for  unwearied  diligence, — for 
study  and  reflection !  Nor  should  the  force  of  this  be 
lessened  by  the  consideration  that,  after  all,  unless  nature 
should  have  done  her  part  of  the  work, — unless  to  a  soul 
not  to  be  shaken  by  any  changes  of  fortune — cool,  col 
lected,  and  strenuous — she  adds  a  head  fertile  in  expedi 
ents,  prompt  in  its  decisions,  and  sound  in  its  judgments, 
no  man  can  ever  merit  the  title  of  a  general" 

The  celebrated  Marshal  Saxe  has  made  the  following 
remarks  on  the  necessary  qualifications  to  form  a  good 
general.  The  most  indispensable  one,  according  to  his 
idea,  is  valor,  without  which  all  the  rest  will  prove  nuga 
tory.  The  next  is  a  sound  understanding  with  some  ge 
nius  :  for  he  must  not  only  be  courageous,  but  be  extreme 
ly  fertile  in  expedients.  The  third  is  health  and  a  robust 
constitution. 

"  His  mind  must  be  capable  of  prompt  and  vigorous  re- 


STAFF  AND  ADMINISTRATIVE  CORPS.       249 

sources  ;  he  must  have  an  aptitude,  and  a  talent  at  dis 
covering  the  designs  of  others,  without  betraying  the 
slightest  trace  of  his  own  intentions  ;  he  must  be,  seem 
ingly,  communicative,  in  order  to  encourage  others  to  un 
bosom,  but  remain  tenaciously  reserved  in  matters  that 
concern  his  own  army ;  he  must,  in  a  word,  possess  ac 
tivity  with  judgment,  be  able  to  make  a  proper  choice  of 
his  officers,  and  never  deviate  from  the  strictest  line  of 
military  justice.  Old  soldiers  must  not  be  rendered 
wretched  and  unhappy  by  unwarrantable  promotions,  nor 
must  extraordinary  talents  be  kept  back  to  the  detriment 
of  the  service  on  account  of  mere  rules  and  regulations. 
Great  abilities  will  justify  exceptions  ;  but  ignorance  and 
inactivity  will  not  make  up  for  years  spent  in  the  profes 
sion. 

"  In  his  deportment  he  must  be  affable,  and  always  su 
perior  to  peevishness  or  ill-humor;  he  must  not- know,  or 
at  least  seem  not  to  know,  what  a  spirit  of  resentment  is  ; 
and  when  he  is  under  the  necessity  of  inflicting  military 
chastisement,  he  must  see  the  guilty  punished  without 
compromise  or  foolish  humanity  ;  and  if  the  delinquent  be 
from  among  the  number  of  his  most  intimate  friends,  he 
must  be  doubly  severe  towards  the  unfortunate  man.  For 
it  is  better,  in  instances  of  correction,  that  one  individual 
should  be  treated  with  rigor  (by  orders  of  the  person  over 
whom  he  may  be  supposed  to  hold  some  influence)  than 
that  an  idea  should  go  forth  in  the  army  of  public  justice 
being  sacrificed  to  private  sentiments. 

"  A  modern  general  should  always  have  before  him  the 
example  of  Manlius  ;  he  must  divest  himself  of  personal 
sensations,  and  not  only  be  convinced  himself,  but  con 
vince  others,  that  he  is  the  organ  of  military  justice,  and 
that  what  he  does  is  irrevocably  prescribed.  With  these 
qualifications,  and  by  this  line  of  conduct,  he  will  secure 
the  affections  of  his  followers,  instil  into  their  minds  ali 


250  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

the  impulses  of  deference  and  respect ;  he  will  be  feared, 
and  consequently  obeyed. 

"  The  resources  of  a  general's  mind  are  as  various  as 
the  occasions  for  the  exercise  of  them  are  multiplied  and 
checkered :  he  must  be  perfectly  master  of  the  art  of 
knowing  how  to  support  an  army  in  all  circumstances  and 
situations  ;  how  to  apply  its  strength,  or  be  sparing  of  its 
energy  and  confidence  ;  how  to  post  all  its  different  com 
ponent  parts,  so  as  not  to  be  forced  to  give  or  receive  bat 
tle  in  opposition  to  settled  plans.  When  once  engaged,  he 
must  have  presence  of  mind  enough  to  grasp  all  the  rela 
tive  points  of  disposition  and  arrangement,  to  seize  favor 
able  moments  for  impression,  and  to  be  thoroughly  con 
versant  in  the  infinite  vicissitudes  that  occur  during  the 
heat  of  a  battle  ;  on  a  ready  possession  of  which  its  ulti 
mate  success  depends.  These  requisites  are  unquestion 
ably  manifold,  and  grow  out  of  the  diversity  of  situations, 
and  the  chance  medley  of  events  that  produce  their  ne 
cessity. 

"  A  general  to  be  in  perfect  possession  of  them,  must 
on  the  day  of  battle  be  divested  of  every  thought,  and  be 
inaccessible  to  every  feeling,  but  what  immediately  regards 
the  business  of  the  day ;  he  must  reconnoitre  with  the 
promptitude  of  a  skilful  geographer,  whose  eye  collects 
instantaneously  all  the  relative  portions  of  locality,  and 
feels  his  ground  as  it  were  by  instinct ;  and  in  the  dispo 
sition  of  his  troops  he  must  discover  a  perfect  knowledge 
of  his  profession,  and  make  all  his  arrangements  with  ac 
curacy  and  dispatch.  His  order  of  battle  must  be  simple 
and  unconfused,  and  the  execution  of  his  plan  be  as  quick 
as  if  it  merely  consisted  in  uttering  some  few  words  of 
command  ;  as,  the  first  line  will  attack  !  the  second  will  sup- 
vort  it !  or,  such  a  battalion  will  advance  and  support  the  line. 

"  The  general  officers  who  act  under  such  a  general 
must  be  ignorant  of  their  business  indeed,  if,  upon  the  re- 


STAFF  AND  ADMINISTRATIVE  CORPS.  251 

ceipt  of  these  orders,  they  should  be  deficient  in  the  im 
mediate  means  of  answering  them,  by  a  prompt  and  ready 
co-operation.  So  that  the  general  has  only  to  issue  out 
directions  according  to  the  growth  of  circumstances,  and 
to  rest  satisfied  that  every  division  will  act  in  conformity 
to  his  intentions  ;  but  if,  on  the  contrary,  he  should  so  far 
forget  his  situation  as  to  become  a  drill-sergeant  in  the  heat 
of  action,  he  must  find  himself  in  the  case  of  the  fly  in 
the  fable,  which  perched  upon  a  wheel,  and  foolishly  im 
agined  that  the  motion  of  the  carriage  was  influenced  by 
its  situation.  A  general,  therefore,  ought  on  the  day  of 
battle  to  be  thoroughly  master  of  himself,  and  to  have  both 
his  mind  and  his  eye  riveted  to  the  immediate  scene  of 
action.  He  will  by  these  means  be  enabled  to  see  every 
thing ;  his  judgment  will  be  unembarrassed,  and  he  will 
instantly  discover  all  the  vulnerable  points  of  the  enemy. 
The  instant  a  favorable  opening  offers,  by  which  the  con 
test  may  be  decided,  it  becomes  his  duty  to  head  the  near 
est  body  of  troops,  and,  without  any  regard  to  personal 
safety,  to  advance  against  the  enemy's  line.  [By  a  ready 
conception  of  this  sort,  joined  to  a  great  courage,  General 
Dessaix  determined  the  issue  of  the  battlo  of  Marengo.] 
It  is,  however,  impossible  for  any  man  to  lay  down  rules, 
or  to  specify  with  accuracy  all  the  different  ways  by  which 
a  victory  may  be  obtained.  Every  thing  depends  upon  a 
variety  of  situations,  casualties  of  events,  and  intermedi 
ate  occurrences,  which  no  human  foresight  can  positively 
ascertain,  but  which  may  be  converted  to  good  purposes 
by  a  quick  eye,  a  ready  conception,  and  prompt  execution. 

"  Prince  Eugene  was  singularly  gifted  with  these  quali 
fications,  particularly  with  that  sublime  possession  of  the 
mind,  which  constitutes  the  essence  of  a  military  char 
acter." 

"  Many  commanders-in-chief  have  been  so  limited  in 
the  j  ideas  of  warfare,  that  when  events  have  brought  the 


252  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

contest  to  issue,  and  two  rival  armies  have  been  drawn 
out  for  action,  their  whole  attention  has  devolved  upon  a 
straight  alignment,  an  equality  of  step,  or  a  regular  dis 
tance  in  intervals  of  columns.  They  have  considered  it 
sufficient  to  give  answers  to  questions  proposed  by  their 
aides-de-camp,  to  send  orders  in  various  directions,  and  to 
gallop  themselves  from  one  quarter  to  another,  without 
steadily  adhering  to  the  fluctuations  of  the  day,  or  calmly 
watching  for  an  opportunity  to  strike  a  decisive  blow. 
They  endeavor,  in  fact,  to  do  every  thing,  and  thereby  do 
nothing.  They  appear  like  men  whose  presence  of  mind 
deserts  them  the  instant  they  are  taken  out  of  the  beaten 
track,  or  reduced  to  supply  unexpected  calls  by  uncommon 
exertions  ;  and  from  whence,  continues  the  same  sensible 
writer,  do  these  contradictions  arise  ?  from  an  ignorance 
of  those  high  qualifications  without  which  the  mere  routine 
of  duty,  methodical  arrangement,  and  studied  discipline 
must  fall  to  the  ground,  and  defeat  themselves.  Many 
officers  spend  their  whole  lives  in  putting  a  few  regiments 
through  a  regular  set  of  manoeuvres  ;  and  having  done  so, 
they  vainly  imagine  that  all  the  science  of  a  real  military 
man  consists  in  that  acquirement.  When,  in  process  of 
time,  the  command  of  a  large  army  falls  to  their  lot,  they 
are  manifestly  lost  in  the  magnitude  of  the  undertaking, 
and,  from  not  knowing  how  to  act  as  they  ought,  they 
remain  satisfied  with  doing  what  they  have  partially 
learned." 

"  Military  knowledge,  as  far  as  it  regards  a  general  01 
commander-in-chief,  may  be  divided  into  two  parts,  one 
comprehending  mere  discipline  and  settled  systems  for 
putting  a  certain  number  of  rules  into  practice ;  and  the 
other  originating  a  sublimity  of  conception  that  method 
may  assist,  but  cannot  give." 

"  If  a  man  be  born  with  faculties  that  are  naturally 
adapted  to  the  situation  of  a  general,  and  if  his  talents  do 


STAFF  AND  ADMINISTRATIVE  CORPS.  253 

not  fit  the  extraordinary  casualties  of  war,  he  will  never 
rise  beyond  mediocrity." 

"  It  is,  in  fact,  in  war  as  it  is  in  painting,  or  in  music. 
Perfection  in  either  art  grows  out  of  innate  talent,  but  it 
never  can  be  acquired  without  them.  Study  and  perse 
verance  may  correct  ideas,  but  no  application,  no  assiduity 
will  give  the  life  and  energy  of  action ;  these  are  the 
works  of  nature." 

"  It  has  been  my  fate  (observes  the  Marshal)  to  see  sev 
eral  very  excellent  colonels  become  indifferent  generals. 
I  have  known  others,  who  have  distinguished  themselves 
at  sieges,  and  in  the  different  evolutions  of  an  army,  lose 
their  presence  of  mind  and  appear  ignorant  of  their  pro 
fession,  the  instant  they  were  taken  from  that  particular 
line,  and  be  incapable  of  commanding  a  few  squadrons  of 
horse.  Should  a  man  of  this  cast  be  put  at  the  head  of  an 
army,  he  will  confine  himself  to  mere  dispositions  and 
manoeuvres  ;  to  them  he  will  look  for  safety  ;  and  if  once 
thwarted,  his  defeat  will  be  inevitable,  because  his  mind 
is  not  capable  of  other  resources." 

"  In  order  to  obviate,  in  the  best  possible  manner,  the 
innumerable  disasters  which  must  arise  from  the  uncer 
tainty  of  war,  and  the  greater  uncertainty  of  the  means 
that  are  adopted  to  carry  it  on,  some  general  rules  ought 
to  be  laid  down,  not  only  for  the  government  of  the  troops, 
but  for  the  instruction  of  those  who  have  the  command  of 
them.  The  principles  to  be  observed  are  :  that  when  the 
line  or  the  columns  advance,  their  distances  should  be 
scrupulously  observed ;  that  whenever  a  body  of  troops  is 
ordered  to  charge,  every  proportion  of  the  line  should  rush 
forward  with  intrepidity  and  vigor ;  that  if  openings  are 
made  in  the  first  line,  it  becomes  the  duty  of  the  second 
instantly  to  fill  up  the  chasms." 

"  These  instructions  issue  from  the  dictates  of  plain  na- 
ure,  and  do  not  require  the  least  elucidation  in  writing 


254  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

They  constitute  the  A,  B,  C  of  soldiers.  Nothing  can  be 
more  simple,  or  more  intelligible  ;  so  much  so,  that  it 
would  be  ridiculous  in  a  general  to  sacrifice  essential  ob 
jects  in  order  to  attend  to  such  minutiae.  His  functions  in 
the  day  of  battle  are  confined  to  those  occupations  of  the 
mind,  by  which  he  is  enabled  to  watch  the  countenance 
of  the  enemy,  to  observe  his  movements,  and  to  see  with 
an  eagle's  or  a  king  of  Prussia's  eye,  all  the  relative  di 
rections  that  his  opponents  take.  It  must  be  his  business 
to  create  alarms  and  suspicions  among  the  enemy's  line  in 
one  quarter,  while  his  real  intention  is  to  act  against 
another ;  to  puzzle  and  disconcert  him  in  his  plans  ;  to 
take  advantage  of  the  manifold  openings  which  his  feints 
have  produced,  and  when  the  contest  is  brought  to  issue, 
to  be  capable  of  plunging  with  effect  upon  the  weakest 
part,  and  carrying  the  sword  of  death  where  its  blow  is 
certain  of  being  mortal.  But  to  accomplish  these  impor 
tant  and  indispensable  points,  his  judgment  must  be  clear, 
his  mind  collected,  his  heart  firm,  and  his  eyes  incapable 
of  being  diverted,  even  for  a  moment,  by  the  trifling  occur 
rences  of  the  day." 

The  administrative  service  of  an  army  is  usually  divided 
into  several  distinct  departments,  as — 

Pay  department. 
Subsistence  " 
Clothing 
Medical          " 


,  These  in  our  service  are  united. 
Hospital 

Barrack          "          \  These  in  our  service  are  combined 

Fuel  "  >      in  one,  called  the  Quartermas- 

Transportation  "      J      ter's  department. 

Recruiting     " 

Military  Justice,  or  Court  Martial  department. 

It  was  intended  to  enter  into  the  history,  organization, 


STAFF  AND  ADMINISTRATIVE  CORPS.  255 

and  use  of  each  of  these  civico-military  departments  of  an 
army  ;  but  our  limits  are  such  as  to  preclude  any  thing 
like  so  detailed  a  discussion  as  would  be  necessary  for  a 
proper  understanding  of  the  subject.  We  therefore  pass 
from  the  staff  directly  to  the  line,  or  rather  the  four  princi 
pal  arms  of  an  army  organization.* 

*  Of  works  that  treat  directly  of  staff  organization  and  duties,  those 
of  Grimoard,  Thiebault,  Boutourlin,  Labaume,  are  esteemed  among  the 
best.  The  writings  of  Jomini,  Napoleon,  Rocquancourt,  Vauchelle, 
Odier,  Scharnhorst,  also  contain  much  valuable  information  on  this  sub 
ject.  The  following  list  of  books  may  be  referred  to  for  further  infor 
mation  on  the  subjects  alluded  to  in  this  chapter: 

Aide-Memoire  des  officiers  generaux  et  superieurs  et  des  capitaines. 

Precis  de  I'art  de  la  guerre.    Jomini. 

Memoires  de  Napoleon.    Montholon  et  Gourgaud. 

Cours  elementaire  d'art  et  d'histoire  militaires.    Rocquancourt. 

Cours  elementaire  d' administration  militaire.    Vauchelle. 

Droite  elementaire  d'art  militaire,  &c.    Gay  de  Vernon. 

Annuaire  militaire  histwique,  &c.    Sicard. 

Cours  abrege  d' administration  militaire.    Bernier. 

Cours  d' administration  militaire,  &c.    Odier. 

De  V administration  de  I'armee  d'Espagne.    Odier. 

De  V organization  de  la  force  armee  en  France.    Carion-Nisas. 

Siemens  de  I'art  militaire,  &c.     Cugnot. 

Memoires  sur  la  guerre.    Feuquieres. 

Cours  d'art  militaire  et  d'histoire.    Jacquinot  de  Presle. 

Cours  d'art  militaire.    Fallot. 

Theorie  de  I'officier  superieur.    Le'orier 

Histoire  de  V administration  de  la  guerre.    Audouin. 

Instructions  diverses  d  I'usage  de  I'ecole  d' application  du  corps 
royal  d'etat-major. 

Handbuch  fur  offiziere,  &,c.    Scharnhorst. 

Having  omitted  all  discussion  of  the  several  departments  of  the  ad 
ministrative  service  of  an  army  organization,  it  is  not  deemed  necessary 
to  give  the  names  of  books  of  reference  on  the  subjects  of  pay,  courts- 
raartial,  medicinal  and  hospital  departments,  &c.,  &c. 


256  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE 


CHAPTER  X. 


Infantry. — Infantry  constitutes,  in  active  service,  by  far 
the  most  numerous  portion  of  an  army ;  in  time  of  peace 
its  duties  are  simple,  and,  in  most  countries,  of  little  com 
parative  importance ;  but  in  our  country  the  continually  re 
curring  difficulties  on  the  Indian  frontiers,  render  this  arm 
peculiarly  necessary  and  important,  even  in  time  of  gen 
eral  peace.  From  the  nature  of  infantry  service — no  pe 
culiar  technical  knowledge  (we  speak  of  the  privates  and 
officers  of  the  lower  grades)  being  so  absolutely  indispen 
sable  as  in  the  other  arms — the  soldier  may  in  a  short 
time  be  trained  and  instructed  in  his  duties.  For  this 
reason  the  ratio  of  infantry  in  a  peace  establishment  is 
ordinarily  much  less  than  in  active  service,  this  arm  being 
always  capable  of  great  expansion  when  occasion  re 
quires. 

In  the  early  periods  of  society,  and  in  countries  where 
horses  abounded,  men  have  usually  preferred  fighting  on 
horseback ;  but  civilization  and  a  more  thorough  acquaint- 


*  In  discussing  our  own  organization,  it  may  be  well  to  compare  it 
with  the  armies  of  some  of  the  principal  nations  of  Europe.  Our  limits 
will  not  allow  us  to  go  very  much  into  details,  nor  to  make  a  com- 
oarison  with  more  than  a  single  European  power.  We  shall  select 
France,  inasmuch  as  her  army  organization  has  served  as  a  model 
for  the  rest  of  Europe,  and  is  still,  in  some  respects,  superior  to  moaf 
•there. 


ARMY  ORGANIZATION. 

ance  with  war  has  always  increased  the  importance  of 
infantry. 

The  Hebrews,  and  also  the  Egyptians,  employed  this 
arm  almost  exclusively.  The  Asiatics  generally  em 
ployed  both  infantry  and  cavalry,  but  with  the  Greeks  the 
infantry  was  the  favorite  arm.  Even  their  kings  and 
generals  usually  fought  on  foot.  The  Romans  conquered 
the  world  mainly  with  their  infantry.  This  arm  was  also 
considered  of  the  greatest  importance  by  the  ancient  Ger 
mans  and  Gauls  ;  but  the  migration  of  the  Huns  and  other 
Mongolia  tribes  mounted  on  small  and  fleet  horses,  and 
the  acquaintance  formed  by  the  Franks  of  northern  Spain 
with  the  Moors,  who  were  mounted  on  beautiful  horses 
from  Arabia  and  the  plateau  of  Asia,  introduced  a  taste 
for  cavalry  in  western  Europe.  This  taste  was  still  fur 
ther  cultivated  under  the  feudal  system,  for  the  knights 
preferred  fighting  on  horseback  to  serving  on  foot.  During 
the  crusades  the  infantry  fell  into  disrepute.  But  the  in 
vention  of  gunpowder  changed  the  whole  system  of  war 
fare,  and  restored  to  infantry  its  former  importance. 

"  The  Romans,"  says  Napoleon  in  his  Memoirs,  "  had 
two  infantries  ;  the  first,  lightly  armed,  was  provided  with 
a  missile  weapon  ;  the  second,  heavily  armed,  bore  a  short 
sword.  After  the  invention  of  powder  two  species  of  in 
fantry  were  still  continued :  the  arquebusiers,  who  were 
lightly  armed,  and  intended  to  observe  and  harass  the 
enemy  ;  and  the  pikemen,  who  supplied  the  place  of  the 
heavy-armed  infantry.  During  the  hundred  and  fifty  years 
which  have  elapsed  since  Vauban  banished  lances  and 
pikes  from  all  the  infantry  of  Europe,  substituting  for  them 
the  firelock  and  bayonet,  all  the  infantry  has  been  lightly 

armed There  has  been  since  .that  time,  properly 

speaking,  only  one  kind  of  infantry :  if  there  was  a  company 
of  chasseurs  in  every  battalion,  it  was  by  way  of  counter 
poise  to  the  company  of  grenadiers  ;  the  battalion  being 


258  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

composed  of  nine  companies,  one  picked  company  did  not 
appear  sufficient.  If  the  Emperor  Napoleon  created  com 
panies  of  voltigeurs  armed  like  dragoons,  it  was  to  substi 
tute  them  for  those  companies  of  chasseurs.  He*  com 
posed  them  of  men  under  five  feet  in  height,  in  order  to 
bring  into  use  that  class  of  the  conscription  which  measured 
from  four  feet  ten  inches  to  five  feet ;  and  having  been  un 
til  that  time  exempt,  made  the  burden  of  conscription  fall 
more  heavily  on  the  other  classes.  This  arrangement 
served  to  reward  a  great  number  of  old  soldiers,  who,  be 
ing  under  five  feet  in  height,  could  not  enter  into  the  com 
panies  of  grenadiers,  who  on  account  of  their  bravery,  de 
served  to  enter  into  a  picked  company :  it  was  a  powerful 
incentive  to  emulation  to  bring  the  giants  and  pigmies  into 
competition.  Had  there  been  men  of  different  colors  in 
the  armies  of  the  emperor,  he  would  have  composed  com 
panies  of  blacks  and  companies  of  whites  :  in  a  country 
where  there  were  cyclops  or  hunchbacks,  a  good  use 
might  be  made  of  companies  of  cyclops,  and  others  of 
hunchbacks. 

"In  1789,  the  French  army  was  composed  of  regiments 
of  the  line  and  battalions  of  chasseurs  ;  the  chasseurs  of 
the  Cevennes,  the  Vivarais,  the  Alps,  of  Corsica,  and  the 
Pyrenees,  who  at  the  Revolution  formed  half  brigades  of 
light  infantry  ;  but  the  object  was  not  to  have  two  differ 
ent  sorts  of  infantry,  for  they  were  raised  alike,  instructed 
alike,  drilled  alike  ;  only  the  battalions  of  chasseurs  were 
recruited  by  the  men  of  the  mountainous  districts,  or  by  the 
sons  of  the  garde-chasse  ;  whence  they  were  more  fit  to 
be  employed  on  the  frontiers  of  the  Alps  and  Pyrenees  ; 
and  when  they  were  in  the  armies  of  the  North,. they  were 
always  detached,  in  preference,  for  climbing  heights  or 
scouring  a  forest :  when  these  men  were  placed  in  line,  in  a 
battle,  they  served  very  well  as  a  battalion  of  the  line, 
oecause  they  had  received  the  same  instructions,  and 


ARMY  ORGANIZATION.  259 

were  armed  and  disciplined  in  the  same  manner.  Every 
power  occasionally  raises,  in  war-time,  irregular  corps, 
under  the  title  of  free  or  legionary  battalions,  consisting 
of  foreign  deserters,  or  formed  of  individuals  of  a  particu 
lar  party  or  faction  ;  but  that  does  not  constitute  two  sorts 
of  infantry.  There  is  and  can  be  but  one.  If  the  apes 
of  antiquity  must  needs  imitate  the  Romans,  it  is  not  light- 
armed  troops  that  they  ought  to  introduce,  but  heavy-armed 
soldiers,  or  battalions  armed  with  swords  ;  for  all  the  in 
fantry  of  Europe  serve  at  times  as  light  troops." 

Most  European  nations,  for  reasons  probably  similar  to 
those  of  Napoleon,  keep  up  this  nominal  division  of  in 
fantry  of  the  line  and  light  infantry ;  but  both  are  usually 
armed  and  equipped  alike,  and  both  receive  the  same  or 
ganization  and  instruction.  The  light  infantry  are  usual 
ly  made  up  from  the  class  of  men,  or  district  of  country, 
which  furnishes  the  greatest  number  of  riflemen  and  sharp 
shooters.  In  France,  the  light  infantry  is  best  supplied 
by  the  hunters  of  the  Ardennes,  the  Vosges,  and  the  Jura 
districts ;  in  Austria,  by  the  Croat.es  and  Tyrolese  ;  in 
Prussia,  by  the  "  forsters,"  or  woodsmen  ;  and  in  Russia, 
by  the  Cossacks.  Our  own  western  hunters,  with  proper 
discipline,  make  the  best  tirailleurs  in  the  world. 

Light  infantry  is  usually  employed  to  protect  the  flanks 
of  the  main  army,  to  secure  outposts,  to  reconnoitre  the 
ground,  secure  avenues  of  approach,  deceive  the  enemy 
by  demonstrations,  and  secure  the  repose  of  the  other 
troops  by  patrolling  parties.  They  usually  begin  a  battle, 
and  afterwards  take  their  places  in  the  line,  either  on  the 
flanks,  or  in  the  intervals  between  the  larger  bodies.  The 
battle  of  Jena  furnishes  a  good  example  of  the  use  of 
French  light  infantry ;  and  at  the  battle  of  Waterloo,  the 
Prussian  tirailleurs  were  exceedingly  effective  in  clearing 
the  ground  for  the  advance  of  Blucher's  heavy  columns. 
The  attack  of  Floh-hug  by  Augereau,  of  Vierzehn  Heile- 


260  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

gen  by  Suchet,  of  Iserstaedt  by  Desjardins,  are  modela 
well  worthy  of  study. 

The  infantry  of  the  line  acts  in  masses,  and,  on  the 
field  of  battle,  constitutes  the  principal  fighting  force.  Its 
formations  and  the  manner  of  engaging  it  have  already 
been  discussed  under  the  head  of  tactics. 

The  importance  of  infantry  is  due,  in  considerable  part, 
to  the  fact  that  it  can  be  used  everywhere — in  mountains 
or  on  plains,  in  woody  or  open  countries,  in  cities  or  in 
fields,  on  rivers  or  at  sea,  in  the  redoubt  or  in  the  attack 
of  the  breach  ;  the  infantry  depends  only  on  itself,  where 
as  the  other  arms  must  depend  in  a  considerable  degree 
on  the  efficiency  of  their  materials  and  the  will  and 
strength  of  brute  force  ;  and  when  the  snows  of  Russia  or 
the  deserts  of  Egypt  deprive  their  animals  of  the  means  of 
sustenance,  they  become  perfectly  useless. 

Foot-soldiers,  in  olden  times,  were  armed  with  a  spear 
and  sometimes  with  a  sword,  arrows,  lance,  and  sling. 
At  present  they  are  armed  with  a  gun  and  bayonet,  and 
sometimes  with  a  sword.  In  some  European  services  a 
few  of  the  foot-soldiers  are  armed  with  a  pike.  Some  of 
the  light  troops  used  as  sharp-shooters  carry  the  rifle,  but 
this  weapon  is  useless  for  the  great  body  of  infantry.  The 
short-sword  is  more  useful  as  an  instrument  for  cutting 
branches,  wood,  &c.,  than  for  actual  fighting.  The  in 
fantry  have  no  defensive  covering,  or  at  least  very  little. 
The  helmet  or  cap  serves  to  protect  the  head,  and  the 
shoulders  are  somewhat  defended  by  epaulets.  It  has 
often  been  proposed  in  modern  times  to  restore  the  ancient 
defensive  armor  of  the  foot-soldier ;  but  this  would  be 
worse  than  useless  against  firearms,  and  moreover  would 
destroy  the  efficiency  of  these  troops  by  impeding  their 
movements.  The  strength  of  this  arm  depends  greatly 
upon  its  discipline  ;  for  if  calm  and  firm,  a  mass  of  infan 
try  in  column  or  in  square  is  almost  impenetrable. 


ARMY  ORGANIZATION.  261 

The  bayonet  was  introduced  by  Yauban  in  the  wars  of 
Louis  XIV.,  and  after  the  years  1703  and  '4,  the  pike  was 
totally  suppressed  in  the  French  army.  This  measure 
was  warmly  opposed  by  Marshal  Montesquieu,  and  the 
question  was  discussed  by  him  and  Marshal  Vauban  with 
an  ability  and  learning  worthy  of  these  great  men.  The. 
arguments  of  Vauban  were  deemed  most  conclusive,  and 
his  project  was  adopted  by  the  king. 

This  question  has  been  agitated  by  military  writers  in 
more  recent  times,  Puysegur  advocating  the  musket,  and 
Folard  and  Lloyd  contending  in  favor  of  restoring  the  pike. 
Even  in  our  own  service,  so  late  as  the  war  of  1812,  a  dis 
tinguished  general  of  the  army  strongly  urged  the  use  ot 
the  pike,  and  the  fifteenth  (and  perhaps  another  regiment) 
was  armed  and  equipped  in  part  as  pikemen ;  but  expe 
rience  soon  proved  the  absurdity  of  the  project. 

Napoleon  calls  the  infantry  .the  arm  of  battles  and  the 
sinews  of  the  army.  But  if  it  be  acknowledged,  that,  next 
to  the  talent  of  the  general-in-chief,  the  infantry  is  the  first 
instrument  of  victory,  it  must  also  be  confessed  that  it  finds 
a  powerful  support  in  the  cavalry,  artillery,  and  engineers, 
and  that  without  these  it  would  often  be  compromised,  and 
could  gain  but  a  half  success. 

The  French  infantry  is  divided  into  one  hundred  regi 
ments  of  three  battalions  each,  a  battalion  being  composed 
of  seven  companies.  There  are  also  several  other  battal 
ions  of  chasseurs,  zuaves,  &c.,  being  organized  especially 
for  service  in  Africa,  and  composed  in  part  of  native 
troops. 

In  our  own  army  we  have  eight  regiments  of  infantry, 
each  regiment  forming  a  single  battalion  often  companies. 
The  flank  companies  are  intended  for  light  infantry. 

In  all  properly  organized  armies  the  infantry  constitutes 
from  three-fourths  to  four-fifths  of  the  entire  active  force  in 
the  field,  and  from  two-thirds  to  three-fourths,  say  about 


262  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

seven-tenths  of  the  entire  military  establishment.     In  time 
of  peace  this  proportion  may  be  slightly  diminished. 

Cavalry. — The  use  of  cavalry  is  probably  nearly  as  old 
as  war  itself.  The  Egyptians  had  cavalry  before  the  time 
of  Moses,  and  the  Israelites  often  encountered  cavalry  in 
their  wars  with  their  neighbors,  though  they  made  no  use 
of  this  arm  themselves  until  the  time  of  Solomon. 

The  Greeks  borrowed  their  cavalry  from  the  Asiatics, 
and  especially  from  the  Persians,  who,  according  to  Xen- 
ophon,  held  this  arm  in  great  consideration.  After  the 
battle  of  Platea,  it  was  agreed  by  assembled  Greece  that 
each  power  should  furnish  one  horseman  to  every  ten  foot- 
soldiers.  In  Sparta  the  poorest  were  selected  for  this  arm, 
and  the  cavalry  marched  to  combat  without  any  previous 
training.  At  Athens  the  cavalry  service  was  more  popular, 
and  they  formed  a  well-organized  corps  of  twelve  hundred 
horsemen.  At  Thebes  also,  this  arm  had  consideration  in 
the  time  of  Epaminondas.  But  the  cavalry  of  Thessaly 
was  the  most  renowned,  and  both  Philip  and  Alexander 
drew  their  mounted  troops  from  that  country. 

The  Romans  had  made  but  little  progress  in  this  arm 
when  they  encountered Mie  Thessalians,  who  fought  in  the 
army  of  Pyrrhus.  They  then  increased  their  cavalry,  but 
it  was  not  numerous  till  after  their  wars  with  the  Cartha 
ginians.  Scipio  organized  and  disciplined  the  Roman 
cavalry  like  that  of  the  Numidians.  This  arm  was  sup 
plied  from  the  ranks  of  the  richest  citizens,  and  afterwards 
formed  an  order  intermediary  between  the  Senate  and  the 
people,  under  the  name  of  knights. 

At  a  later  period,  the  cavalry  of  the  Gauls  was  particu 
larly  good.  The  Franks  were  without  cavalry  when  they 
made  their  first  irruption  into  Gaul.  Under  tho  reign  of 
Childeric  I.  we  see  for  the  first  time  the  "  cavaliers  francs'' 
figure  as  a  part  of  the  national  forces.  At  the  battle  of 
Tours  the  cavalry  and  infantry  were  in  the  proportion  of 


ARMY    ORGANIZATION.  263 

one  to  five,  and  under  Pepin  and  Charlemagne  their  num 
bers  were  nearly  equal.  Under  Charles  the  Bald  armies 
were  composed  entirely  of  cavalry,  and  during  the  middle 
ages  the  knights  disdained  the  foot  service,  and  fought 
•  only  on  horseback. 

After  the  introduction  of  artillery,  cavalry  was  still  em 
ployed,  though  to  little  advantage.  Gustavus  Adolphus 
was  the  first  to  perceive  the  real  importance  of  this  arm  in 
modern  warfare,  and  he  used  it  with  great  success.  But 
it  was  left  for  Seidlitz  to  perfect  it  under  the  direction  of 
Frederick  the  Great. 

Marshal  Saxe  very  justly  remarked,  that  cavalry  is  the 
"  arme  du  moment,"  for  in  almost  every  battle  there  are 
moments  when  a  decisive  charge  of  cavalry  will  gain  the 
victory,  but  if  not  made  at  the  instant  it  may  be  too  late . 
The  efficiency  of  cavalry  depends  upon  the  moral  impres 
sion  which  it  makes  on  the  enemy,  and  is  greater  in  pro 
portion  to  the  size  of  the  mass,  and  the  rapidity  of  its  mo 
tion.  This  last  quality  enables  a  commander  to  avail  him 
self  immediately  of  a  decisive  moment,  when  the  enemy 
exposes  a  weak  point,  or  when  disorder  appears  in  his 
ranks.  But  this  requires  a  bold  and  active  spirit,  which 
shrinks  not  from  responsibility,  and  is  able  to  avail  itself 
with  quickness  and  decision  of  every  opportunity.  If  it  be 
remembered  that  it  is  essential  that  this  coup  d'ceil,  so  rare 
and  so  difficult  to  acquire,  be  accompanied  by  a  courage 
and  vigor  of  execution  which  nothing  can  shake,  we  shall 
not  be  astonished  that  history  furnishes  so  few  good  cav 
alry  generals,  and  that  this  arm  so  seldom  does  such  exe 
cution  as  it  did  under  Frederick  and  Napoleon,  with  Seid 
litz  and  Murat  as  commanders. 

The  soldier  gains  great  velocity  by  the  use  of  the  horse 
m  war  ;  but  in  other  respects  he  is  the  loser.  The  great 
expense  and  care  required  of  the  cavalier  to  support  his 
horse ;  the  difficulty  experienced  in  surmounting  ordinary 


264  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

obstacles,  and  in  using  his  fire-arms  to  advantage,  are  all 
prejudicial  to  success. 

The  unequal  size  of  the  horse,  and  the  great  diversity 
in  his  strength  and  breed,  have  rendered  it  necessary  to 
divide  this  arm  into  light  and  heavy  cavalry,  and  a  mixed 
class  called  dragoons.  The  heavy  cavalry  is  commonly 
used  in  masses  where  force  is  mainly  requisite ;  the  lighter 
troops  are  used  singly  and  in  small  detachments,  where 
rapidity  of  movement  is  most  desired. 

The  heavy  cavalry  are  divided  into  carabiniers,  cuiras 
siers,  and  sometimes  lancers.  The  two  latter  are  fre 
quently  united,  the  cuirassiers  being  armed  with  the  lance. 
These  troops  are  seldom  used  for  scouts,  vanguards,  and 
convoys  ;  but  are  frequently  employed  to  sustain  the  light 
cavalry.  Their  main*  duty  is  "to  appear  on  the  field  of  bat 
tle  and  make  the  decisive  charges" 

The  light  cavalry  is  composed  of  chasseurs,  or  troopers, 
hussars,  and  lancers.  The  latter,  when  composed  of  large 
men  and  mounted  on  heavy  horses,  are  attached  to  the 
heavy  cavalry. 

The  dragoons  were  formerly  a  mixed  body  of  horse  and 
foot,  but  it  being  found  impossible  to  unite  these  two  dis 
tinct  arms  in  one,  and  the  attempt  having  destroyed  the 
usefulness  of  the  body  to  act  in  either  capacity,  the  term 
was  applied  to  a  mixed  kind  of  cavalry  between  the  heavy 
and  the  light  horse.  In  more  recent  wars  they  have  also 
been  instructed  as  infantry  and  employed  as  foot-soldiers, 
till  horses  could  be  found  in  the  enemy's  country  with 
which  to  mount  them.  'But  we  believe  there  is  no  instance 
in  more  modern  wars  in  which  they  have  been  employed 
at  the  same  time  in  both  capacities. 

This  term  is,  very  improperly,  applied  to  all  our  cavalry; 
and  some  of  the  congressional  wiseacres  have  recently 
experimented  on  one  of  our  so-called  regiments  of  dra 
goons,  by  dismounting  it  one  year,  selling  its  horses  at 


ARMY    ORGANIZATION.  265 

auction,  and  changing  its  arms  and  equipments,  and  again, 
the  next  year,  purchasing  new  horses,  arms,  and  equip 
ments  for  remounting  it ;  and  all  this  for  economy  ! 

The  Roman  cavalry  at  first  wore  a  round  shield  and 
helmet,  the  rest  of  their  body  being  nearly  uncovered. 
Their  arms  were  a  sword  and  long  thin  javelin,  or  lance, 
with  an-  iron  head.  They  afterwards  reduced  the  shield 
to  a  much  smaller  size,  and  made  square,  and  their  lance 
was  greatly  increased  in  size  and  length,  and  armed  at 
both  ends.  In  other  respects  they  were  armed  in  the 
same  way  as  infantry.  The  use  of  the  lance  and  the 
shield  at  the  same  time,  of  course  rendered  both  nearly 
worthless.  The  Roman  cavalry  was  superior  to  that  of  their 
enemies,  except,  perhaps,  the  light  cavalry  of  the  Parthians. 

The  heavy  armor  which  was  sometimes  worn  by  the 
ancients,  like  the  gens  d'armes  of  the  middle  ages,  rendered 
them  greatly  inferior  to  infantry  in  a  close  engagement. 
Tigranes,  king  of  Armenia,  brought  an  army  of  one  hun 
dred  and  fifty  thousand  horse  into  the  field,  against  the 
Roman  general  Lucullus,  who  had  only  about  six  thousand 
horse  and  fifteen  thousand  foot.  But  the  Armenian  cav 
alry,  called  cataphratti,  were  so  overburdened  with  armor, 
that  when  they  fell  from  their  horses  they  could  scarcely 
move  or  make  any  use  of  their  arms.  They  were  routed 
by  a  mere  handful  of  Roman  infantry. 

The  modern  cavalry  is  much  lighter,  and,  by  dispensing 
with  armor,  shields,  &c.,  it  can  move  with  much  greater 
rapidity.  A  modern  cavalry  horse  carries  a  weight  of 
from  two  hundred  and  fifty  to  three  hundred  pounds,  viz. : 

Heavy       Light 
cavalry,    cavalry. 

The  rider,                  .        .         .         .  160  140  Ibs. 

His  arms  and  equipments,           .  55  40 

His  horse  equipments,                 ...  60  45 

Two  days'  rations  of  provisions  and  grain,  25  25 

300 250 
23 


266  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

The  horse  moves  per  minute — 

At  a  walk,  .        .         .         from  110  yards  to  120 

At  a  trot,  ......        220  240 

At  a  gallop, 330  360 

But  on  a  march  over  the  ordinary  average  of  good  and 
bad  roads,  cavalry  will  walk  about  one  hundred  yards  per 
minute,  and  at  an  easy  trot,  two  hundred. 

An  ordinary  day's  march  for  cavalry  is  about  thirty 
miles,  but  on  a  forced  march  this  arm  can  march  fifty  miles 
within  the  twenty-four  hours.  A  single  horseman,  or  a 
small  detachment,  can  easily  exceed  this  distance. 

"  Light  cavalry,"  says  Napoleon,  in  his  Memoirs,  "ought 
to  reconnoitre  and  watch  the  motions  of  the  enemy,  con 
siderably  in  advance  of  the  army ;  it  is  not  an  appendage 
to  the  infantry  :  it  should  be  sustained  and  protected  espe 
cially  by  the  cavalry  of  the  line.  Rivalry  and  emulation 
have  always  existed  between  the  infantry  and  cavalry : 
light  cavalry  is  indispensable  to  the  vanguard,  the  rear 
guard,  and  the  wings  of  the  army ;  it,  therefore,  cannot 
properly  be  attached  to,  and  forced  to  follow  the  move 
ments  of  any  particular  corps  of  infantry.  It  would  be 
more  natural  to  attach  it  to  the  cavalry  of  the  line,  than 
to  leave  it  in  dependence  upon  the  infantiy,  with  which  it 
has  no  connection;  but  it  should  be  independent  of  both. 

"  If  the  light  cavalry  is  to  form  vanguards,  it  must  be 
organized  into  squadrons,  brigades,  and  divisions,  for  the 
purpose  of  manoeuvring  ;  for  that  is  all  vanguards  and  rear 
guards  do  :  they  pursue  or  retreat  by  platoons,  form  them 
selves  into  several  lines,  or  wheel  into  column,  or  change 
their  position  with  rapidity  for  the  purpose  of  outfronting 
a  whole  wing.  By  a  combination  of  such  evolutions,  a 
vanguard,  of  inferior  numbers,  avoids  brisk  actions  and 
general  engagements,  and  yet  delays  the  enemy  long 
enough  to  give  time  for  the  main  army  to  come  up,  for  the 


ARMY   ORGANIZATION.  267 

infantry  to  deploy,  for  the  general-in-chief  to  make  his 
dispositions,  and  for  the  baggage  and  parks  to  file  into 
their  stations.  The  art  of  a  general  of  the  vanguard,  or 
of  the  rear-guard,  is,  without  hazarding  a  defeat,  to  hold 
the  enemy  in  check,  to  impede  him,  to  compel  him  to 
spend  three  or  four  hours  in  moving  a  single  league  :  tac 
tics  point  out  the  methods  of  effecting  these  important 
objects,  and  are  more  necessary  for  cavalry  than  for  in 
fantry,  and  in  the  vanguard,  or  the  rear-guard,  than  in  any 
other  position.  The  Hungarian  Insurgents,  whom  we 
saw  in  1797,  1805,  and  1809,  were  pitiful  troops.  If  the 
light  troops  of  Maria  Theresa's  times  became  formidable, 
it  was  by  their  excellent  organization,  and,  above  every 
thing,  by  their  numbers.  To  imagine  that  such  troops 
could  be  superior  to  Wurmser's  hussars,  or  to  the  dra 
goons  of  Latour,  or  to  the  Archduke  John,  would  be  en 
tertaining  strange  ideas  of  things  ;  but  neither  the  Hun 
garian  Insurgents,  nor  the  Cossacks,  ever  formed  the  van 
guards  of  the  Austrian  and  Russian  armies  ;  because  to 
speak  of  a  vanguard  or  a  rear-guard,  is  to  speak  of  troops 
which  manoeuvre.  The  Russians  considered  a  regiment 
of  Cossacks  who  had  been  trained  worth  three  regiments 
untrained.  Every  thing  about  these  troops  is  despicable, 
except  the  Cossack  himself,  who  is  a  man  of  fine  person, 
powerful,  adroit,  subtle,  a  good  horseman,  and  indefatiga 
ble  ;  he  is  born  on  horseback,  and  bred  among  civil 
wars  ;  he  is  in  the  field,  what  the  Bedouin  is  in  the  desert, 
or  the  Barbet  in  the  Alps  ;  he  never  enters  a  house,  never 
lies  in  a  bed ;  and  he  always  changes  his  bivouac  at  sun 
set,  that  he  may  not  pass  a  night  in  a  place  where  the 
enemy  may  possibly  have  observed  him. 

"  Two  Mamelukes  kept  throe  Frenchmen  at  bay,  because 
they  were  better  armed,  better  mounted,  and  better  exer 
cised  ;  they  had  two  pairs  of  pistols,  a  tromblon,  a  carbine, 
a  helmet  with  a  visor,  a  coat  of  mail,  seveial  horses,  and 


268  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

several  men  on  foot  to  attend  them.  But  a  hundred 
French  did  not  fear  a  hundred  Mamelukes  ;  three  hun 
dred  were  more  than  a  match  for  an  equal  number ;  and 
one  thousand  would  beat  fifteen  hundred:  so  powerful  is 
the  influence  of  tactics,  order,  and  evolutions !  Murat, 
Leclerc,  and  Lasalle,  cavalry  generals,  presented  them 
selves  to  the  Mamelukes  in  several  lines  :  when  the  latter 
were  upon  the  point  of  outfronting  the  first  line,  the  second 
came  to  its  assistance  on  the  right  and  left ;  the  Mame 
lukes  then  stopped,  and  wheeled,  to  turn  the  wings  of  this 
new  line  :  this  was  the  moment  seized  for  charging  them ; 
they  were  always  broken. 

"  The  duty  of  a  vanguard,  or  a  rear-guard,  does  not  con 
sist  in  advancing  or  retiring,  but  in  mano3uvring.  It 
should  be  composed  of  a  good  light  cavalry,  supported  by  a 
good  reserve  of  cavalry  of  the  line,  by  excellent  battalions 
of  foot,  and  strong  batteries  of  artillery :  the  troops  must 
be  well  trained ;  and  the  generals,  officers,  and  soldiers, 
should  all  be  equally  well  acquainted  with  their  tactics, 
each  according  to  his  station.  An  undisciplined  troop 
would  only  embarrass  the  advanced  guard." 

"It  is  admitted  that  for  facility  in  mano3uvring,  the 
squadron  should  consist  of  one  hundred  men,  and  that  every 
three  or  four  squadrons  should  have  a  superior  officer." 

"  It  is  not  advisable  for  all  the  cavalry  of  the  line  to 
wear  cuirasses  :  dragoons,  mounted  upon  horses  of  four 
feet  nine  inches  in  height,  armed  with  straight  sabres,  and 
without  cuirasses,  should  form  a  part  of  the  heavy  caval 
ry  ;  they  should  be  furnished  with  infantry-muskets,  with 
bayonets  :  should  have  the  shakot  of  the  infantry,  panta 
loons  covering  the  half-boot-buskin,  cloaks  with  sleeves, 
and  portmanteaus  small  enough  to  be  carried  slung  across 
the  back  when  the  men  are  on  foot.  Cavalry  of  all  de 
scriptions  should  be  furnished  with  fire-arms,  and  should 
know  how  to  mano3uvre  on  foot.  Three  thousand  light 


ARMY  ORGANIZATION.       ,  269 

cavalry,  or  three  thousand  cuirassiers,  should  not  suffer 
themselves  to  be  stopped  by  a  thousand  infantry  posted  in 
a  wood,  or  on  ground  impracticable  to  cavalry  ;  and  three 
thousand  dragoons  ought  not  to  hesitate  to  attack  two 
thousand  infantry,  should  the  latter,  favored  by  their  posi 
tion,  attempt  to  stop  them. 

"  Turenne,  Prince  Eugene  of  Savoy,  and  Vendome, 
attached  great  importance  to  dragoons,  and  used  them 
successfully.  The  dragoons  gained  great  glory  in  Italy, 
in  1796  and  1797.  In  Egypt  and  in  Spain,  during  the 
campaigns  of  1806  and  1807,  a  degree  of  prejudice  sprung 
up  against  them.  The  divisions  of  dragoons  had  been 
mustered  at  Compiegne  and  Amiens,  to  be  embarked  with 
out  horses  for  the  expedition  of  England,  in  order  to  serve 
on  foot  until  they  should  be  mounted  in  that  country. 
General  Baraguay  d'Hilliers,  their  first  inspector,  com 
manded  them ;  he  had  them  equipped  with  gaiters,  and 
incorporated  with  them  a  considerable  number  of  recruits, 
whom  he  exercised  in  infantry  manoeuvres  alone.  These 
were  no  longer  cavalry  regiments :  they  served  in  the 
campaign  of  1806  6n  foot,  until  after  the  battle  of  Jena, 
when  they  were  mounted  on  horses  taken  from  the  Prus 
sian  cavalry,  three-fourths  of  which  were  unserviceable. 
These  combined  circumstances  injured  the  dragoons  ;  but 
in  1813  and  1814  their  divisions  acquired  honor  in  rival 
ling  the  cuirassiers.  Dragoons  are  necessary  for  the  sup 
port  of  light  cavalry  in  the  vanguard,  the  rear-guard,  and 
the  wings  of  an  army ;  cuirassiers  are  little  adapted  for 
van  and  rear-guards :  they  should  never  be  employed  in 
.  this  service  but  when  it  is  requisite  to  keep  them  in  prac 
tice  and  accustom  them  to  war." 

Napoleon  further  recommends  that  light  cavalry  be  di 
vided  into  two  kinds,  chasseurs  or  troopers,  and  light 
horse  ;  and  the  heavy  to  be  composed  of  dragoons  and 
cuirassiers  ;  the  troopers  to  be  mounted  on  horses  of  4  ft 


270  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

6  in. ;  light  cavalry  on  horses  of  4  ft.  7  or  8  in. ;  dragoons 
on  horses  of  4  ft.  9  in. ;  and  cuirassiers  on  horses  of  4  ft. 
10  or  11  in.;  which  employ  horses  of  all  kinds  for 
mounting  the  troops. 

All  cavalry  must  receive  the  same  instruction  ;  and  all 
should  be  capable,  in  case  of  need,  of  performing  any  of 
the  duties  of  mounted  troops.  The  shock  is  the  principal 
effect  produced  by  this  arm ;  therefore,  the  greater  the 
velocity  the  greater  must  be  this  effect,  .provided  the 
troops  can  be  kept  in  mass.  But  it  is  found,  by  experi 
ence,  that  it  is  impossible  to  preserve  them  in  line  when  put 
to  the  height  of  their  speed.  The  best  authorities  there 
fore  prefer,  as  we  have  said  elsewhere,  the  charge  at  the 
trot,  or  at  any  rate  the  gallop  should  not  be  taken  up  till 
within  a  very  short  distance  of  the  enemy.  The  charge 
of  a  compact  mass  at  a  trot  is  much  greater  than  that  of  a 
wavering  one  at  a  gallop. 

On  the  field  of  battle  the  cavalry  of  the  line  is  consider 
ed  as  the  arm  of  the  shock,  to  break  through  any  corps 
that  may  be  in  opposition ;  but  it  is  unable  of  itself  to  re 
sist  a  shock,  and  therefore  should  on  no  account  wait  to 
receive  the  charge  of  another  body  of  mounted  troops.  It 
was  on  this  account  that  Frederick  directed  his  cavalry 
officers,  under  the  severest  penalties,  never  to  receive  a 
charge,  but  always  to  meet  the  attacking  force  half  way. 
This  is  the  only  mode  of  preventing  defeat. 

A  good  infantry  can  always  sustain  itself  against  the 
charges  of  cavalry.  At  the  battle  of  Auerstedt,  in  1806, 
Davoust  ordered  the  divisions  of  Gudin  to  form  squares  to 
resist  the  Prussian  cavalry,  which,  by  means  of  a  fog,  had 
gained  a  most  advantageous  position.  Bliicher  led  his 
cavalry  in  repeated  and  impetuous  charges,  but  all  was  in 
vain  ;  the  French  infantry  presented  a  front  of  iron.  At 
the  combat  of  Krasnoi,  in  1812,  the  cavalry  of  Grouchy, 
Nansonty,  and  Bordesoult,  attacked  and  overthrew  the 


ARMY  ORGANIZATION.  271 

dragoons  of  Clarkof,  but  the  Russian  infantry  under  Neve- 
roffskoi  sustained  itself  against  the  repeated  charges  of 
vastly  superior  numbers  of  these  French  horse.  At  the 
battle  of  Molwitz,  the  grenadiers  sustained  the  charges  of 
the  enemy's  cavalry,  although  the  cavalry  of  the  great 
Frederick  had  already  been  completely  overthrown. 

But  when  the  infantry  is  engaged  with  the  infantry  of 
the  enemy,  the  charges  of  cavalry  are  generally  success 
ful,  and  sometimes  decide  the  fate  of  the  battle,  as  was 
the  case  at  Rosbach,  Zornsdorf,  Wurtsburg,  Marengo, 
Eylau,  Borodino,  &c. 

Cavalry  may  also  be  very  efficacious  against  infantry 
in  wet  weather,  when  the  rain  or  snow  renders  it  impos 
sible  for  the  foot  soldiers  to  use  their  fire-arms  to  advan 
tage,  as  was  the  case  with  the  corps  of  Augereau,  at 
Eylau,  and  with  the  Austrian  left,  at  the  battle  of  Dresden. 
Again,  if  the  infantry  be  previously  weakened,  or  thrown 
into  disorder  by  the  fire  of  batteries.  The  charge  of  the 
Russian  cavalry  at  Hohenfriedberg,  in  1745,  is  a  remark 
able  example  of  this  kind. 

Cavalry  should  always  be  immediately  sustained  in  its 
efforts  either  by  infantry  or  other  bodies  of  horse  ;  for  as 
soon  as  the  charge  is  made,  the  strength  of  this  arm  is 
for  a  time  exhausted,  and,  if  immediately  attacked,  defeat 
becomes  inevitable.  The  charge  of  the  cavalry  of  Ney 
on  Prince  Hohenlohe  at  the  battle  of  Jena,  and  of  the 
French  horse  on  Gossa  at  Leipsic,  are  fine  examples  of 
the  successful  charges  of  cavalry  when  properly  sus 
tained.  Kunnersdorf  and  Waterloo  are  examples  of  the 
disastrous  consequences  of  leaving  such  charges  without 
support. 

The  choice  of  the  field  of  battle  is  sometimes  such  as 
to  render  cavalry  almost  useless.  Such  was  the  case  at 
the  battle  of  Cassano,  between  the  Duke  of  Vendome  and 
the  Prince  Eugene.  The  field  was  so  cut  up  by  the 


272  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

Adda  and  the  canals  of  Rittorto  and  Pendina,  that  Prince) 
Eugene  could  make  no  use  of  his  horse.  If,  when  mas 
ter  of  the  bridge  of  Rittorto,  he  had  been  able  to  charge 
the  French  with  a  body  of  cavalry,  there  had  been  no 
doubt  of  his  complete  success. 

After  a  battle,  and  in  the  pursuit  of  a  flying  enemy, 
cavalry  is  invaluable.  If  Napoleon  had  possessed  a  suit 
able  number  of  mounted  troops,  with  an  able  commander, 
at  the  battles  of  Lutzen  and  Ligny,  the  results  of  these 
victories  had  been  decisive  ;  whereas  they  were  really 
without  consequence.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Prussian 
army  in  1806,  after  the  battle  of  Jena,  and  Napoleon's 
army  in  1815  at  Waterloo,  were  completely  cut  to  pieces 
by  the  skilful  use  of  cavalry  in  the  pursuit  of  a  defeated 
and  dispirited  foe. 

The  want  of  good  cavalry  was  severely  felt  in  the  war 
of  the  American  Revolution.  Had  Washington  possessed 
a  few  good  squadrons  of  horse,  his  surprise  and  defeat  in 
the  lines  of  Brooklyn,  and  the  consequent  loss  of  New 
York,  had  never  taken  place.  The  efficient  employment 
of  a  few  good  squadrons  of  cavalry  might  readily  have 
prevented  the  defeat  at  Bladensburg,  and  the  loss  of  the 
capitol,  in  1814. 

In  a  well-organized  army,  the  cavalry  should  be  from 
one-fourth  to  one-sixth  of  the  infantry,  according  to  the 
nature  of  the  war.* 


*  To  gain  a  competent  knowledge  of  the  duties  connected  with  the 
two  arms  of  service  mentioned  in  this  chapter,  the  officer  should  make 
himself  thoroughly  acquainted  with  Scott's  System  of  Infantry  Tac 
tics,  for  the  United  States'  Infantry,  or  at  least  with  Major  Cooper's 
abridged  edition  of  Infantry  Tactics,  and  with  the  system  of  Cavalry 
Tactics,  adopted  in  our  army;  also  with  the  directions  for  the  use  of 
these  two  arms  in  a  campaign,  and  their  employment  on  the  battle 
field,  given  in  the  writings  of  Jomini,  Decker,  Okouneff,  Rocquancourt, 
and  Jacquinot  de  Presle 


ARMY  ORGANIZATION.  273 

The  following  books  may  be  referred  to  for  further  information  re 
specting  the  history,  organization,  use,  and  instruction  of  infantry  and 
cavalry : — 

Essai  general  dc  tactique.     Guibert. 

Considerations  generales  sur  I'infanterie  franc. aise,  par  un  gdndral 
en  retraite.  A  work  of  merit. 

De  I'infanterie,  par  1'auteur  de  1'histoire  de  1'expedition  de  Russie 

Histoire  de  la  guerre  de  la  peninsule.  Foy.  This  work  contains 
many  intere'sting  and  valuable  remarks  on  the  French  and  English 
systems  of  tactics,  and  particularly  on  the  tactics  of  Infantry. 

Cours  d'art  et  d'histoire  militaircs.     Jacquinot  de  Presle. 

Art  de  la  guerre.     Rogniat. 

Instruction  destinee  aux  troupes  legeres,  &c.,  redigee  sur  une  in 
struction  de  Frederick  II.  a  ses  officiers. 

English  Infantry  Regulations. 

Ordonnance  (French)  pour  I'exercice  et  les  manoeuvres  de  I'in- 
fanterie,  par  le  commission  de  mano3uvres. 

Aide-memoires  des  officiers  generaux  et  superieurs,  et  des  capi- 
taines. 

Essai  sur  I'histoire  generale  de  I'art  militaire.     Carion-Nisas. 

Histoire  de  ia  milice  fran$aise.     Daniel. 

Cours  elementaire  d'art  et  d'histoire  militaires.     Rocquancourt. 

Traite  elementaire  d'art  militaire,  &c.     Gay  de  Vernon. 

Introduction  d  I'etude  de  I'art  de  la  guerre.     La  Roche-Amyou. 

Tactique  des  trois  armes.     Decker. 

Examen  raisonne  des  trois  armes,  &c.     OkounefE 

The  last  two  are  works  of  great  merit.  The  writings  of  OkounefF, 
however,  are  very  diffuse. 

Instruction  pour  le  service  de  I'infanterie  legere.     Guyard. 

Instruction  de  I'infanterie,  &c.     Schauenbourg. 

Traite  de  tactique.     Ternay  et  Koch. 

Mecanism  des  manosuvres  de  guerre  de  I'infanterie  polonaise. 
Vroniecki. 

Traite  sur  I'infanterie  legere.     Beurmami. 

English  Cavalry  Regulations. 

Ordonnance  (French)  sur  I'exercice  et  les  evolutions  de  la  ca* 
calerie. 

Les  troupes  d  cheval  de  France,  &c.     De  Bourge. 

Avant-postes  de  cavalerie  legere.  Brack.  The  author  served  with 
distinction  under  Lassale,  Colbert,  Maison,  Pujol,  and  Excelmans. 

Reflexions  sur  I'emploi  de  la  cavalerie,  &c.     Caraman. 


274  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

Observations  sur  I'ordonnance,  tyc.,  de  la  cavalerie.     Dejean. 

Tactique  de  la  cavalerie.     Itier. 

Elements  de  tactique  pour  la  cavalerie,  par  Mottin  de  la  Balrae. 
A  work  of  rare  merit. 

De  I'emploi  de  la  cavalerie  a  la  guerre.     Schauenbourg. 

Remarques  sur  la  cavalerie.  Warnery.  This  work  has  long  en 
joyed  a  high  reputation  among  the  cavalry  officers  of  the  European 
services.  The  Paris  edition  is  enriched  with  notes  by  a  French  gen 
eral  officer. 

Nachrichten  und  Betrachtungen  uber  die  Thaten  und  Schicksalc 
der  Reiterei,  &c.  This  work  discusses  the  operations  of  cavalry  in 
the  campaigns  of  Frederick  the  Great  and  of  Napoleon,  down  to  the 
battle  of  Lutzen  in  1813. 

Examen  du  livret  provisoire,  &c.     Marbot. 

Le  Spectateur  Militaire,  contains  many  essays  by  cavalry  officers 
on  the  various  questions  connected  with  the  organization  and  use  of 
this  arm. 

Die  Gefechtslelire  der  beiden  verbundenen  Waffen-Kavallerie  und 
rcitenden  Artillerie.  Decker  * 

Manuel  de  I'officier.     Ruhle  de  Lilienstern. 

Aide-memoire,  d  I'usage  des  ojficiers  de  cavalerie. 

Journal  de  Vinfanterie  et  de  la  cavalerie. 

Traite  de  tactique  pour  les  ojficiers  d'infanterie  et  de  cavalerie. 

Histoire   des  exploits  et   des  vicissitudes   de   la  cavalerie 
sienne.     Coutz 


AllTILLERY.  275 


CHAPTER    XI. 

ARMY  ORGANIZATION. ARTILLERY. 

Artillery. — Previous  to  the  invention  of  gunpowder  in 
the  thirteenth  century,  the  machines  of  war  were  divided 
between  two  classes  of  military  men,  the  engineers  (en- 
vignours,  as  they  were  called  in  the  middle  ages)  and  the 
artillery,  (artilliers,  as  they  were  formerly  called,)  the  lat 
ter  being  particularly  charged  with  the  management  of  the 
lighter  and  more  portable  projectile  machines,  such  as  the 
balistas  and  arco-balistas,  which  were  used  for  throwing 
different  kinds  of  arrows — -fl&ches,  viretons,  carreaux,  ma- 
tras,  &c.,  while  the  former  managed  the  battering-rams, 
cranes,  helipoles,  &c.  And,  indeed,  for  a  long  time  after 
the  discovery  of  gunpowder,  this  distinction  was  kept  up, 
and  the  artillery  retained  all  the  more  ordinary  projectile 
machines,  while  the  engineers  constructed  and  managed^ 
the  more  ponderous  weapons  of  attack  and  defence.  But 
the  new  artillery  was  gradually  introduced,  without,  how 
ever,  immediately  displacing  the  old,  and  there  were  for 
a  time,  if  we  may  be  allowed  the"  expression,  two  artille 
ries,  the  one  employing  the  old  projectile  machines,  and 
the  other  those  of  the  new  invention.  The  latter  were 
called  canoniers,  to  distinguish  them  from  the  former,  who 
still  retained  the  name  of  artilliers, 

The  first  cannon  were  invented  in  the  early  part  of  the 
fourteenth  century,  or,  perhaps,  among  the  Arabs  as  early 
as  the  middle  of  the  thirteenth  century,  but  they  were  not 
much  known  in  Europe  till  about  1350.  Cannon  are  said 
to  have  been  employed  by  the  Moors  as  early  as  1249,  and 
by  the  French  in  1338.  The  English  used  artillery  at 


276  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

the  battle  of  Crecy  in  1346.  Both  cannon  and  the  ancien 
projectile  machines  were  employed  at  the  siege  of  Ai 
guillon  in  1339,  at  Zara  in  1345,  at  Rennes  in  1357,  and 
at  Naples  in  1380.     At  this  last  siege  the  ancient  balista 
was  employed  to  throw  into  the  castle  of  Naples  barrels 
of  infectious  matter  and  mutilated  limbs  of  prisoners  of 
war.     We  read  of  the  same  thing  being  done  in  Spain  at 
a  later  period. 

Cannon  in  France  were  at  first  called  bombards  and 
couleuverines,  but  were  afterwards  named  from  certain 
figures  marked  on  them,  such  as  serpentines,  basilisks,  scor- 
vions,  &c.  In  the  infancy  of  the  art  they  were  made 
small,  weighing  only  from  twenty  to  fifty  pounds,  and  were 
mounted  on  small  moveable  carriages.  This  species  of 
fire-arms  became  quite  numerous  about  the  beginning  of 
the  fifteenth  century.  They  were  followed  by  heaviei 
pieces,  used  in  the  attack  and  defence  of  towns.  This 
siege  artillery  continued  to  be  increased  in  dimensions 
till,  towards  the  latter  part  of  the  fifteenth  century,  they 
reached  such  an  enormous  size  as  to  be  almost  useless  as 
ft  military  machine.  Louis  XL  had  an  immense  piece 
constructed  at  Tours,  in  1770,  which,  it  was  said,  carried 
a  ball  from  the  Bastille  to  Charenton,  (about  six  miles !) 
Its  caliber  was  that  of  five  hundred  pounds.  It  was  in 
tended  for  experiment,  and  burst  on  the  second  discharge. 
The  famous  culverin  of  Bolduc  was  said  to  carry  a  ball 
from  that  city  to  Bommel.  The  culverin  of  Nancy,  made 
in  1598,  was  more  than  twenty-three  feet  in  length. 
There  is  now  an  ancient  cannon  in  the  arsenal  at  Metz 
of  about  this  length,  which  carries  a  ball  of  one  hundred 
and  forty  pounds.  Cannon  balls  were  found  at  Paris  as 
late  as  1712,  weighing  near  two  hundred  pounds,  and  from 
twelve  to  sixteen  inches  in  diameter.  At  the  siege  of 
Constantinople  in  1453,  there  was  a  famous  metallic  bom 
bard  which  threw  stone  balls  of  an  incredible  size ;  at  the 


ARTILLERY.  277 

siege  of  Bourges  in  1412,  a  cannon  was  used  which,  it 
was  said,  threw  stone  balls  "  of  the  size  of  mill-stones." 
The  Gantois,  under  Arteville,  made  a  bombard  fifty  feet 
in  length,  whose  report  was  heard  at  a  distance  of  ten 
leagues ! 

The  first  cannon  were  made  of  wood,  and  covered  with 
sheet-iron,  or  embraced  by  iron  rings  :  longitudinal  bars 
of  iron  were  afterwards  Substituted  for  the  wooden  form. 
Towards  the  end  of  the  fourteenth  century,  brass,  tin,  cop 
per,  wrought  and  cast  iron,  were  successively  used  for 
this  purpose.  The  bores  of  the  pieces  were  first  made  in 
a  conical  shape,  and  it  was  not  until  a  much  later  period 
that  the  cylindrical  form  was  introduced. 

In  the  wars  between  the  Spaniards  and  Moors  in  the 
latter  part  of  the  fifteenth  century,  very  great  use  was  made 
of  artillery  in  sieges  and  battles.  Ferdinand  the  Catholic 
had  at  this  time,  probably,  a  larger  artillery  train  than  any 
other  European  power.  The  Spanish  cannon,  generally 
very  large,  were  composed  of  iron  bars  about  two  inches 
in  breadth,  held  together  by  bolts  and  rings  of  the  same 
metal.  The  pieces  were  firmly  attached  to  their  car 
riages,  and  incapable  of  either  horizontal  or  vertical  move 
ment.  The  balls  thrown  by  them  were  usually  of  marble, 
though  sometimes  of  iron.  Many  of  the  pieces  used  at 
the  siege  of  Baza,  in  1486,  are  still  to  be  seen  in  that  city, 
and  also  the  cannon  balls  then  in  use.  Some  of  the  latter 
are  fourteen  inches  in  diameter,  and  weigh  one  hundred 
and  severity-five  pounds.  The  length  of  the  cannon  was 
about  twelve  feet.  These  dimensions  are  a  proof  of  a 
slight  improvement  in  this  branch  of  military  science, 
which  was,  nevertheless,  still  in'its  infancy.  The  awk 
wardness  of  artillery  at  this  period  may  be  judged  of  by  its 
slowness  of  fire.  At  the  siege  of  Zeteuel,  in  1407,  five 
"  bombards,"  as  the  heavy  pieces  of  ordnance  were  then 
called,  were  able  to  discharge  only  forty  shot  in  the  course 


278  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

of  a  day ;  and  it  is  noticed  as  a  remarkable  circumstance 
at  the  siege  of  Albahar,  that  two  batteries  discharged  one 
hundred  and  forty  balls  in  the  course  of  the  twenty-four 
hours ! 

In  the  Italian  wars  between  France  and  Spain,  in  the 
beginning  of  the  sixteenth  century,  the  difficulty  of  moving 
the  heavy  cannon  then  in  use  was  so  great  that  only  a  very 
small  number  of  pieces  were  brought  upon  the  battle-field. 
At  the  battle  of  Cerignola,  in  1503,  the  number  of  cannon 
in  the  French  army  was  only  thirteen.  Indeed,  during 
the  greater  part  of  this  century,  four  or  five  pieces  were 
considered  sufficient  for  an  ordinary  army  in  the  field,  and 
many  agreed  to  the  doctrine  of  Machiavelli,  that  the  only 
legitimate  use  of  artillery  was  in  the  attack  and  defence 
of  places.  But  in  the  wars  of  Henry  IV.  of  France,  this 
arm  of  service  was  again  increased,  and  the  troops  which 
this  king  destined  against  the  house  of  Austria  had  an  ar 
tillery  train  of  fifty  pieces.  Great  improvements  were  also 
made  about  this  period  in  the  manufacture  of  powder,  and 
all  kinds  of  fire-arms.  Sully  gave  greater  development 
to  this  arm  of  service,  improving  its  materials,  and  in 
creasing  its  efficiency.  Then,  as  at  most  other  periods,  the 
French  were  in  advance  of  most  other  nations  in  artillery. 

It  was  near  the  close  of  the  sixteenth  or  the  beginning 
of  the  seventeenth  century,  that  the  heavy  and  ill-shaped 
artillery  began  to  give  place  to  more  wieldy  and  useful 
pieces.  A  certain  M.  de  Linar  demonstrated,  in  the  lat 
ter  part  of  the  sixteenth  century,  that  cannon  twelve  feet 
in  length  would  give  a  greater  range  than  those  seventeen 
feet  in  length,  the  calibre  being  the  same  ;  but  some  years 
elapsed  before  advantage  was  taken  of  this  discovery.  In 
1624,  Gustavus  Adolphus  caused  experiments  to  be  made 
to  veiify  this  point,  and,  on  being  convinced  of  its  truth, 
caused  his  batteries  to  be  furnished  with  shorter  and  light 
er  pieces.  This  great  king  introduced,  about  the  same 


ARTILLERY.  279 

time,  a  new  and  lighter  kind  of  artillery,  made  of  sheet 
iron  and  leather.  Each  piece  had  its  chamber  formed  of 
thin  metal  and  embraced  by  strong  iron  rings  ;  over  these 
was  placed  a  form  of  hardened  leather,  which  was  again 
encircled  with  rings  and  held  compactly  together.  These 
pieces  were  mounted  on  light  carriages,  so  that  two  men 
could  easily  manoeuvre  them.  It  was  said  that  they  would 
fire  from  eight  to  ten  rounds  without  requiring  repairs. 
Gustavus  made  use  of  them  in  all  his  military  operations 
from  1 628  to  the  time  of  his  death.  They  did  him  excel 
lent  service  on  numerous  occasions  ;  being  so  very  light 
they  could  be  easily  transported,  and,  on  the  field  of  bat 
tle,  their  movements  could  be  made  to  conform  to  the 
movements  of  his  troops. 

As  cannon  and  small  arms  were  gradually  introduced 
into  general  use,  various  inventions  and  improvements 
were  proposed  and  introduced  from  time  to  time.  Can 
non  were  constructed  with  two  or  more  barrels ;  some 
were  arranged  for  being  loaded  in  the  breech,  and  others 
at  the  mouth  of  the  piece ;  two  pieces  were  sometimes 
connected  by  horizontal  timbers,  which  revolved  about 
a  vertical  axis,  so  that  the  recoil  of  one  piece  would 
bring  the  other  into  battery ;  and  various  other  arrange 
ments  of  this  description,  which  have  recently  been  re 
vived  and  some  of  them  patented  as  new  inventions.  The 
small  arms  employed  at  this  period  were  much  the  same 
as  those  used  at  the  present  day,  except  the  match 
lock,  which  afterwards  gave  place  to  flint-locks.  Arms 
of  this  description  were  sometimes  made  to  be  load 
ed  at  the  breach,  and  guns  with  two,  three,  and  even  as 
many  as  eight  barrels,  were  at  one  time  in  fashion.  In 
the  Musee  de  VArtillerie  at  Paris  may  be  found  many  arms 
of  this  kind,  which  have  been  reproduced  in  this  country 
and  England  as  new  inventions.  In  this  Museum  are  two 
ancient  pieces,  invented  near  the  end  of  the  sixteenth  or 


280  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

the  beginning  of  the  seventeenth  century,  which  very 
nearly  correspond  with  Colt's  patent,  with  the  single  ex 
ception  of  the  lock  !* 

The  materiel  of  artillery  employed  in  modern  warfare 
is  divided  into  two  general  classes  :  1st.  Siege  Artillery, 
or  such  as  is  employed  in  the  attack  and  defence  of 
places.  2d.  Field  Artillery,  or  such  as  is  used:  in  battle, 
or  in  the  field-operations  of  an  army. 

1.  Siege  Artillery  is  composed  of  mortars,  large  how 
itzers,  Paixhan  guns  or  Columbiads,]  and  all  cannon  of  a 
large  calibre.  In  our  service  this  class  of  ordnance  in 
cludes  the  twelve,  eighteen,  twenty-four,  thirty-two,  and 
forty-two-pounder  guns,  the  eight,  ten,  and  thirteen-inch 
mortars,  the  sixteen-inch  stone  mortar,  the  twenty-four- 
pounder  coehorn  mortar,  the  twenty-four-pounder  carron- 
ade,  and  the  eight,  ten,  and  twelve-inch  howitzers. 

All  these,  except  the  smaller  mortars,  are  made  of  cast 
iron.  This  substance  is  less  tenacious  than  wrought  iron 
or  bronze,  and  the  cannon  made  of  it  are,  on  this  account, 

*  It  is  not  to  be  inferred  that  the  modern  improvements  (as  they 
are  called)  are  copied  from  the  more  ancient  inventions.  Two  men 
of  different  ages,  or  even  of  the  same  age,  sometimes  fall  upon  the 
same  identical  discovery,  without  cither's  borrowing  from  the  other. 

t  These  pieces  were  first  invented  by  Colonel  Bomford,  of  the  U.  S. 
army,  and  used  in  the  war  of  1812.  The  dimensions  of  these  guns 
were  first  taken  to  Europe  by  a  young  French  officer,  and  thus  fell 
into  the  hands  of  General  Paixhan,  who  immediately  introduced  them 
into  the  French  service.  They  were  by  this  means  first  made  known 
to  the  rest  of  Europe,  and  received  the  name  of  th^  person  who  in 
troduced  them  into  the  European  services,  rather  than  that  of  the 
original  inventor.  All  these  facts  are  so  fully  susceptible  of  proof, 
that  Europeans  now  acknowledge  themselves  indebted  to  us  for  the 
invention  ;  even  General  Paixhan  gives  up  all  claim  to  originality  in 
his  gun,  and  limits  himself  to  certain  improvements  which  he  intro 
duced.  Tho  original  gun,  which  was  invented  by  Colonel  Bomford, 
and  whose  dimensions  were  carried  to  General  Paixhan  in  France,  ia 
DOW  lying  at  the  ordnance  depot,  in  New  York  harbor. 


ARTILLERY,  281 

much  heavier  than  of  the  other  materials  ;  but  for  the  na 
val  service,  and  the  attack  and  defence  of  fortifications, 
the  weight  required  to  secure  the  necessary  strength  is 
not  very  objectionable.  Wrought  iron  and  bronze  are 
much  more  expensive  and  less  durable.  Moreover,  the 
difficulty  of  forging  wrought  iron  in  masses  of  sufficient 
size  has  been  such  as  to  prevent  its  being  brought  into 
general  use  for  artillery.  Numerous  attempts  have  been 
made,  at  different  periods,  to  construct  large  guns  of  this 
material,  but  none  have  yet  been  successful.  Improve 
ments  which  are  now  making  in  the  manufacture  of 
wrought  iron,  may  render  this  the  preferable  material  for 
the  smaller  pieces  of  artillery  ;  but  the  best  informed  mil 
itary  men  deem  it  objectionable  for  the  heavier  cannon, 
both  on  account  of  its  cost  and  the  imperfection  of  its 
manufacture.  Even  should  the  latter  objection  be  re 
moved,  its  cost  must  prevent  its  general  application  to  the 
construction  of  siege  artillery.  Charlatans  in  military  sci 
ence,  both  in  this  country  and  in  Europe,  bring  this  sub 
ject  up  every  fifteen  or  twenty  years  as  a  new  invention, 
and  flaming  notices  of  the  improvement,  and  predictions 
of  the  revolution  it  is  to  effect  in  the  art  of  war,  are  cir 
culated  in  the  newspapers  to  "gull"  a  credulous  public; 
and  after  some  fifty  or  one  hundred  thousand  dollars  have 
been  squandered  on  some  court-favorite,  the  whole  matter 
ends  in  the  explosion  of  the  "  improvement"  and  probably 
the  destruction  of  the  "  inventor"  and  perhaps  also  of  his 
spectators.  Let  us  be  distinctly  understood  on  this  sub 
ject.  There  may  be  inventions  and  improvements  in  the 
manufacture  of  wrought  iron,  but  there  is  nothing  new  in 
its  application  to  the  construction  of  cannon,  for  it  has 
been  used  for  this  purpose  as  long  ago  as  the  first  inven 
tion  of  the  art. 

2.  Field  Artillery  is  composed  of  the  smaller  guns  and 
howitzers.     In  our  service  this  class  of  cannon  includes 


282  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

the  six  and  twelve-pounder  guns,  arid  the  twelve  and 
twrnty-four-pounder  howitzers.  All  these  are  now  made 
of  bronze.  This  material  is  more  expensive  than  cast- 
iron,  but  its  superior  tenacity  renders  it  more  useful 
where  great  weight  is  objectionable.  Improvements  in 
the  manufacture  of  cast  iron  may  render  it  safe  to  employ 
this  metal  in  the  construction  of  field-pieces.  It  is  also 
possible  the  wrought  iron  may  be  forged  in  masses  large 
enough,  arid  the  cost  be  so  reduced  as  to  bring  it  into  use 
for  field-pieces.  It  is  here  important  to  combine  strength 
with  lightness,  arid  additional  expense  may  very  properly 
be  incurred  to  secure  this  important  object. 

The  projectiles  now  in  use  are  solid  shot,  shells,  strap- 
shot,  case  or  canister-shot,  grape-shot,  light  and  fire-balls, 
carcasses,  grenades,  and  rockets. 

Solid  shot  are  now  almost  invariably  made  of  cast  iron,* 
formed  in  moulds  of  sand  or  iron.  This  projectile  is  used 
under  almost  every  circumstance,  whether  in  the  battle 
field  or  in  the  attack  and  defence  of  places,  and  is  the 
only  one  that  is  effectual  against  the  stone  walls  of  forts. 
Hot  shot  are  used  against  shipping  and  wooden  structures 
of  every  description.  Red-hot  balls  were  first  employed 
by  the  king  of  Poland,  in  1575,  but,  on  account  of  the  dif 
ficulty  of  heating  them  with  rapidity,  and  the  danger  of 
loading  the  piece  with  them,  this  kind  of  projectile  was 
not  in  general  use  till  a  much  later  period.  It  was  at  first 
supposed  that  the  expansion  of  the  metal  would  be  so 
great,  when  heated  to  a  red  or  white  heat,  as  to  prevent 
the  ball  from  entering  the  piece  ;  it  is  found,  however, 
that  the  windage  is  still  sufficient  for  loading  with  facility. 
These  red-hot  balls  are  principally  used  to  fire  wooden 
buildings,  ships,  and  other  combustible  matter.  They  are 
therefore  much  used  as  a  projectile  for  coast  defence,  and 

*  In  Mexico,  where  iron  is  scarce,  copper  is  used  for  shot  and 
•hells  ;  but  it  is  a  poor  substitute. 


ARTILLERi. 


283 


all  fortifications  on  the  seaboard  should  be  provided  with 
furnaces  and  grates,  arranged  so  as  to  heat  them  with  fa 
cility  and  rapidity. 

There  are  several  kinds  of  hollow-shot  and  shells,  called 
bombs,  Jwwitzes,  grenades,  &c.  They  are  made  of  cast  iron, 
and  usually  in  a  spherical  shape,  the  cavity  being  concen 
tric  with  the  exterior  surface.  The  cavity  was  formerly 
made  eccentric  with  the  exterior,  under  the  belief  that  the 
heavier  side  would  always  strike  first.  The  rotary  motion 
of  the  shell  during  its  flight  rendered  this  precaution  of 
no  use.  Fire  is  communicated  to  the  combustible  matter 
within  the  shell  by  means  of  a  fuse,  which  is  so  regulated 
that  the  explosion  shall  take  place  at  the  desired  moment. 
Hollow-shot  are  used  with  advantage  to  destroy  ordinary 
buildings,  ships,  earthwork,  and  thin  walls  of  masonry ; 
they,  however,  are  of  little  avail  in  breaking  the  massive 
walls  of  well-constructed  forts.  Howitzes  and  grenades 
are  particularly  effective  against  cavalry  and  columns  of 
infantry,  and  are  much  employed  on  the  battle-field ;  they 
are  also  much  used  in  the  attack  and  defence  of  places. 

We  find  that  as  early  as  1486  the  Spaniards  made  use 
of  a  projectile  similar  to  the  modern  bomb.  "  They  threw 
from  their  engines  large  globular  masses,  composed  of 
certain  inflammable  ingredients  mixed  with  gunpowder, 
which,  scattering  long  trains  of  light,"  says  an  eye-wit 
ness,  "  in  their  passage  through  the  air,  filled  the  behold 
ers  with  dismay,  and  descending  on  the  roofs  of  edi 
fices,  frequently  occasioned  extensive  conflagration."  In 
the  siege  of  Constantinople  by  Mahomet  II.,  shells 
were  used,  and  also  mortars  of  enormous  size.  In  1572 
Valturus  proposed  to  throw,  with  a  kind  of  mortar, 
"  globes  of  copper  filled  with  powder."  In  1588,  an  arti 
ficer  of  Venloo  burned  Wachtendeck  by  throwing  bombs 
into  the  place.  A  similar  attempt  had  just  been  made  at 
Berg-op-Zoom.  The  use  of  this  projectile  became  quite 


284  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

common  in  France  under  Louis  XIII.  Howitzes  were 
not  much  used  till  the  seventeenth  century.  They  are  of 
German  origin,  and  the  howitzer  first  bore  the  name  of 
haufmitz. 

The  strap-shot  consists  of  a  round  ball  attached  to  a 
sabot  of  the  same  calibre,  by  means  of  two  strips  of  tin 
passing  over  the  shot  at  right  angles,  and  fastened  to  a 
third,  which  is  soldered  around  the  sabot.  One  end  of 
the  sabot  is  arranged  for  attaching  it  to  the  cartridge,  the 
other  being  hollowed  out  to  receive  the  shot.  The  sup 
posed  advantages  of  this  arrangement  are,  1st,  a  diminu 
tion  of  the  windage  ;  2d,  the  gun  may  be  loaded  with 
greater  rapidity  ;  and,  3d,  the  cartridge  Is  transported  with 
greater  safety. 

The  case  or  canister-shot  is  prepared  by  filling  a  tin  can 
ister  with  grape-shot  or  musket-balls,  and  attaching  it  to 
the  cartridge  by  means  of  a  sabot.  There  being  two  sizes 
of  grape-shot,  and  one  of  musket-balls,  we  have  three  kinds 
of  canister-shot  calculated  to  reach  at  different  distances. 
The  three  sizes  of  shot  are  frequently  mixed  in  the  same 
canister.  This  projectile  is  particularly  effective  against 
lines  of  infantry  and  cavalry,  when  the  distance  is  short. 

The  grape-shot  is  composed  of  small  balls  arranged 
round  an  upright  pin  attached  to  a  plate  of  wood  or  iron. 
The  concave  cast-iron  plate  is  preferable,  as  it  increases 
the  range  of  the  shot.  The  balls  are  covered  with  can 
vass,  and  thoroughly  confined  by  a  quilting  of  strong  twine. 
This  shot  is  used  for  the  same  purposes  as  the  canister. 

Light  and  fire-balls  are  formed  of  an  oval  case  of  sacking, 
filled  with  combustible  matter,  and  attached  to  a  culot  of 
cast-iron.  The  whole  is  covered  with  a  net  of  spun-yarn. 
Light-balls  are  used  to  light  up  our  own  works,  and  are 
not  armed  ;  fire-balls  being  employed  to  light  up  the  works 
or  approaches  of  an  enemy,  it  is  necessary  to  arm  them 
with  pistol-barrels,  in  order  to  prevent  any  one  from  extin- 


ARTILLERY.  285 

guishing  them.  When  made  of  very  combustible  mate 
rials,  and  used  for  setting  fire  to  wooden  structures,  they 
are  denominated  incendiary  balls. 

Carcasses  are  employed  for  the  same  purpose  as  incen 
diary  balls  ;  they  are  of  two  kinds  :  1st,  the  shell-carcass ; 
and,  2d,  the  ribbed-carcass.  The  first  is  composed  of  a 
spherical  shell,  cast  with  five  fuse-holes,  one  being  at  the 
top,  and  the  other  four  in  a  plane  perpendicular  to  this  and 
at  right  angles  with  each  other ;  the  shell  is  filled  with 
matter  highly  combustible.  The  second  is  formed  of  iron 
ribs  connected  by  iron  straps,  and  attached  at  the  ends  to 
culots  of  the  same  material,  the  whole  being  filled  with 
combustible  composition.  This  is  more  expensive  than 
the  shell  carcass,  and  cannot  be  fired  with  as  great  accu 
racy  ;  it  is  now  seldom  used.  Carcasses  may  be  armed 
in  the  same  manner  as  fire-balls. 

Smoke  and  suffocating  balls  are  used  to  drive  an  enemy 
from  galleries  and  mines.  They  are  thrown  by  hand. 

The  personnel  of  the  French  artillery  was  for  a  long 
time  retained,  together  with  the  engineers,  under  the  gen 
eral  direction  of  the  "  Grand  Master  of  Cross-bows." 
In  1420  the  master-general  of  artillery  was  made  inde 
pendent  of  the  grand-master  of  cross-bows  ;  but  previous, 
to  the  reign  of  Louis  XIV.,  the  artillery  troops  had  no  or 
ganization  as  a  separate  corps.  In  1668  six  companies 
of  canoniers  were  created,  and  soon  after  two  companies 
of  bombardiers.  In  1693  the  first  regiment  of  fusiliers 
was  changed  into  a  royal  regiment  of  artillery,  and  both 
the  canoniers  and  bombardiers  were  eventually  incorpo 
rated  with  it.  The  staff  of  artillery,  towards  the  close 
of  this  reign,  was  composed  of  one  grand-master,  sixty 
lieutenants,  sixty  commissaries,  and  eighty  officiers-poin- 
teurs.  In  1721  the  artillery  was  divided  into  five  battal 
ions  and  stationed  at  Metz,  Strasbourg,  Grenoble,  Per- 
pignan,  and  La  Fere,  where  they  established  schools  of 


286  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

theory  and  practice.  In  1756  the  artillery  was  organized 
into  seven  regiments,  each  regiment  having  its  own  sepa 
rate  school.  This  organization  continued  without  any 
remarkable  change  till  the  Revolution. 

During  the  earlier  campaigns  of  the  French  Revolu 
tion  it  is  impossible  to  trace  out  the  changes  that  took 
place  in  army  organization,  every  thing  was  then  so 
irregular  and  confused,  the  troops  of  different  arms  being 
frequently  united  together.  In  the  campaign  of  1792 
there  were  some  six  or  seven  regiments  of  foot  artillery, 
and  ten  companies  of  horse.  This  arm  was  greatly  in 
creased  during  the  subsequent  campaigns,  and  its  organ 
ization  was  completely  remodelled  by  Napoleon  on  his 
elevation  to  the  head  of  the  government.  The  personnel 
of  the  artillery  was  then  composed  of  a  general  staff, 
nine  regiments  of  foot  and  six  of  horse.  In  1815  it  was 
reduced  to  eight  regiments  of  foot  and  four  of  horse. 

The  personnel  of  artillery  in  modern  army  organization 
is  divided  into  four  classes  :  the  staff,  guards,  artificers, 
and  troops. 

I.  The  Staff",  or  Ordnance,  as  it  is  called  in  our  service, 
is  charged  with  the  construction  of  all  the  materials  of 
artillery,  and  the  collection  of  powder  and  military  stores. 
As  the  lives  of  persons  using  these  materials,  and,  in  a 
considerable  degree,  the  success  of  war,  depend  upon  the 
nature  and  quality  of  the  stores  thus   manufactured  and 
collected,  it  is  obvious  that  the  members  of  this  branch 
of  the  artillery  service  should  possess  high  and  peculiar 
qualifications.     In  the  French  army  the  artillery  staff  is 
composed  of  two  hundred  and  eighty-three  officers  of  dif 
ferent  grades  :    also  twenty-four  officers  of  the  general 
staff  are  attached  to  this  service.     In  our  army  the  ord- 
nance  is  composed  of  twenty-eight  officers  of  different  grades. 

II.  Artillery -guards. — These  in  our  service  are  divided 
into  two  classes  :   1st.  Military  Store-keepers.     2d.   Ord- 


ARTILLERY. 


287 


nance  Sergeants.  Both  are  alike  charged  with  the  care 
and  preservation  of  the  artillery  property  and  stores  at 
the  several  garrisons,  arsenals,  and  magazines.  In  our 
army  we  have  fifty-eight  of  these  guards,  viz:  fifteen 
commissioned  military  store-keepers,  and  forty-three  ord 
nance  sergeants.  We  seldom  have  more  than  this  num 
ber  of  permanent  posts ;  each  one  can  therefore  be  sup 
plied  with  an  artillery  guard  for  the  care  of  the  artillery 
stores.  In  the  French  service  there  are  three  hundred 
and  fifteen  of  these  artillery  guards  ;  they  are  divided 
into  three  classes. 

III.  Artificers. — This  class  of  men  are  employed  in 
the  construction  and  repairs  of  military  materials.  In 
most  of  our  arsenals  and  armories  it  is  thought  to  be 
best  to  employ  unenlisted  workmen,  by  the  piece  or  con 
tract.  Nevertheless  a  limited  number  of  enlisted  men  of 
this  description  are  found  to  be  both  useful  and  necessary.. 
We  have  three  hundred  and  thirty  of  these  in  our  army, 
viz  :  two  hundred  and  fifty  enlisted  "  ordnance  men,"  and 
eighty  "  artificers"  attached  to  the  regiments.  In  the 
French  army  they  have  for  the  service  of  the  arsenals 
and  establishments,  one  hundred  and  forty-nine  "  ouv- 
riers,"  and  twelve  "  artificers  ;"  there  are  also  three  hun 
dred  and  sixty  "  ouvriers"  and  seventeen  "  armuriers" 
attached  to  the  corps  of  artillery,  making  in  all  five  hun 
dred  and  thirty-eight. 

IV.  Artillery  Troops. — Artillery,  as  an  arm  of  service, 
is  divided  in  the  same  manner  as  its  materiel;  the  field- 
artillery  being  intended  for  field  service,  and  the  garrison 
or  siege-artillery,  for  the  attack  and  defence  of  places. 
The  troops  of  the  artillery  corps  of  a  modern  army  usu 
ally  do  duty  either  in  the  field,  or  in  sieges,  or  garrison, 
as  occasion  may  require.  When  employed  in  the  service 
of  a  campaign,  artillery  is  usually  divided  into  two  class 
es :  1st.  Foot  Artillery;  and  2d.  Horse  Artillery. 


288  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

In  the  early  history  of  artillery,  as  has  already  been 
shown,  but  few  pieces  were  ever  brought  upon  the  battle 
field.  Charles  VIII.  crossed  the  Alps  with  a  pretty  large 
train ;  but  a  part  of  these  were  hand-guns,  and  but  very 
few  of  the  larger  pieces  were  ever  brought  into  battle  ; 
indeed,  it  was  then  thought  that  this  arm  would  be  of  little 
use  except  in  sieges.  At  the  battle  of  Gravelines  the 
army  of  Philip  II.  had  only  seventeen  pieces  of  artillery  ; 
and  at  the  battle  of  Ivry  the  French  had  only  four  pieces 
of  cannon,  and  two  culverins  :  the  army  of  the  League 
had  also  only  four  pieces.  At  the  battle  of  Moncontour 
the  opposing  armies  had  but  eight  pieces  each. 

Gustavus  Adolphus  of  Sweden  not  only  improved  the 
character  of  artillery,  but  also  gave  to  it  great  develop 
ment  as  an  arm  of  service.  At  the  battle  of  Breetenfield 
he  had  one  hundred  pieces  of  artillery,  great  and  small, 
and  at  the  camp  of  Nuremberg  he  numbered  about  three- 
hundred.  This  king  also  made  a  more  skilful  use  of  his 
cannon  by  uniting  them  more  in  mass  than  had  been  done 
by  his  predecessors  ;  his  system  was  nevertheless  very 
imperfect.  In  the  disposition  of  this  arm  on  the  field  of 
battle,  a  vast  improvement  was  made  by  Conde,  Turenne, 
and  Prince  Eugene  of  Savoy.  Frederick  the  Great 
also  made  great  use  of  this  arm,  and  was  the  first  to 
introduce  horse  artillery.  This  mode  of  using  field- 
pieces  has  peculiar  properties  which  in  many  circum 
stances  render  it  an  invaluable  arm.  The  promptness  and 
rapidity  of  its  movements  enable  it  to  act  with  other  troops 
without  embarrassing  them.  The  French  soon  introduced 
into  their  army  the  improvements  made  by  the  king  of 
Prussia,  and  in  1763  the  celebrated  Gribeauval  appeared. 
He  improved  the  form  of  the  cannon  and  greatly  dimin 
ished  the  weight  of  field  artillery,  giving  it  an  organ 
ization  which  has  been  but  slightly  changed  since  his 
time. 


ARTILLERY.  289 

The  successive  improvements  in  artillery  have  for  a 
long  time  constituted  a  prominent  feature  in  war.  The 
power  of  this  arm  to  throw  projectiles  to  a  great  distance, 
and  to  overturn  and  destroy  opposing  obstacles,  renders  it 
a  necessary  arm  on  the  battle-field,  and  a  strong  barrier 
and  safeguard  of  states.  It  is  an  essential  element  in  all 
army  organization. 

In  our  army  we  have  four  regiments  of  artillery,  form 
ing  the  basis  of  forty  batteries.  In  the  French  service 
there  are  fourteen  regiments,  forming  the  basis  of  two 
hundred  and  six  field  batteries. 

The  term  battery,  when  applied  to  artillery  as  an.  arm 
of  service,  refers  to  a  permanent  organization  of  a  certain 
number  of  cannon,  with  the  men  and  other  accessaries  re 
quired  to  serve  them.  This  is  the  unit  of  force  in  this 
arm.  The  regimental  organization  is  a  mere  nominal  ar 
rangement,  for  in  actual  service  artillery  acts  by  batteries, 
and  never  by  regiments.  Its  strength  is  therefore  invaria 
bly  estimated  by  the  number  of  its  batteries. 

A  battery  is  ordinarily  composed  of  six  pieces,  two  of 
them  being  howitzers.  The  lighter  batteries  would,  in 
our  service,  be  formed  of  six-pounder  guns  and  twelve- 
pounder  howitzers  ;  and  the  heavier  of  twelve-pounder 
guns  and  twenty-four-pounder  howitzers.  These  heavy 
batteries  would  usually  form  the  reserve.  Each  piece  be 
ing  attended  by  its  caisson,  this  formation  would  give 
twelve  carriages  to  each  battery,  six  for  the  guns  and  six 
for  the  caissons.  The  extra  caissons  form  a  part  of  the 
reserve,  and  move  with  the  train.  In  some  foreign  ser 
vices  a  battery  is  composed  of  eight  pieces  with  their 
caissons. 

This  arm  admits  of  three  formations — in  column,  in  battle, 
and  in  battery.  In  column  it  ordinarily  moves  by  sections 
of  two  pieces,  each  piece  being  followed  or  preceded  by 
its  caisson.  Columns  of  half-batteries  are  sometimes 

25 


290  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

formed,  and  also  columns  of  single  pieces  ;  but  the  lattei 
ought  never  to  be  employed  except  in  cases  of  necessity 
in  passing  a  narrow  defile,  and  at  a  distance  from  the 
enemy. 

In  order  of  battle,  the  pieces  are  drawn  up  in  line,  their 
caissons  forming  a  second  line,  at  the  distance  of  a  few 
paces. 

When  in  order  of  battery,  the  pieces  are  formed  in  the 
same  way  as  for  battle,  except  that  the  guns  are  directed 
towards  the  enemy  and  prepared  for  firing. 

The  movements  and  mano3uvres  of  foot  artillery  corre 
spond  with  those  of  infantry,  and  of  mounted  artillery  with 
those  of  cavalry,  a  battery  being  regarded  as  a  battalion  or 
squadron,  of  which  the  pieces  form  the  platoons.  Mounted 
batteries  can  seldom  move  with  greater  rapidity  than  the 
trot,  except  in  cases  of  emergency,  and  even  then  the 
gallop  can  be  kept  up  only  for  a  very  short  time  ;  but  this 
is  of  no  great  importance,  as  the  batteries  never  accom 
pany  cavalry  in  the  charge. 

The  French  and  German  writers  discuss  artillery  as 
employed  in  battle,  under  two  distinct  heads — 1st,  as  an 
arm  of  preparation,  and  2d,  as  an  arm  of  succor. 

I.  As  an  arm  of  preparation  it  serves,  1st,  to  protect  the 
deploying  of  the  other  troops  ;  2d,  to  disorganize  the  ene 
my's  masses,  and  to  facilitate  the  action  of  infantry  and 
cavalry,  by  weakening  the  intended  points  of  attack ;  3d, 
to  force  an  enemy  to  evacuate  a  position  by  overthrowing 
obstacles  with  which  he  has  covered  himself;  4th,  to 
keep  up  the  action  till  the  other  troops  can  be  prepared  to 
strike  the  decisive  blow. 

The  force  of  this  arm  depends  upon  the  rapidity  and 
accuracy  of  its  fire  ;  rash  valor  is  therefore  far  less  desi 
rable  in  artillery  than  skill,  patience,  and  cool  courage. 
Artillery  always  acts  at  a  distance,  and  in  mass ;  single 
pieces  are  seldom  employed,  except  to  cover  reconnoitring 


ARTILLERY.  291 

parties,  or  to  sustain  the  light  infantry  in  a  skirmish. 
Mounted  batteries  sometimes  approach  within  two  or 
three  hundred  yards  of  the  enemy's  infantry ;  but  this  is 
only  done  with  a  strong  support  of  other  troops,  and  to 
prepare  the  way  for  a  charge  of  cavalry.  The  batteries 
do  not  accompany  the  charge,  but  they  should  always 
follow  up  and  complete  the  success  ;  mounted  batteries 
are  particularly  useful  in  pursuit.  If  Murat,  in  1812,  had 
accompanied  his  attacks  upon  Neveroffskoi's  retreating 
columns  of  sixty  thousand  infantry  by  two  or  three  bat 
teries  of  mounted  artillery,  the  whole  column  must  have 
been  captured  or  destroyed. 

Artillery,  on  the  field  of  battle,  is  very  liable  to  allow 
its  fire  to  be  drawn,  and  its  projectiles  wasted,  while  the 
enemy  is  at  too  great  a  distance  to  be  reached.  It  is  a 
very  common  thing  in  a  battle,  to  employ  two  or  three 
pieces  of  heavy  calibre  at  the  beginning  of  the  fight,  in 
order  to  provoke  the  opposing  batteries  to  open  their  fire 
before  the  proper  time.  The  waste  of  material  is  not  the 
only  loss  attending  this  error ;  the  troops  are  fatigued  and 
disheartened,  while  the  courage  and  confidence  of  their 
opponents  are  always  revived  by  a  weak  and  inaccurate 
fire.  To  avoid  such  an  error  the  commanding  officer  of  a 
battery  of  artillery  should  be  perfectly  familiar  with  the 
effective  ranges  of  his  pieces,  and  accustomed  to  form  a 
correct  estimate  of  distances.  For  this  purpose  the  eye 
should  be  frequently  practised  in  time  of  peace  in  esti 
mating  the  ranges  for  different  calibres. 
The  effective  range  of  a  12-pounder  field-piece 

is  about  1000  yds. 

6         »  «  800    " 

24         «       howitzer,     600    " 
12         «  «  500    " 

grape  and  case  shot  is 

from     .      -  .         .  300  to  500    « 


292  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

Even  at  these  distances  the  aim  is  usually  so  inaccurate 
that  a  large  portion  of  the  projectiles  are  lost.  In  the  at 
tack  on  Spires,  a  whole  column  of  artillery  expended  its 
fire  while  at  a  distance  of  900  yards  from  the  enemy,  who, 
of  course,  received  little  or  no  injury.  In  firing  from  for 
tifications,  the  aim  is  far  more  accurate,  and  the  artillery 
may  therefore  be  employed  to  advantage  as  soon  as  the 
enemy  comes  within  the  longest  range. 

II.  As  an  arm  of  succor,  the  artillery  serves,  1st,  to  give 
impulsive  force  to  the  attacking  columns  ;  2d,  to  assist  in 
arresting,  or  at  least  in  retarding,  the  offensive  movements 
of  an  enemy  ;  3d,  to  protect  the  avenues  of  approach,  and 
to  defend  obstacles  that  cover  a  position  ;  and,  4th,  to 
cover  a  retrograde  movement. 

Mounted  artillery  is,  like  cavalry,  much  the  most  effec 
tive  in  attack ;  but  batteries  of  foot  are  better  calculated 
for  defence.  The  cannoniers  are  so  armed  as  to  be  capa 
ble  of  defending  their  pieces  to  the  last  extremity ;  they 
therefore  cannot  be  easily  captured  by  opposing  columns 
of  infantry.  "As  to  pretending  to  rush  upon  the  guns," 
says  Napoleon,  "  and  carry  them  by  the  bayonet,  or  to 
pick  off  the  gunners  by  musketry,  these  are  chimerical 
ideas.  Such  things  do  sometimes  happen ;  but  have  we 
not  examples  of  still  more  extraordinary  captures  by  a 
coup  de  main  ?  As  a  general  rule,  there  is  no  infantry,  how 
ever  intrepid  it  may  be,  that  can,  without  artillery,  march 
with  impunity  the  distance  of  five  or  six  hundred  toises, 
against  two  well-placed  batteries  (16  pieces)  of  cannon, 
served  by  good  gunners  ;  before  they  could  pass  over  two- 
thirds  of  the  way,  the  men  would  be  killed,  wounded,  or 
dispersed.  *  *  *  *  A  good  infantry  forms,  no  doubt,  the 
sinews  of  an  army ;  but  if  it  were  required  to  fight  for  a 
long  time  against  a  very  superior  artillery,  its  good  quality 
would  be  exhausted,  and  its  efficiency  destroyed.  In  the 
first  campaigns  of  the  wars  of  the  Revolution,  what  France 


ARTILLERY.  293 

had  in  the  greatest  perfection  was  artillery  ;  we  know  not 
a  single  instance  in  which  twenty  pieces  of  cannon,  judi 
ciously  placed,  and  in  battery,  were  ever  carried  by  the  bay 
onet.  In  the  affair  at  Valmy,  at  the  battles  of  Jemmapes, 
Nordlingen,  and  Fleurus,  the  French  had  an  artillery  su 
perior  to  that  of  the  enemy,  although  they  had  often  only 
two  guns  to  one  thousand  men  ;  but  that  was  because  their 
armies  were  very  numerous.  It  may  happen  that  a  gen 
eral,  more  skilful  in  mano3uvring,  more  expert  than  his  ad 
versary,  and  commanding  a  better  infantry,  may  obtain 
successes  during  a  part  of  a  campaign,  although  his  ar 
tillery  may  be  far  inferior  to  that  of  his  opponent ;  but  on 
the  critical  day  of  a  general  engagement,  his- inferiority  in 
point  of  metal  will  be  severely  felt." 

History  furnishes  us  numerous  examples  of  the  use  of 
artillery  in  protecting  avenues  of  approach : — such  as  the 
defile  of  Koesen  at  the  battle  of  Auerstedt ;  the  avenues 
between  the  redoubts  of  Pultowa,  &c.,  &c. 

When  an  army  is  forced  to  retreat,  it  covers  its  rear  by 
that  portion  of  its  cavalry  and  mounted  artillery  which  has 
suffered  least  during  the  battle.  By  placing  the  squadrons 
of  horse  and  the  light  batteries  in  echelon,  the  retiring 
column  may  be  well  protected.  The  artillery,  by  using 
the  prolonge,  may  also  continue  its  retreat  while  in  bat 
tery  and  firing.  It  was  in  this  way  that  at  the  battle  of 
Albuera,  in  1811,  the  French  artillery  on  the  left  wing 
held  in  check  the  right  and  centre  of  the  Anglo- Spaniards 
till  the  army  effected  its  retreat ;  the  artillery  then  retired 
in  echelons,  by  batteries  and  fractions  of  batteries,  under 
the  protection  of  the  cavalry. 

We  have  already  discussed,  under  the  general  head  of 
tactics,  the  position  and  use  of  artillery  on  the  battle-field 
a  few  additional  remarks  must  suffice. 

As  a  general  rule,  batteries  should  be  placed  in  positions 
from  which  they  can  employ  their  fire  to  advantage,  and 


294  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

also  be  free  to  move  in  any  direction  that  the  progress  of 
the  battle  may  require.  Advantage  should  always  be 
taken  of  natural  or  artificial  obstacles,  such  as  hedges, 
clumps  of  trees,  logs,  mounds  of  earthy  &c.,  to  cover  and 
conceal  the  guns  till  the  moment  they  open  their  fire.  El 
evated  positions  are,  contrary  to  the  common  opinion,  gen 
erally  unfavorable,  for  artillery  cannot  fire  to  advantage  at 
any  considerable  angle  of  depression.  The  slopes  in  front 
should  be  of  considerable  length,  otherwise  the  balls  would 
do  very  little  execution  upon  that  portion  of  the  column  of 
attack  which  occupied  the  valley.  The  ground  should 
also  be  smooth,  for  if  rough  the  balls  will  either  bury 
themselves  in  the  earth,  or  ricochet  at  a  high  angle  of  de 
flection,  thus  destroying  a  considerable  part  of  the  effect 
of  the  fire.  The  counterforts  or  spurs  of  hills  are  favora 
ble  for  artillery,  as  they  enable  it  to  see,  with  an  enfilading 
fire,  the  slopes  of  the  principal  range.  Batteries  should 
seldom  be  placed  so  as  to  fire  over  other  troops,  for  they 
will  not  only  be  intimidated  by  this  fire,  but  also  exposed 
to  the  opposing  fire  of  the  enemy's  artillery.  A  large  num 
ber  of  pieces  should  never  be  crowded  into  the  same  place, 
but  an  interval  should  be  left  between  the  guns  of  forty  or 
fifty  feet,  according  to  the  locality.  The  most  favorable 
position  for  this  arm  in  ordinary  ground,  is  in  the  intervals 
between  the  regiments  or  brigades  of  the  line,  and  far 
enough  in  advance  of  this  line  not  to  draw  upon  the  other 
troops  the  fire  of  the  enemy's  artillery.  The  flanks  of  the 
line  are  also  favorable  for  the  action  of  this  arm. 

Sometimes  artillery  has  been  employed  to  form  a  part 
of  the  line  of  battle ;  but  such  instances  are  exceptions, 
and  can  never  be  comprised  in  general  rules.  Whenever 
this  disposition  has  been  made,  it  has  resulted  from  the 
defective  character  of  the  other  arms,  or  from  some  pecu 
liar  circumstance  in  the  battle  which  enabled  a  "bold  and 
skilful  commander  to  deviate  from  the  ordinary  rules  of 


ARTILLERY 


295 


tactics.  Such  was  the  case  with  Napoleon  at  Wagram. 
In  Saxony,  in  1813,  he  was  several  times  obliged  to  sub 
stitute  his  artillery  to  supply  the  want  of  other  arms. 

In  the  defence  and  attack  of  field-works,  and  in  the 
passage  of  rivers,  artillery  plays  an  important  and  indis 
pensable  part ;  but  it  here  becomes  an  auxiliary  to  the  dis 
positions  of  the  engineers,  or  at  least  acts  in  concert  with 
that  arm. 

The  troops  of  artillery,  in  all  well-regulated  army  or 
ganizations,  should  equal  about  two-thirds  of  the  cavalry, 
or  one-seventh  of  the  infantry.* 

*  To  qualify  himself  for  the  duties  connected  with  his  arm  of  ser 
vice,  the  artillery  officer  must  make  himself  thoroughly  acquainted 
with  — 

The  Instruction  for  United  States  Field  Artillery,  horse  and  foot ; 

Capt.  Anderson's  Instruction  for  Garrison  Artillery; 

Kinsley's  Notes  on  Pyrotechny  ; 

Knowlton's  Notes  on  Gunpowder,  &c. ;  and 

The  writings  of  Thiroux  and  Piobert  on  theoretical  and  practical 
instruction,  and  the  writings  of  Jomini,  Decker,  and  Okouneff,  on  the 
use  of  this  arm  on  the  field  of  battle. 

The  following  list  of  books  of  reference  may  be  of  use  to  those  who 
wish  to  make  themselves  perfectly  familiar  with  all  the  branches  of 
artillery. 

Histoire  general  de  Vartillerie.     Brunet. 

L'artillerie  d  cheval  dans  les  combats  de  cavalerie.  Par  un  officier 
de  1'artillerie  Prussienne. 

Considerations  et  experiences  sur  le  tir  des  obus  d  holies.  Bor- 
mann. 

Essai  sur  les  obusiers.     Dusaert. 

Essai  sur  I 'organisation  de  Vartillerie.     Le  Bourg. 

Traite  sur  Vartillerie,  (traduit  de  1'Allemaud.)     Rouvroy, 

Bombardier  Fran^ais.     Belidor. 

Memoires  d'ar  tiller  ie.     St.  Remy. 

Essai  sur  Vusagc  de  Vartillerie  dans  la  guerre  de  campagno  ft 
celle  de  siege.  Dupuget. 

Memoires  sur  les  nouneaux  systemes  d'artilleric.     St.  Aubin. 

Treatise  on  Artillery.     Miiller. 


296  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

Artificial  Fire-Works.    Jones. 

Table  de  tir  les  canons  et  obusicrs.     Lombard. 

On  Gunpowder.    Antoni. 

Recherches  sur  Vartillerie  en  general.     Texier  de  Norbec. 

Description  de  I'art  defabriquer  les  canons.     Monge. 

Precedes  de  la  fabrication  des  armes  blanches.     Vandermoude. 

Manuel  de  rartilleitr.     Durtubie. 

Trait e  du  mouvement  des  projectiles.     Lombard. 

Treatise  on  Artillery.     Scheel.     (Translated  from  the  German.) 

Trait  e  pratique  des  feux  d' artifice.     Morel. 

Manuel  du  canonnier  marin.     Cornibert. 

New  Principles  of  Gunnery.     Robins. 

Memoires  sur  la  fabrication  des  armes  portatives.     Cotty. 

Recherches  sur  la  poudre.     Cossigny. 

Supplement.     Cossigny. 

Fabrication  de  la  poudre.     Renaud. 

American  Artillerist's  Companion.     Toussard. 

Tables  des  portees  des  canons  et  canonades  de  la  marine.     Cor* 
nibert. 

Traite  d'artijices  de  guerre.     Bigot. 

Tarite  elementaire  de  la  fabrication  des  bouches  a  feu.     Dartein. 

Traite  de  Vart  defabriquer  la  poudre  a  canon.     Bottle  et  RifFault. 
Hart  du  salpetrier.     Bottee  et  Riffault. 
Dictionary  of  Artillery.     Hoyer.     (German.) 
New  Experiments  on  Gunnery.     Hutton — (Hutton's  Tracts.) 
Des  bois  propres  au  service  des  Arsenaux.     Herbin  de  Halles. 
Instruction  sur  le  service  de  Vartillerie.     Hulot. 
Manoeuvres  de  force.     Bigot. 
Balistique.     Obenheim. 

Treatise  on  Artillery.     German.     Scharnhorst.     (Translated  into 
French,  1840.) 

Essai  sur  I'art  de  pointer.     Poumet. 

Refiexions  sur  la  fabrication  des  bouches  a  feu.     Lamartillibre. 
Memoir  e  sur  la  planchette  du  canonnier.     Obenheim. 
Aide-Memoire.     Gassendi. 

Observations  on  the  use  of  Artillery  at  the  sieges  of  Badajos,  St. 
Sebastian,  tyc. 

Treatise  on  Artillery.     Lallemand. 
Siemens  de  pyrotechnic.     Ruggieri. 
Nouvclle  force  maritime.     Paixhans. 
Dictionnaire  d'artillerie.     Cotty. 


ARTILLERY  297 

Rechcrches  balistiques.     Coste. 

Poudres  fulminantes.     Vergnaud. 

Manuel  de  la  metallurgie  dufer.     Culmarv 

Pyrotechnic  militaire,  (traduit  de  1' Alleraand,  par  R.  de  Peretsdorff.) 

Journal  des  Sciences  Militaires. 

Pyrotechny.     Cutbush. 

Traite  elementaire  d'artillerie.     Decker. 

Fusees  de  guerre.     Montgery. 

Documens  sur  la  matiere  a  canons.     Hervd. 

Observations  sur  le  nouveau  systeme  d'artillerie.     Allix. 

Systeme  d'artillerie  de  campagne.     Allix. 

Pocket  Gunner.     Adye. 

On  the  Rocket  System.     Congreve 

Essai  sur  I' art  des  f antes.     Serres 

Receuil  de  Memoires  sur  la  poudre  a  canon.     Proust. 

Manorial  de  I'artilleur  marin.     Michel. 

Observations  sur  le  nouveau  systeme  de  I'artillerie.     Poumet 

Memorial  d'artillerie. 

British  Gunner.     Spearman. 

Regies  de  pointage  a  bord  des  vaisseaux.     Moiitgery. 

Manuel  du  maitre  de  forges.     Landrin. 

Naval  Gunnery.    Douglass. 

Metallurgie  du  fer  (traduit  de  1'Allemand,  par  Culmaii.)  Kar- 
sten. 

4.ide-Mernoire  a  Vusage  des  officers  d'artillerie.     (Strasbourg.) 

Traite  de  V  organisation  et  de  la  tactique  de  I'artillerie,  (traduit  de 
1'Allemand  par  Peretsdorff.)  Grewenitz. 

Supplement  au  dictionnaire  d'artillerie.     Cotty. 

Memoir  on  Gunpowder.     Braddock. 

Manuel  de  I'armurier.     Paulin-Desormeaux. 

Journal  des  armes  speciales. 

Cours  sur  le  service  des  officiers  dans  les  fonderies.     Serres. 

Experiences  sur  la  fabrication  et  la  duree  des  bouches  a  feu  en 
fer  et  bronze,  (traduit  de  1'Allemand  par  Peretsdorff.)  Meyer. 

Applications  du  fer  aux  constructions  de  I' artillerie.     Thierry 

Aide-Memoire  d'art  militaire.     Lebas. 

Memorial  a  Vusage  de  I'armee  Beige. 

Instructions  and  Regulations  for  the  service  and  management  of 
heavy  ordnance  in  the  British  service. 

Experiences  sur  les  principes  du  tir,  faites  &,  Metz,  en  1834. 

Traite  d'artillerie  theorique  et  pratique.     Piobert. 


29$  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

Aide-Memoire  a  Vusage  des  officiers  d'artillerie,  (avec  approbation 
du  comite  d'artillerie.) 

Manuel  d'artillerie  a  Vusage  des  officiers  de  la  Republique  Hel- 
vetique.  Bonaparte,  (Napoleon  Louis.) 

Experiences  comparatives  entre  des  bouckes  a  feu  en  fonte  defer, 
d'origine  Frangaise,  Anglaise  et  Suidoise,  faites  &  Gavres,  en  1836. 

Experiences  faites  a  Brest  en  1831,  sur  les  canons.     Paixhans. 

Essai  sur  I' organisation  de  V artillerie.     Le  Bourg. 

Experiences  sur  des  projectiles  creux,  faites  en  1829,  '30,  '31. 

Instruction  pratique  sur  I'emploi  des  projectiles,  (traduit  de  1'Alle- 
mand  par  Peretsdorff.)  Decker. 

Effects  of  heavy  ordnance  as  applied  to  ships  of  war.     Simmons. 

Experiences  sur  lespoudres  de  guerre,  faites  a  Esquerdes,  en  1832, 
'33,  '34,  and  '35.  Maguin. 

Cours  d'artillerie  a  Vusage  des  sous -officiers.     De  Crepy. 

Instruction  theorique  et  pratique  d'artillerie,  a  1'usage  des  Sieves 
de  St.  Cyr.  Thiroux. 

Cours  sur  le  service  des  officiers  d'artillerie  dans  les  forges. 

Manuel  historique  de  la  technologic  des  armes  a  feu,  (traduit  de 
1'Allemand  par  M.  Rieffel.)  Meyer. 

Formules  relatives  aux  effets  du  tir  sur  affut.     Poisson. 

Manuel  de  I'artificer.    Vergnaud. 

Etat  actuel  de  I'artillerie  de  campagne  de  toutes  les  puissances 
de  I' 'Europe,  (traduit  par  Maze  ;  Ire  partie,  Artillerie  Anglaise.)  Ja- 
cobi.  (Six  other  parts  have  been  published  in  German,  containing  de 
scriptions  of  the  French,  Belgian,  Hessian,  Wirtemburg,  Nassau,  and 
Swedish  systems.) 

Introduction  d  I'etude  de  V artillerie.     Madelaine. 
Cours  sur  le  service  des  officiers  d'artillerie  dans  les  fonder ies. 

Description  de  la  fabrication  desbouches  d  feu  d  la  fonderie  royale 
de  Liege.  Huguenm. 

Poudre  d  canon.     Timmerhans. 

Procedes  de  fabrication  dans  les  forges,  (extrait  du  cours  sur  le  ser 
vice  des  officiers  dans  les  forges.) 

Renseignements  sur  le  materiel  de  I'artillerie  navale  de  la  Grande 
Bretagne.  Zeni  et  des  Hays. 

Theorie  des  affuts  et  des  voitures  de  V artillerie.  Migout  et  Bergory 

Artillerist's  Manual     Griffith. 

Handbuchfur  die  K.  K.Oesterreichische  Artillerie  Offiziere,  (man 
ual  for  the  Austrian  artillery  officers.) 

Sammlungvon  Steindruckzeichnungen  der  Preussischen  Artillerie, 


ARTILLERY.  299 

mit  Erlauterungen,  (collection  of  plates  of  the  Prussian  artillery,  with 
explanatory  text.) 

Histoiri  des  fusees  de  guerre. 

Ordnance  Manual,  for  the  use  of  the  officers  of  the  United  States 
Army. 

Experiments  on  Gunpowder.     Capt.  Mordecai. 

Pyrotechny,  for  the  use  of  the  Cadets  at  the  United  States  Military 
Academy.  Kinsley. 

Notes  on  Gunpowdet,  Percussion  Powder,  Cannon,  and  Projec 
tiles.  Lt.  Knowlton. 


300  St  LITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 


CHAPTER   XII, 

ARMY  ORGANIZATION ENGINEERS. 

Engineers. — The  term  engineer  is  derived  from  the  un- 
classical  Latin  word  ingenium,  which  was  applied  bofh  to 
a  machine  and  the  mind  or  skill  of  the  person  who  devised 
or  constructed  it. 

It  was  Philip  Augustus,  say  the  French  writers,  who 
first  introduced  engineers  (engigneurs,  or  engignours,  as 
they  were  called)  into  France,  and  restored  the  art  of 
sieges.  The  engineers  of  that  age  were  seldom  charged 
with  the  construction  of  works  of  military  defence,  but, 
like  Archimedes  at  Syracuse,  and  Longinus  at  Palmyra, 
they  directed  their  attention  principally  to  devising  imple 
ments  of  war  and  the  most  effective  manner  of  using  them. 
Engines  of  war  were  at  that  time  divided  between  the  en 
gigneurs  and  the  artilliers,  the  former  being  charged  with 
the  heavier  machines,  and  the  latter  with  the  smaller  wea 
pons  used  for  throwing  projectiles.  After  the  invention 
of  gunpowder,  the  old  battering-rams,  cranes,  helipoles, 
&c.,  disappeared,  and  with  them  the  engigneurs,  or  mas 
ters  of  engines.  The  new  inventions  were  united  with 
the  few  old  projectile  machines  that  remained  in  the  artil 
lery,  and  the  engineers  were  for  a  time  left  almost  with 
out  employment.  The  revival  of  the  art  of  fortification 
was  very  slow,  and  the  modern  system  scarcely  began  to 
be  developed  till  near  the  sixteenth  century. 

We  must  omit  for  the  present  giving  even  an  outline  of 


ENGINEERS.  301 

the  history  of  military  engineering,  and  pass  to  the  troops 
of  this  arm,  as  constituting  an  essential  element  of  an 
army  organization.  The  subject  of  fortification,  and  the 
history  of  its  various  changes,  will  be  examined  in  the 
next  chapter. 

The  engineers,  in  modern  army  organization,  constitute 
the  fourth  arm  of  service,  as,  compared  with  artillery, 
their  relative  numbers  are  about  as  two  to  three.  They 
are  divided  in  the  same  manner  as  the  artillery,  viz. :  — 
1st,  the  staff;  2d,  guards,  or  fort-keepers  ;  3d,  artificers  ; 
and  4th,  the  troops. 

I.  The  officers  constituting  the  staff  of  this  corps  are 
charged  in  time  of  peace  with  planning,  constructing,  and 
repairing  all  fortifications  and  other  defensive  works  ;  the 
construction  and  preparation  of  all  military  materials,  and 
stores  connected  with  this  arm ;  and  (in  our  service) 
with  the  disbursements  of  money  connected  with  these 
operations  :  in  time  of  war  they  are  charged  with  the  at 
tack  and  defence  of  military  works,  the  laying  out  and 
construction  of  field  defences,  redoubts,  intrerichments, 
roads,  &c. ;  in  the  attack  they  form  a  part  of  the  van 
guard,  to  remove  obstructions  ;  and  in  retreat  they  form  a 
part  of  the  rear-guard,  to  erect  obstacles,  destroy  roads, 
bridges,  &c.,  so  as  to  retard  an  enemy's  pursuit. 

From  the  important  character  of  these  duties  as  con 
nected  with  the  means  essential  to  a  national  defence,  and 
the  vast  amount  of  money  expended  in  these  operations, 
it  is  evident  that  a  high  order  of  acquirements  should  be 
deemed  necessary  to  qualify  one  to  perform  the  duties  of 
a  military  engineer.  This  officer  requires  a  knowledge 
of  chemistry,  to  guide  his  choice  of  materials  for  mortars, 
cements,  and  mastics  ;  of  mineralogy  and  geology,  for 
selecting-  stone  ;  of  botany,  for  timber  and  the  means  of 
preventing  its  decay ;  of  mathematics,  in  laying  out  his 
work  and  calculating  the  thickness  and  stability  of  his 


302  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

walls,  embankments,  &c.  ;  of  mechanical  philosophy,  it 
constructing  his  machinery ;  of  military  engineering,  in 
his  plans  of  fortifications  ;  and  of  all  the  higher  branches 
of  military  science,  in  selecting  positions  for  these  works, 
such  that  they  shall  have  the  proper  relations  to  the  means 
of  national  defence,  and  to  the  grand  operations  of  armies 
in  the  field.  The  avenues  to  appointment  to  this  corps 
are  guarded,  in  most  European  armies,  with  special  care, 
to  prevent  the  influence  of  money,  politics,  or  family  con 
nections  ;  and  in  our  own  army  it  is  now  specified  by  law 
of  Congress,  that  the  vacancies  shall  be  filled  only  from  the 
most  distinguished  graduates  of  the  military  academy. 
Formerly  our  service  suffered  most  severely  from  the  em 
ployment  of  incompetent  persons,  introduced  through 
political  influence  from  civil  life,  and  foreign  charlatans, 
the  refuse  of  European  armies.  Many  of  our  earlier 
military  works  (as  will  be  mentioned  hereafter)  were 
modelled  upon  systems  for  a  long  time  discarded  by  the 
profession  in  Europe,  and  even  some  of  those  which  have 
been  constructed  within  the  last  thirty  years  are  made  of 
such  wretched  materials  and  workmanship  that  they  are 
already  crumbling  into  ruins.  While  the  existing  laws 
and  regulations  seem  well  calculated  to  prevent  the  recur 
rence  of  similar  abuses  and  errors,  it  nevertheless  can  be 
shown  that  the  organization  of  this  arm  of  our  service  re 
quires  modifications  and  extensions  to  give  it  the  requisite 
degree  of  efficiency,  and  to  economize  the  public  expen 
ditures. 

The  wars  of  Louis  XIV.  first  led  to  a  regular  military  or 
ganization,  and  a  regular  system  of  defence.  In  these  wars 
the  engineers  received  great  development,  and  have  ever 
since  occupied  a  prominent  position  as  parts  of  an  army  or 
ganization.  We  therefore  find  in  all  the  great  sieges  and 
battles  of  this  era  a  large  and  continually  increasing  number 
of  engineers  and  engineer  troops,  this  force  being  grad- 


ENGINEERS.  303 

Dally  augmented  as  the  true  principles  of  war  became 
better  understood,  and  as  the  wants  of  the  service  required. 
Even  in  the  earliest  of  these  battles  we  find  the  engineers 
taking  a  prominent  and  distinguished  part.  In  the  war 
of  1688,  twenty-four  engineers  were  killed  and  wounded 
at  the  siege  of  Philipsbourg,  eighteen  at  Namur,  eight  at 
Huy,  ten  at  Charleroi,  eight  at  Ath,  thirty  at  Barcelona, 
&c.  Such  losses  were  good  proofs  of  the  usefulness  of 
these  officers,  and  before  this  war  was  closed,  their  num 
ber  was  increased  to  six  hundred;  and  in  1706  the  army 
contained  eight  brigades  of  engineers  and  four  companies 
of  miners. 

The  engineer  corps  being  partially  disbanded  in  the  early 
part  of  the  French  Revolution,  great  difficulty  was  experi 
enced  in  reorganizing  it  and  in  finding  competent  men  to 
supply  the  places  of  those  who  had  been  driven  into  exile  or 
sacrificed  during  the  reign  of  terror.  Energy  and  activity, 
combined  with  republican  zeal,  could  supply  the  place  of 
skill  in  the  other  arms,  but  the  science  of  the  engineer 
could  not  be  acquired  in  a  day. 

In  1799,  the  staff  of  the  engineer  corps  consisted  of 
four  hundred  and  forty-nine  officers,  without  including  tho 
general  officers,  commanding  departments,  or  those  con 
nected  with  the  engineer  troops.  The  same  organization 
was  continued  in  1804.  The  engineer  staff  of  the  French 
army  now  numbers  four  hundred  and  thirty-two  officers. 
We  have  in  our  service  forty-three  engineer  officers,  for 
staff  duty,  who  are  now  engaged  in  the  construction  and 
repairs  of  some  sixty  or  seventy  fortifications,  and  other 
works  of  a  civil  and  military  character. 

II.  Engineer  Guards,  or  Fort-Keepers,  are  a  class  of 
men  charged  with  the  general  care  of  forts,  and  all  public 
property  deposited  in  the  several  engineer  depots  and 
garrisons,  and  in  the  public  works  during  their  construction. 

There  are  five  hundred  and  fifty  of  these  "gardes  du 


304  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

Genie"  in  the  French  army,  who  rank  next  the  sub-lieuten« 
ants  of  engineers,  and  are  assimilated  with  the  sub-lieu 
tenants  of  infantry  in  the  hospitals,  marches,  &c.  In  our 
service  we  have  no  engineer  guards  or  fort-keepers. 

This  defect  in  our  organization  has  been  the  cause  of 
serious  inconvenience,  and  the  consequent  waste  of  public 
property.  The  expense  of  hiring  civil  agents  for  this 
purpose  has  more  than  trebled  the  cost  of  supporting  a 
suitable  number  of  non-commissioned  guards  to  maintain 
the  good  order  and  efficiency  of  our  forts,  in  the  absence 
of  engineer  officers,  and  to  preserve  and  keep  in  repair 
the  military  implements  and  stores  connected  with  this 
department  of  the  army.  It  has  already  been  shown  that 
we  have  fifty-eight  of  these  guards  for  the  artillery  service, 
and  it  really  seems- somewhat  singular  that  the  engineers, 
with  a  much  greater  amount  of  public  property  in  their 
charge,  are  allowed  no  assistants  of  this  kind. 

III.  Engineer  artificers  are  a  class  of  men  employed  in 
the  practical  operations  of  constructing  forts  and  other 
military  defences,  and  in  making  and  repairing  all  the  im 
plements  used  by  the  engineer  troops  in  the  operations  of 
sapping  and  mining,  in  crossing  rivers,  in  constructing 
field-defences,  and  in  the  attack  and  defence  of  field- 
works. 

As  very  few  new  fortifications  are  now  required  in 
France,  the  services  of  engineer  artificers  are  less  neces 
sary  and  important  than  in  our  service,  where  large  sums 
of  money  are  annually  expended  upon  military  defences. 
There  are,  however,  in  the  French  army  a  corps  of  en 
gineer  artificers,  consisting  of  eight  officers  and  a  cadre  of 
fifty-four  non-commissioned  officers,  with  a  variable  num 
ber  of  privates,  organized  into  two  companies.  But  in 
our  army  we  have  no  regular  engineer  artificers !  In  our 
Artillery  service  we  have  three  hundred  and  thirty  enlist 
ed  artillery  artificers.  If  these  are  useful  and  necessary 


ENGINEERS.  305 

to  the  artillery  service,  which  no  one  doubts,  for  still 
stronger  reasons  would  it  be  advantageous  to  the  public 
sendee  to  employ  at  least  an  equal  number  of  enlisted  en 
gineer  artificers  on  our  fortifications  ;  for  the  annual  ex 
penditure  of  public  money  is  here  much  greater  than  in 
the  corresponding  branch  of  the  artillery  service. 

IV.  Engineer  troops  are  divided  into    three    classes — 
1st,  sappers  and  pioneers;  2d,  miners;  and  3d,  pontoniers. 

In  the  French  army  of  1799,  there  were  four  battalions  of 
sappers,  consisting  of  120  officers  and  7,092  men.  In  1804, 
Napoleon  organized  five  battalions  of  these  troops,  consist 
ing  of  165  officers  and  8,865  men.  Even  this  number  was 
found  insufficient  in -his  campaigns  in  Germany  and  Spain, 
and  he  was  obliged  to  organize  an  additional  number  of 
sappers  from  the  Italian  and  French  auxiliaries.  The 
pioneers  were  then  partly  attached  to  other  branches  of 
the  service.  There  is,  at  present,  in  the  French  army  a 
considerable  number  of  sappers  or  pioneers  detached  for 
the  service  of  the  infantry  regiments,  three  companies  of 
sapeurs-conducteurs,  and  forty-two  companies  of  sapeurs. 
In  the  French  army  of  1799,  there  were  six  companies 
of  miners,  consisting  of  24  officers  and  576  men.  In  1804, 
Napoleon  increased  these  troops  to  nine  companies,  con 
taining  36  officers  and  864  men.  The  present  French 
peace  establishment  contains  six  companies  of  miners, 
organized  much  the  same  as  under  Napoleon.  In  the 
French  army  of  1799  there  were  two  regiments  of  pon 
toniers,  of  38  officers  and  960  men.  But  this  number  was 
found  too  small  in  the  remaining  campaigns,  and  the  de 
ficiency  was  temporarily  supplied  by  organizing  sailors 
for  these  duties.  In  the  present  French  army  organiza 
tion,  there  are  eleven  companies  of  pontoniers,  forming  a 
regiment  of  sixty-three  officers. 

We  have  in  our  service  no  sappers,  miners,  or  pontoniers^- 
md,  in  case  of  war,  would  be  found  without  the  means  of 


306  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

executing  any  military  works,  or  performing  any  military 
operation  which  would  require  engineer  troops. 

In  the  preliminary  stages  of  army  organization  under 
Louis  XIV.,  infantry  troops  were  detailed  as  sappers,- and 
instructed  in  these  duties  by  the  engineers.  This  irregu 
larity  of  service  soon  caused  difficulties  and  losses,  and 
the  evils  springing  from  it  were  so  great,  that  Vauban  ur 
ged  the  propriety  of  a  separate  organization.  In  1670 
he  officially  recommended  to  the  king  to  establish  a  regi 
ment  of  twelve  hundred  sappers  and  ouvriers,  and  in  a  sub 
sequent  report  on  the  value  of  these  troops,  used  the  fol 
lowing  language  :  "  They  would  be  useful  in  peace  as 
well  as  in  war,  and  would  be  the  means  of  saving  much  in 
all  fortifications  where  they  should  be  employed.  In  fact, 
I  have  not  the  least  doubt  that  they  would  save  annually 
to  the  king  much  more  than  their  pay.  I  assert  all  I  have 
said  on  this  subject  with  as  much  confidence  as  if  I  had 
seen  the  result ;  and  I  can,  with  the  same  certainty,  add, 
that  this  small  troop  will  be  the  means  of  saving  large 
numbers  of  good  engineers  and  brave  officers  and  soldiers, 
from  the  stern  necessity  to  which  we  are  reduced  of  ex 
posing,  almost  always,  the  laborers  and  those  who  support 
them ;  which  necessity  would  not  arise  had  we  at  com 
mand  a  sufficient  number  of  this  kind  of  workmen  well  in 
structed.  To  such  a  degree  have  I  felt  the  necessity  of 
sappers,  at  every  siege  at  which  I  have  been  present,  that 
I  have  always  had  reason  to  repent  of  not  having  more 
urgently  solicited  the  creation  of  this  company." 

Such  are  the  views  of  he  greatest  of  military  engi 
neers,  a  man  who  fought  one  hundred  and  forty  battles, 
conducted  fifty-eight  sieges,  and  built  or  repaired  three 
hundred  fortifications.  His  anticipations  of  the  useful 
ness  of  engineer  troops  were  fully  realized,  and  they  have 
ever  since  received  the  most  careful  attention,  and  now 
form,  as  has  just  been  shown,  one  of  the  most  important 


ENGINEERS. 


30? 


and  efficient  arms  in  the  French  service.  The  fortifi 
cations  constructed  by  the  engineers,  as  organized  by 
Yauban,  have  ever  since  constituted  one  of  the  principal 
elements  of  the  French  military  power. 

In  the  wars  of  Napoleon  there  are  innumerable  instan 
ces  in  illustration  of  the  delays  and  disasters  attending  the 
operations  of  armies  not  supplied  with  engineer  troops  ; 
and,  on  the  other  hand,  the  advantages  resulting  from  their 
services  when  properly  organized  and  instructed.  We 
have  already  pointed  out  the  influence  which  the  fortifica 
tions  in  the  hands  of  the  French  exerted  on  the  results  of 
these  wars,  and  the  fatal  consequences  to  the  Allies  of 
neglecting  these  works  of  national  defence.  Every  stu 
dent  of  military  history  will  immediately  call  to  mind  the 
influence  of  Savona,  Coni,  Mondovi,  Cera,  Govi,  Ales 
sandria,  Tortona,  Pizzighitone,  Peschiera,  Mantua,  Palma- 
Nuova,  Osopo,  Klagenfurth,  &c.,  in  the  campaigns  of 
1796-7 ;  of  Genoa,  Fort  Bard,  the  fortifications  of  the 
Var,  Ulm,  Ingoldstadt,  &c.,  in  1800  ;  of  Milan,  Turin, 
Mantua,  Roco  d'Aufo,  Genoa,  Alessandria,  &c.,in  1805; 
the  importance  of  Kehl,  Cassel,  Wesel,  &c.,  to  the  French 
in  1806,  and  the  fatal  consequences  to  the  Prussians  in 
that  campaign,  of  their  total  and  culpable  neglect  of  their 
own  fortifications. 

All  military  historians  speak  of  the  influence  of  fortifi 
cations  in  the  Peninsular  campaigns:  those  which  had 
been  given  up  to  Napoleon  previous  to  the  opening  of 
hostilities,  contributed  very  much  to  the  success  of  his 
arms,  while  those  which  were  retained  by  Spain  and  her 
allies,  contributed  in  an  equal  degree  to  hamper  and  em 
barrass  his  operations.  Some  of  these,  like  Saragossa 
and  Tarragona,  with  their  broken  walls  and  defective  ar 
maments,  kept  the  enemy  in  check  some  sixty  days  each, 
and  did  much  to  weaken  the  French  power  in  the  Penin- 
•ula. 


308  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

Temporary  or  field-fortifications  also  had  an  important 
influence  here.  The  lines  of  Torres- Vedias,  the  field- 
works  of  Ronda,  the  intrenched  camps  of  the  Pyrenees, 
Bayonne,  Toulouse,  &c.,  are  examples  under  this  head. 
In  fact,  field-works  played  a  most  important  part  in  all  of 
Napoleon's  wars.  We  might  mention  the  redoubt  of  Mon- 
tenotte,  the  intrenchments  at  Milesimo,  the  batteries  of 
Lobau,  the  field-defences  of  Hougomont,  La  Haye-Sainte, 
and  Papelotte  at  Waterloo,  and  numerous  other  cases 
equally  striking.  Just  before  the  battle  of  Waterloo,  Wel 
lington  employed  some  eighteen  thousand  peasants  and 
two  thousand  horses,  under  the  direction  of  British  of 
ficers  of  engineers.  In  speaking  of  these  defences,  Colo 
nel  Pasley  says  :  "  It  may  be  easily  conceived  that  to 
have  directed  such  a  great  body  of  workmen  to  proper  ad 
vantage,  by  means  of  a  few  officers  of  engineers,  would 
have  been  impossible,  but  for  the  system  adopted  of  sub 
dividing  the  various  works  among  the  non-commissioned 
officers  and  privates  of  the  engineer  troops,  each  of  whom 
was  made  responsible  for  laying  out  the  details  of  his  own 
portion,  and  for  the  direction  of  a  party  of  from  twenty  to 
one  hundred  men,  or  even  more,  according  to  circum 
stances." 

But  to  return  to  the  Peninsular  war.  These  campaigns 
exhibit  in  strong  colors  the  advantages  derived,  on  the  one 
side,  from  a  well-organized  engineer  corps,  and  the  losses, 
delays,  and  defects  suffered  on  the  other,  until  the  defects 
of  the  organization  were  remedied.  Napoleon  entered 
Spain  with  a  well-appointed  army,  and  soon,  through 
strategy  and  well-directed  force,  gained  possession  of  the 
important  fortresses  of  the  Peninsula ;  seizing  in  this 
way  the  strategic  routes  and  important  geographical  points, 
he  was  enabled  to  retain  possession  of  the  country  for 
eight  years,  in  spite  of  the  numerous  forces  arrayed  against 
him,  the  absence  of  himself  and  his  best  generals  in  Ger- 


ENGINEERS.  309 

many,  and  the  great  inefficiency  of  Joseph  and  of  many  of  his 
generals.  These  fortifications  were  old,  and  of  strength 
inferior  to  modern  works  of  defence,  but  it  required  years 
and  the  expenditure  of  millions  in  blood  and  treasure 
to  expel  from  the  country  those  who  had  possession  of 
them. 

For  the  first  five  years  of  this  war  the  English  strug 
gled  with  a  most  imperfect  army  organization.*  When 
"  the  first  serious  siege,"  says  Napier,  was  undertaken  by 
the  British  army,  "  to  the  discredit  of  the  English  govr 
ernment,  no  army  was  ever  so  ill  provided  with  the  means 
of  prosecuting  such  an  enterprise.  The  engineer  officers 
were  exceedingly  zealous  ;  and  many  of  them  were  well 
versed  in  the  theory  of  their  business.  But  the  ablest 
trembled  when  reflecting  on  their  utter  destitution  of  all 
that  belonged  to  real  service.  Without  a  corps  of  sap 
pers  and  miners,  without  a  single  private  who  knew  how 
to  carry  on  an  approach  under  fire,  they  were  compelled 
to  attack  fortresses  defended  by  the  most  warlike,  prac 
tised,  and  scientific  troops  of  the  age. 

"  The  best  officers  and  finest  soldiers  were  obliged  to 
sacrifice  themselves  in  a  lamentable  manner,  to  compen 
sate  for  the  negligence  and  incapacity  of  a  government, 
always  ready  to  plunge  the  nation  into  war,  without  the 

*In  a  letter  dated  February  llth,  1812,  Wellington  wrote  to  the 
Secretary  of  State  as  follows : — "  I  would  beg  leave  to  suggest  to 
your  lordship  the  expediency  of  adding  to  the  engineer  establishment 
a  corps  of  sappers  and  miners.  It  is  inconceivable  with  what  disad 
vantages  we  undertake  any  thing  like  a  siege  for  want  of  assistance 
of  this  description.  There  is  no  French  corps  d'armee  which  has  not 
a  battalion  of  sappers  and  a  company  of  miners ;  but  we  are  obliged 
to  depend  for  assistance  of  this  description  upon  the  regiments  of  the 
line  ;  and  although  the  men  are  brave  and  willing,  they  want  the 
knowledge  and  training  which  are  necessary.  Many  casualties  among 
them  consequently  occur,  and  much  valuable  time  is  lost  at  the  most 
critical  period  of  the  siege." 


310  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

slightest  care  of  what  was  necessary  to  obtain  success. 
The  sieges  carried  on  by  the  British  in  Spain  were  a 
succession  of  butcheries  ;  because  the  commonest  mate 
rials,  and  the  means  necessary  to  their  art,  were  denied 
the  engineers."  Colonel  J.  T.  Jones  writes  in  nearly 
the  same  terms  of  the  early  sieges  in  the  Peninsula,  and 
with  respect  to  the  siege  of  Badajos,  adds  in  express 
terms,  that  "  a  body  of  sappers  and  miners,  and  the  ne 
cessary  fascines  and  gabions,  would  have  rendered  the 
reduction  of  the  work  certain."*  Soon  after  this  siege  a 
body  of  engineer  troops  arrived  from  England,  but  their 
number  was  insufficient,  and  Wellington,  having  learned 
by  sad  experience  the  importance  of  engineer  troops,  or 
dered  a  body  of  two  hundred  volunteers  to  be  detached 
from  the  line,  "  and  daily  instructed  in  the  practice  of 
sapping,  making  and  laying  fascines  and  gabions,  and  the 
construction  of  batteries,  &c."  The  siege  of  Ciudad 
Rodrigo,  which  immediately  followed  this  organization, 
was  conducted  with  greater  skill  and  success  than  any 
other  till  nearly  the  close  of  the  war ;  and  all  military 
writers  have  attributed  this  result  to  the  greater  efficiency 
of  the  engineer  force  engaged  in  the  siege.  This  arm 
was  now  gradually  increased,  and  the  last  year  of  the 
war  the  engineer  force  with  the  English  army  in  the  field 
consisted  of  seventy-seven  officers,  seven  assistant-engi- 
n  ers  and  surveyors,  four  surgeons  and  assistants,  one 
thousand  six  hundred  and  forty-six  sappers,  miners,  arti 
ficers,  &£.,  one  thousand  three  hundred  and  forty  horses 
and  one  hundred  and  sixty  carriages. 

During  all  this  time  the  French  furnished  their  armies 

*  Colonel  Pasley  states  that  only  one  and  a  half  yards  of  excava 
tion,  per  man,  was  executed  in  a  whole  night,  by  the  untrained 
troops  in  the  Peninsular  war ;  whereas  an  instructed  sapper  can 
easily  accomplish  this  in  twenty  minutes,  and  that  it  has  been  done 
by  one  of  his  most  skilful  sappers,  at  Chatham,  in  seven  minutes  ! 


ENGINEERS.  311 

in  Spain  with  well-organized  engineer  forces.  We  have 
endeavored  to  form  a  comparison  of  the  number  of  French 
engineers  and  artillerists  employed  on  these  peninsular 
sieges.  But  from  the  loose  manner  in  which  these  de 
tails  are  usually  given  by  historians,  it  is  almost  im 
possible  to  distinguish  between  the  two.  Both  are  not 
unfrequently  given  under  the  same  head,  and  when  a 
distinction  is  apparently  kept  up,  only 'the  engineer  staff 
is  mentioned  under  the  head  of  engineers — the  sappers, 
miners,  artificers,  the  train,  &c.,  all  being  put  down  as 
artillery.  In  the  following  table  we  have  endeavored  to 
arrange  them  as  is  done  in  our  own  army.  The  trains  of 
both  arms  are  left  out,  for  frequently  that  of  one  arm  per 
formed  the  duties  of  the  other.  Moreover,  in  our  service 
a  portion  of  these  duties  of  engineer  and  artillery  trains  is 
performed  by  the  quartermaster's  department.  For  those 
who  wish  to  know  the  exact  organization  of  the  French 
engineer  train,  we  give  it  as  it  existed  in  1811,  viz.: — 
seven  troops,  each  troop  consisting  of  three  officers,  one 
hundred  and  forty-one  non-commissioned  officers  and  pri 
vates,  two  hundred  and  fifty  horses,  and  fifty  wagons,  con 
veying  five  thousand  two  hundred  and  seventy  intrenching 
tools,  one  thousand  seven  hundred  cutting  tools,  one  thou 
sand  eight  hundred  and  two  artificers'  tools,  two  hundred 
and  fifty-three  miners'  tools,  and  eight  thousand  three  hun 
dred  and  eighteen  kilogrammes'  weight  of  machinery  and 
stores,  each  article  being  made  to  a  particular  pattern. 
The  pioneers  in  Spain  acted  sometimes  with  one  arm  and 
sometimes  with  the  other,  and  we  have  assigned  them  ac 
cordingly  in  the  table.  The  pontoniers,  however,  in  our 
service  are  included  with  the  engineers  ;  we  have  there 
fore  put  them,  in  our  table,  in  the  same  column  with  the 
engineers. 


312 


MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 


Name  of  Siege. 

Engineer 
staff,  sappers, 
miners,  ponto- 
niers,  and 
pioneers. 

Artillery  staff, 
horse  and  foot 
artillery, 
ouvriers,  and 
pioneers. 

Total 
of 
engineers, 
sappers, 
miners, 
ponton- 
iers,  and 
pioneers. 

Total  ot 
artillery 
staff,  horse 
and  foot 
artillery, 
ouvriers, 
and 
pioneers. 

Offic. 

Men. 

Offic. 

Men. 

Saragossa,  

86 
21 
54 
7 
15 
34 
34 
34 
43 
50 
10 
25 
12 
13 
3 
9 
4 
5 
13 

1189 
211 
603 
91 
316 
278 
441 
489 
429 
681 
106 
707 
235 
138 
12 
256 
124 
68 
248 

90 

62 
17 
11 

32 

46 

41 
17 
9 

8 

3 

8 

7 

1276 

1299 
427 
208 

381 
701 

699 
148 
183 
160 

126 
197 
166 

1275 
232 
657 
98 
331 
312 
475 
523 
472 
731 
116 
732 
247 
151 
15 
265 
128 
73 
261 

1360 
461 
1361 
444 
219 
136 
1019 
1019 
413 
747 
186 
740 
165 
192 
168 
268 
129 
205 
173    . 

Rosas 

Girona, 

Astorga,  

Lerida,  

Meguinenza, 

1st  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  
Almeida 

Tortosa,  

Tarragon  t,  

Olivensa,  

1st  BadaJQt',  

Tarifa,  .     . 

Peniscola,  

2d  Ciudad  Rodrigo 

2d  Badajos,  

Burgos 

Castio  Udiales,  

St.  Sebastian,  

From  this  table  it  appears  that  the  ratio  of  the  two  arms 
at  these  sieges,  making  the  comparison  on  the  basis  of 
our  own  organization,  is  about  the  same  as  for  the  present 
French  army  in  Algeria,  or  a  little  more  than  five  of  engi 
neers  to  six  of  artillery. 

Thus  far  we  have  spoken  of  the  field-operations  of  en 
gineer  troops  in  connection  with  fortifications,  alluding 
only  incidentally  to  the  use  of  military  bridges  and  the 
passage  of  rivers.  In  the  early  wars  of  the  French  Revo 
lution  the  want  of  pontoniers  was  severely  felt,  and  from 
the  deficiency  of  this  branch  of  service,  the  operations  of 
the  French  generals  were  on  several  occasions  very  much 
restricted.  The  evil  was  afterwards  remedied  in  a  great 
degree  by  the  introduction  of  several  battalions  of  ponio- 
niers  in  the  regular  army  organization.  On  many  occa 
sions,  during  his  wars,  did  Napoleon  feel  and  acknow 
ledge  the  importance  of  these  troops ;  but  on  none,  per- 


ENGINEERS.  313 

haps,  was  this  importance  more  clearly  shown  than  in  the 
passage  of  the  Beresina  during  his  retreat  from  Moscow 
with  the  wreck  of  his  army.  The  Russians  had  cut  the 
bridge  of  Borisow  and  taken  position  in  great  strength  on 
the  right  bank  of  the  river,  both  at  this  point  and  below ; 
the  French,  wearied  with  long  and  difficult  marches,  des 
titute  of  artillery,  provisions,  and  military  stores,  with  a 
wide  and  deep  river  in  front,  and  a  powerful  enemy  on 
their  flank  and  rear,  benumbed  by  the  rigors  of  a  merciless 
climate,  and  dispirited  by  defeat — every  thing  seemed  to 
promise  their  total  destruction.  "  General  Eble,"  says  an 
English  general  officer,  in  his  remarks  on  this  retreat, 
"  who,  from  the  beginning  of  the  campaign,  had  made  all 
the  arrangements  for  the  equipment  and  construction  of 
military  bridges,  was  specially  charged  with  the  important 
duty  of  providing  for  the  passage  of  this  river ;  and  he 
discharged  that  duty  with  a  degree  of  forecast  and  ability 
to  which  certainly  Napoleon  owed  his  escape  and  the 
wreck  of  his  army  its  safety.  General  Eble  had  begun  to 
prepare,  at  Smolensko,  for  the  difficulties  which  he  fore 
saw  in  this  operation.  He  formed,  with  every  care,  a 
train  sufficient  for  the  transport  of  all  the  tools  and  stores 
that  might  be  required ;  and,  further  to  provide  against 
casualties  and  accidents,  every  man  belonging  to  the  com 
panies  of  pontoniers  was  obliged  to  carry  from  Smolensko 
a  tool  or  implement  of  some  kind,  and  a  proportion  of 
nails  :  and  fortunate  was  it  for  the  army  that  he  did  so ; 
for  such  was  the  difficulty  in  getting  through  the  carriages 
containing  stores,  that  only  two  forge-wagons  and  six  cais 
sons  of  tools  and  nails  could  be  preserved.  To  these  the 
general  added  a  quantity  of  iron-work  taken  from  the 
wheels  of  carriages  that  were  abandoned  on  the  march. 
Much  was  sacrificed  to  bring  off  these  valuable  materials 
for  making  clamps  and  fastenings,  but,  as  Segur  observes, 
that  exertion  '  sauva  I'armee.'" 

27 


314  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

But  it  is  not  always  in  the  possession  of  a  thing  that 
we  are  most  likely  to  appreciate  its  utility ;  the  evils  and 
inconveniences  resulting  from  the  want  of  it  not  unfre- 
quently  impress  us  most  powerfully  with  its  importance 
and  the  advantages  to  be  derived  from  its  possession.  A 
few  examples  of  this  nature,  drawn  from  military  history, 
may  be  instructive.  We  need  not  go  back  to  the  disas 
trous  passage  of  the  Vistula  by  Charles  XII.,  the  failure 
of  Marlborough  to  pass  the  Dyle,  and  Eugene  to  cross  the 
Adda  in  1705,  nor  of  the  three  unsuccessful  attempts  of 
Charles  of  Lorraine  to  cross  the  Rhine  in  1743.  The 
wars  following  the  French  Revolution  are  sufficiently  re 
plete  with  useful  instruction  on  this  subject.* 

In  1794  so  great  was  the  disorder  in  the  direction  of 
affairs,  that  the  boats  of  the  bridges  across  the  Wahal  and 
the  Rhine  were  disposed  of  for  commercial  purposes  ;  and 
in  the  beginning  of  1795,  says  Jomini,  "  the  conquerors  of 

*  Before  recurring  to  these*  it  might  be  useful  to  give  one  example, 
as  it  is  often  referred  to,  in  the  campaign  of  1702.  It  was  deemed 
important  for  the  success  of  the  campaign  to  attack  the  Prince  of  Ba 
den  in  his  camp  at  Friedlingen.  Accordingly,  a  bridge  was  thrown 
across  the  Rhine  at  Huningen,  the  passage  effected,  and  the  victory 
gained.  But  Villars  was  several  times  on  the  point  of  losing  all  for 
want  of  a  sufficient  ponton  equipage.  Having  but  a  single  bridge, 
the  passage  was  necessarily  slow ;  the  artillery  and  stores  were  fre 
quently  interrupted  by  the  infantry  hurrying  to  the  field  of  battle  ; 
disorder  ensued,  and  the  whole  movement  was  retarded  ;  Villars  could 
bring  only  a  small  part  of  his  artillery  into  action,  and  towards  the 
close  of  the  battle  the  infantry  were  in  want  of  ammunition :  more 
over,  the  whole  operation  had  nearly  failed  from  the  attempt  of  the 
enemy  to  destroy  this  bridge,  but  the  skill  of  the  French  pontoniera 
saved  it.  We  here  remark,  1st,  the  passage  secured  to  Villars  an  im 
portant  victory ;  2d,  from  having  an  inefficient  bridge-equipage  his 
whole  army  was  placed  in  great  peril,  and  the  operation  had  nearly 
failed ;  3d,  if  the  Prince  of  Baden  had  possessed  a  skilful  corps  to  op 
pose  that  of  Villars,  this  single  bridge  would  have  been  destroyed,  and 
the  army  cut  to  pieces ;  4th,  the  skill  of  the  little  corps  of  French  pon- 
toniers  saved  the  bridge,  and  of  consequence,  the  army. 


ENGINEERS.  315 

Belgium  and  Holland  had  not  even  a  bridge  equipage,  at 
a  time  too  when  the  success  of  the  campaign  depended 
solely  on  the  means  of  crossing  a  river."  A  few  boats 
were  procured  from  the  Wahal  and  the  Meuse,  and  others 
manufactured  in  the  forests  of  the  Moselle  ;  but  "  these 
operations  consumed  precious  time,  and/owr  months  thus 
passed  away  in  preparations."  Even  after  other  things 
were  all  ready,  the  army  was  obliged  to  wait  thirty  days 
for  the  arrival  of  boats  for  ponton  bridges  ;  during  this 
delay  the  Austrians  strengthened  their  position,  and  with 
very  little  exertion  they  might  easily  have  prevented  the 
passage. 

In  1796,  profiting  by  the  errors  of  the  former  campaigns, 
the  French  collected  more  suitable  bridge  equipages,  and 
the  two  armies  passed  the  Rhine  at  Neuweid  and  Kehl 
without  loss  or  delay.  The  latter  of  these  passages  has 
often  been  referred  to  as  a  model  for  such  operations,  and 
certainly  does  credit  to  the  general  who  directed  it.  But 
Moreau's  bridge  equipage  having  been  destroyed  during 
this  disastrous  campaign,  his  operations  the  following  year 
were  considerably  delayed  in  preparing  a  new  one,  and 
even  then  he  was  under  the  necessity  of  seizing  all  pri 
vate  boats  that  could  be  found  within  reach ;  but  the  diffi 
culty  of  collecting  and  using  boats  of  all  sizes  and  de 
scriptions  was  so  great  as  entirely  to  defeat  his  plan  of 
surprising  the  enemy  on  the  opposite  bank  of  the  river. 
The  necessity  of  co-operating  with  Hoche  admitted  of  no 
further  delay,  and  he  was  now  obliged  to  force  his  pas 
sage  in  the  open  day,  and  in  face  of  the  enemy.  Under 
taken  under  such  circumstances,  "  the  enterprise  was  ex 
tremely  sanguinary,  and  at  one  time  very  doubtful ;"  and 
had  it  failed,  "  Moreau's  army  would  have  been  ruined  for 
the  campaign." 

Napoleon's  celebrated  passage  of  the  Po,  at  Placentia, 
shows  plainly  how  important  it  is  for  a  general  to  possess 


316  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

the  means  of  crossing  rivers.  "  I  felt  the  importance  of 
hastening  the  enterprise  in  order  not  to  allow  the  enemy 
time  to  prevent  it.  But  the  Po,  which  is  a  river  as  wide 
and  deep  as  the  Rhine,  is  a  barrier  difficult  to  be  over 
come.  We  had  no  means  of  constructing  a  bridge,  and 
were  obliged  to  content  ourselves  with  the  means  of  em 
barkation  found  at  Placentia  and  its  environs.  Lannes, 
chief  of  brigade,  crossed  in  the  first  boats,  with  the  ad 
vanced  guard.  The  Austrians  had  only  ten  squadrons  on 
the  other  side,  and  these  were  easily  overcome.  The 
passage  was  now  continued  without  interruption,  but  very 
slowly.  If  I  had  had  a  good  ponton-equipage,  the  fate  of 
the  enemy's  army  had  been  sealed ;  but  the  necessity  of  pass 
ing  the  river  by  successive  embarkations  saved  it." 

In  the  campaign  of  1799,  the  Archduke  attempted  to 
pass  the  Aar,  and  attacked  the  French  on  the  opposite 
side,  but  for  want  of  suitable  equipage  his  operation  was 
delayed  till  the  enemy  had  collected  sufficient  forces  to 
intercept  the  passage  ;  he  was  now  obliged  to  enter  into 
a  stipulation  for  a  suspension  of  hostilities,  and  to  with 
draw  his  bridges. 

The  operations  of  the  French  in  the  campaign  of  1800, 
led  to  the  most  glorious  results,  but  their  execution  was 
attended  with  the  greatest  difficulties.  The  passage  of 
the  Alps  was  greatly  facilitated  by  the  ability  of  the  chief 
engineer,  Marescot,  and  the  skill  of  the  troops  under  his 
command  ;  and  the  facility  of  passing  rivers  afforded  Na 
poleon  by  his  pontoniers,  had  an  important  influence  upon 
the  success  of  the  campaign.  "  The  army  of  the  reserve 
had  many  companies  of  pontoniers  and  sappers  ;  the  pon 
tons  of  course  could  not  be  taken  across  the  St.  Bernard, 
but  the  pontoniers  soon  found  materials  on  the  Po  and 
Tesin  for  constructing  bridge  equipages."  Moreau's  army 
in  the  same  year  profited  well  by  his  pontoniers,  in  the 
passages  of  the  Inn,  the  Salza,  the  Traun,  the  Alza,  &c., 


ENGINEERS.  317 

and  in  the  pursuit  of  the  Austrian  army — a  pursuit  that 
has  but  a  single  parallel  example  in  modern  history. 

The  facility  with  which  Napoleon  crossed  rivers,  made 
forced  marches,  constructed  redoubts,  fortified  depots,  and 
grasped  the  great  strategic  points  of  the  enemy  in  the 
campaign  of  1805,  resulted  from  the  skilful  organization 
of  his  army,  and  the  efficiency  given  to  the  forces  em 
ployed  in  these  important  operations.  The  engineer  staff 
of  the  French  army  at  this  period,  consisted  of  four  hun 
dred  and  forty-nine  officers,  and  there  were  four  battalions 
of  sappers,  of  one  hundred  and  twenty  officers  and  seven 
thousand  and  ninety-two  men  ;  six  companies  of  miners, 
of  twenty-four  officers  and  five  hundred  and  seventy-six 
men  ;  and  two  regiments  of  pontoniers,  of  thirty-eight  offi 
cers  and  nine  hundred  and  sixty  men.  On  the  contrary, 
the  enemy's  neglect  of  these  things  is  one  of  the  most 
striking  of  the  many  faults  of  the  war,  and  his  ill-directed 
efforts  to  destroy  the  great  wooden  bridge  across  the 
Danube,  and  the  successful  operations  of  the  French  sap 
pers  in  securing  it,  formed  one  of  the  principal  turning 
points  in  the  campaign. 

The  same  organization  enabled  the  French  to  perform 
their  wonderfully  rapid  and  decisive  movements  in  the 
Prussian  campaign  of  1806,  and  the  northern  operations 
of  1807. 

In  1809,  Napoleon's  army  crossed,  with  the  most  won 
derful  rapidity,  the  Inn,  the  Salza,  the  Traun,  and  other 
Drivers  emptying  into  the  Danube,  and  reached  Vienna  be- 
'fore  the  wonder-stricken  Austrians  could  prepare  for  its 
defence.  It  was  then  necessary  for  the  French  to  effect 
a  passage  of  the  Danube,  which  was  much  swollen  by 
recent  rains  and  the  melting  snow  of  the  mountains. 
Considering  the  depth  and  width  of  the  river,  the  positions 
of  the  enemy,  and  his  preparations  to  oppose  a  passage, 
with  the  disastrous  consequences  that  would  result  to  the 


318  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

French  from  any  failure  in  its  execution ;  taking  all  these 
things  into  consideration,  Jomini  pronounced  it  "  one  of 
the  most  hazardous  and  difficult  of  all  the  operations  of 
war."  Here  the  fate  of  the  army  depended,  apparently, 
upon  the  skill  and  efficiency  of  the  engineers  and  pon- 
loniers,  and  nobly  did  they  discharge  the  trust  reposed  in 
them.  When  the  pontons  failed,  tressel-bridges  were 
substituted,  and  even  fifty-four  enormous  boats  were  put  in 
requisition.  So  skilfully  were  these  operations  conducted, 
that  Napoleon's  immense  army  crossed  over  in  safety,  di 
rectly  in  the  face  of  a  superior  enemy,  and  the  same  day 
fought  the  memorable  battle  of  Esling.  Forced  to  retire 
before  numbers  vastly  superior  to  his  own,  Napoleon  con 
centrated  his  forces  on  the  island  of  Lobau,  and  intrenched 
his  position.  Surrounded  by  the  broad  and  deep  channel 
of  the  Danube,  and  watched  by  numerous  and  skilful  ene 
mies,  it  required  the  most  constant  activity  and  the  greatest 
good  fortune  to  effect  a  passage.  Here  the  skill  and 
efficiency  of  the  engineers  shone  conspicuously ;  a  num 
ber  of  bridges  were  thrown  across  the  river  in  the  face 
of  the  Austrians,  and  against  obstacles  almost  insurmount 
able  ;  the  whole  French  army  passed  in  safety,  and  soon 
put  the  finishing  stroke  to  that  brilliant  campaign.  So 
high  an  estimate  did  Napoleon  attach  to  the  construction 
of  these  bridges,  that,  when  the  passage  was  completed, 
he  offered  to  place  Bertrand,  the  constructing  engineer, 
though  of  comparatively  low  rank,  at  the  head  of  the 
French  corps  du  genie. 

On  many  occasions  during  the  retreat  in  1812—13,  from 
the  Beresina  to  the  left  of  the  Rhine,  across  the  Niemen, 
the  Vistula,  the  Oder,  the  Elbe,  and  the  numerous  other 
rivers  which  divide  that  immense  country,  the  French 
derived  vast  advantages  from  the  experience  and  skill  of 
their  engineers  and  pontoniers,  several  times  whole  corps 
escaping  through  their  means  from  the  grasp  of  their  pur 


ENGINEERS.  319 

suers.  When,  however,  the  disasters  of  this  retreat  had 
absorbed  most  of  the  material  of  the  army,  and  had  sadly 
thinned  the  ranks  of  men  of  skill  and  experience,  they 
sustained  many  severe,  and,  in  other  circumstances,  unne 
cessary  losses.  Of  this  character  we  may  mention  the 
passage  of  the  Elster  by  the  bridge  of  Lindnau,  where, 
through  the  ignorance  and  carelessness  of  those  charged 
with  the  mines,  and  through  the  want  of  suitable  bridge 
arrangements,  thousands  of  brave  men  were  buried  in  the 
muddy  waters  of  this  small  river.  So  sensibly  did  Napo 
leon  feel  this  want  of  bridge  equipages,  in  the  winter  of 
1813-14,  that  he  addressed  to  his  minister  of  war,  on  this 
subject,  the  following  remarkable  words  :  "  If  I  had  had 
pontons,  I  should  have  already  annihilated  the  army  of 
Schwartzenberg,  and  closed  the  war;  I  should  have  taken 
from  him  eight  or  ten  thousand  wagons,  and  his  entire 
army  in  detail ;  but  for  want  of  the  proper  means  I  could 
not  pass  the  Seine."  Again,  on  the  2d  of  March  he  wrote : 
"  If  I  had  had  a  bridge  equipage  this  morning,  Bliicher's 
army  had  been  lost."  Whoever  will  examine  the  details 
of  the  operations  of  this  campaign,  will  be  convinced  of 
the  full  force  of  these  remarks. 

In  Spain  in  1808,  Sir  John  Moore,  in  order  to  assist  the 
native  forces,  had  penetrated  so  near  the  army  of  Napo 
leon,  that  retreat  became  exceedingly  difficult,  and  he  was 
several  times  on  the  point  of  being  lost.  The  English 
army  was  at  this  time  very  deficient  in  engineer  troops, 
and  Moore  suffered  much  for  want  of  miners  to  destroy 
bridges,  and  pontoniers  to  construct  new  ones.  In  order 
to  cover  his  retreat  and  impede  the  advance  of  the  French, 
the  commander-in-chief,  says  Napier,  "  directed  several 
bridges  to  be  destroyed,  but  the  engineers  [for  want  of 
miners  and  miner's  tools]  failed  of  success  in  every  at 
tempt." 

In  Soult's  retreat,  in   1809,  he  crossed  the  Duero  at 


320  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

Oporto,  and  destroyed  the  bridges  so  as  to  cut  off  the  pur 
suit  of  Wellington.  But  while  Soult,  deceived  by  treach 
ery  in  his  own  corps,  neglected  to  guard  the  river  with 
proper  vigilance,  Wellington  collected  boats  at  differ 
ent  points,  crossed  over  his  army,  surprised  the  French, 
and,  had  it  not  been  for  the  singular  delay  and  indecision 
of  General  Murray, would  most  certainly  have  forcedthe  en 
tire  army  to  capitulate  ;  as  it  was,  his  operation  produced  a 
decided  influence  on  the  campaign,  and  effected  the  safety 
of  Beresford's  corps.  Soult  destroyed  his  artillery  and 
baggage,  and  hastily  retreated  through  the  mountain 
passes  ;  but  his  army  was  again  arrested  at  the  river  Ca- 
vado,  and  placed  on  the  very  brink  of  destruction,  when 
the  brave  and  skilful  Dulong  succeeded  in  effecting  a  pas 
sage  at  the  Ponte  Nova ;  the  same  daring  officer  opened, 
on  the  same  day,  a  way  for  the  further  escape  of  the 
French  across  the  Misarella  by  the  Saltador. 

In  the  pursuit  of  Massena,  in  1810,  it  was  important  to 
the  English  to  cross  the  Guadiana,  and  attack  the  French 
before  Badajos  could  be  put  in  a  state  of  defence.  Be- 
resford  was  directed  by  Wellington  to  pass  this  river  at 
Jerumina,  where  the  Portuguese  had  promised  to  furnish 
pontons  ;  but  they  neglected  to  fulfil  their  engagement, 
and  the  army  had  to  wait  till  Capt.  Squire,  an  able  and 
efficient  officer  of  engineers,  could  construct  other  means 
for  effecting  a  passage.  Every  thing  was  done  that  genius 
could  devise  and  industry  execute  ;  nevertheless,  the  op 
erations  of  the  army  were  greatly  delayed — "  a  delay" 
says  the  historian,  "  that  may  be  considered  as  the  principal 
cause  of  those  long  and  bloody  operations  which  afterwards 
detained  Lord  Wellington  more  than  a  year  on  the  frontiers 
of  Portugal." 

•  We  might  prolong  these  remarks  by  discussing  the  pas 
sages  of  the  Ceira  and  Alva,  and  their  influence  on  the 
pursuit  of  Massena ;  Wellington's  passage  of  the  Tagus, 


ENGINEERS.  321 

and  his  retreat  from  Burgos  in  1812  ;  the  passage  of  the 
Adour  and  Garonne  in  1814  ;  and  the  failure  of  the  mines 
to  blow  up  the  bridges  of-  Saltador,  Alcantara,  &c. ;  but  a 
sufficient  number  of  examples,  it  is  believed,  has  already 
been  adduced  to  show  the  advantage  of  maintaining  a  prop 
erly  organized  and  instructed  body  of  sappers,  miners,  and 
pontoniers,  and  the  fatal  results  attending  the  want  of  such 
troops,  as  a  component  part  of  an  army  organization. 

It  has  already  been  .remarked  that  the  infantry  of  an 
army  must  always  form  the  basis  of  the  apportionment ; 
and  by  the  general  rule  laid  down  by  military  writers,  the 
cavalry  should  be  from  one-fourth  to  one-sixth  of  the  in 
fantry,  according  to  the  character  of  the  war  ;"the  artillery 
about  two-thirds  of  the  cavalry,  or  one-seventh  of  the  in 
fantry  ;  and  the  engineers  from  one-half  to  three-fourths 
of  the  artillery, — say  about  two-thirds.  The  staff  and  ad 
ministrative  corps  must  v#ry  according  to  the  nature  of  the 
organization,  and  the  character  of  the  theatre  of  war.  The 
former  ought  to  be  from  two  to  five  in  a  thousand,  and  the 
latter  from  twenty-five  to  seventy-five,*  as  a  general  rulo. 
These  ratios  would  give  for  a  good  army  organization  : 

-    Staff,  about 5 

Administrative  service — pay,  medical,  commis 
sary,  quarter-master,  &c.                .  65 
Infantry,       ....                          .  650 
Cavalry,       ....                          .  130 

Artillery,       . 90 

Engineers, 60 

Total,         .         .'  1,000 

In  a  broken  country,  and  against  savage  and  undis 
ciplined  foes,  like  the  Indians  in  this  country,  the  natives 
opposed  to  the  English  in  India,  to  the  French  in  Algeria, 

*  This  supposes  the  teamsters,  wagon-masters,  hospital-servants, 
&c.,  to  be  enlisted  men,  and  not  persons  hired  for  the  occasion,  as  is 
done  in  our  army. 


322  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

or  to  the  Russians  in  Circassia,  the  cavalry,  artillery,  and 
engineers  would  be  diminished,  and  the  infantry  and  ad 
ministrative  corps  proportionably  increased ;  the  former 
because  light  troops  are  always  preferable  against  an  un 
disciplined  foe,  and  the  latter  because  of  the  difficulty  of 
moving  and  procuring  supplies  in  new  and  uncultivated 
countries.  The  French  forces  in  Algeria,  in  1844,  amount 
ed  to  about  sixty  thousand  men,  in  the  following  propor 
tion  : — 

Staff, .4.7 

Administrative,  &c., 112.3 

Infantry, 687.3 

Cavalry, 86.6 

Artillery, 61.2 

Engineers,          .  ....       47.9 

1000  men. 

In  small  peace  establishments  the  relative  proportion  of 
inantry  and  cavalry  should  be  much  less  than  when  pre 
pared  for  the  field,  because  troops  for  these  two  arms  can 
be  much  more  readily  formed  in  case  of  emergency,  than 
for  those  which  require  more  scientific  information,  and 
technical  skill  and  instruction.  The  staff  and  engineers 
are  evidently  the  most  difficult  to  be  formed  in  case  of 
war,  and  next  to  these  the  artillery  and  administrative  corps. 

In  this  country  we  can  maintain,  in  time  of  peace,  only 
the  frame-work  of  an  army,  looking  to  our  citizen  soldiery 
to  form,  in  case  of  need,  the  great  mass  of  our  military 
force.  This  is  the  starting  point  in  our  military  system, 
and  the  basis  of  our  army  organization.  Let  us  see 
whether  this  principle  is  carried  out  in  practice. 

For  every  thousand  men  in  our  present  organization*  we 
have, 

*  These  numbers  are  the  real  rather  than  the  nominal  proportions, 
many  of  our  officers  being  called  staff,  who  properly  belong  to  one  of 
Ihe  other  classes. 


ENGINEERS  323 

For  the  staff, 2 

Administrative, 20* 

Infantry, 513 

Cavalry, 150 

Artillery,     . 310 

Engineers,           ...  5 

1000 

We  see  from  this  table,  that  while  our  artillery  is  nearly 
six  times  as  numerous  as  in  ordinary  armies,  our  staff  is 
less  by  one-half,  and  our  engineers  not  more  than  one-half 
what  ought  to  be  their  proportion  in  a  war  establishment. 
To  this  excess  of  artillery  over  infantry  and  cavalry  in  our 
army  in  time  of  peace  there  is  no  objection,  inasmuch  as 
the  latter  could  be  more  easily  expanded  in  case  of  war 
than  the  artillery.  But  for  a  still  stronger  reason  our  staff 
and  engineers  should  also  be  proportionally  increased,  in 
stead  of  being  vastly  diminished,  as  is  actually  the  case. 

Experience  in  the  first  campaigns  of  the  American 
Revolution  strongly  impressed  on  the  mind  of  Washing 
ton  the  absolute  necessity  of  forming  a  regular  and  sys 
tematic  army  organization.  But  so  difficult  was  it  to  ob 
tain  properly  instructed  engineers,  that  he  was  obliged  to 
seek  his  engineer  officers  in  the  ranks  of  foreign  adven 
turers,  and  to  make  drafts  from  the  other  arms  of  service, 
and  have  them  regularly  instructed  in  the  duties  of  engi 
neer  troops,  and  commanded  by  the  officers  of  this  corps. 
An  order,  in  his  own  handwriting,  giving  the  details  of 
this  temporary  arrangement,  is  dated  March  30th,  1779. 
Until  men  are  enlisted  for  the  purpose,  companies  of  sap 
pers  and  miners  shall  be  formed  by  drafts  from  the  line. 
"  The  duties  of  the  companies  of  sappers  and  miners," 

*  Much  of  the  administrative  duty  in  our  army  is  done  by  unen- 
listed  men,  or  by  soldiers  detached  from  their  companies.  Where  such 
is  the  case,  the  ratio  of  this  branch  of  the  service  ought  to  be  no  high- 
tr  than  is  represented  above. 


324  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE, 

fie  continues,  "  shall  be  under  the  direction  of  the  engi 
neers,  to  construct  field-works  of  every  kind,  and  all 
works  necessary  for  the  attack  or  defence  of  places,  as 
circumstances  may  require.  On  a  march  in  the  vicinity 
of  an  enemy,  a  detachment  of  the  companies  of  sappers 
and  miners  shall  be  stationed  at  the  head  of  the  column, 
directly  after  the  vanguard,  for  the  purpose  of  opening 
and  mending  the  roads,  and  removing  obstructions,"  &c. 
&c. 

The  great  difficulties  encountered  by  Washington  in 
instructing  his  inexperienced  forces  in  the  more  difficult 
branches  of  the  art,  made  him  the  more  earnest,  in  after 
years,  to  impress  on  us  how  important  it  was  for  us  In 
peace  to  prepare  for  war.  The  preparation  here  meant  is 
not  the  keeping  up,  in  time  of  peace,  of  a  large  standing 
army,  ever  ready  to  take  the  field ;  but  rather  the  forma 
tion  of  a  small  body,  educated  and  practised  in  all  the 
scientific  and  difficult  parts  of  the  profession ;  a  body 
which  shall  serve  as  the  cadre  or  framework  of  a  large 
army,  capable  of  imparting  to  the  new  and  inexperienced 
soldiers  of  the  republic  that  skill  and  efficiency  which 
has  been  acquired  by  practice.  How  far  have  we  accom 
plished  this  object,  and  what  will  be  the  probable  opera 
tions  in  case  of  another  contest  with  a  European  power  ? 
New  and  inexperienced  troops  will  be  called  into  the 
field  to  oppose  a  veteran  and  disciplined  army.  From 
these  troops  we  shall  expect  all  the  bravery  and  energy 
resulting  from  ardent  patriotism  and  an  enthusiastic  love 
of  liberty.  But  we  cannot  here  expect  much  discipline, 
military  skill,  or  knowledge  of  the  several  branches  of 
the  military  art.  The  peaceful  habits  of  our  citizens 
tend  but  little  to  the  cultivation  of  the  military  character. 
How,  then,  are  we  to  oppose  the  hostile  force  ?  Must 
human  blood  be  substituted  for  skill  and  preparation,  and 
».he  dead  bodies  of  our  citizens  serve  as  epaulements 


ENGINEERS.  325 

against  the  inioads  of  the  enemy  1  To  some  extent,  we 
fear  it  must  be  the  case  ;  but  not  entirely  so,  for  govern 
ment  has  not  altogether  neglected  to  make  preparation  for 
such  an  event.  Fortifications  have  been  planned  or 
erected  on  the  most  important  and  exposed  positions ; 
military  materials  and  munitions  have  been  collected  in 
the  public  arsenals  ;  a  military  school  has  been  organized 
to  instruct  in  the  military  sciences ;  there  are  regularly 
kept  up  small  bodies  of  infantry  and  cavalry,  weak  in 
numbers,  but  capable  of  soon  making  good  soldiers  of  a 
population  so  well  versed  as  ours  is  in  the  use  of  the 
musket  and  the  horse ;  an  artillery  force,  proportionally 
much  larger,  is  also  regularly  maintained,  with  a  suf 
ficient  number  of  men  and  officers  to  organize  and  make 
good  artillery-men  of  citizens  already  partially  acquainted 
with  the  use  of  the  cannon.  But  an  acquaintance  with 
infantry,  cavalry,  and  artillery  duties  is  not  the  only  prac 
tical  knowledge  requisite  in  war.  In  the  practical  oper 
ations  of  an  army  in  the  field,  rivers  are  to  be  crossed, 
bridges  suddenly  erected  and  suddenly  destroyed,  field- 
works  constructed  and  defended,  batteries  captured  and 
destroyed ;  fortifications  are  to  be  put  in  order  and  de 
fended,  or  to  be  besieged  and  recaptured ;  trenches  must 
be  opened,  mines  sprung,  batteries  established,  breaches 
made  and  stormed ;  trous-de-loup,  abattis,  palisades,  ga 
bions,  fascines,  and  numerous  other  military  implements 
and  machinery  are  to  be  constructed.  Have  our  citizens 
a  knowledge  of  these  things,  or  have  we  provided  in  our 
military  establishment  for  a  body  of  men  instructed  and 
practised  in  this  branch  of  the  military  art,  and  capable 
of  imparting  to  an  army  the  necessary  efficiency  for  this 
service  ?  Unfortunately  this  question  must  be  answered 
in  the  negative ;  and  it  is  greatly  to  be  feared  that  the 
future  historian  will  have  to  say  of  us,  as  Napier  has 
said  of  the  English  : — "  The  best  officers  and  soldiers  were 


326  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

obliged  to  sacrifice  themselves  in  a  lamentable  manner,  to 
compensate  for  the  negligence  and  incapacity  of  a  govern 
ment  always  ready  to  plunge  the  nation  into  a  war,  without 
the  slightest  care  of  what  was  necessary  to  obtain  success. 
Their  sieges  were  a  succession  of  butcheries ;  because  the 
commonest  materials,  and  the  means  necessary  to  their  art, 
were  denied  the  engineers"* 

*  The  subjects  discussed  in  this  chapter  are  also  treated  by  most 
authors  on  Military  Organization  and  Military  History,  and  by  the 
several  writers  on  Military  Engineering.  Allent,  Vauban,  Cormon- 
taigne,  Rocquancourt,  Pasley,  Douglas,  Jones,  Belmas,  Napier,  Gay 
de  Vernon,  may  be  referred  to  with  advantage.  Pasley,  Douglas, 
Jones,  and  Napier,  speak  in  the  strongest  terms  of  the  importance  of 
engineer  troops  in  the  active  operations  of  a  war,  and  of  the  absolute 
necessity  of  organizing  this  force  in  time  of  peace.  A  list  of  books  of 
reference  on  Military  Engineering  will  be  given  at  the  close  of  the  fol 
lowing  chapters. 

While  these  pages  are  passing  through  the  press,  Congress  has  au 
thorized  the  President  to  raise  one  company  of  engineer  troops !  This 
Dumber  is  altogether  too  small  to  be  of  any  use  in  time  of  war. 


PERMANENT    FORTIFICATIONS.  327 


CHAPTER   XIII. 

PERMANENT     FORTIFICATIONS. 

Fortification  is  defined, — the  art  of  disposing  the  ground 
in  such  a  manner  as  to  enable  a  small  number  of  troops 
to  resist  a  larger  army  the  longest  time  possible.  If 
the  work  be  placed  in  a  position  of  much  importance, 
and  its  materials  be  of  a  durable  character,  it  is  called 
permanent;  if  otherwise,  it  receives  the  appellation  of  field, 
or  temporary.  Field-works  are  properly  confined  to  oper 
ations  of  a  single  campaign,  and  are  used  to  strengthen 
positions  which  are  to  be  occupied  only  for  a  short  period. 
Generally  these  works  are  of  earth,  thrown  up  by  the 
troops  in  a  single  day.  They  are  intimately  connected 
with  a  system  of  permanent  fortifications,  but  from  the  fa 
cility  of  their  construction,  no  provision  need  be  made  for 
them  before  the  actual  breaking  out  of  war.  Indeed, 
they  could  not  well  be  built  before  hostilities  commenced, 
as  their  locality  in  each  case  must  be  determined  by  the 
position  of  the  hostile  forces. 

Having  already  described  the  general  influence  of  per 
manent  fortifications  as  a  means  of  national  defence,  we 
shall  here  speak  merely  of  the  principles  of  their  con 
struction.  It  is  not  proposed  to  enter  into  any  technical 
discussion  of  matters  that  especially  belong  to  the  instruc 
tion  of  the  engineer,  but  merely  to  give  the  nomenclature 
and  use  of  the  more  important  parts  of  a  military  work  ; 
in  a  word,  such  general  information  as  should  belong  to 
officers  of  every  grade  and  corps  of  an  army. 


328  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

The  arst  species  of  fortification  among  the  ancients 
was  of  course  very  simple,  consisting  merely  of  an  earth 
en  mound,  or  palisades.  A  wall  was  afterwards  used,  and 
a  ditch  was  then  added  to  the  wall.  It  was  found  that  a 
straight  wall  could  be  easily  breached  by  the  enemy's  bat 
tering-rams  ;  to  remedy  this  evil,  towers  were  built  at 
short  intervals  from  each  other,  forming  a  broken  line  of 
salient  and  re-entering  parts.  These  towers  or  salient 
points  gradually  assumed  a  shape  approximating  to  the 
modern  bastion. 

After  the  invention  of  gunpowder  and  the  application 
of  cannon  to  the  attack  and  defence  of  places,  it  became 
necessary  to  arrange  earthen  ramparts  behind  the  thin 
walls  of  the  ancient  works,  for  the  reception  of  the  new 
artillery.  Moreover  these  walls  were  soon  found  iria^- 
equate  to  resist  the  missiles  of  the  besiegers,  and  it  be 
came  necessary  to  replace  them  by  parapets  of  earth.  In 
order  to  cover  the  retaining  walls  of  these  parapets  from 
the  besieging  batteries,  it  was  also  found  to  be  necessary 
to  lower  these  walls  as  much  as  possible,  and  to  raise  the 
counterscarps.  The  traces  or  plans  of  the  works,  how 
ever,  received  no  material  change  till  about  the  close  of 
the  fifteenth  century. 

It  is  not  known  who  first  changed  the  ancient  towers 
into  bastions.  Some  attribute  it  to  an  Italian,  and  with 
considerable  show  of  reason,  for  a  bastion  was  built  at 
Turin  as  early  as  1461.  Achmet  Pacha,  it  is  said,  forti 
fied  Otranto  in  this  way,  in  1480,  but  whether  the  system 
was  previously  known  among  the  Turks  cannot  be  deter 
mined.  Others  attribute  the  invention  to  Ziska,  the  cele 
brated  leader  of  the  Hussites.  It  is  most  probable  that 
the  transition  from  the  tower  to  the  bastion  was  a  very 
gradual  one,  and  that  the  change  was  perfected  in  several 
countries  at  about  the  same  time. 

Fortifications,    like   other   arts    and   sciences,   greatly 


PERMANENT  FORTIFICATIONS.  329 

flourished  in  Italy  under  the  Medicis,  and  that  country- 
furnished  Europe  with  its  most  skilful  engineers.  Cath 
arine  of  Medicis  introduced  into  France  many  of  her 
countrymen,  distinguished  in  this  profession  ;  among  these 
may  be  named  Bellamat,  Bephano,  Costritio,  Relogio, 
Vorganno,  the  two  Marini,  Campi,  and  Hieronimo,  who 
built  several  important  places  and  directed  the  sieges  of 
others.  These  able  foreigners  were  rivalled  by  some 
distinguished  French  engineers,  who  laid  the  foundation 
of  the  "  corps  du  Genie"  which  has  since  become  a  school 
of  military  instruction  for  the  world.  Among  the  early 
French  engineers  may  be  distinguished  Lafontaine  De 
Serre,  Feuquieres,  and  St.  Remy.  Pedro  Navarro  had 
been  appointed  a  member  of  this  corps,  but  his  attention 
was  more  specially  directed  to  mining,  and  we  do  not 
learn  that  he  distinguished  himself  in  the  construction  of 
any  fortification. 

In  Germany,  in  the  beginning  of  the  sixteenth  century, 
Albert  Durer  distinguished  himself  as  a  writer  on  fortifi 
cation  ;  his  book  is  remarkable  as  containing  the  germs 
of  many  of  the  improvements  which  were  made  by  those 
who  followed  him.  This  is  the  more  to  be  wondered  at 
as  he  was  not  a  professed  engineer.  After  him  followed 
Spekel,  a  native  of  Strasburg,  who  died  in  1589.  His 
writings  are  valuable  as  showing  the.  state  of  the  art  at 
that  time,  and  the  changes  which  he  himself  introduced. 
He  was  an  engineer  of  much  practical  knowledge  and 
experience,  having  assisted  at  the  sieges  of  Malta,  Gol- 
letta,  Vienna,  Jula,  Nicosia,  Famagusta,  &c. 

The  first  French  engineer  who  wrote  on  fortification  was 
Errard  de  Bar-le-Duc,  who  published  near  the  close  of 
the  sixteenth  century.  As  an  engineer,  he  was  rivalled 
by  Chatillon,  a  man  of  distinguished  merit.  Errard  for 
tified  Amiens,  built  a  part  of  the  castle  of  Sedan,  and  a 
portion  of  the  defences  of  Calais.  Under  the  reign  of 


330  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

Louis  XIII.,  Desnoyers,  Deville,  Pagan,  and  Fabre  were 
greatly  distinguished.  Deville  published  in  1628.  He 
was  a  man  of  much  learning  and  experience  ;  but  he  is 
said  to  have  adopted,  both  in  his  theory  and  practice,  the 
principles  of  the  Italian  school,  with  most  of  its  errors. 
Pagan  began  his  military  career  while  young,  and  became 
marechal  de  champ  at  the  age  of  38,  when,  having  the  mis 
fortune  to  become  blind,  he  was  compelled  to  relinquish 
his  brilliant  hopes.  He  was  the  ablest  engineer  of  his 
age,  and  was  also  greatly  distinguished  in  other  brandies 
of  science.  In  his  plans  he  inclined  to  the  Dutch  rather 
than  the  Italian  school  of  fortification.  He  published  in 
1645. 

At  the  close  of  the  sixteenth  century,  the  Dutch  had 
been  forced  to  resort  to  military  defences  to  protect 
themselves  against  the  aggressions  of  the  Spaniards.  As 
the  Dutch  wrere  inferior  in  other  military  means,  fortifica 
tion  became  one  of  the  vital  resources  of  the  country. 
Their  works,  however,  thrown  up  in  much  haste,  were 
in  many  respects  defective,  although  well  adapted  to  the 
exigencies  of  the  time.  Freytag,  their  principal  engineer, 
wrote  in  1630.  Some  of  his  improvements  were  intro 
duced  into  France  by  Pagan.  He  was  preceded  by  Ma- 
rolois,  (a  cotemporary  of  Pagan,)  who  published  in  1613. 

In  Germany,  Rimpler,  a  Saxon,  wrote  on  fortification  in 
1671.  He  was  a  man  of  great  experience,  having  served 
at  the  sieges  of  Candia,  Phillipsburg,  Bonn,  Riga,  Bre 
men,  Dansburg,  Bommeln,  &c.  He  fell  at  the  siege  of 
Vienna  in  1683.  His  writings  are  said  to  contain  the 
groundwork  of  Montalembert's  system. 

In  Italy,  after  the  time  of  Tartaglia,  Marchi,  Campi, 
&c.,  we  find  no  great  improvement  in  this  art.  Several 
Italians,  however,  distinguished  themselves  as  engineers 
under  the  Spaniards.  The  fortifications  of  Badajos  are  a 
good  example  of  the  state  of  the  art  in  Italy  and  Spain  a 


PERMANENT  FORTIFICATIONS.  331 

that  epoch.  The  citadel  of  Antwerp,  built  by  two  Italian 
engineers,  Pacciotti  and  Cerbelloni,  in  1568,  has  become 
celebrated  for  the  siege  it  sustained  in  1832. 

The  age  of  Louis  XIV.  effected  a  great  revolution  in 
the  art  of  fortification,  and  carried  it  to  such  a  degree  of 
perfection,  that  it  has  since  received  but  slight  improve 
ment.  The  years  1633  and  1634  are  interesting  dates  in 
the  history  of  this  art,  as  having  given  birth  respectively 
to  Vauban  and  Coehorn.  The  former  was  chief  engineer 
of  France  under  Louis  XIV.,  and  the  latter  held  a  corre 
sponding  position  under  the  Dutch  republic.  Coehorn's 
ideas  upon  fortification  are  conceived  with  an  especial 
view  to  the  marshy  soil  of  his  own  country,  and,  although 
well  suited  to  the  object  in  view,  are  consequently  of  less 
general  application  than  those  of  his  more  distinguished 
cotemporary  and  rival.  The  best  specimens  of  his  mode 
of  construction  that  exist  at  the  present  day,  are  the 
fortresses  of  Manheim,  Bergen-op-Zoom,  Nimiguen,  and 
Breda. 

Coehorn  was  followed  in  Holland  by  Landsberg,  an  able 
and  practical  engineer,  who  to  much  reading  added  ex 
tensive  experience,  having  himself  served  at  sixteen 
sieges.  His  system  was  in  many  respects  peculiar,  both 
in  trace  and  relief;  it  dispensed  with  the  glacis,  and  all 
revertments  of  masonry.  His  plans  could  be  applied  only 
to  marshy  soils.  The  first  edition  of  his  work  was  pub 
lished  in  1685. 

But  the  career  of  Vauban  forms  the  most  marked  and 
prominent  era  in  the  history  of  fortification ;  it  constitutes 
the  connecting  link  between  the  rude  sketches  of  the  ear 
lier  engineers,  and 'the  well-established  form  which  the 
art  has  since  assumed.  In  his  earlier  works  we  find  many 
of  the  errors  of  his  predecessors ;  but  a  gradual  change 
seems  to  have  been  wrought  in  his  mind  by  reflection  and 
experience,  and  these  faults  were  soon  remedied  and  a 


332  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

new  and  distinct  system  developed.  Vauban  has  left  no 
treatise  upon  his  favorite  art,  and  his  ideas  upon  fortifica 
tion  have  been  deduced  from  his  constructions,  and  from 
detached  memoirs  left  among  his  papers.  The  nature  of 
his  labors,  and  the  extent  of  his  activity  and  industry, 
may  be  imagined  from  the  fact  that  he  fought  one  hundred 
and  forty  battles,  conducted  fifty-eight  sieges,  and  built  or 
repaired  three  hundred  fortifications.  His  memoirs,  found 
among  his  manuscript  papers,  on  various  military  and  po 
litical  subjects,  are  numerous,  and  highly  praised  even  at 
the  present  day.  But  his  beautiful  and  numerous  con 
structions,  both  of  a  civil  and  military  character,  are  real 
monuments  to  his  genius.  The  best  illustrations  of  his 
principles  of  fortification  occur  at  Lille,  Strasbourg,  Lan 
dau,  Givet,  and  Neuf-Brisack.  His  writings  on  mines, 
and  the  attack  and  defence  of  places,  are,  by  the  profes 
sion,  regarded  as  classic.  His  improvements  in  the  ex 
isting  method  of  attack  gave  great  superiority  to  the  arms 
of  his  countrymen,  and  even  enabled  him  to  besiege  and 
capture  his  rival  Coehorn,  in  his  own  works.  He  died  in 
1707,  and  was  soon  succeeded  by  Cormontaigne. 

The  latter  did  not  attempt  the  introduction  of  any  new 
system,  but  limited  himself  to  improving  and  perfecting 
the  plans  of  his  illustrious  predecessors.  His  improve 
ments,  however,  were  both  extensive  and  judicious,  and 
are  sufficient  to  entitle  him  to  the  place  he  holds  as  one 
of  the  ablest  military  engineers  the  world  has  ever  pro 
duced.  His  works  on  the  subject  of  fortification,  besides 
being  elegantly  written,  contain  the  most  valuable  infor 
mation  of  any  works  we  have.  His  most  admired  con 
structions  are  to  be  found  at  Metz,  Thtonville,  and  Bitche. 
The  beautiful  crown  works  of  Billecroix,  at  Metz,  are  per 
fect  models  of  their  kind.  Cormontaigne  died  in  1750. 

Cotemporary  with  him  were  Sturin  and  Glasser.  The 
former  deviated  but  slightly  from  the  systems  of  his  prede- 


PERMANENT  FORTIFICATIONS.  333 

cessors,  but  the  latter  invented  several  ingenious  improve 
ments  which  gave  him  grxeat  reputation. 

Next  follows  Rosard,  a  Bavarian  engineer ;  and  Fred 
erick  Augustus,  king  of  Poland,  who  devoted  himself  par 
ticularly  to  this  art.  The  former  casemated  only  the  flanks 
of  his  works,  but  the  latter  introduced  casemate  fire  more 
extensively  than  any  one  who  had  preceded  him. 

In  France,  Belidor  and  De  Filey  published  about  the 
middle  of  the  last  century.  They  were  both  able  engineers, 
but  their  systems  were  inferior  to  that  of  Cormontaigne. 

In  1767  De  la  Chiche  introduced  a  system  of  fortifica 
tion  in  many  respects  original.  He  raised  his  covered- 
ways  so  as  to  conceal  all  his  masonry,  and  casemated  a 
great  portion  of  his  enceinte.  For  exterior  defence,  he 
employed  direct  fire  from  his  barbettes,  and  curvated  fire 
from  his  casemates  ;  the  direct  fire  of  the  latter  secured 
his  ditches. 

Next  to  De  la  Chiche  follows  Montalembert,  who  pub 
lished  in  1776.  He  was  a  man  of  much  experience  and 
considerable  originality,  but  of  no  great  ability  as  an  engi 
neer.  Most  of  his  ideas  were  derived  from  De  la  Chiche 
and  the  German  school  of  Rimpler.  His  plans  have  gen 
erally  been  rejected  by  his  own  countrymen,  but  they  still 
have  advocates  among  the  Germans. 

General  Virgin,  a  distinguished  Swedish  engineer, 
wrote  in  1781.  His  idea  of  strongly  fortifying  the  smaller 
towns  to  the  comparative  neglect  of  the  larger  cities,  con 
stitutes  one  of  the  principal  novelties  in  his  system. 

In  1794,  Reveroni  devised  a  system  in  which  the  case 
mates  of  Montalembert  were  employed,  but  his  guns  were 
so  arranged  as  to  be  employed  in  barbette  while  the  be 
siegers  were  at  a  distance,  and  afterwards  to  be  used  for 
casemated  fire.  The  casemate  gun-carriage,  which  form 
ed  a  part  of  his  invention,  was  ingenious,  but  never  much 
employed  in  practice. 


834  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

Bousmard,  a  French  emigrant,  published  in  1799.  He 
adopted  the  general  trace  of  Vauban,  but  introduced  modi 
fications  in  the  details  essentially  different  from  those  of 
Cormontaigne.  Some  of  these  modifications  are  very  val 
uable  improvements,  while  others  are  of  a  more  doubtful 
character.  Bousmard  is,  on  the  whole,  a  very  able  wri 
ter,  and  his  works  should  be  found  in  the  library  of  every 
military  engineer. 

Carnot's  celebrated  treatise  was  published  in  1810.  He 
was  evidently  a  man  of  genius,  and  during  his  career  at 
the  head  of  the  War  Department  of  France,  numerous  and 
very,  important  improvements  were  made  in  the  several 
branches  of  the  military  art,  and  especially  in  strategy. 
His  work  on  fortification  exhibits  much  originality  and 
genius,  but  it  is  doubtful  whether  it  has  very  much  contrib 
uted  to  the  improvement  of  this  art.  His  ideas  have  been 
very  severely,  and  rather  unfairly  criticised  by  the  Eng 
lish,  and  particularly  by  Sir  Howard  Douglas. 

Chasseloup  de  Laubat  early  distinguished  himself  as  an 
engineer  of  much  capacity  and  talent.  He  followed  Na 
poleon  in  nearly  all  his  campaigns,  and  conducted  many 
of  his  sieges.  He  remodelled  the  fortifications  of  North 
ern  Italy  and  of  the  Lower  Rhine.  He  published  in  1811. 
The  improvements  which  he  introduced  are  numerous 
and  valuable,  and  he  probably  contributed  more  to  advance 
his  art,  and  to  restore  the  equilibrium  between  attack  and 
defence,  than  any  other  engineer  since  Cormontaigne. 
After  the  fall  of  Napoleon  and  the  partition  of  his  empire, 
the  allies  mutilated  or  destroyed  the  constructions  of  Chas 
seloup,  so  that,  it  is  believed,  no  perfect  specimen  of  his 
system  remains. 

The  cotemporaries  of  Chasseloup  were  mostly  engaged 
in  active  field  service  and  sieges,  and  few  had  either  lei 
sure  or  opportunity  to  devote  themselves  to  improvements 
in  permanent  fortification. 


PERMANENT    FORTIFICATIONS.  335 

Choumara  published  in  1827.  His  system  contains 
much  originality,  and  his  writings  give  proof  of  talent  and 
genius.  He  has  very  evidently  more  originality  than 
judgment,  and  it  is  hardly  probable  that  his  system  will 
ever  be  generally  adopted  in  practice. 

The  Metz  system,  as  arranged  by  Noizet,  as  a  theore 
tical  study,  is  undoubtedly  the  very  best  that  is  now  known. 
It,  however,  requires  great  modifications  to  suit  it  to  dif 
ferent  localities.  For  a  horizontal  site,  it  is  probably  the 
most  perfect  system  ever  devised.  It  is  based  on  the 
system  of  Vauban  as  improved  by  Cormontaigne,  and  con 
tains  several  of  the  modifications  suggested  by  modern 
engineers.  It  is  applied  in  a  modified  form  to  the  new 
fortifications  of  Paris. 

Baron  Rohault  de  Fleury  has  introduced  many  modifi 
cations  of  the  ordinary  French  system  in  his  new  defences 
of  Lyons.  We  have  seen  no  written  account  of  these 
works,  but  from  a  hasty  examination  in  1844,  they  struck 
us  as  being  too  complicated  and  expensive. 

The  new  fortifications  of  Western  Germany  are  modi 
fications  of  Rempler's  system,  as  improved  by  De  la 
Chiche  and  Montalembert.  It  is  said  that  General  Aster, 
the  directing  engineer,  has  also  introduced  some  of  the 
leading  principles  of  Chasseloup  and  Carnot. 

The  English  engineers  have  satisfied  themselves  with 
following  in  the  track  of  their  continental  neighbors,  and 
can  offer  no  claims  to  originality. 

Of  the  system  of  fortification  now  followed  in  our  ser- 
\  ice  we  must  decline  expressing  any  opinion ;  the  time 
has  not  yet  arrived  for  subjecting  it  to  a  severe  and  judi 
cious  criticism.  But  of  the  system  pursued  previous  to 
1820,  we  may  say,  without  much  fear  of  contradiction, 
that  a  worse  one  could  scarcely  have  been  devised.  In 
stead  of  men  of  talent  and  attainments  in  military  science, 
most  of  our  engineers  were  then  either  foreigners,  or 


336  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

civilians  who  owed  their  commissions  to  mere  political 
influence.  The  qualifications  of  the  former  were  proba 
bly  limited  to  their  recollection  of  some  casual  visit  to 
two  or  three  of  the  old  European  fortresses ;  and  the  latter 
probably  derived  all  their  military  science  from  some  old 
military  book,  which,  having  become  useless  in  Europe, 
had  found  its  way  into  this  country,  and  which  they  had 
read  without  understanding,  and  probably  without  even 
looking  at  its  date.  The  result  was  what  might  have  been 
anticipated — a  total  waste  of  the  public  money.  We 
might  illustrate  this  by  numerous  examples.  A  single 
one,  however,  must  suffice.  About  the  period  of  the  last 
war,  eight  new  forts  were  constructed  for  the  defence  of 
New  York  harbor,  at  an  expense  of  some  two  millions  of 
dollars.  Six  of  these  were  circular,  and  the  other  two  were 
star  forts — systems  which  had  been  discarded  in  Europe 
for  nearly  two  thousand  years !  Three  of  these  works 
are  now  entirely  abandoned,  two  others  are  useless,  and 
large  sums  of  money  have  recently  been  e'xpended  on  the 
other  three  in  an  attempt  to  remedy  their  faults,  and  ren 
der  them  susceptible  of  a  good  defence.  Moreover,  a 
number  of  the  works  which  were  constructed  by  our  en 
gineers  before  that  corps  was  made  to  feel  the  influence 
of  the  scientific  education  introduced  through  the  medium 
of  the  Military  Academy — we  say,  a  considerable  number 
of  our  fortifications,  constructed  by  engineers  who  owed 
their  appointment  to  political  influence,  are  not  only  wrong 
in  their  plans,  but  have  been  made  of  such  wretched  mate 
rials  and  workmanship  that  they  are  already  crumbling 
into  ruins. 

A  fortification,  in  its  most  simple  form,  consists  of  a 
mound  of  earth,  termed  the  rampart,  which  encloses  the 
space  fortified  ;  a  parapet,  surmounting  the  rampart  and 
covering  the  men  and  guns  from  the  enemy's  projectiles  ; 
a  scarp  wall,  which  sustains  the  pressure  of  the  earth  of 


PERMANENT  FORTIFICATIONS.  337 

the  rampart  and  parapet,  and  presents  an  insurmountable 
obstacle  to  an  assault  by  storm ;  a  wide  and  deep  ditch, 
which  prevents  the  enemy  from  approaching  near  the  body 
of  the  place ;  a  counterscarp  wall,  w4iich  sustains  the  earth 
on  the  exterior  of  the  ditch  ;  a  covered  way,  which  occu 
pies  the  space  between  the  counterscarp  and  a  mound  of 
earth  called  a  glacis,  thrown  up  a  few  yards  in  front  of  the 
ditch  for  the  purpose  of  covering  the  scarp  of  the  main  work. 

The  work  by  which  the  space  fortified  is  immediately 
enveloped,  is  called  the  enceinte,  or  body  of  the  place. 
Other  works  are  usually  added  to  the  enceinte  to  strength 
en  the  weak  points  of  the  fortification,  or  to  lengthen  the 
siege  by  forcing  the  enemy  to  gain  possession  of  them  be 
fore  he  can  breach  the  body  of  the  place  :  these  are  term 
ed  outworks,  when  enveloped  by  the  covered  way,  and 
advanced  works,  when  placed  exterior  to  the  covered  way, 
but  in  some  way  connected  with  the  main  work  ;  but  if 
entirely  beyond  the  glacis,  and  not  within  supporting  dis 
tance  of  the  fortress,  they  are  called  detached  works. 

In  a  bastioned  front  the  principal  outwork  is  the  demi 
lune,  which  is  placed  in  front  of  the  curtain ;  it  serves  to 
cover  the  main  entrance  to  the  work,  and  to  place  the 
adjacent  bastions  in  strong  re-enterings. 

The  tenaille  is  a  small  low  work  placed  in  the  ditch,  to 
cover  the  scarp  wall  of  the  curtain  and  flanks  from  the 
fire  of  the  besieger's  batteries  erected  along  the  crest  of 
the  glacis. 

The  places  of  arms,  are  points  where  troops  are  assem 
bled  in  order  to  act  on  the  exterior  of  the  work.  The  re- 
entering  places  of  arms,  are  small  redans  arranged  at  the 
points  of  junction  of  the  covered  ways  of  the  bastion  and 
demi-lune.  The  salient  places  of  arms  are  the  parts  of  the 
covered  way  in  front  of  the  salients  of  the  bastion  and 
demi-lune. 

Small  permanent  works,  termed  redoubts,  are  placed 
29 


338  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

within  the  demi-lune  and  re-entering  places  of  arms  fol 
strengthening  those  works.  Works  of  this  character  con 
structed  within  the  bastion  are  termed  interior  retrench* 
ments ;  when  sufficiently  elevated  to  command  the  exte 
rior  ground,  they  are  called  cavaliers. 

Caponniers  are  works  constructed  to  cover  the  passage 
of  the  ditch  from  the  tenaille  to  the  gorge  of  the  demi 
lune,  and  also  from  the  demi-lune  to  the  covered  way,  by' 
which  communication  may  be  maintained  between   the 
enceinte  and  outworks. 

Posterns  are  underground  communications  made  through 
the  body  of  the  place  or  some  of  the  outworks. 

Sortie-passages  are  narrow  openings  made  through  the 
crest  of  the  glacis,  which  usually  rise  in  the  form  of  a 
ramp  from  the  covered  way,  by  means  of  which  commu 
nication  may  be  kept  up  with  the  exterior.  These  pas 
sages  are  so  arranged  that  they  cannot  be  swept  by  the 
lire  of  the  enemy.  The  other  communications  above 
ground  are  called  r#?nps,  stairs,  &c. 

Traverses  are  small  works  erected  on  the  covered  way 
to  intercept  the  fire  of  the  besieger's  batteries. 

Scarp  and  counterscarp  galleries  are  sometimes  con 
structed  for  the  defence  of  the  ditch.  They  are  arranged 
with  loop-holes,  through  which  the  troops  of  the  garrison 
fire  on  the  besiegers  when  they-  have  entered  the  ditch, 
without  being  themselves  exposed  to  the  batteries  of  the 
enemy. 

In  sea-coast  defences,  and  sometimes  in  a  land  front  for 
the  defence  of  the  ditch,  embrasures  are  made  in  the  scarp 
wall  for  the  fire  of  artillery ;  the  whole  being  protected 
from  shells  by  a  bomb-proof  covering  over  head :  this  ar 
rangement  is  termed  a  casemate. 

Sometimes  double  ramparts  and  parapets  are  formed,  so 
that  the  interior  one  shall  fire  over  the  more  advanced ; 
the  latter  in  this  case  is  called  a  faussebraie. 


PERMANENT  FORTIFICATIONS.  339 

If  the  inner  work  be  separated  from  the  other  it  is  called 
a  retrenchment*  and  if  in  addition  it  has  a  commanding 
fire,  it  is  termed,  as  was  just  remarked,  a  cavalier. 

The  capital  of  a  bastion  is  a  line  bisecting  its  salient 
angle.  All  the  works  comprehended  between  the  capitals 
of  two  adjacent  bastions  is  termed  a  front :  it  is  taken  as 
the  unit  in  permanent  fortification. 

Fig.  39  represents  the  ground  plan  of  a  modern  bas- 
tioned  front,  of  a  regular  and  simple  form,  on  a  horizontal 
site. 

A,  A,  A — Is  the  enceinte,  or  body  M— The  redoubt  of  the  re-entering 

of  the  place. '  places  of  arms. 

B— The  bastions.  N—  The  ditches  of  the  redoubts. 

C — The  main  ditch.  O — The  tenaille. 

D — The  covered  ways.  P — The  double  caponnier. 

E — The  re-entering  places  of  arms,  a — The  traverses. 

F — The  salient  places  of  arms.  b — The  sortie-passages. 

G — The  demi-lune.  c — Stairs. 

H—  The  demi-lune  ditch.  d — Cut  in  the  demi-lune  to  flank 

J—  The  demi-lune  redoubt.  the  redoubt  of  the  re-entering 

L — The  ditch  of  the  demi-lune  place  of  arms, 
redoubt. 

Fig.  40  represents  a  section  through  the  line  mn'  of  the 
preceding  figure. 

A— Is  the  rampart.  /'—The  glacis. 

B — The  parapet.  G — The  covered  way. 

C— The  ditch.  //—The  terre-plein. 

D — The  scarp  wall.  J— The  parade. 
E — The  counterscarp  wall. 

Sometimes  half  embrasures  are  cut  in  the  earthen  par 
apet  of  a  fort,  so  as  to  sink  the  gun  below  the  crest,  and 
thus  more  effectually  cover  the  men  from  the  enemy's  fire. 

*  The  term  retrenchment  implies  an  interior  work,  which  is  con 
structed  within  or  in  rear  of  another,  for  the  purpose  of  strengthening 
it;  the  term  intrenchment,  on  the  contrary,  implies  an  independent 
work,  constructed  in  the  open  field,  without  reference  to  any  other  ad 
joining  work. 


340  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

But  guns  in  embrasure  have  a  far  less  extended  field  of 
fire  than  when  mounted  in  barbette  ;  moreover,  the  embra 
sures  present  openings  through  which  an  enemy  may  pen 
etrate  in  an  assault.  Owing  to  these  objections,  they  are 
employed  only  for  the  protection  of  particular  points  ;  that 
is,  where  it  is  important  to  cover  the  artillerists  from  the 
enemy's  fire,  or  where  the  guns  are  to  be  used  merely  to 
protect  a  ditch,  or  to  enfilade  a  road,  &c.  The  bottom  of 
the  embrasure  is  called  the  sole,  the  sides  are  called 
cheeks,  and  the  mass  of  earth  between  two  embrasures,  the 
merlon.  Embrasures  may  be  made  either  direct  or  oblique, 
according  as  the  fire  is  required  to  be  perpendicular  or 
oblique  to  the  parapet. 

A  coverport  is  a  small  outwork  of  any  convenient  form, 
erected  immediately  in  front  of  a  gateway,  to  screen  it 
from  the  enemy's  fire. 

A  counterguard  is  a  more  extensive  work,  constructed  in 
front  of  a  part  of  the  fortress  itself,  or  of  some  other  outwork 
of  greater  importance,  which  it  is  intended  to  cover.  These 
are  sometimes  called  coverfaces,  from  their  situation  and 
object ;  but  the  former  term  is  most  commonly  used. 

Sometimes  outworks,  called  tenaillons,  consisting  of  one 
long  and  one  short  face,  are  placed  on  each  side  of  the 
demi-lune  of  a  front  of  fortification,  for  the  purpose  of  pro 
longing  the  siege.  (Fig.  41.) 

Small,  or  cZemz-tenaillons,  are  frequently  so  arranged  as 
to  cover  only  one-half  of  the  demi-lune,  and  then  a  bonnet 
constructed  in  front  of  the  salient  of  the  demi-lune.  (Fig. 
42.)  In  this  case  the  bonnet  is  flanked  by  the  short  faces 
of  the  demi-tenaillons  ;  these  short  faces  are  themselves 
flanked  by  the  demi-lune,  while  the  bastions  flank  the  long 
faces. 

A  hornwork  consists  of  a  front  of  fortification,  and  two 
wings  resting  on  the  faces  of  bastions  of  a  front  of  the 


PERMANENT  FORTIFICATIONS  341 

fortress.  It  sometimes  has  also  a  demi-lune  or  bonnet,  as 
in  the  case  of  demi-tenaillons.  (Fig.  43.) 

A  crownwork  consists  of  two  fronts  of  fortification,  and 
two  wings.  (Fig.  44.)  It  is  sometimes  made  double,  and 
even  triple 

These  works  are  also  employed  as  advanced  works, 
and  placed  entirely  in  front  of  the  glacis.  They  have 
generally  been  added  to  a  fortress  for  the  purpose  of  oc 
cupying  some  important  piece  of  ground  not  included 
within  the  limits  of  the  main  work.  They  may  be  con 
structed  with  covered  ways,  and  sometimes  it  may  be 
found  advantageous  to  secure  them  by  retrenchments. 

A  detached  work  may  be  made  in  any  form  deemed  best 
suited  to  the  site.  Being  but  remotely  connected  with  the 
fortress,  the  latter  will  exercise  but  slight  influence  on  the 
character  of  its  plan  or  construction.  They  are  usually 
of  limited  extent  and  slight  relief,  partaking  much  of  the 
nature  of  field-works.* 

*  The  general  principles  of  permanent  fortification  may  be  best 
learned  from  the  writings  of  Cormonfaigne,  St.  Paul  de  Noizet,  and 
Laurillard-Fallot.  A  list  of  valuable  books  of  reference  on  the  seve 
ral  branches  of  military  engineering  will  be  given  at  the  close  of  th« 
next  chapter 


342  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 


CHAPTER    XIV. 

FIELD-ENGINEERING. 

Field-Engineering  includes  the  making  of  military  re 
connaissances,  temporary  fortifications,  and  military  roads  ; 
the  planning  and  construction  of  military  bridges  ;  the  at 
tack  and  defence  of  military  works  ; — in  fine,  all  the  various 
duties  of  engineer  troops,  either  in  the  operations  of  a 
campaign,  or  in  the  dispositions  on  the  battle-field. 

Military  reconnaissance. — By  this  term  is  meant  an  ex 
amination  of  a  portion  of  the  theatre  of  war,  to  ascertain 
its  military  character  and  resources.  If  the  examination 
be  made  of  a  large  district  of  country,  and  for  an  entire 
campaign,  the  reconnaissance  is  general ;  if  made  for  col 
lecting  detailed  information  respecting  a  proposed  line  of 
march,  the  passage  of  a  river,  the  position  of  an  enemy, 
&c.,  it  is  termed  special. 

In  making  a  general  reconnaissance,  great  care  should 
be  taken  to  collect  accurate  information  respecting  the 
general  topography  of  the  country ;  the  character  of  the 
mountains,  forests,  and  watercourses ;  the  nature  of  the 
roads,  canals,  and  railways  ;  the  quality  of  the  soil,  arid 
the  amount  of  provisions  and  forage  it  produces  ;  the  pop 
ulation  and  character  of  the  cities,  towns,  and  villages , 
the  commercial  and  manufacturing  resources  of  every  part 
of  the  country,  and  the  means  of  transportation  to  be  found 
in  each  district.  The  plan  of  military  operations  will  be 
based  on  the  information  thus  obtained,  and  any  serious 
error  in  the  reconnaissance  may  involve  the  results  of  the 
campaign,  and  even  the  fate  of  the  war. 

In  a  special  reconnaissance,  not  only  accurate  but  mi- 


FIELD-ENGINEERING.  343 

nute  information  will  be  required  :  the  character  of  the 
roads  must  be  given  in  detail ;  the  nature  of  the  water 
courses,  their  depth  arid  velocity  ;  the  position  and  charac 
ter  of  bridges,  and  fords  ; — in  fine,  a  full  description  of 
all  obstacles  to  be  encountered,  and  the  means  that  can^be 
made  available  for  overcoming  these  obstacles. 

A  reconnoitring  officer  may  usually  derive  much  valua 
ble  information  from  the  published  maps  and  descriptions 
of  the  country  to  be  examined  ;  additional  matters  of  de 
tail  may  be  obtained  from  woodsmen,  hunters,  and  fisher 
men  ;  and  also  from  the  innkeepers  and  local  authorities 
of  the  district.  But  the  officer  should  always  verify  this 
information,  so  far  as  practical,  by  personal  examination. 
In  making  a  reconnaissance  in  the  vicinity  of  an  enemy, 
he  must  be  supported  by  a  strong  escort  of  mounted  troops, 
and  in  all  his  operations  the  greatest  precaution  will  be  re 
quisite  to  ensure  success. 

Some  simple  instrument,  such  as  a  pocket  sextant,  or 
compass,  will  be  sufficient  to  enable  tho  reconnoitring  offi 
cer  to  measure,  with  considerable  accuracy,  the  height  of 
mountains,  the  width  of  streams,  &c.,  and  an  ordinary  scale 
and  dividers  will  enable  him  to  make  a  suitable  military 
sketch. 

Temporary  Fortification. — It  has  been  stated  in  the  pre 
ceding  chapter  that  temporary  fortifications  are  properly 
confined  to  the  operations  of  a  single  campaign,  and  are 
used  to  strengthen  positions  which  are  to  be  occupied  only 
for  a  short  period  ;  and  that  they  are  usually  made  of 
earth,  thrown  up  by  the  troops  in  a  single  day.  Tempo 
rary  fortifications,  as  a  part  of  field-engineering,  may  there 
fore  be  regarded  rather  as  an  arm  than  an  art.  The  prin 
ciples  of  their  construction  are  derived,  of  course,  from  the 
theory  of  permanent  fortification,  but  in  applying  these  prin 
ciples  to  practice  in  the  field,  much  greater  latitude  is  allowed 
than  in  the  exact  scientific  arrangement  of  permanent  works. 


344  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

The  purpose  of  field-works  (or  intrenchments,  as  they 
are  commonly  called)  is  to  arrest,  or  at  least  to  impede, 
the  march  of  the  attacking  foe  ;  to  shelter  the  defensive 
troops  from  the  missive  weapons  of  the  assailants,  and  to 
det&in  them  in  a  position  where  they  will  be  exposed  to 
the  fire  of  the  defensive  force.  The  numerical  and  posi 
tive  strength  of  the  assailed  may  be  much  less  than  that 
of  the  assailant,  and  yet  an  equilibrium  exist ;  the  material 
obstacles  compensating  for  the  difference  in  numbers.  In 
trenchments,  though  inert  masses,  must  therefore  be  re 
garded  as  most  valuable  and  important  accessaries  in  the 
defence  of  a  position. 

Intrenchments  consist  either  of  lines  of  works  made  to 
cover  extended  positions,  or  of  detached  works  designed 
simply  to  defend  the  ground  they  occupy.  The  former 
generally  present  a  front  against  the  enemy  in  but  one  di 
rection,  while  the  latter  are  usually  closed  on  all  their  sides. 

The  following  figures  have  been  employed  for  the  plan 
of  simple  intrenchments,  viz.  :  the  polygon,  redan,  lunette, 
mitre,  star-fort,  and  bastion. 

Square  or  polygonal  redoubts  are  the  most  common  forms 
given  to  field-works,  on  account  of  the  ease  of  their  con 
struction.  But  they  have  many  defects.  There  is  a  sec 
tor  without  fire  in  front  of  each  salient,  and  the  ditches  are 
without  protection.  The  latter  objection  also  holds  good 
against  all  circular  works. 

The  redan  (Fig.  45)  is  frequently  used  to  cover  a  point 
in  rear,  as  a  bridge,  a  ford,  or  a  defile.  When  used  alone, 
its  gorge  should  be  closed  by  palisades.  Its  ditches  are 
unprotected. 

The  lunette  (Fig.  46)  has  nearly  the  same  defects  as 
the  redan. 

The  mitre,  or  priest-cap,  (Fig.  47,)  may  be  employed 
with  advantage  when  a  cross-fire  is  required  on  the  capi 
tal  of  the  work. 


FIELD-ENGINEERING.  345 

The  star-fort  has  all  the  defects,  without  the  merit  of 
simplicity,  which  belong  to  the  polygonal  redoubt. 

The  bastion-fort  (Fig.  48)  more  fully  satisfies  the  con 
ditions  of  a  good  defence  than  any  other  plan  ;  but  it  is 
less  simple  and  easy  of  execution.  It  is  usually  composed 
of  four  or  five  fronts,  but  it  may  be  applied  to  a  polygon  of 
any  number  of  sides. 

For  the  details  of  the  construction  of  these  several 
works,  we  must  refer  to  the  special  treatises  on  field-forti 
fication. 

Lines  of  intrenchments  may  be  made  either  continuous 
or  with  intervals.  In  adopting  either  plan,  the  engineer 
should  avail  himself  of  all  the  natural  obstacles  presented 
by  the  position,  so  as  to  diminish  the  labor  of  erecting 
artificial  means  of  defence. 

The  simplest  arrangement  for  a  continuous  intrench- 
ment  is  the  cremaillidre,  or  indented  line.  When  applied 
to  an  irregular  site,  or  used  to  connect  together  distant 
and  detached  works,  the  indented  line  may  be  regarded 
as  a  good  disposition.  Mitres  and  redans,  connected  by 
straight  curtains,  are  sometimes  employed,  as  also  a  com 
bination  of  large  and  small  redans,  forming  alternate  sa^ 
lient  and  re-entering  angles.  A  continuous  line  of  bas 
tions  is  preferable  to  any  other  arrangement,  when  there 
is  plenty  of  time  for  their  construction. 

Lines  with  intervals  are  frequently  formed  of  alternate 
lunettes  and  square  redoubts.  Other  detached  works  may 
be  employed  in  the  same  way.  This  manner  of  intrench 
ing  a  position  has  several  advantages,  with  disciplined 
troops.  The  first  shock  of  the  assailant  is  sustained  by 
the  detached  works,  and  when  he  attempts  to  penetrate  in 
the  intervals,  his  flanks  become  exposed  to  a  deadly  cross 
fire.  These  intervals  also  allow  the  assailed  to  act  on  the 
offensive,  by  charging  the  enemy  at  the  opportune  moment. 
But  with  raw  and  militia  forces  it  will  be  safer  to  resor4 


346  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

to  continuous  lines.  If  cavalry  form  any  part  of  the  de« 
fensive  force,  it  will  be  absolutely  necessary  to  leave  in 
tervals  through  which  these  troops  may  charge. 

A  vertical  section  of  all  intrenchments  is  of  the  same 
general  form ;  the  dimensions  will,  of  course,  vary  with 
the  nature  of  the  soil,  and  the  time  and  means  employed  in 
their  construction.  The  minimum  dimensions  that  can  be 
used  with  any  considerable  advantage  are  given  in  Fig.  49. 

In  laying  out  field-works  advantage  should  be  taken  of 
all  available  artificial  obstacles,  such  as  hedges,  walls, 
houses,  outbuildings,  &c.  A  thickset  hedge  may  be  ren 
dered  defensible  by  throwing  up  against  it  a  slight  parapet 
of  earth.  Stone  fences  may  be  employed  in  the  same  way. 
Walls  of  masonry  may  be  pierced  with  loopholes  and  ar 
ranged  for  one  or  two  tiers  of  fire.  The  walls  of  houses 
are  pierced  in  the  same  manner,  and  a  projecting  wooden 
structure,  termed  a  machicoulis  gallery,  is  sometimes  made 
from  the  floor  of  the  second  story,  to  enable  the  assailed 
to  fire  down  upon  their  opponents.  This  arrangement  is 
frequently  employed  to  advantage  in  wooden  blockhouses 
against  a  savage  foe  ;  but  it  is  of  little  avail  when  exposed 
to  the  fire  of  artillery.  Some  have  proposed  galleries  of 
this  description  in  permanent  works  of  masonry,  but  the 
project  is  too  obviously  absurd  to  merit  discussion. 

In  addition  to  the  parapet  of  an  intrenchment,  a  good 
engineer  will  always  find  time  and  means  for  constructing 
other  artificial  obstacles,  such  as  trous-de-loup,  abattis, 
palisades,  stockades,  fraises,  chevaux-de-frise,  crows'-feet, 
mines,  &c. 

Trous-de-loup  are  pits  dug  in  the  earth  in  the  form  of 
an  inverted  truncated  cone,  some  six  feet  in  diameter,  and 
about  the  same  number  of  feet  in  depth.  They  are  usu 
ally  placed  a  few  yards  in  front  of  the  ditch,  and  concealed 
by  some  slight  covering. 

Abattis  are  tops  and  large  limbs  of  trees  arranged  along 


FIELD-ENGINEERING.  347 

the  glacis  of  a  work  ;  the  ends  of  the  branches  are  lopped 
off  and  sharpened. 

Palisades  are  stakes  some  eight  or  ten  feet  long,  with 
one  end  fastened  in  the  ground  and  the  other  made  sharp. 
They  are  placed  in  juxtaposition  and  connected  together 
by  horizontal  riband-pieces.  This  arrangement  is  fre 
quently  placed  at  the  foot  of  the  counterscarp.  When  the 
timbers  are  large  and  the  work  is  intended  as  a  part  of  a 
primary  defence,  it  is  called  a  stockade ;  when  the  stakes 
are  placed  at  the  foot  of  the  scarp,  either  horizontally  or 
inclined,  they  receive  the  name  of /raises. 

A  cheval-de-frise  consists  of  a  horizontal  piece  of  timber 
armed  with  wooden  or  iron  lances,  which  project  some 
eight  or  ten  feet.  It  is  much  employed  against  cavalry, 
and  on  rocky  soils  serves  as  a  substitute  for  palisades. 

Crowd-feet  are  small  wooden  or  iron  forms  filled  with 
sharp  spikes.  They  are  thrown,  with  their  points  up 
ward,  on  ground  which  is  to  be  passed  over  by  cavalry. 

Mines  are  sometimes  used  in  connection  with  intrench- 
ments,  but  more  commonly  in  the  attack  and  defence  of 
permanent  works.  They  will  be  noticed  further  on. 

Field-works  which  are  to  be  occupied  for  a  consider 
able  length  of  time  will  usually  have  their  steeper  slopes 
revetted,  and  be  arranged  with  scarp  and  counterscarp, 
galleries,  traverses,  blindages,  &c.  Such  works  hold  an 
intermediary  rank  between  temporary  and  permanent  for 
tification. 

As  examples  of  the  importance  of  field  fortifications 
and  of  the  manner  of  organizing  them,  the  reader  is  re 
ferred  to  the  celebrated  battle  of  Fontenoy,  in  1745,  where 
the  carefully-arranged  intrenchments  of  Marshal  Saxe  en 
abled  the  French  to  repel,  with  immense  destruction,  the 
attacks  of  greatly  superior  numbers  ;  to  the  battle  of  Fleu- 
rus,  in  1690,  where  the  Prince  of  Waldeck  exposed  him 
self  to  a  most  disastrous  defeat  "  by  neglecting  the  re- 


348  MILITARY   ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

sources  of  fortification  and  other  indispensable  precau 
tions ;"  to  the  battle  of  Malplaquet,  in  1709,  where 
Marshal  Villars,  by  neglecting  to  occupy  and  intrench  the 
farm  that  closed  the  passage  between  the  woods  of  Sars 
and  Laniere,  exposed  himself  to  a  disastrous  defeat ;  to 
the  operations  of  1792,  where  General  Custine,  by 
neglecting  to  intrench  the  heights  that  covered  Bingen, 
as  the  engineers  had  recommended,  exposed  himself  to 
those  terrible  disasters  which  forced  him  to  a  precipi 
tate  retreat ;  to  the  works  of  Wervike,  which,  by  a  vig 
orous  resistance  on  the  10th  of  September,  1793,  saved 
the  Dutch  army  from  total  destruction ;  to  the  intrenched 
camp  of  Ulm,  in  1800,  which  for  six  weeks  held  in  check 
the  victorious  army  of  Moreau  ;  to  the  intrenched  lines  of 
Torres  Vedras,  in  1810,  which  saved  from  destruction  the 
English  army  of  Wellington ;  to  the  field-defences  of 
Hougomont,  which  contributed  so  much  to  the  victory  of 
Waterloo,  &c. 

Military  communications. — The  movements  of  armies 
are  always  much  embarrassed  by  forests,  marshes,  and 
water-courses,  and  nothing  contributes  more  to  the  dis 
patch  of  military  operations  than  the  means  of  opening 
practical  and  easy  communication  through  these  various 
obstacles. 

It  is  not  necessary  here  to  enter  into  any  detailed  dis 
cussion  of  the  manner  of  constructing  military  communi 
cations  through  forests  or  marshes.  In  a  new  country 
like  ours,  where  almost  every  one  has  had  some  experi 
ence  in  road-making,  no  very  great  technical  knowledge 
is  required  for  the  construction  of  temporary  works  of 
this  character;  but  much  professional  skill  and  experience 
will  be  requisite  for  the  engineers  who  make  the  prelimi 
nary  reconnaissances,  and  fix  the  location  of  these  roads. 

Water-courses  may  be  crossed  by  means  of  fords,  on 
the  ice,  or  by  ferries  and  bridges.  When  temporary 


FIELD-ENGINEERING.  349 

bridges  or  ferries  are  constructed  by  the  aimy  in  the  field, 
they  are  classed  under  the  general  head  of  military  bridges, 
or  more  properly,  pontoniering. 

Where  the  depth  of  the  stream  is  not  great,  the  current 
slight,  and  the  bottom  smooth  and  hard,  the  passage  may 
be  effected  loy  fording.  If  the  bottom  be  of  mud,  or  large 
stones,  the  passage  will  be  difficult  and  dangerous,  even 
where  the  depth  and  current  are  favorable.  Under  favor 
able  circumstances  infantry  can  ford  a  stream  where  the 
depth  is  not  greater  than  four  feet ;  cavalry  to  a  depth  of 
four  or  five  feet ;  but  artillery,  and  engineer  trains,  cannot 
go  to  a  depth  of  more  than  two  and  a  half  feet,  without 
greatly  exposing  their  ammunition  and  military  stores. 
The  fords  should  be  accurately  staked  out  before  the  pas 
sage  is  attempted,  and  ropes  ought  to  be  stretched  across 
the  stream,  or  cavalry  and  small  boats  stationed  below,  to 
prevent  the  loss  of  life. 

Ice  may  be  crossed  by  infantry,  in  small  detachments. 
Its  strength  may  be  increased  by  covering  it  with  boards, 
or  straw,  so  as  to  distribute  the  weight  over  a  greater  sur 
face.  By  sprinkling  water  over  the  straw,  and  allowing 
it  to  freeze,  the  mass  may  be  made  still  more  compact. 
But  large  bodies  of  cavalry,  and  heavy  artillery,  cannot 
venture  on  the  ice  unless  it  be  of  great  thickness  and 
strength.  An  army  can  never  trust,  for  any  length  of 
time,  to  either  fords  or  ice  ;  if  it  did  a  freshet  or  a  thaw 
would  place  it  in  a  most  critical  state.  Military  bridges 
will,  therefore,  become  its  only  safe  reliance  for  keeping 
open  its  communications. 

Military  bridges  are  made  with  trestles,  rafts,  boats,  and 
other  floating  bodies.  Rope  bridges  are  also  sometimes 
resorted  to  by  troops  for  passing  rivers. 

Trestle  bridges  are  principally  used  for  crossing  small 
streams  not  more  than  seven  or  eight  feet  in  depth :  they 
also  serve  to  connect  floating  bridges  with  the  shore,  iu 


350  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

shallow  water.  The  form  of  the  trestle  is  much  the  same 
as  that  of  an  ordinary  carpenter's  horse,  i.  e.,  a  horizontal 
beam  supported  by  four  inclined  legs.  These  trestles  are 
placed  in  the  stream,  from  twelve  to  twenty  feet  apart,  and 
connected  by  string-pieces,  (or  balks  as  they  are  termed 
in  technical  language,)  which  are  covered  over  with 
plank.  The  action  of  the  current  against  the  bridge  may 
be  counteracted  by  anchors  and  cables,  or  by  means  of 
boxes  or  baskets  attached  to  the  legs  of  the  trestles,  and 
filled  with  stones.  A  more  substantial  form  may  be  given 
to  the  bridge  by  substituting  for  the  trestles,  piles,  or  the 
ordinary  framed  supports  so  much  used  in  the  newer 
parts  of  our  country. 

For  examples  of  the  use  of  bridges  of  this  description 
we  would  refer  to  Caesar's  celebrated  bridge  across  the 
Rhine  ;  the  passage  of  the  Scheldt  in  1588  by  the  Span 
iards  ;  the  passage  of  the  Lech  in  1631  by  Gustavus 
Adolphus  ;  the  passage  of  the  Danube  in  1740  by  Mar 
shal  Saxe  ;  the  great  bridge  across  the  Var  during  Na 
poleon's  Italian  campaigns ;  the  passage  of  the  Lech  in 
1800  by  Lecourbe  ;  the  bridges  across  the  Piava,  the 
Isonso,  &c.,  in  the  subsequent  operations  of  the  army  in 
Italy ;  the  celebrated  passage  of  the  Danube  at  the  island 
of  Lobau  in  1809;  the  passage  of  the  Agueda  in  1811 
by  the  English ;  the  passages  of  the  Dwina,  the  Mos- 
cowa,  the  Dneiper,  the  Beresina,  &c.,  in  the  campaign 
of  1812  ;  the  repairing  of  the  bridge  near  Dresden,  and 
the  passage  of  the  Elbe  in  1813,  &c. 

Rafts  formed  of  timbers,  casks,  barrels,  &c.,  are  fre 
quently  used  as  military  bridges.  They  may  be  made  to 
bear  almost  any  weight,  and  will  answer  for  the  passage 
of  rivers  of  any  depth  and  width,  provided  the  current  be 
not  rapid. 

Where  the  bridge  is  to  be  supported  by  rafts  made  of 
solid  timbers,  these  timbers  should  be  first  placed  in  the 


FIELD-ENGINEERING.  351 

water,  to  ascertain  their  natural  position  of  stability,  and 
then  the  larger  ends  cut  away  on  the  under  side,  so  as  to 
present  the  least  possible  resistance  to  the  action  of  the 
current.  They  are  afterwards  lashed  together  by  strong 
rope  or  withe  lashing,  or  fastened  by  cross-pieces  let  into 
the  timbers,  and  held  firm  by  bolts,  or  wooden  pins. 
These  rafts  are  kept  in  place  by  anchors  and  cables  pla 
ced  up  and  down  stream.  The  roadway  is  formed  in 
nearly  the  same  manner  as  for  a  bridge  supported  on 
trestles.  Empty  casks,  and  other  floating  bodies,  may  be 
substituted  in  place  of  logs  in  the  construction  of  rafts. 

For  examples  of  the  use  of  rafts  in  the  construction  of 
military  bridges,  we  would  refer  to  the  passage  of  the 
Seine  in  1465  by  Count  Charolais  ;  the  passage  of  the 
Meuse  in  1579  by  Alexander  Farnese  ;  the  passage  of 
the  Vistula  in  1704,  the  Borysthenese  in  1709,  and  the 
Sound  in  1718,  by  Charles  XII.;  the  passage  of  the 
Adige  in  1796  ;  the  passage  of  the  Po  in  1807 ;  and  the 
subsequenLmilitary  operations  in  the  Spanish  Peninsula. 

Military  bridges  are  frequently  made  of  boats,  and  the 
ordinary  river-craft  found  in  the  vicinity  of  the  intended 
passage.  Flat-bottomed  boats  are  the  most  suitable  for 
this  purpose,  but  if  these  cannot  be  obtained,  keel  boats 
will  serve  as  a  substitute.  When  these  water-craft  are  of 
very  unequal  sizes,  (as  is  frequently  the  case,)  two  smaller 
ones  may  be  lashed  together  to  form  a  single  support ; 
they  can  be  brought  to  the  same  level  by  means  of  stone 
ballast.  The  gunwales  must  be  suitably  arranged  for  sup 
porting  the  balks,  or  else  frameworks  should  be  erected 
for  this  purpose  from  the  centre  of  the  boat.  The  ar 
rangement  of  the  roadway,  anchors,  &c.,  is  the  same  as 
before. 

A  bridge-equipage  made  to  follow  an  army  in  its  move 
ments  in  the  field,  is  generally  composed  of  light  skiffs  or 
batteaux,  and  the  necessary  timbers,  planks,  anchors,  &c., 


352  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

for  forming  the  roadway,  and  keeping  the  bridge  in  its  po 
sition.  All  these  articles  are  constructed  especially  for 
this  purpose.  All  the  wood- work  should  be  of  tough  and 
well-seasoned  timber,  so  as  to  impose  no  unnecessary 
weight  on  the  wagon  trains.  The  bateaux  should  also  be 
made  of  strong  and  light  materials.  For  convenience  in 
transportation,  these  boats  are  sometimes  made  with  hinges 
so  as  to  fold  up.  The  ribs  are  usually  of  oak,  and  the 
sides  and  bottom  of  pine.  Instead  of  plank,  a  covering  of 
tin,  copper,  India-rubber,  &c.,  has  sometimes  been  substi 
tuted.  Floating  supports  of  this  character  are  often  made 
in  compartments,  so  as  to  prevent  their  sinking  when  in 
jured  by  the  enemy's  projectiles.  Indian-rubber  pontons 
may  be  folded  up  into  a  small  space,  and  their  slight  weight 
renders  them  convenient  for  transportation. 

On  navigable  streams  a  part  of  the  bridge  resting  on 
one  or  two  bateaux  should  be  so  arranged  that  it  can  be 
shipped  out  of  its  place,  forming  a  draw  for  the  passage  of 
river-craft.  Indeed,  it  would  be  well,  even  where  the 
river  is  not  navigable,  to  form  a  draw  for  the  passage  of 
trees,  and  other  floating  bodies,  sent  down  by  the  enemy 
against  the  bridge. 

An  ordinary  bridge-equipage  of  bateaux,  or  light  pontons, 
for  crossing  a  river  of  from  three  to  four  hundred  yards  in 
width,  and  of  moderate  current,  will  require  a  train  of  from 
sixty  to  eighty  wagons.*  Under  favorable  circumstances, 
and  with  a  well-instructed  corps  of  pontoniers,  the  bridge 
may  be  thrown  across  the  river,  and  prepared  for  the  pas 
sage  of  an  army  in  a  few  hours  at  most.f  After  the  troops 

*  The  number  of  wagons  in  a  ponton  train  will  be  greatly  diminished 
if  it  be  found  that  Indian-rubber  boats  may  be  used  as  supports  for  the 
bridge.  The  engineer  department  of  our  army  are  making  experi 
ments  to  determine  this  point. 

t  In  1746,  three  bridges  of  bateaux  were  thrown  across  the  Po,  near 
Placentia,  each  fifteen  hundred  feet  in  length,  and  entirely  comple- 


FIELD-ENGINEERING.  353 

have  passed  over,  the  bridge  may  be  taken  tip,  and  re 
placed  on  the  wagons  in  from  a  quarter  to  half  an  hour 

The  following  examples  will  serve  to  illustrate  the  use 
of  different  kinds  of  boat-bridges  in  military  operations  : — • 
the  passage  of  the  Rhine,  in  1702,  by  Villars  ;  the  pas 
sage  of  the  Dnieper  and  the  Bog,  in  1739,  by  the  Rus 
sians ;  the  passage  of  the  Danube,  in  1740,  by  Marshal 
Saxe  ;  the  passage  of  the  Rhine,  near  Cologne,  in  1758, 
by  the  Prince  of  Clermont ;  the  passage  of  the  Rhine,  in 

1795,  by  Jourdan  ;    the  passage  of  the  Rhine,  at  Kehl,  in 

1796,  by  Moreau  ;  and  again  the  same  year,  at  Weissen- 
thurn,  and  at  Neuwied,  by  Jourdan ;  the  bridges  across 
the    Rhine,    at    the    sieges    of  Kehl  and  Huninguen,  in 
1797;  the  passage  of  the  Limmat,  in  1799,  by  Massena  ; 
the  passages  of  the  Miricio,  the  Adige,  the  Brenta,  the  Pi- 
ava,  &c.,  in  1800  ;  the  passages  of  these  rivers  again  in 
1805  ;  the  passages  of  the  Narew,  in  1807,  by  the  Rus 
sians  ;  the  several  passages  of  the  Danube,  in  1809,  by 
the  French  and  Austrian  armies  ;  the  passages  of  the  Ta- 
gus  and  Douro,  in  1810,  by  the  English  ;  the  passages  of 
the  Niemen,  the  Dwina,  the  Moskwa,  and  the  Beresina, 
in  1812,  by  the  French;  and  of  the  great  rivers  of  Ger 
many  and  France,  in  1813  and  1814. 

A  floating  body,  propelled  from  one  bank  to  the  other  by 
the  current  of  the  stream,  is  termed  a,  flying-bridge.  The 
usual  mode  of  establishing  a  ferry  of  this  kind,  is  to  at- 

ted  in  eight  hours.  In  1757,  two  bridges  of  bateaux  were  thrown 
across  the  Rhine,  at  Wesel,  in  half  an  hour  ;  again,  in  the  same 
year,  a  third  bridge  was  thrown  across  this  river  near  Dusseldorf,  in 
six  hours.  In  1841,  Col.  Birago,  of  the  Austrian  army,  arrived  on  the 
bank  of  the  Weisgerben  arm  of  the  Danube,  with  his  bridge -equipage, 
at  a  round  trot,  and  immediately  began  the  construction  of  his  bridge, 
without  any  previous  preparation  or  examination.  In  less  than  three- 
quarters  of  an  hour  the  bridge  was  completed,  and  three  loaded  four- 
horee  wagons  passed  over  on  a  trot,  followed  by  a  column  of  infantry, 


354  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

tach  the  head  of  the  boat  by  means  of  a  cable  and  anchor 
to  some  point  near  the  middle  of  the  stream.  By  steering 
obliquely  to  the  current,  the  boat  may  be  made  to  cross 
and  recross  at  the  same  point.  A  single  passage  may  be 
made  in  the  same  way,  by  the  action  of  the  current  with 
out  the  cable  and  anchor,  but  the  boat  in  this  case  will  be 
carried  some  distance  down  the  stream.  Rowboats  are 
employed  for  crossing  over  infantry  by  successive  debar 
kations  ;  but  this  process  is  too  slow  for  the  passage  of  a 
large  force  ;  it  may  very  well  be  resorted  to  as  auxiliary 
to  other  means. 

Steam  craft  are  so  common  at  the  present  day  on  all 
navigable  streams,  that  an  army  in  the  field  will  frequent 
ly  be  able  to  avail  itself  of  this  means  of  passing  the 
larger  rivers.  But,  in  a  hostile  country,  or  in  one  already 
passed  over  by  the  enemy,  it  will  not  be  safe  to  rely  with 
confidence  upon  obtaining  craft  of  this  character.  A  well- 
organized  army  will  always  carry  in  its  train  the  means  of 
effecting  a  certain  and  speedy  passage  of  all  water-courses 
that  may  intercept  its  line  of  march. 

Flying-bridges  or  rowboats  were  employed  in  the  pas-  . 
sage  of  the  Dwina,  in  1701,  by  the  Swedes  ;  the  passage 
of  the  Po,  in  1701,  by  Prince  Eugene  ;  the  passage  of  the 
Rhine,  at  Huninguen,  in  1704 ;  Jourdan's  passage  of  the 
Rhine  in  1795  ;  Moreau's  passage  in  1796  ;  the  sieges  of 
Kehl  and  Huninguen  in  1797;  Massena's  passage  of  the 
Limmat,  and  Soult's  passage  of  the  Linth,  in  1799;  the 
passage  of  the  Rhine,  at  Lucisteig.  in  1800  ;  the  passage 
of  the  Po,  by  the  French,  just  before  the  battle  of  Maren- 
go ;  and  others  in  Italy,  Germany,  and  Spain,  in  the  sub 
sequent  campaigns  of  Napoleon. 

Military  bridges  have  sometimes  been  formed  of  ropes, 
cables  stretched  across  the  stream,  and  firmly  attached  at 
each  end  to  trees,  or  posts  let  into  the  earth.  If  the  shore 
is  of  rock,  rings  with  staples  let  into  the  stone  form  the 


FIELD-ENGINEERING.  355 

best  means  for  securing  the  ends  of  the  main  ropes.  Plank 
are  laid  on  these  cables  to  form  the  road- way.  The  ropes 
forming  the  "  side-rail"  of  the  bridge  are  passed  over  tres 
tles  at  each  shore,  and  then  fastened  as  before.  Short 
vertical  ropes  attach  the  main  supports  to  these  side  ropes, 
in  order  that  they  may  sustain  a  part  of  the  weight  passing 
over  the  bridge.  Constructions  of  this  character  are  fully 
described  in  Douglas's  Essay  on  Military  Bridges.  For 
example,  see  the  passage  of  the  Po,  near  Casal,  in  1515, 
by  the  Swiss  ;  the  bridge  thrown  over  the  'Clain  by  Admi 
ral  Coligni,  at  the  siege  of  Poitiers,  in  1569  ;  the  opera 
tions  of  the  Prince  of  Orange  against  Ghent  and  Bruges, 
in  1631  ;  the  passage  of  the  Tagus,  at  Alcantara,  in  1810, 
by  the  English ;  the  bridge  constructed  across  the  Zezere, 
by  the  French,  in  1810;  the  bridge  thrown  across  the 
Scarpe,  near  Douai,  in  1820;  the  experiments  made  at 
Fere  in  1823,  &c. 

The  passage  of  a  river  in  the  presence  of  an  enemy, 
whether  acting  offensively  or  in  retreat,  is  an  operation  of 
great  delicacy  and  danger.  In  either  case  the  army  is 
called  upon  to  show  the  coolest  and  most  determined 
courage,  for  its  success  will  depend  on  its  maintaining  the 
strictest  discipline  and  good  order. 

In  the  case  of  a  retreat  the  bridge  should  be  covered  by 
field  intrenchments,  called  a  t&te  depont,  and  defended  by 
a  strong  guard.  If  the  river  be  of  moderate  width,  the 
enemy  may  be  kept  at  a  distance  by  heavy  batteries  on 
the  opposite  shore.  As  soon  as  the  passage  is  effected 
by  the  main  body,  the  bridge,  if  permanent,  will  be  blown 
up,  or  otherwise  destroyed  by  the  miners,  and  if  floating, 
will  be  swung  round  to  the  other  shore.  The  rear-guard 
will  pass  over  in  rowboats,  or  the  end  pontons  detached 
for  that  purpose.  An  army  retreating  in  the  face  of  an 
enemy  should  never  rely  upon  one  single  bridge,  no  mat 
ter  what  may  be  its  character  ;  for  the  slightest  accident 


356  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

happening  to  it  might  expose  the  whole  army  to  inevita* 
ble  destruction. 

The  passage  of  a  river  by  main  force,  against  an  enter 
prising  and  active  enemy  on  the  opposite  shore,  is  always 
an  operation  of  the  greatest  difficulty,  and  not  unfrequent- 
ly  accompanied  with  the  most  bloody  results. 

The  most  effectual  method  of  accomplishing  this  ob 
ject  is  by  stratagem.  Demonstrations  are  made  at  seve 
ral  points  at  the  same  time  :  bodies  of  troops  are  thrown 
across,  after  nightfall,  in  rowboats  or  by  flying-bridges,  to 
get  possession  of  the  opposite  bank.  The  vanguard  of 
light  cavalry  may  cross  by  swimming.  The  pontoniers 
should  have  their  bridge  equipage  in  readiness  near  the 
intended  point  of  passage,  so  that  it  can  be  thrown  across 
with  the  greatest  possible  rapidity,  while  the  advanced 
guards  are  still  able  to  keep  the  enemy  at  a  distance. 
Under  favorable  circumstances  the  pontoniers  will  have  the 
bridge  in  readiness  for  the  passage  of  the  army  before  the 
enemy  can  collect  his  troops  upon  the  threatened  point. 

Cannon-balls  and  hollow  shot  are  the  most  effectual 
means  for  destroying  an  enemy's  bridge  when  our  batteries 
can  be  planted  within  reach.  When  this  cannot  be  done, 
we  must  resort  to  fire-boats,  floating  rafts,  &c.,  to  accom 
plish  our  object.  Operations  of  this  kind  carried  on  in 
the  night,  are  most  likely  to  succeed. 

To  protect  bridges  from  the  action  of  these  floating 
bodies,  stockades,  or  floating  chevaux-de-frise  are  con 
structed  across  the  stream  at  some  distance  above  the 
bridge  ;  strong  cables,  or  chains  stretched  directly  across 
the  river,  or  with  an  angle  up  stream,  may  be  used  in 
place  of  stockades,  or  in  conjunction  with  them.  Guards 
should  be  stationed  above  the  bridge,  with  boats,  ropes, 
grapnels,  &c.,  for  the  purpose  of  arresting  all  floating 
bodies  and  drawing  them  ashore,  or  directing  them  safely 
through  the  draw  in  the  bridge  arrangement. 


FIELD-ENGINEERING.  357 

The  troops  especially  charged  with  the  construction 
and  management  of  the  various  kinds  of  military  bridges, 
are  denominated  pontoniers.  The  duties  of  these  troops 
are  arduous  and  important,  and,  in  a  country  like  ours, 
intersected  by  numerous  water-courses,  the  success  of  a 
campaign  will  often  depend  upon  their  skill  and  efficiency. 

Sapping. — This  is  a  general  term  applied  to  the  opera 
tions  of  forming  trenches,  along  which  troops  may  ap 
proach  a  work  without  being  exposed  to  the  fire  of  the 
besieged. 

In  addition  to  the  ordinary  sapping-tools,  such  as  shov 
els,  picks,  gabion-forks,  &c.,  used  in  constructing  trenches, 
there  will  also  be  required  a  considerable  amount  of  sap 
ping  materials,  such  as  gabions,  fascines,  sap-fagots,  sand 
bags,  &c. 

The  gabion  is  a  cylindrical  basket  of  twigs,  about  two 
feet  in  diameter,  and  some  three  feet  in  length,  and  with 
out  a  bottom.  It  is  made  by  driving  into  the  ground,  in  a 
circular  form,  a  number  of  small  pickets  about  an  inch  in 
diameter,  and  of  the  length  required  for  the  gabion. 
Twigs  are  wattled  between  the  pickets  like  ordinary  bas 
ket-work,  and  fastened  at  the  ends  by  withs  or  packthread. 
Gabions  are  used  in  forming  saps,  batteries,  blindages, 
powder-magazines,  and  in  revetting  the  steep  slopes  of 
field-works. 

The  fascine  is  a  bundle  of  twigs  closely  bound  up,  from 
nine  to  twelve  inches  in  diameter,  and  from  ten  to  fifteen 
or  twenty  feet  in  length.  The  largest  are  sometimes  called 
saucissons.  In  making  a  fascine,  straight  twigs  about  the 
thickness  of  a  man's  finger  are  laid  side  by  side,  and 
firmly  compressed  together  by  a  strong  rope  or  chain  at 
tached  to  the  extremities  of  two  levers.  While  held  in 
this  position  the  twigs  are  firmly  bound  together  by  withs 
or  cords.  Fascines  are  used  in  constructing  trenches,  bat 
teries,  &c.,  and  for  filling  up  wet  ditches. 


358  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

The  sap-fagot  is  a  strong  fascine  about  ten  inches  ir 
diameter  and  two  feet  in  length,  with  a  picket  inserted 
through  the  middle.  It  is  used  in  the  double  sap  in  con 
nection  with  gabions. 

Sand-bags  are  usually  made  of  coarse  canvass.  When 
filled  with  earth  they  are  some  six  or  eight  inches  in  dia 
meter,  and  from  eighteen  inches  to  two  feet  in  length. 
From  their  perishable  nature,  they  are  used  only  when 
other  materials  cannot  be  procured,  and  where  it  is  im 
portant  to  place  the  troops  speedily  under  cover  from  the 
enemy's  fire. 

Bales  of  wool,  cotton,  hay,  straw,  &c.,  may  be  employed 
iri  sapping  for  the  same  purposes  as  the  above  materials, 
when  they  can  be  procured  in  sufficient  quantity.  Pork 
and  flour  barrels,  which  are  usually  in  abundance  in  a 
camp,  are  frequently  filled  with  sand  and  used  for  forming 
magazines,  blindages,  &c.,  in  field-works. 

A  trench  constructed  in  ordinary  soil  beyond  the  range 
of  the  enemy's  grape,  is  called  a  simple  sap,  or  ordinary 
trench.  The  earth  is  thrown  up  on  the  side  towards  the 
place  besieged,  so  as  to  form  a  kind  of  parapet  to  cover 
the  men  in  the  trench.  The  labor  is  here  executed  under 
the  supervision  of  engineer  soldiers,  by  working  parties 
detached  from  the  other  arms.  Fig.  50  represents  a  ver 
tical  section  of  a  simple  sap. 

When  within  range  of  the  enemy's  grape,  iheflyi?ig  sap 
is  resorted  to  in  order  to  place  the  workmen  speedily  under 
cover.  In  this  operation,  gabions  are  placed  in  juxtapo 
sition  on  the  side  towards  the  besieged  work,  and  filled 
with  all  possible  speed  by  the  workmen.  Three  rows  of 
fascines  are  usually  placed  on  the  top  of  the  gabions  to  in 
crease  the  height.  The  most  difficult  part  of  the  flying 
sap  is  executed  by  engineer  troops,  and  the  trench  is  com 
pleted  by  the  ordinary  working  parties.  Fig.  51  repre 
sents  a  section  of  this  sap. 


FIELD-ENGINEERING.  359 

The  full-sap  is  employed  when  the  works  of  the  be 
siegers  are  within  range  of  musketry,  or  when  the  grape 
fire  of  the  besieged  is  so  deadly  that  the  flying  sap  can 
no  longer  be  used.  This  is  a  difficult  operation,  and  un 
less  executed  with  great  care  and  by  well-instructed  engi 
neer  troops,  the  construction  of  the  trench  will  be  attend 
ed  with  an  immense  loss  of  life.  The  work  must  be  ex 
ecuted  under  cover  of  a  sap-roller,  which  is  a  cylindrical 
mass  of  fascines,  wool,  or  cotton,  some  two  feet  in  diame 
ter.  On  very  smooth  ground  a  ball-proof  shelter  on  wheels 
might  be  used  as  a  substitute.  The  sap-roller  being 
placed  along  the  line  of  the  trench  so  as  to  cover  the  sap 
per  in  front,  who  is  armed  with  a  musket-proof  head 
piece  and  cuirass,  this  sapper  commences  the  sap  by 
placing  a  gabion  on  the  line  of  the  proposed  trench  and 
fills  it  with  earth,  working  on  his  hands  and  knees.  Hav 
ing  filled  the  first  gabion,  he  pushes  forward  the  sap-roller 
and  places  a  second  one  next  the  first,  stopping  the  open 
joint  between  the  two  with  a  stop-fagot.  The  second 
gabion  being  filled  in  the  same  manner  as  the  first,  others 
are  successively  established.  When  the  first  sapper  has 
advanced  a  few  feet,  he  is  followed  by  a  second,  also  in 
defensive  armor,  who  increases  the  excavation  and  em 
bankment  ;  this  sapper  is  then  followed  in  the  same  way 
by  a  third  and  a  fourth,  after  which  the  trench  will  be  suf 
ficiently  advanced  to  be  turned  over  to  the  ordinary  work 
men.  The  sap-fagots  may  be  removed  when  the  em 
bankment  becomes  thick  enough  to  resist  grape.  Fig.  52 
represents  a  plan  and  section  of  a  full-sap. 

When  the  direction  of  the  trench  is  such  that  the  men 
are  exposed  on  both  sides,  it  will  be  necessary  to  throw 
up  an  embankment  both  to  the  right  and  left.  This  oper 
ation  is  called  the  double  sap,  and  is  executed  by  two 
parties  of  sappers,  working  side  by  side.  In  this  sap  it 
will  be  necessary  to  frequently  change  the  direction  of 


360  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

the  trench,  or  to  throw  up  traverses,  in  order  to  cover  the 
men  at  a  distance  from  the  sap-roller.     Wing-traverses, 
on  the  side  of  the  trench  which  is  least  exposed,  some 
times  serve  the  same  purpose  as  a  double  sap. 

Mines. — By  mining,  as  a  military  term,  we  understand 
the  operations  resorted  to  for  the  demolition,  with  pow 
der,  of  a  military  structure  of  any  description.  The  term 
mine  is  applied  both  to  the  excavation  charged  with  pow 
der  for  the  purpose  of  producing  an  explosion,  and  to  the 
communications  which  lead  to  this  excavation. 

The  place  in  which  the  charge  of  powder  is  lodged  is 
called  the  chamber,  the  communication  by  which  this 
place  is  reached  the  gallery,  and  the  excavation  made  by 
the  explosion  is  termed  the  crater. 

The  form  of  the  crater  caused  by  an  explosion  in  or 
dinary  soils  is  assumed  to  be  a  truncated  cone,  the  diam 
eter,  c  d,  (Fig.  53,)  of  the  lower  circle  being  one-half  the 
diameter,  a  b,  of  the  upper  circle.  This  form  has  never 
been  ascertained  to  be  exactly  correct,  but  the  theoretical 
results  deduced  from  a  mathematical  discussion  of  this 
figure  have  been  fully  verified  in  practice.  The  radius, 
p  b,  of  the  upper  circle  is  termed  the  crater  radius ;  the 
line  o  p,  drawn  from  the  centre  of  the  charge  perpendicular 
to  the  surface  where  the  explosion  takes  place,  is  termed 
the  line  of  least  resistance ;  the  line  o  b,  drawn  from  the 
centre  of  the  powder  to  any  point  in  the  circumference  of 
the  upper  circle,  is  termed  the  radius  of  explosion. 

When  the  crater  radius  is  equal  to  the  line  of  least  re 
sistance,  the  mine  is  termed  common ;  when  this  radius  is 
greater  than  the  line  of  least  resistance,  the  mine  is 
termed  overcharged ;  and  when  the  radius  is  less,  under 
charged.  A  mine  of  small  dimensions,  formed  by  sinking 
a  shaft  in  the  ground,  is  termed  a  fougassc.  The  term 
camoujlet  is  applied  to  a  mine  used  to  suffocate  the  ene 
my's  miner,  without  pr6ducing  an  explosion.  Small  mines 


FIELD-ENGINEERING.  361 

made  in  rock  or  masonry,  merely  for  the  purpose  of  ex 
cavation,  without  any  considerable  external  explosion,  are 
called  blasts. 

From  experiments  made  on  common  mines,  whose  line 
of  least  resistance  did  not  exceed  fifteen  feet,  it  has  been 
ascertained  that  the  tenacity  of  the  earth  is  completely 
destroyed  around  the  crater  to  a  distance  equal  to  the 
crater  radius,  and  that  empty  galleries  would  be  broken 
in  at  once  and  a  half  that  distance.  It  has  also  been 
proved  by  experiment,  that  the  crater  radius  in  over 
charged  mines  may  be  increased  to  six  times  the  line 
of  least  resistance,  but  not  much  beyond  this  ;  that  within 
this  limit  the  diameter  of  the  crater  increases  nearly  in 
the  ratio  of  the  square  roots  of  the  charge ;  and  that 
empty  galleries  may  be  destroyed  by  overcharged  mines 
at  the  distance  of  four  times  the  line  of  least  resistance. 

By  means  of  the  deductions  of  physico-mathematical 
theory,  and  the  results  of  experiments,  rules  have  been 
determined  by  which  the  miner  can  calculate,  with  much 
accuracy,  the  charge  necessary  to  produce  a  required 
result  in  any  given  soil. 

In  the  earlier  stages  of  the  history  of  this  art,  mines 
were  only  used  to  open  breaches  and  demolish  masses  of 
masonry  ;  but  in  later  times  they  have  been  employed  as 
important  elements  in  the  attack  and  defence  of  places. 

An  isolated  wall,  only  two  or  three  feet  thick,  may 
readily  be  demolished  by  exploding  one  or  two  casks  of 
powder  placed  in  contact  with  its  base.  If  the  wall  be 
five  or  six  feet  thick,  the  charges  should  be  placed  under 
the  foundation.  For  walls  of  still  greater  thickness  it 
will  be  best  to  open  a  gallery  to  the  centre  of  the  wall,  a 
foot  or  two  above  its  base,  and  place  the  powder  in  cham 
bers  thus  excavated.  Revetment  walls  may  be  over 
turned  by  placing  the  charges  at  the  back  of  the  wall, 
tbout  one-third  or  one-quarter  of  the  way  up  from  the 

31 


362  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

base.    If  placed  too  near  the  base,  a  breach  will  be  made 
in  the  wall  without  overturning  it. 

To  demolish  a  bridge  of  masonry  the  powder  should  be 
lodged  in  chambers  excavated  in  the  centre  of  the  piers. 
When  there  is  not  time  for  excavating  these  chambers  in 
the  piers,  a  trench  may  be  cut  over  the  key  of  the  arch, 
in  which  the  powder  is  placed  and  exploded ;  or,  the 
casks  of  powder  may  be  suspended  immediately  under 
the  arch,  with  the  same  results.  Where  a  saving  of  pow 
der  is  of  consequence,  small  chambers  may  be  excavated 
in  the  haunches  of  the  arch,  and  the  mine  carefully 
tamped  before  firing  it. 

Bridges  of  wood  may  be  destroyed  by  suspending  casks 
of  powder  under  the  principal  timbers,  or  attaching  them 
to  the  supports. 

Palisading,  gates,  doors,  &c.,  may  be  destroyed  in  the 
same  way,  by  suspending  casks  or  bags  of  powder  against 
their  sides ;  or  still  more  effectually,  by  burying  the 
charges  just  beneath  their  base. 

To  demolish  a  tower,  magazine,  or  house,  of  masonry, 
place  charges  of  powder  under  the  piers  and  principal 
walls  of  the  building.  In  wooden  structures  the  powder 
should  be  placed  under,  or  attached  to  the  principal  sup 
ports.  Where  time  is  wanting  to  effect  these  arrange 
ments,  a  building  may  be  blown  down  by  placing  a  large 
mass  of  powder  in  the  interior.  The  powder  may  be 
economized,  in  this  case,  by  putting  it  in  a  strong  case, 
which  should  be  connected  with  the  walls  of  the  building 
on  all  sides  by  wooden  props. 

Special  treatises  on  military  mining  contain  full  in 
structions  for  regulating  the  size  and  position  of  the 
charge  for  the  various  cases  that  may  be  met  with  in 
the  practical  operations  of  field-engineering. 

As  applied  to  the  attack  and  defence  of  a  fortified  place, 
mines  are  divided  into  two  general  classes — offensive  and 


FIELD-ENGINEERING.  363 

defensive  mines.  The  former  are  employed  by  the  besie 
gers  to  overthrow  the  scarps  and  counterscarps  of  the 
place,  to  demolish  barriers,  palisades,  walls,  and  other 
temporary  means  of  defence,  and  to  destroy  the  mines  or' 
the  besieged.  The  latter  are  employed  by  the  opposite 
party  to  blow  up  the  besiegers'  works  of  attack,  and  to  de 
fend  the  passage  of  ditches  against  an  assault.  Small 
mines  called  fougasses  may  be  employed  for  the  last 
named  object.  The  shell-fougasse  is  composed  of  a  wooden 
box  filled  with  one  or  more  tiers  of  shells,  and  buried  just 
below  the  surface  of  the  earth.  Sometimes  a  quantity  of 
powder  is  placed  under  the  shells,  so  as  to  project  them 
into  the  air  previous  to  their  explosion.  The  stone  fou- 
gasse  is  formed  by  making  a  funnel-shaped  excavation, 
some  five  or  six  feet  deep,  and  placing  at  the  bottom  a 
charge  of  powder  enclosed  in  a  box,  and  covered  with  a 
strong  wooden  shield ;  severaj  cubic  yards  of  pebbles, 
broken  stone,  or  brickbats,  are  placed  against  the  shield, 
and  earth  well  rammed  round,  to  prevent  the  explosion  from 
taking  place  in  the  wrong  direction.  These  mines  are 
fired  by  means  of  powder  hose,  or  by  wires  connected 
with  a  galvanic  battery. 

The  defensive  mines  employed  to  blow  up  the  besie 
gers'  works,  are  generally  common  mines  with  the  lines  of 
least  resistance  seldom  greater  than  fifteen  feet.  All  the 
main  galleries  and  principal  branches  of  mines  for  a  per 
manent  fortification  are  constructed  at  the  same  time  with 
the  other  portions  of  the  work,  leaving  only  the  secondary 
branches,  chambers,  &c.,  to  be  made  during  the  siege 
For  the  general  arrangement  of  these  galleries,  and  the 
precautions  necessary  for  their  protection  from  the  opera 
tions  of  the  besiegers,  reference  must  be  made  to  trea 
tises  specially  devoted  to  the  discussion  of  this  subject. 

Mines  can  seldom  be  employed  with  advantage  in  works 
of  slight  relief,  and  liable  to  an  assault.     But  if  judiciously 


364  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

arranged  in  the  plan  of  their  construction,  and  well  man 
aged  during  the  operations  of  the  siege,  they  contribute 
very  materially  to  the  length  of  the  defence. 

Attack  and  defence, — This  subject  admits  of  two  natural 
divisions  :  1st,  of  intrenchments,  and  2d,  of  permanent 
works. 

I .  Intrenchments  may  be  attacked  either  by  surprise,  or 
by  open  force.  In  either  case  the  operations  should  be 
based  on  exact  information  of  the  strength  of  the  works 
and  the  number  and  character  of  the  garrison — information 
that  can  be  obtained  from  spies,  deserters,  and  prisoners, 
and  confirmed  by  examinations  or  reconnaissances  made 
by  officers  of  engineers.  By  these  means  a  pretty  accu 
rate  knowledge  may  be  obtained  of  the  natural  features  of 
the  ground  exterior  to  the  works ;  their  weak  and  strong 
points  ;  and  their  interior  arrangements  for  defence. 

In  an  attack  by  surprise,  the  troops  should  consist  of  a 
storming  party  and  a  reserve  of  picked  men.  The  at 
tacking  column  is  preceded  by  a  company  of  sappers 
armed  with  axes,  shovels,  picks,  crowbars,  &c. ;  bags  of 
powder  are  also  used  for  blowing  down  gates,  palisades, 
&c.  All  the  operations  must  be  carried  on  with  the  ut 
most  dispatch.  The  time  most  favorable  for  a  surprise  is 
an  hour  or  two  before  day,  as  at  this  moment  the  sentinels 
are  generally  less  vigilant,  and  the  garrison  in  a  profound 
sleep  ;  moreover,  the  subsequent  operations,  after  the  first 
surprise,  will  be  facilitated  by  the  approach  of  day.  Un 
der  certain  circumstances,  it  maybe  advisable  to  make 
false  attacks  at  the  same  time  with  the  true  one,  in  order 
to  distract  the  attention  of  the  garrison  from  the  true  point 
of  danger.  But  false  attacks  have,  in  general,  the  objec 
tion  of  dividing  the  forces  of  the  assailants  as  well  as  of 
the  assailed.  In  all  attacks  by  surprise,  secrecy  is  the 
soul  of  the  enterprise. 

In  an  open  assault,  if  artillery  be  employed,  the  troops 


FIELD-ENGINEERING.  365 

should  be  drawn  up  in  a  sheltered  position,  until  the  fire 
of  the  works  is  silenced,  and  breaches  effected  in  the  par 
apet.  But  if  the  bayonet  alone  be  resorted  to,  the  troops 
are  immediately  brought  forward  at  the  beginning  of  the 
assault.  The  attack  is  begun  by  a  storming  party  of  picked 
men  :  they  are  preceded,  as  before,  by  a  body  of  sappers, 
provided  with  necessary  means  for  removing  obstacles, 
and  followed  by  a  second  detachment  of  engineers,  who 
will  widen  the  passages,  and  render  them  more  accessi 
ble  to  the  main  body  of  troops  who  now  advance  to  the 
assistance  of  the  storming  party.  If  the  assailants  should 
be  arrested  at  the  counterscarp  by  obstacles  which  must 
be  removed  before  any  farther  progress  can  be  made,  the 
infantry  troops  of  the  detachment  display  and  open  a  fire 
upon  the  assailed,  in  order  to  divert  their  fire  from  the 
sappers.  A  few  pieces  of  light  artillery,  on  the  flanks  of 
the  column,  may  sometimes  be  employed  for  this  purpose 
with  great  advantage. 

The  storming  party  should  always  be  provided  with  sca 
ling-ladders,  planks,  fascines,  &c.,  for  crossing  the  ditch, 
and  mounting  the  scarp.  If  the  counterscarp  be  revetted 
with  masonry,  the  troops  must  either  descend  by  ladders, 
or  fill  up  the  ditch  with  fascines,  bales  of  straw,  bundles  of 
wool,  &c. :  if  not  revetted,  a  passage  for  the  troops  into 
the  ditch  will  soon  be  formed  by  the  shovels  of  the  sap 
pers.  When  the  ditch  is  gained,  shelter  is  sought  in  a 
dead  angle  till  the  means  are  prepared  for  mounting  the 
scarp,  and  storming  the  work.  If  the  scarp  be  of  earth 
only,  the  sappers  will  soon  prepare  a  passage  for  the  es 
calade  ;  but  if  revetted  with  masonry,  the  walls  must  be 
breached  with  hollow  shot,  or  scaled  by  means  of  ladders. 

In  the  defence,  the  strictest  vigilance  should  be  at  all 
times  exerted  to  guard  against  a  surprise  :  sentinels  are 
posted  on  all  the  most  commanding  points  of  the  work  ; 
all  the  avenues  of  approach  are  most  thoroughly  guarded ; 


366  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

and  patroles  are  constantly  scouring  the  ground  in  all  di 
rections.  At  night  all  these  precautions  are  redoubled. 
Light  and  fire-balls  are  thrown  out  in  front  of  the  work  to 
light  up  the  ground,  and  discover  the  movements  and  ap 
proach  of  the  enemy.  Each  rnan  should  have  his  particu 
lar  post  assigned  to  him,  and  be  thoroughly  instructed  in 
the  duties  he  will  have  to  perform.  All  auxiliary  arrange 
ments,  such  as  palisades,  abattis,  &c.,  should  be  defended 
with  the  utmost  obstinacy  ;  the  longer  the  enemy  is  held 
in  check  by  these  obstacles,  the  longer  will  he  be  exposed 
to  the  grape  and  musketry  of  the  main  work.  When  he 
assaults  the  parapet,  he  will  be  opposed  by  the  bayonet  in 
front  and  a  well-aimed  fire  in  flank.  While  in  the  ditch, 
or  as  he  mounts  the  scarp,  hollow  projectiles,  incendiary 
preparations,  stones,  logs,  &c.,  will  be  rolled  down  upon 
his  head.  But  when  the  assaulting  column  has  gained 
the  top  of  the  scarp,  the  bayonet  forms  the  most  effective 
means  of  resistance. 

The  measures  resorted  to  in  the  attack  and  defence  of 
the  larger  class  of  field-works,  will  necessarily  partake 
much  of  the  nature  of  the  operations  employed  in  the  at 
tack  and  defence  of  permanent  fortifications. 

II.  The  attack  and  defence  of  a  fortress  may  be  car 
ried  on  either  by  a  regular  siege,  or  by  irregular  opera 
tions  and  an  assault.  The  latter  plan  has  sometimes  been 
adopted  wfien  the  works  of  the  place  were  weak  and  im 
properly  defended  ;  where  the  time  and  means  were  want 
ing  for  conducting  a  regular  siege  ;  or  where  the  assail 
ants  were  ignorant  of  the  means  proper  to  be  resorted  to 
for  the  reduction  of  the  fortress.  Such  operations,  how 
ever,  are  usually  attended  by  an  immense  sacrifice  of  hu 
man  life,  and  the  general  who  neglects  to  employ  all  the 
resources  of  the  engineer's  art  in  carrying  on  a  siege,  is 
justly  chargeable  with  the  lives  of  his  men.  In  the  siege 
of  Cambrai,  Louis  XIV.,  on  the  solicitation  of  Du  Metz, 


FIELD-ENGINEERING.  367 

but  contrary  to  the  advice  of  Vauban,  ordered  the  demi 
lime  to  be  taken  by  assault,  instead  of  waiting  for  the  re 
sult  of  a  regular  siege.  The  assault  was  made,  but  it  was 
unsuccessful,  and  the  French  sustained  great  losses.  The 
king  now  directed  Vauban  to  take  the  demi-lune  by  regu 
lar  approaches,  which  was  done  in  a  very  short  time,  and 
with  a  loss  of  only  five  men  !  Again,  at  the  siege  of  Ypres, 
the  generals  advised  an  assault  before  the  breaches  were 
ready.  "  You  will  gain  a  day  by  the  assault,"  said  Vauban, 
"  but  you  will  lose  a  thousand  men."  The  king  directed 
the  regular  works  to  be  continued,  and  the  next  day  the 
place  was  taken  with  but  little  loss  to  the  besiegers. 

But  a  work  may  be  of  such  a  character  as  to  render  it 
unnecessary  to  resort  to  all  the  works  of  attack  which 
would  be  required  for  the  reduction  of  a  regular  bastioned 
fort,  on  a  horizontal  site.  For  example  : .  the  nature  of  the 
ground  may  be  such  as  to  enable  the  troops  to  approach  to 
the  foot  of  the  glacis,  without  erecting  any  works  what 
ever  ;  of  course,  all  the  works  up  to  the  third  parallel  may 
in  this  case  be  dispensed  with  without  any  violation  of  the 
rules  of  a  siege.  Again,  the  point  of  attack  may  be  such 
that  the  other  parts  of  the  place  will  not  flank  the  works 
of  approach ;  here  a  single  line  of  boyaux  and  short  par 
allels  may  be  all-sufficient. 

But  for  the  purpose  of  discussion,  we  will  here  suppose 
the  place  besieged  to  be  a  regular  bastioned  work  on  a 
horizontal  site,  (Fig.  54.) 

The  operations  of  the  siege  may  be  divided  into  three 
distinct  periods. 

1st.  The  preliminary  operations  of  the  attack  and  de 
fence  previous  to  the  opening  of  the  trenches. 

2d.  The  operations  of  the  two  parties  from  the  opening 
of  the  trenches  to  the  establishment  of  the  third  parallel. 

3d.  From  the  completion  of  the  third  parallel  to  the  re 
duction  of  the  place. 


368  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

First  period.  The  object  of  the  investment  of  the  place  ia 
to  cut  off  all  communication  between  the  work  and  the 
exterior,  thus  preventing  it  from  receiving  succors,  pro 
visions,  and  military  munitions,  and  also  to  facilitate  a 
close  reconnoissance  of  the  place  by  the  engineers,  who 
should  always  accompany  the  investing  corps,  and  pursue 
their  labors  under  its  protection.  This  corps  should  be 
composed  chiefly  of  light  troops — cavalry,  light  infantry, 
horse  artillery,  "  brigades  of  engineers  and  mounted  sap 
pers," — who  march  in  advance  of  the  besieging  army,  and, 
by  a  sudden  movement,  surround  the  work,  seize  upon  all 
the  avenues  of  approach,  and  carry  off  every  thing  without 
the  work  that  can  be  of  service  either  to  the  garrison  or  to 
the  besiegers.  To  effect  this  object,  the  enterprise  must 
be  conducted  with  secrecy  and  dispatch. 

The  investing  corps  is  now  distributed  around  the  work 
in  the  most  favorable  positions  for  cutting  off  all  access 
to  it,  and  also  to  prevent  any  communication  with  the  ex 
terior  by  detachments  from  the  garrison,  and  even  single  in 
dividuals  are  sent  out  to  give  intelligence  to  a  succoring  ar 
my  or  to  reconnoitre  the  operations  of  the  besieging  corps. 
These  posts  and  sentinels,  called  the  daily  cordon,  are 
placed  some  mile  or  mile  and  a  half  from  the  work,  and 
beyond  the  reach  of  the  guns.  But  in  the  night-time 
these  posts  are  insufficient  to  accomplish  their  object,  and 
consequently  as  soon  as  it  is  dark  the  troops  move  up  as 
close  to  the  work  as  possible  without  being  exposed  to  the 
fire  of  musketry.  This  arrangement  constitutes  the  nightly 
cordon. 

By  the  time  the  main  army  arrives  the  reconnoissance 
will  be  sufficiently  complete  to  enable  the  chief  engineer 
to  lay  before  the  general  the  outline  of  his  plan  of  attack, 
so  as  to  establish  the  position  of  his  depots  and  camp. 
These  will  be  placed  some  two  miles  from  the  work,  ac 
cording  to  the.  nature  of  the  ground.  As  they  occupy  a 


FIELD-ENGINEERING. 

considerable  extent  of  ground  around  the  work,  it  will  gene 
rally  be  necessary  to  form  intrenchments  strong  enough  to 
prevent  succors  of  troops,  provisions,  &c.,  from  being 
thrown  into  the  place,  and  also  to  restrain  the  excursions 
of  the  garrison.  The  works  thrown  up  between  the 
camp  and  besieged  place  are  termed  the  line  of  counter  val- 
lation,  and  those  on  the  exterior  side  of  the  camp  form  the 
line  of  circumv dilation.  These  lines  are  generally  about 
six  hundred  yards  apart.  It  is  not  unusual  in  modern 
warfare  to  dispense  with  lines  of  circumvallation,  (except 
a  few  detached  works  for  covering  the  parks  of  the  engi 
neers  and  artillery,)  and  to  hold  the  succoring  army  in 
check  by  means  of  an  opposing  force,  called  the  army  of 
observation. 

The  measures  of  defence  resorted  to  by  the  garrison 
will,  of  course,  be  subordinate,  in  some  degree,  to  those 
of  attack.  As  soon  as  any  danger  of  an  investment  is  ap 
prehended,  the  commanding  general  should  collect  into 
the  place  all  the  necessary  provisions,  forage,  military 
munitions,  &c.,  to  be  found  in  the  surrounding  country; 
all  useless  persons  should  be  expelled  from  the  garrison  ; 
a  supply  of  timber  for  the  works  of  the  engineers  and  ar 
tillery,  fascines,  gabions,  palisades,  &c.,  prepared;  all 
ground  within  cannon  range  around  the  work  levelled ; 
hedges  and  trees  cut  down ;  holes  filled  up ;  temporary 
buildings  demolished  or  burnt ;  and  all  obstacles  capable 
of  covering  an  enemy  and  interrupting  the  fire  of  the 
work,  removed. 

During  this  period  the  engineer  troops  and  working 
parties  detached  from  the  other  arms  will  be  most  actively 
employed.  As  soon  as  the  investing  corps  makes  its  ap 
pearance,  bodies  of  light  troops  are  thrown  out  to  cut  off 
reconnoitring  parties,  and,  if  possible,  to  draw  the  enemy 
into  ambush.  To  facilitate  these  exterior  operations,  and 
to  prevent  a  surprise,  several  guns  of  long  range  are 


370  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE 

placed  on  the  salients  of  the  bastions  and  demi-lunes,  and 
others,  loaded  with  grape,  in  the  embrasures  of  the  flanks, 
so  as  to  sweep  the  ditches.  About  one-third  of  the  gar 
rison  may  be  employed  in  exterior  operations,  and  the 
other  two-thirds  in  arranging  the  means  of  defence  in  the 
interior. 

Second  period. — As  soon  as  the  engineers  have  com 
pleted  their  reconnaissances  and  determined  on  the  front 
of  attack,  and  all  the  other  preparations  are  made,  the 
general  will  direct  the  opening  of  the  trenches.  The 
ground  being  previously  marked  out,  battalions  of  light 
troops,  termed  guards  of  the  trenches,  as  soon  as  it  is  dark, 
are  placed  about  thirty  yards  in  front  of  the  first  parallel, 
(A.  Fig.  54,)  with  smaller  sections,  and  sentinels  about 
the  same  distance  further  in  advance.  These  guards  lie 
down,  or  otherwise  conceal  themselves  from  the  fire  of 
the  work.  The  engineer  troops  and  detachments  of  work 
men  being  first  marched  to  the  depots  and  supplied  with 
all  the  necessary  tools  for  carrying  on  the  work,  now 
commence  their  labors  under  the  protection  of  these 
guards.  By  daybreak  the  construction  of  the  first  parallel, 
and  the  trenches  connecting  it  Avith  the  depots,  will  be 
sufficiently  advanced  to  cover  the  men  from  the  fire  of 
the  place  ;  the  guards  will  therefore  be  withdrawn,  and 
the  workmen  continue  their  labors  during  the  day  to  give 
the  trenches  the  proper  size  and  form.  . 

The  parallels  are  the  long  lines  of  trench  which  en 
velop  the  besieged  work,  and  serve  both  as  covered  ways 
for  the  circulation  of  the  besiegers,  and  as  means  of  de 
fence  against  sorties  from  the  garrison ;  they  are  therefore 
arranged  with  banquettes  for  musketry  fire.  The  boyaux 
are  trenches  run  in  a  zigzag  direction  along  the  capitals 
of  the  front  of  attack,  and  are  intended  exclusively  for  the 
circulation  of  the  troops  ;  they  have  no  banquettes.  The 
first  parallel  is  about  six  hundred  yards  from  the  place, 


FIELD-ENGINEERING.  371 

and  consequently  beyond  the  reach  of  grape.  It  is  con 
structed  by  the  simple  sap.  After  the  first  night,  the 
guards,  instead  of  advancing  in  front  of  the  work,  are 
placed  in  the  trenches. 

The  second  parallel  (B)  is  made  some  three  hundred 
or  three  hundred  and  fifty  yards  from  the  place,  and  being 
much  exposed  to  grape,  the  flying-sap  is  employed  in  its 
construction.  Batteries  (H)  are  established  between  the 
first  and  second  parallels  to  silence  the  fire  of  the  demi 
lunes  of  the  collateral  bastions,  and  others  (I)  near  the 
second  parallel,  to  enfilade  the  faces  of  the  front  of  at 
tack.  These  are  armed  in  part  with  mortars  and  in  part 
with  heavy  siege-pieces. 

The  works  are  now  gradually  pushed  forward  to  the 
third  parallel,  (C,)  which  is  constructed  about  sixty  yards 
from  the  salients  of  the  place.  As  the  operations  of  the 
besiegers  are  here  greatly  exposed  to  musketry  fire,  the 
trenches  are  constructed  by  the  full-sap.  The  third  paral 
lel,  having  to  contain  the  guards  of  the  trenches,  and  being 
of  less  development  than  the  two  preceding,  is  made  much 
wider.  The  second  parallel  now  contains  the  reserve, 
and  the  first  parallel  becomes  the  depot  of  materials. 
Demi-parallels  (G)  are  frequently  established  between  the 
second  and  third,  to  be  occupied  by  detachments  of  guards. 

The  operations  of  defence  during  this  period  are  so 
directed  as  to  harass  the  workmen  in  the  trenches  and 
retard  the  advance  of  the  works  of  attack.  Garrison 
pieces  of  long  range  and  large  howitzers  are  brought  for 
ward  on  the  salients  of  the  bastions  and  demi-lunes  of  at 
tack,  so  as  to  fire  in  ricochet  along  the  capitals  on  which 
the  boyaux  must  be  pushed  :  light  and  fire-balls  are  thrown 
out  as  soon  as  it  becomes  dark,  to  light  up  the  ground  oc 
cupied  by  the  besiegers,  thus  exposing  them  to  the  fire  of 
the  work  and  to  the  attacks  of  the  sortie  parties.  These 
parties  are  composed  of  light  troops  who  charge  the  guards 


372  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE, 

and  compel  the  workmen  to  abandon  their  sapping  tools 
and  stand  upon  the  defence.  They  are  most  effective 
when  the  besiegers  commence  the  second  parallel,  as  the 
guards  in  the  first  parallel  are  not  so  immediately  at  hand 
to  protect  the  workmen.  When  the  sortie  detachment  has 
driven  these  workmen  from  the  trenches,  instead  of  pur 
suing  them  into  the  first  parallel,  it  will  display  itself  in 
battle  order  to  cover  the  engineer  troops,  (who  should  al 
ways  accompany  the  detachment  in  this  enterprise,)  while 
they  fill  up  the  trenches  and  destroy  the  implements  of 
the  besiegers.  When  the  guards  of  the  trenches  appear 
in  force,  the  detachment  will  retire  in  such  a  way,  if  pos 
sible,  as  to  draw  the  enemy  within  range  of  the  grape  and 
musketry  of  the  collateral  works.  These  sorties,  if  suc 
cessful,  may  be  frequently  repeated,  for  they  tend  very 
much  to  prolong  the  siege.  The  best  time  for  making 
them  is  an  hour  or  two  before  day,  when  the  workmen  and 
guards  are  fatigued  with  the  labors  of  the  night.  While 
the  besiegers  are  establishing  their  enfilading  batteries,  a 
strong  fire  of  solid  shot  and  shells  will  be  concentrated  on 
the  points  selected  for  their  construction.  The  garrison 
will  also  labor  during  this  period  to  put  the  work  into  a 
complete  state  of  defence  :  constructing  all  necessary  pa- 
lisadings,  traverses,  blindages,  barriers ;  and  strengthening, 
if  necessary,  the  covering  of  the  magazines. 

Third  period. — After  the  completion  of  the  third  paral 
lel,  the  crowning  of  the  covered  way  may  be  effected  by 
storm,  by  regular  approaches,  or  (if  the  work  is  secured  by 
defensive  mines)  by  a  subterranean  warfare. 

In  the  first  case  stone  mortar-batteries  are  established 
in  front  of  the  third  parallel,  which,  on  a  given  signal,  will 
open  their  fire  in  concert  with  all  the  enfilading  and  mor 
tar  batteries.  When  this  fire  has  produced  its  effect  in 
clearing  the  outworks,  picked  troops  will  sally  forth  and 
carry  the  covered  way  with  the  bayonet,  sheltering  them- 


FIELD-ENGINEERING.  373 

selves  behind  the  traverses  until  the  sappers  throw  up  a 
trench  some  four  or  five  yards  from  the  crest  of  the  glacis, 
high  enough  to  protect  the  troops  from  the  fire  of  the  be 
sieged.  It  may  afterwards  be  connected  with  the  third 
parallel  by  boyaux. 

When  the  covered  way  is  to  be  crowned  by  regular  ap 
proaches,  a  double  sap  is  pushed  forward  from  the  third 
parallel  to  within  thirty  yards  of  the  salient  of  the  covered 
way ;  the  trench  is  then  extended  some  fifteen  or  twenty 
yards  to  the  right  or  left,  and  the  earth  thrown  up  high 
enough  to  enable  the  besiegers  to  obtain  a  plunging  fire 
into  the  covered  way,  and  thus  prevent  the  enemy  from 
occupying  it.  This  mound  of  earth  is  termed  a  trench  ca 
valier,  (0.)  Boyaux  are  now  pushed  forward  to  the  crown 
ing  of  the  covered  way  and  the  establishing  of  breach  bat 
teries,  (J.)  Descents  are  then  constructed  into  the  ditches, 
and  as  soon  as  these  batteries  have  made  a  breach  into 
the  walls  of  the  bastions  and  outworks,  the  boyaux  are 
pushed  across  the  ditches  and  lodgments  effected  in  the 
breaches.  The  demi-lune  is  first  carried  ;  next  the  demi 
lune  redoubt  and  bastion  ;  and  lastly,  the  interior  retrench 
ments  and  citadel.  In  some  cases  the  breaches  are  car 
ried  by  assault,  but  the  same  objection  is  applicable  here 
as  in  the  storming  of  the  covered  way ;  time  is  gained,  but 
at  anjmmcnse  expense  of  human  life. 

If  the  place  is  defended  by  mines  it  will  be  necessary 
for  the  besiegers  to  counteract  the  effects  of  these  works 
by  resorting  to  the  slow  and  tedious  operations  of  a  sub 
terranean  warfare.  In  this  case  a  fourth  trench  is  formed 
in  front  of  the  third  parallel ;  shafts  are  sunk  in  this, 
about  six  yards  apart,  for  establishing  overcharged  mines  ; 
as  soon  as  the  galleries  of  the  besieged  are  destroyed  by 
the  explosion  of  these  mines,  the  covered  way  is  attacked 
by  storm ;  other  mines  are  established  on  the  terre-plain 
of  the  covered  way  to  destroy  the  entrance  to  the  gal- 


374  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

leries,  and  thus  deprive  the  besieged  of  the  use  of  theil 
entire  system  of  mines. 

The  measures  of  defence  during  this  period  must  em 
brace  every  thing  calculated  to  retard  the  works  of  the  be 
siegers.  This  may  be  most  effectually  accomplished  by 
maintaining  a  constant  fire  of  grape  and  musketry  on  the 
heads  of  the  sap,  and  throwing  grenades,  shells,  &c.,  into 
the  trenches,  to  harass  and  destroy  the  workmen.  As 
the  musketry  fire  of  the  besiegers  now  becomes  very  de 
structive  to  the  artillerists  at  the  guns,  strong  musket-proof 
blinds  are  arranged  to  mask  the  mouths  of  the  embrasures 
when  the  guns  are  not  in  battery,  and  also  sloping  blind 
ages  to  cover  the  men  when  serving  at  the  pieces.  The 
possession  of  the  outworks  should  be  disputed  inch  by 
inch,  and  when  the  besiegers  have  reached  the  ditch  of 
the  body  of  the  place,  sorties,  and  every  species  of  pro 
jectile,  should  be  employed  to  drive  off  the  sappers,  and 
to  retard  the  construction  of  their  works.  In  fine,  all  the 
resources  of  the  engineer's  art  should  be  put  in  requisition 
for  the  defence  of  the  breach,  and  the  final  assault  should 
be  vigorously  resisted  by  the  bayonet,  and  by  a  well-sus 
tained  fire  from  all  the  collateral  works. 

With  respect  to  the  relative  strength  of  the  opposing 
forces  it  may  be  well  to  remark,  that  if  the  fortress  is 
properly  constructed  the  garrison  will  be  able  to  resist  a 
besieging  army  six  times  as  numerous  as  itself.  Such  is 
the  estimate  of  the  best  engineers.* 

*  A  good  knowledge  of  the  several  subjects  discussed  in  this  chapter 
may  be  derived  from  the  writings  of  Vauban,  Cormontaigne,  and  Noi- 
zet  de  St.  Paul,  on  the  attack  and  defence  of  places  and  field  fortifica 
tion  ;  the  several  manuels  used  in  the  French  service  on  sapping,  mi 
ning,  and  pontoniering ;  Col.  Pasley's  experiments  on  the  operations  of 
a  siege,  sapping,  mining,  &c. ;  Douglas's  work  on  military  bridges ; 
Macauley's  work  on  field  fortification  ;  and  Professor  Mahan's  Treatise 
on  Field  Fortification.  This  last  is  undoubtedly  the  very  best  work 


FIELD-ENGINEERING.  375 

that  has  ever  been  written  on  field  fortification,  and  every  officer  going 
into  the  field  should  supply  himself  with  a  copy. 

The  following  are  recommended  as  books  of  reference  on  subjects 
discussed  in  the  three  preceding  chapters. 

Memorial  pour  la  fortification  permanente  et  passagere.  Cormon- 
taigne. 

Defense  des  places.     Cormontaigne. 

Attaque  des  places.     Cormontaigue. 

Attaque  des  places.     Vauban. 

Traite  des  mines.    Vauban. 

Memorial  pour  la  castrametation  et  la  fortification  passagere* 
Lafitte-Clave'. 

Exercice  sur  les  fortifications.     Duvigneau. 

Memorial  de  Vofficier  du  genie.  A  periodical  of  rare  merit,  con 
taining  most  valuable  military  and  scientific  matter.  It  is  conducted 
by  officers  of  the  French  corps  of  engineers.  It  has  already  reached 
its  fourteenth  number,  each  number  forming  a  volume. 

Traite  complet  de  fortification.     Noizet  de  St.  Paul. 

Traite  d'art  militairc  et  de  la  fortification.     Gay  de  Vernon. 

Art  de  la  guerre.     Rogniat. 

Essai  general  de  fortification,  &c.     Bousmard, 

Aide-memoire  portatif  a  Vusage  des  officiers  du  genie.  Laisn& 
A  very  valuable  and  useful  book. 

Aide-memoire  de  I'ingenieur  militaire.     Grivet. 

Cours  d'art  militaire.     Laurillard  Fallot. 

Cours  de  fortification,  &c.     Lavart. 

Le  lime  de  la  guerre.     Perrot. 

Journaux  des  sieges  dans  la  peninsule.     Belmas. 

Journal  of  Sieges  in  Spain.     John  Jones. 

Both  of  the  above  are  works  of  great  value. 

Cours  d'art  militaire  et  de  fortification  militaire.     Francois. 

Architettura  militare.     Marchi. 

Essai  sur  la  fortification.     Baltard. 

La  fortification.     Bar-le-Duc. 

Elemens  de  fortification.     Bellaire. 

La  science  des  ingenieurs.     Belidor. 

L'art  universel  des  fortifications.     Bitainvieu. 

Nouvelle  maniere  de  fortifier  les  places.     BloudeL 

Les  sept  sieges  de  Lille.     Brun  Lavaine. 

Defense  des  places  fortes.     Carnot. 

Memoire  sur  la  fortification.     Carnot 


376  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

Defense  de  Saragosse.     Cavallero. 
Memoir cs  sur  la  fortification.    Choumara. 
Nouvelle  fortification.     Coehorn. 
Theorie  de  la  fortification.    Cugnot 
Des  fortifications,  &c.  &c.     Dargon. 
Relation  de  la  defense  de  Dantzik.     D'Artois. 
Les  fortifications.     Deville. 
Peribologie.     Dilich. 

De  la  fortification  permanente.     Dufour.     A  work  of  merit 
Essai  sur  la  defense  des  etats  par  les  fortifications.     Duvivie*. 
Attaque  et  defense  des  places  du  camp  de  St.  Omer. 
L'ecole  de  la  fortification.     Falloi& 
Introduction  a  la  fortification.     De  Fer. 
Precis  de  la  defense  de  Valenciennes.     Ferrand. 
Traite  theorique,  &c.     Foissac-Latour. 
Examen  detaille,  &c.     Foissac-Latour. 
Les  outrages  militaires  de  Fosse. 
Instruction  sur  la  fortification,  &c.     Gaillard. 
Memoires  pour  I'attaque  et  defense  d'une  place.     Goulon 
Siege  of  Peschiera.     Henin. 
Journal  du  siege  de  Philisbourg. 
Precis  du  siege  de  Dantzick.     Kirgener. 
Deuxieme  defense  de  Badajos.     Lamare. 
Fortification,  et  Vattaque  et  defense  des  places.     Leblovid. 
CEuvres  de  Lefebvre. 
IS  architecture  des  forteresses.     Mandar. 
Traite  sur  Vart  des  sieges.     Mazeroy. 
La  siirete  des  etats  par  le  moyen  des  forteresses.     Maigre* 
Defense  d'Ancone.     Mangourit. 
Fortification.     Marolois. 
Siege  de  Turin.     Mengin. 
Recherches  sur  Vart  defensif,  &c.     Michaloz. 
La  fortification  de  campagne,  &,c.     Miller. 
L'art  defensif,  &c.     Montalembert. 
Journaux  des  sieges  de  Flandre. 

Relations  des  sieges  en  Europe,  &c.     Musset-Pathay.    A 
f  aluable  and  interesting  work. 
Relation  du  siege  de  Metz. 
Relation  du  siege  d'Anvers. 
Les  sieges  de  Jaffa  et  de  St.  Jean  d'Acre. 
Les  sieges  de  Saragosse  et  de  Tortose.     Rogniat. 


FIELD-ENGINEERING.  ,377 

Siege  de  Dantzick.     Sainte-Susanne. 

Memoire  sur  la  fortification  permanente.     Sda. 

Le  siege  de  Constantine. 

Siemens  de  fortification.     Trincano. 

Des  places  fortes.     Valaz<5. 

Essay  on  Military  Bridges.     Douglas.     A  valuable  work. 

Guide  du  pontonier.     Drieu. 

Memoire  sur  la  guerre  souterraine.     Coutele. 

Traite  des  mines.     Etienne. 

Traite  de  I'art  du  mineur.     Geuss. 

Traite  de  fortification  souterraine.     Gillot. 

Traite  pratique  et  theorique  des  mines.     Lebrun 

Nouveau  trait  e  des  mines,  &c.     Prudhomme. 

Manuel  du  sapeur.     Used  in  the  French  service. 

Manuel  du  mineur.  "  "  " 

Manuel  du  pontonier.         "  "  " 

Essay  on  Field  Fortifications.     Pleydell. 

Elements  of  Field  Fortifications.     Lochee. 

Relation  du  siege  de  Grave  et  Mayence. 

Sieges  de  Genes.     Thiebault. 

Traite  de  fortification  souterraine.     Mouze. 

Militairische  Mittheilungen.     Xilander. 

Die  Befestigung  der  Statten.     Hauser. 

Abhandlung  uber  die  Befestigung»kunst,  &c.     Hauser 

Versuch  uber  die  Verschanzungskunst.     Muller. 

Course  of  Elementary  Fortification.  Pasley.  This  is  a  work  of 
much  detail — useful,  no  doubt,  to  an  uneducated  engineer  soldier,  but 
to  an  officer  at  all  acquainted  with  his  profession,  it  must  seem  ridicu 
lously  minute. 

To  the  above  list  might  be  added  a  long  list  of  books  on  that  branch 
of  the  engineer's  art  called  constructions ;  but  as  this  part  of  the  pro 
fession  is,  in  some  degree,  common  both  to  the  civil  and  military  engi 
neer,  it  is  not  deemed  necessary  to  include  works  of  this  character  in  a 
list  of  books  strictly  military. 


3TS  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 


CHAPTER   XV. 

MILITARY  EDUCATION APPOINTMENT  AND  PROMOTION. 

WITH  the  Romans,  six  years'  instruction  was  required 
to  make  a  soldier ;  and  so  great  importance  did  these  an 
cient  conquerors  of  the  world  attach  to  military  education 
and  discipline,  that  the  very  name  of  their  army  was  de 
rived  from  the  verb  to  'practise. 

Modern  nations,  learning  from  experience  that  military 
success  depends  more  upon  skill  and  discipline  than  upon 
numbers,  have  generally  adopted  the  same  rule  as  the  Ro 
mans  ;  and  nearly  all  of  the  European  powers  have  estab 
lished  military  schools  for  the  education  of  their  officers 
and  the  instruction  of  their  soldiers. 

France,  which  has  long  taken  the  lead  in  military  sci 
ence,  has  six  military  schools  for  the  instruction  of  officers, 
containing  in  all  more  than  one  thousand  pupils,  and  nu 
merous  division  and  regimental  schools  for  the  sub-officers 
and  soldiers. 

Prussia  maintains  some  twelve  general  schools  for  mil 
itary  education,  which  contain  about  three  thousand  pu 
pils,  and  also  numerous  division,  brigade,  garrison,  and 
company  schools  for  practical  instruction. 

Austria  has  some  fifty  military  schools,  which  contain 
in  all  about  four  thousand  pupils. 

Russia  has  thirty-five  engineer  and  artillery  technical 
schools,  with  about  two  thousand  pupils  ;  twenty-five  mili- 
jaiy  schools  for  the  noblesse,  containing  eight  thousand 
seven  hundred  pupils  ;  corps  d'armee  schools,  with  several 
thousand  pupils  ;  regimental  schools,  with  eleven  thou- 


MILITARY  EDUCATION.  379 

sand  pupils  ;  and  brigade-schools,  with  upwards  of  one 
hundred  and  fifty-six  thousand  scholars  ; — making  in  all 
about  two  hundred  thousand  pupils  in  her  military  schools ! 

England  has  five  military  schools  of  instruction  for  offi 
cers,  number  of  pupils  not  known  ;  a  military  orphan 
school,  with  about  twelve  thousand  pupils  ;  and  numerous 
depot  and  regimental  schools  of  practice. 

The  smaller  European  powers — Belgium,  Sardinia,  Na 
ples,  Spain,  Portugal,  Denmark,  Sweden,  Wurtemberg, 
Bavaria,  Baden,  have  each  several  military  schools,  with 
a  large  number  of  pupils. 

It  is  seen  from  these  statistics,  that  the  European  pow 
ers  are  not  so  negligent  in  educating  their  officers,  and  in 
instructing  and  disciplining  their  soldiers,  as  some  in  this 
country  would  have  us  believe. 

Washington,  Hamilton,  Knox,  Pickering,  and  others, 
learning,  by  their  own  experience  in  the  war  of  the  Amer 
ican  revolution,  the  great  necessity  of  military  education, 
urged  upon  our  government,  as  early  as  1783,  the  impor 
tance  of  establishing  a  military  academy  in  this  country, 
but  the  subject  continued  to  be  postponed  from  year  to  year 
till  1802.  In  1794,  the  subaltern  grade  of  cadet  was  cre 
ated  by  an  act  of  Congress,  the  officers  of  this  grade  being 
attached  to  their  regiments,  and  "  furnished  at  the  public 
expense  with  the  necessary  books,  instruments,  and  appa 
ratus"  for  their  instruction.  But  this  plan  of  educating 
young  officers  at  their  posts  was  found  impracticable,  and 
in  his  last  annual  message,  Dec.  7th,  1796,  Washington 
urged  again,  in  strong  language,  the  establishment  of  a 
military  academy,  where  a  regular  course  of  military  in 
struction  could  be  given.  "  Whatever  argument,"  said  he, 
"  may  be  drawn  from  particular  examples,  superficially 
viewed,  a  thorough  examination  of  the  subject  will  evince 
that  the  art  of  war  is  both  comprehensive  and  complicated; 
that  it  demands  much  previous  study  ;  and  that  the  pos- 


380  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

session  of  it  in  its  most  improved  and  perfect  state  is  al 
ways  of  great  moment  to  the  security  of  a  nation." 

The  subject  was  however  postponed  from  time  to  time, 
till  March,  1802,  when  a  bill  was  passed  establishing  the 
Military  Academy.  It  was  at  first  on  a  small  scale,  and  its 
course  of  instruction  meager  and  deficient.  It  gradually 
became  enlarged,  but  lingered  along,  with  no  great  im 
provement,  till  1817,  when  Capt.  Patridge  was  dismissed 
from  the  superintendency,  and  Col.  Thayer  put  in  charge. 
From  this  period  we  date  the  commencement  of  the  suc 
cess  and  reputation  which  the  Military  Academy  has  since 
enjoyed. 

This  institution,  as  now  organized,  consists  of  one  cadet 
from  each  congressional  district,  and  a  few  at  large,  making 
an  average  of  two  hundred  and  thirty-seven.  The  course 
of  instruction  is  four  years,  after  which  time  the  cadet  is 
sent  to  his  regiment  or  corps,  with  higher  rank  if  there  are 
vacancies,  but  if  there  are  no  vacancies,  he  goes  as  a  cadet, 
with  the  brevet  rank  of  the  next  higher  grade. 

The  examination  for  admission  to  the  institution  is  a 
very  limited  one,  being  confined  to  the  elementary  branches 
of  an  English  education. 

The  annual  course  at  the  academy  is  divided  into  two 
distinct  periods,  the  first  extending  from  June  till  Septem 
ber,  and  the  second  from  September  to  the  following  June. 
During  the  first  period,  the  cadets  leave  their  barracks  and 
encamp  in  tents,  and  are  made  subject  to  the  police  and 
discipline  of  an  army  in  time  of  war.  In  addition  to  the 
thorough  and  severe  course  of  practical  exercises  and 
drills  in  the  different  arms  during  these  three  summer 
months  of  each  year,  they  are  made  to  perform  the  same 
tours  of  guard-duty,  night  and  day,  as  is  required  of  the 
common  soldier  in  time  of  actual  war.  This  continues  till 
the  first  of  September  of  each  year,  when  the  cadets  re 
turn  to  their  barracks,  and  for  the  remaining  nine  months 


MILITARY    EDUCATION.  381 

devote  themselves  to  the  prescribed  course  of  scientific  and 
military  studies,  intermixed  with  military  exercises  and 
practical  operations  in  the  laboratory  and  on  the  field. 

To  test  the  progress  of  the  cadets  in  their  studies, 
there  are  held  semi-annual  public  examinations.  These 
examinations  are  strict  and  severe,  and  all  who  fail  to 
come  up  to  the  fixed  standard  are  obliged  to  withdraw 
from  the  institution,  to  allow  some  one  else  from  the 
same  district  to  make  the  trial. 

During  their  course  of  studies  the  cadets,  as  warrant- 
officers  of  the  army,  draw  pay  barely  sufficient  to  defray 
their  necessary  expenses.  The  allowance  to  each  is 
twenty-six  dollars  per  month,  but  none  of  this  is  paid  to 
the  cadet,  but  is  applied  to  the  purchase  of  books,  fuel, 
lights,  clothing,  board,  <fec. 

This  institution  furnishes  each  year  to  the  army  about 
forty  subaltern  officers,  thoroughly  instructed  in  all  the 
theoretical  and  practical  duties  of  their  profession.  After 
completing  this  course,  the  cadef  is  usually  promoted 
from  the  grade  of  warrant-officer  to  that  of  a  commis 
sioned  officer,  and  is  immediately  put  on  duty  with  his 
regiment  or  corps. 

This  system  of  appointment  to  the  army  has  produced 
the  most  satisfactory  results,  and  has  received  the  com 
mendation  of  our  best  military  men,  and  the  approbation 
of  all  our  presidents  and  most  able  statesmen.  Never 
theless,  it  has  occasionally  met  with  strong  opposition ; 
this  opposition  springing  in  part  from  a  want  of  proper 
information  respecting  the  character  and  working  of  the 
system,  and  in  part  from  the  combined  efforts  of  those 
who  from  negligence  or  incapacity  have  failed  to  pass 
their  examinations  for  promotion,  and  of  those  who,  from 
a  conscious  want  of  qualifications  or  merit,  feel  assured 
that  they  cannot  obtain  commissions  in  the  army  so  long 
as  this  system  of  merit,  as  fixed  by  examination,  shall 


382  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

exist.  Hence  the  effort  to  destroy  the  Military  Academy 
and  to  throw  the  army  entirely  open  to  political  appoint 
ment. 

Several  legislative  bodies,  acting  under  these  combined 
influences,  have  passed  resolutions,  giving  various  objec 
tions  to  the  Military  Academy,  and  recommending  that  it 
be  abolished.  The  objections  made  by  t\e  legislatures 
of  Tennessee,  Ohio,  Connecticut,  New  Hampshire,  and 
Maine,  are  mostly  founded  on  false  information,  and  may 
be  readily  answered  by  reference  to  the  official  records 
of  the  War-office.  But  it  is  not  the  present  object  to  en 
ter  into  a  general  discussion  of  the  charges  against  that 
institution,  except  so  far  as  they  are  connected  with  the 
importance  of  military  education,  and  the  rules  of  military 
appointment  and  promotion. 

It  has  been  alleged  by  many  of  the  opponents  of  the 
West  Point  Academy,  that  military  instruction  is  of  little 
or  no  advantage  to  a  general ; — that  in  the  wars  of  Napo 
leon,  and  in  the  American  Revolution,  and  the  American 
war  of  1812,  armies  were  generally  led  to  victory  by 
men  without  a  military  education,  and  unacquainted  with 
military  science  ; — and  that  in  the  event  of  another  war 
in  this  country,  we  must  seek  our  generals  in  the  ranks 
of  civil  life,  rather  than  among  the  graduates  of  our  Mil 
itary  Academy. 

The  objection  here  made  to  military  education  will 
hold  with  equal  force  against  education  in  any  other  pro 
fession.  We  sometimes  find  men  who  have  become  emi 
nent  in  the  pulpit  and  at  the  bar,  or  in  medicine  and  the 
sciences,  without  ever  having  enjoyed  the  advantage  s  of 
an  education  in  academic  or  collegiate  halls,  and  perhaps 
even  without  that  preliminary  instruction  usually  deemed 
necessary  for  professional  pursuits.  Shall  we  therefore 
abolish  all  our  colleges,  theological  seminaries,  schools 
of  law  and  medicine,  our  academies  and  primary  schools, 


MILITARY  EDUCATION.  383 

and  seek  for  our  professional  men  among  the  uneducated 
and  the  ignorant  ?  If  professional  ignorance  be  a  recom 
mendation  in  our  generals,  why  not  also  in  our  lawyers 
and  our  surgeons  ?  If  we  deem  professional  instruction 
requisite  for  the  care  of  our  individual  property  and 
health,  shall  we  require  less  for  guarding  the  honor  and 
safety  of  our  country,  the  reputation  of  our  arms,  and  the 
lives  of  thousands  of  our  citizens  ? 

But  in  reality,  were  not  these  men  to  whom  we  have 
alluded  eminent  in  their  several  professions  in  spite  of, 
rather  than  by  means  of  their  want  of  a  professional  edu 
cation  ?  And  have  not  such  men,  feeling  the  disadvan 
tages  under  which  they  were  forced  to  labor,  been  almost 
without  exception  the  advocates  of  education  in  others  ? 

But  is  it  true  that  most  of  the  generals  of  distinction 
in  the  more  recent  wars  were  men  destitute  of  military 
education, — men  who  rose  from  the  ranks  to  the  pinnacle 
of  military  glory,  through  the  combined  influence  of  ig 
norance  of  military  science  and  contempt  for  military  in 
struction  1  Let  us  glance  at  the  lives  of  the  most  distin 
guished  of  the  generals  of  the  French  Revolution,  for 
these  are  the  men  to  whom  reference  is  continually  made 
to  prove  that  the  Military  Academy  is  an  unnecessary 
and  useless  institution,  the  best  generals  being  invariably 
found  in  the  ranks  of  an  army,  and  not  in  the  ranks  of 
military  schools.  Facts  may  serve  to  convince,  where 
reasoning  is  of  no  avail. 

Napoleon  himself  was  a  pupil  of  the  military  schools 
of  Brienne  and  Paris,  and  had  all  the  advantages  of  the 
best  military  and  scientific  instruction  given  in  France. 

Dessaix  was' a  pupil  of  the  military  school  of  Effiat, 
with  all  the  advantages  which  wealth  and  nobility  could 
procure.  Davoust  was  a  pupil  of  the  military  school  of 
Auxerre,  and  a  fellow-pupil  with  Napoleon  in  the  military 
school  of  Paris.  Kleber  was  educated  at  the  military 


384  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

school  of  Bavaria.  Eugene  Beauharnais  was  a  pupil  of 
St.  Germain-en-Loye,  and  had  for  his  military  instructor 
the  great  captain  of  the  age.  His  whole  life  was  devoted 
to  the  military  art.  Berthier  and  Marmont  were  both 
sons  of  officers,  and,  being  early  intended  for  the  army, 
they  received  military  educations.  Lecourbe  had  also 
the  advantages  of  a  military  education  before  entering  the 
army.  Pichegru  and  Duroc  were  pupils  of  the  military 
school  of  Brienne.  Drouet  was  a  pupil  of  the  artillery 
school.  Foy  was  first  educated  in  the  ^college  of  Sois- 
sons,  and  afterwards  in  the  military  schools  of  La  Fere 
and  Chalons.  Carnot,  called  the  "  Organizer  of  French 
victory,"  received  a  good  early  education,  and  was  also  a 
pupil  of  the  engineer  school  of  Mezieres. 

Several  of  the  distinguished  French  generals  at  first  re 
ceived  good  scientific  and  literary  educations  in  the  col 
leges  of  France,  and  then  acquired  their  military  instruc 
tion  in  the  subordinate  grades  of  the  army ;  and  by  this 
means,  before  their  promotion  to  responsible  offices,  ac 
quired  a  thorough  practical  instruction,  founded  on  a  basis 
of  a  thorough  preliminary  education.  Such  was  Suchet, 
a  pupil  of  the -college  of  Lisle-Barbe  ;  Lannes,  a  pupil  of 
the  college  of  Lectoure  ;  and  Mortier,  who  was  most  care 
fully  educated  at  Cambrai ;  Lefebvre  and  Murat  were 
both  educated  for  the  church,  though  the  latter  profited  but 
little  by  his  instruction  ;  Moreau  and  Joubert  were  educa 
ted  for  the  bar ;  Massena  was  not  a  college  graduate,  but 
he  received  a  good  preliminary  education,  and  for  several 
years  before  he  entered  the  army  as  an  officer,  he  had  en 
joyed  all  the  advantages  afforded  by  leisure  and  affluent 
circumstances  ;  Ney,  though  poor,  received  a  good  prelim 
inary  education,  and  entered  a  notary's  office  to  study  a 
profession.  Hoche  was  destitute  of  the  advantages  of 
early  education,  but,  anxious  to  supply  this  deficiency,  he 
early  distinguished  himself  by  his  efforts  to  procure  books, 


MILITARY    EDUCATION.  385 

and  by  ht&  extraordinary  devotion  to  military  studies.  By 
several  years  devoted  in  this  way  to  professional  studies 
and  the  practical  duties  of  a  subordinate  grade  in  the  army, 
Iloche  acquired  a  military  knowledge  which  early  distin 
guished  him  among  the  generals  of  the  French  Revolution. 
Soult  and  Gouvion-Saint-Cyr,  being  of  parents  in  limited 
circumstances,  had  not  the  advantages  of  extensive  educa 
tion,  but  close  and  diligent  application,  an  ardent  ambition, 
and  strong  and  powerful  intellect,  combined  with  long 
years  of  service  in  the  practical  operations  of  the  field,  at 
length  enabled  these  men  to  overcome  all  obstacles,  and 
force  their  way  to  the  higher  walks  of  their  professions. 
But  both  knew  from  experience  the  advantages  of  military 
instruction,  and  the  importance  of  professional  education 
in  the  army,  and  they  have  consequently  both  been  the 
warmest  friends  and  strongest  advocates  of  the  military 
schools  of  France. 

The  Polytechnic  School  was  established  too  late  to  fur 
nish  officers  for  any  of  the  earlier  wars  of  Napoleon ;  but 
in  his  last  campaigns  he  began  to  reap  the  advantages  of 
an  institution  which  had  been  under  his  fostering  care,  and 
Bertrand,  Dode,  Duponthon,  Haxo,  Rogniat,  Fleury,  Va- 
laze,  Gourgaud,  Chamberry,  and  a  host  of  other  distin 
guished  young  generals,  fully  justified  the  praises  which 
the  emperor  lavished  on  his  "  poulet  aux  wufs  d'or" — the 
hen  that  laid  him  golden  eggs  ! 

In  our  own  revolutionary  war,  Generals  Washington, 
Hamilton,  Gates,  Schuyler,  Knox,  Alexander,  (Lord  Stir 
ling,)  the  two  Clintons,  the  Lees,  and  others,  were  men  of 
fine  education,  and  a  part  of  them  of  high  literary  and 
scientific  attainments  ;  Washington,  Gates,  Charles  Lee, 
the  Clintons,  and  some  others,  had  considerable  military 
experience  even  before  the  war :  nevertheless,  so  desti 
tute  was  the  army,  generally,  of  military  science,  that  the 
government  was  under  the  necessity  of  seeking  it  in 
33 


386  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

foreigners — in  the  La  Fayettes,  the  Kosciuskos,  the  Steu« 
bens,  the  De  Kalbs,  the  Pulaskis,  the  Duportails — who 
were  immediately  promoted  to  the  highest  ranks  in  our 
army.  In  fact  the  officers  of  our  scientific  corps  were 
then  nearly  all  foreigners. 

But,  say  the  opponents  of  the  Academy,  military  know 
ledge  and  education  are  not  the  only  requisites  for  military 
success ;  youthful  enterprise  and  efficiency  are  far  more 
important  than  a  mere  acquaintance  with  military  science 
and  the  military  art :  long  service  in  garrison,  combined 
with  the  indolent  habits  acquired  by  officers  of  a  peace- 
establishment,  so  deadens  the  enterprise  of  the  older  offi 
cers  of  the  army,  that  it  must  inevitably  result,  in  case  of 
wrar,  that  military  energy  and  efficiency  will  be  derived 
from  the  ranks  of  civil  life. 

We  are  not  disposed  to  question  the  importance  of 
youthful  energy  in  the  commander  of  an  army,  and  we 
readily  admit  that  while  seeking  to  secure  to  our  service 
a  due  degree  of  military  knowledge,  we  should  also  be 
Very  careful  not  to  destroy  its  influence  by  loading  it  down 
with  the  dead  weights  of  effete  seniority.  But  we  do 
question  the  wisdom  of  the  means  proposed  for  supplying 
our  army  with  this  desired  efficiency.  Minds  stored  with 
vast  funds  of  professional  knowledge,  and  the  rich  lore  of 
past  history  ;  judgments  ripened  by  long  study  and  expe 
rience  ;  with  passions  extinguished,  or  at  least  softened 
by  the  mellowing  influence  of  age — these  may  be  best 
suited  for  judges  and  statesmen,  for  here  there  is  time  for 
deliberation,  for  the  slow  and  mature  judgment  of  years. 
But  for  a  general  in  the  field,  other  qualities  are  also  re 
quired.  Not  only  is  military  knowledge  requisite  for  di 
recting  the  blow,  but  he  must  also  have  the  military  ener 
gy  necessary  for  striking  that  blow,  and  the  military  ac 
tivity  necessary  for  parrying  the  attacks  of  the  enemy.  A 
rapid  coup  d'&il,  prompt  decision,  active  movements,  are 


MILITARY  EDUCATION.  387 

as  indispensable  as  sound  judgment ;  for  the  general  must 
see,  and  decide,  and  act,  all  in  the  same  instant.  Accord 
ingly  we  find  that  most  great  generals  of  ancient  and  mod 
ern  times  have  gained  their  laurels  while  still  young. 

Philip  of  Macedon  ascended  the  throne  at  the  age  of 
twenty-two,  and  soon  distinguished  himself  in  his  wars 
with  the  neighboring  states.  At  the  age  of  forty-five  he 
had  conquered  all  Greece.  He  died  at  forty-seven. 

Alexander  the  Great  had  defeated  the  celebrated -The- 
ban  band  at  the  battle  of  Cheronea,  and  gained  a  military 
reputation  at  the  age  of  eighteen.  He  ascended  the  throne 
of  his  father  Philip  before  twenty,  and  at  twenty-five  had 
reached  the  zenith  of  his  military  glory,  having  already 
conquered  the  world.  He  died  before  the  age  of  thirty- 

vWO. 

Julius  Csesar  commanded  the  fleet  sent  to  blockade 
^litylene,  whore  he  greatly  distinguished  himself  before 
;he  age  of  twenty-two.  He  soon  after  held  the  important 
offices  of  tribune,  qucestor,  and  edile.  He  had  completed 
his  first  war  in  Spain,  and  was  made  consul  at  Rome  be 
fore  the  age  of  forty.  He  twice  crossed  the  Rhine,  and 
conquered  all  Gaul,  and  had  twice  passed  over  to  Britain, 
before  the  age  of  forty-five  ;  at  fifty-two  he  had  won  the 
field  of  Pharsalia,  and  attained  the  supreme  power.  He 
died  in  the  fifty-sixth  year  of  his  age,  the  victor  of  five 
hundred  battles,  and  the  conqueror  of  a  thousand  cities. 

Hannibal  joined  the  Carthaginian  army  in  Spain  at 
twenty-two,  and  was  made  commander-in-chief  at  twenty- 
six.  Victorious  in  Spain  and  France,  he  crossed  the  Alps 
and  won  the  battle  of  Cannae  before  the  age  of  thirty-one. 

Scipio  Africanus,  (the  elder,)  at  the  age  of  sixteen  dis 
tinguished  himself  at  the  battle  of  Ticinus  ;  at  twenty  was 
made  edile,  and  soon  after  pro-consul  in  Spain ;  at 
twenty-nine  he  won  the  great  battle  of  Zama,  and  closed 
his  military  career.  Scipio  Africanus  (the  younger)  also 


388  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

distinguished  himself  in  early  life  ;  at  the  age  of  thirty 
six  he  had  conquered  the  Carthaginian  armies  and  com 
pleted  the  destruction  of  Carthage. 

Gengis-Khan  succeeded  to  the  domain  of  his  father  at 
the  age  of  thirteen,  and  almost  immediately  raised  an  army 
of  thirty  thousand  men,  with  which  he  defeated  a  numer 
ous  force  of  rebels,  who  had  thought  to  take  advantage  of 
his  extreme  youth  to  withdraw  from  his  dominion.  He 
soon  acquired  a  military  reputation  by  numerous  conquests, 
and  before  the  age  of  forty  had  made  himself  emperor  of 
Mogul. 

Charlemagne  was  crowned  king  at  twenty-six,  con 
quered  Aquitania  at  twenty-eight,  made  himself  master  of 
France  and  the  greater  part  of  Germany  at  twenty-nine, 
placed  on  his  brows  the  iron  crown  of  Italy  at  thirty-two, 
and  conquered  Spain  at  thirty-six. 

Gonsalvo  de  Cordova,  the  "  great  captain,"  entered  the 
army  at  fifteen,  and  before  the  age  of  seventeen  had  ac 
quired  a  brilliant  military  reputation,  and  was  knighted  by 
the  king  himself  on  the  field  of  battle  ;  at  forty-one  he 
was  promoted  over  the  heads  of  older  veterans  and  made 
commander-in-chief  of  the  army  in  Italy. 

Henry  IV.  of  France  was  placed  at  the  head  of  the  Hu 
guenot  army  at  the  age  of  sixteen,  at  nineteen  he  became 
king  of  Navarre  ;  at  forty  he  had  overthrown  all  his  ene 
mies,  placed  himself  on  the  throne  of  France,  and  become 
the  founder  of  a  new  dynasty. 

Montecuculi,  at  the  age  of  thirty-one,  with  two  thousand 
horse,  attacked  ten  thousand  Swedes  and  captured  all  their 
baggage  and  artillery  ;  at  thirty-two  he  gained  the  victory 
of  Triebel,  at  forty-nine  defeated  the  Swedes  and  saved 
Denmark,  and  at  fifty-three  defeated  the  Turks  at  the  great 
battle  of  St.  Gothard.  In  his  campaigns  against  the 
French  at  a  later  age,  he  made  it  his  chief  merit,  "not  that 
no  conqiiered,  but  that  he  was  not  conquered." 


MILITARY  EDUCATION.  389 

Saxe  entered  the  army  at  the  early  age  of  twelve,  and 
soon  obtained  the  command  of  a  regiment  of  horse ;  at 
twenty-four  he  became  marechal-de-camp,  at  forty-four  mar 
shal  of  France,  and  at  forty-nine  gained  the  celebrated 
victory  of  Fontenoy.  He  died  at  the  age  of  fifty-four. 

Vauban.  entered  the  army  of  Conde  as  a  cadet  at  the 
age  of  seventeen,  at  twenty  was  made  a  lieutenant,  at 
twenty-four  he  commanded  two  companies,  at  forty-one 
was  a  brigadier,  at  forty-three  a  marechal-de-camp,  and  at 
forty-five  commissaire-general  of  all  the  fortifications  of 
France.  At  the  age  of  twenty-five  he  had  himself  con 
ducted  several  sieges,  and  had  assisted  at  many  others. 

Turenne  entered  the  army  before  the  age  of  fourteen ; 
he  served  one  year  as  a  volunteer,  four  years  as  a  captain, 
four  years  as  a  colonel,  three  years  as  a  major-general, 
five  years  as  a  lieutenant-general,  and  became  a  marshal 
of  France  at  thirty-two.  He  had  won  all  his  military  re 
putation  by  the  age  of  forty. 

Prince  Maurice  commanded  an  army  at  the  age  of  six 
teen,  and  acquired  his  military  reputation  in  very  early 
life.  He  died  at  fifty-eight. 

The  great  Conde  immortalized  his  name  at  the  battle 
of  Rocroi,  in  which,  at  the  age  of  twenty-two,  he  defeated 
the  Spaniards.  He  had  won  all  his  great  military  fame 
before  the  age  of  twenty-five. 

Prince  Eugene  of  Savoy  was  a  colonel  at  twenty-one, 
a  lieutenant-field-marshal  at  twenty-four,  and  soon  after,  a 
general-field-marshal.  He  gained  the  battle  of  Zenta  at 
thirty-four,  and  of  Blenheim  at  forty-one.  At  the  opening 
of  the  war  of  1733,  he  again  appeared  at  the  head  of  the 
army  at  the  advanced  age  of  sixty-nine,  but  having  lost 
the  vigor  and  fire  of  youth,  he  effected  nothing  of  im 
portance. 

Peter  the  Great  of  Russia  was  proclaimed  czar  at  ten 
years  of  age  ;  at  twenty  he  organized  a  large  army  and 


390  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

built  several  ships  ;  at  twenty-four  he  fought  the  Turks 
and  captured  Asoph  ;  at  twenty-eight  he  made  war  with 
Sweden ;  at  thirty  he  entered  Moscow  in  triumph  after 
the  victory  of  Embach,  and  the  capture  of  Noteburg  and 
Marienburg ;  at  thirty-one  he  began  the  city  of  St.  Pe 
tersburg  ;  at  thirty-nine  he  was  defeated  by  the  Turks  and 
forced  to  ransom  himself  and  army.  His  latter  years  were 
mostly  devoted  to  civil  and  maritime  affairs.  He  died  at 
the  age  of  fifty-five. 

Charles  the  XII.  of  Sweden  ascended  the  throne  at 
the  age  of  fifteen,  completed  his  first  successful  campaign 
against  Denmark  at  eighteen,  overthrew  eighty  thousand 
Russians  at  Narva  before  nineteen,  conquered  Poland  and 
Saxony  at  twenty-four,  and  died  at  thirty-six. 

Frederick  the  Great  of  Prussia  ascended  the  throne  at 
twenty-eight,  and  almost  immediately  entered  on  that  ca 
reer  of  military  glory  which  has  immortalized  his  name. 
He  established  his  reputation  in  the  first  Silesian  war, 
which  he  terminated  at  the  age  of  thirty.  The  second  Si 
lesian  war  was  terminated  at  thirty-three  ;  and  at  forty- 
three,  with  a  population  of  five  millions,  he  successfully 
opposed  a  league  of  more  than  one  hundred  millions  of 
people. 

Prince  Henry  of  Prussia  served  his  first  campaign  as 
colonel  of  a  regiment  at  sixteen  ;  at  the  age  of  thirty-one 
he  decided  the  victory  of  Prague,  and  the  same  year  was 
promoted  to  the  command  of  a  separate  army.  The  mili 
tary  reputation  he  acquired  in  the  Seven  Years'  War  was 
second  only  to  that  of  Frederick. 

Cortes  had  effected  the  conquest  of  Mexico,  and  com 
pleted  his  military  career,  at  the  age  of  thirty-six. 

Sandoval,  the  most  eminent  of  his  great  captains,  died 
at  the  age  of  thirty-one.  He  had  earned  his  great  renown, 
and  closed  his  military  achievements,  before  the  age  of 
wenty-five. 


MILITARY  EDUCATION.  391 

Pizarro  completed  the  conquest  of  Peru  at  thirty-five, 
and  died  about  forty. 

Lord  Clive  began  his  military  career  at  twenty-two,  and 
had  reached  the  zenith  of  his  military  fame  at  thirty-five  ; 
he  was  raised  to  the  peerage  at  thirty-six,  and  died  at  fifty. 

Hastings  began  his  military  service  at  about  twenty-five, 
and  became  governor  of  Bengal  at  forty. 

Napoleon  was  made  a  lieutenant  at  seventeen,  a  captain 
at  twenty,  chef-de-lataillon  at  twenty-four,  general  of  bri 
gade  at  twenty-five,  and  commander-in-chief  of  the  army 
of  Italy  at  twenty-six.  All  his  most  distinguished  gener 
als  were,  like  him,  young  men,  and  they  seconded  him  in 
his  several  campaigns  with  all  the  energy  and  activity  of 
youthful  valor  and  enthusiasm. 

Dessaix  entered  the  army  at  fifteen  ;  at  the  opening  of 
the  war  he  quickly  passed  through  the  lower  grades,  and 
became  a  general  of  brigade  before  the  age  of  twenty-five, 
and  a  general  of  division  at  twenty-six ;  he  died  before  the 
age  of  thirty-two,  with  a  reputation  second  only  to  that  of 
Napoleon. 

Kleber  did  not  enter  the  army  till  later  in  life,  but  he 
quickly  passed  through  the  subordinate  grades,  and  was 
made  a  general  of  brigade  at  thirty-eight,  a  general  of  di 
vision  at  forty,  and  general-in-chief  of  an  army  at  forty- 
one  :  he  died  at  forty-six.  On  his  death,  and  in  Napoleon's 
absence,  Menau,  aged  and  inefficient,  succeeded  by  right 
of  seniority  to  the  command  of  the  army  of  Egypt.  Its 
utter  ruin  was  the  almost  immediate  consequence. 

Massena  first  entered  the  army  at  seventeen,  but  soon 
married  a  rich  wife,  and  retired  to  civil  life.  He  returned 
to  the  army  at  the  opening  of  the  revolution,  and  in  two 
years,  before  the  age  of  thirty-five,  was  promoted  to  the 
rank  of  general  of  division.  He  immediately  acquired  that 
high  reputation  which  he  sustained  through  a  long  career 
of  military  glory. 


392  Mil  ITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

Soult  became  a  sub-lieutenant  at  twenty-two,  a  cap 
tain  at  twenty-four  ;  the  following  year  he  passed  through 
the  several  grades  of  chef-de-bataillon,  colonel,  and  gen 
eral  of  brigade,  and  became  general  of  division  at  twenty- 
nine. 

Davoust  was  a  sub-lieuterianfcat  seventeen,  a  general  of 
brigade  at  twenty -three,  and  general  of  division  at  twenty- 
five. 

Eugene  Beauharnais  entered  the  army  at  a  very  early 
age.  He  became  chef-de-bataillon  at  nineteen,  colonel  at 
twenty-one,  general  of  brigade  at  twenty-three,  and  Vice 
roy  of  Italy  at  twenty-five.  He  soon  proved  himself  one 
of  Napoleon's  ablest  generals.  At  twenty-eight  he  com 
manded  the  army  of  Italy,  and  at  thirty-one  gained  great 
glory  in  the  Russian  campaign,  at  the  head  of  the  fourth 
corps  d'armee. 

Gouvion-Saint-Cyr  entered  the  army  at  the  beginning 
of  the  Revolution,  and  passing  rapidly  through  the  lower 
grades,  became  a  general  of  brigade  at  twenty-nine,  and  a 
general  of  division  at  thirty. 

Suchet  became  a  chef-de-lataillon  at  twenty,  general  of 
brigade  at  twenty-five,  major-general  of  Brune's  army  at 
twenty-seven,  and  general  of  division  and  of  a  corps  d'armee 
at  twenty-eight. 

Oudinot  became  a  captain  at  twenty-three,  chef-de-ba- 
taillon  at  twenty-four,  general  of  brigade  at  twenty-five, 
and  general  of  division  at  twenty-eight. 

Ney  was  a  captain  at  twenty-three,  adjutant-general  at 
twenty-six,  general  of  brigade  at  twenty-sever ,  and  gen 
eral  of  division  at  twenty-nine. 

Lannes  was  a  colonel  at  twenty-seven,  general  of  bri 
gade  at  twenty-eight,  and  very  soon  after  general  of  di 
vision. 

Joubert  became  adjutant-general  at  twenty-five,  general 
of  brigade  at  twenty-six,  general  of  division  at  twenty- 


MILITARY    EDUCATION.  393 

eight,  and  general-in-chief  of  the  army  of  Italy  at  twenty- 
nine.    He  died  at  thirty. 

Victor  was  a  chef-de-bataillon  at  twenty-seven,  general 
of  brigade  at  twenty-nine,  and  general  of  division  at  thirty- 
two. 

Murat  was  a  lieutenant  at  twenty,  and  passing  rapidly 
through  the  lower  grades,  he  became  a  general  of  brigade 
at  twenty-five,  and  a  general  of  division  at  twenty-seven. 

Mortier  was  a  captain  at  twenty-three,  adjutant-general 
at  twenty-five,  general  of  brigade  at  thirty,  and  general  of 
division  at  thirty-one. 

Macdonald  was  a  colonel  at  twenty-seven,  a  general  of 
brigade  at  twenty-seven,  and  a  general  of  division  at  thirty. 

Marmont  was  a  captain  at  twenty-one.,  chef-de-bataillon 
at  twenty-two,  general  of  brigade  at  twenty-four,  inspector 
general  at  twenty-seven,  and  general-in-chief  of  an  army 
at  thirty-two. 

Bernadotte  wa*s  a  colonel  at  twenty-eight,  general  of 
brigade  at  twenty-nine,  and  general  of  division  at  thirty. 

Lefebvre  was  made  a  captain  at  the  organization  of  the 
army  in  1793  ;  he  became  a  general  of  brigade  at  thirty- 
eight,  and  general  of  division  at  thirty-nine. 

Bessieres  entered  the  army  at  twenty-six,  became  a 
colonel  at  thirty,  general  of  brigade  at  thirty-two,  and  gen 
eral  of  division  at  thirty-four.  He  died  at  forty-seven. 

Duroc  was  a  captain  at  twenty-three,  chef-de-bataillon 
at  twenty-six,  colonel  and  chcf-de-brigade  at  twenty-seven, 
and  general  of  division  at  thirty.  He  died  at  forty-one. 

This  list  might  be  still  further  extended  with  the  same 
results,  but  names  enough  have  been  given  to  show  that 
the  generals  who  assisted  Napoleon  in  his  immortal  cam 
paigns  were  all,  with  scarcely  an  exception,  young  men, 
still  burning  with  the  fires  of  youthful  ardor  and  enthusi 
asm.  The  grade  of  marshal  was  not  created  till  after  Na 
poleon  became  emperor.  On  ascending  the  throne  of  tho 


394  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

empire,  he  nominated  to  this  rank  eighteen  of  the  mos* 
distinguished  generals  of  France.  Some  of  these  were 
generals  of  the  earlier  wars  of  the  Revolution,  and  had 
never  served  under  him.  Others  were  younger  men,  sev 
eral  being  only  thirty-four,  thirty-five,  and  thirty-six  years 
of  age.  The  mean  age  of  all  was  forty-four.  He  after 
wards  made  seven  more  marshals,  whose  mean  age  was 
forty-three.  These  appointments,  however,  were  regard 
ed  as  rewards  for  past  services,  rather  than  as  a  grade  from 
which  service  was  expected,  for  several  of  the  older  mar 
shals  were  never  called  into  the  field  after  their  promo 
tion. 

Having  noticed  the  ages  of  the  principal  generals  who 
commanded  in  the  armies  of  Napoleon,  let  us  look  for  a 
moment  at  those  who  opposed  him.  In  the  campaign  of 
1796  the  enemy's  forces  were  directed  by  Beaulieu,  then 
nearly  eighty  years  of  age  ;  Wurmser,  also  an  octogena 
rian,  and  Alvinzi,  then  over  seventy :  these  had  all  three 
distinguished  themselves  in  earlier  life,  but  had  now  lost 
that  youthfulr  energy  and  activity  so  essential  for  a  mili 
tary  commander. 

In  the  campaign  of  1800  the  general-in-chief  of  the  Aus 
trian  forces  was  Melas,  an  old  general,  who  had  served 
some  fifty  years  in  the  army ;  he  had  distinguished  him 
self  so  long  ago  as  the  Seven  Years'  War,  but  he  had 
now  become  timid  and  inefficient,  age  having  destroyed 
his  energy. 

In  the  campaign  of  1805  the  French  were  opposed  by 
Kutusof,  then  sixty,  and  Mack,  then  fifty-three  ;  the  plan 
of  operations  was  drawn  up  by  still  more  aged  generals 
of  the  Aulic  council. 

In  the  campaign  of  1806  the  French  were  opposed  by 
the  Duke  of  Brunswick,  then  seventy-one,  Hohenlohe, 
then  sixty,  and  Mollendorf,  Kleist,  and  Massenbach,  old 
generals,  who  had  served  under  the  great  Frederick,— 


MILITARY  EDUCATION.  395 

men,  says  Joinini,  "  exhumed  from  the  Seven  Years'  War," 
— "  whose  faculties  were  frozen  by  age,"" — "  who  had  been 
buried  for  the  last  ten  years  in  a  lethargic  sleep." 

In  the  campaign  of  1807  the  French  were  opposed  by 
Kamenski,  then  eighty  years  of  age,  Benningsen,  then  six 
ty,  and  Buxhowden,  then  fifty-six.  The  Allies  now  be 
gan  to  profit  by  their  experience,  and  in  1809  the  Austrian 
army  was  led  by  the  young,  active,  skilful,  and  energetic 
Archduke  Charles  ;  and  this  campaign,  although  the  com- 
mander-in-chief  was  somewhat  fettered  by  the  foolish 
projects  of  the  old  generals  of  the  Aulic  council,  and 
thwarted  by  the  disobedience  of  his  brother,  was  never 
theless  the  most  glorious  in  the  Austrian  annals  of  the 
wars  of  the  Revolution. 

At  the  opening  of  the  campaign  of  1812  the  Emperor 
Alexander,  young,  (only  thirty-five,)  active,  intelligent,  and 
ambitious,  had  remodelled  his  army,  and  infused  into  it  his 
own  energy  and  enthusiastic  love  of  glory.  He  was  him 
self  at  its  head,  and  directed  its  operations.  Kutusof  was 
for  a  short  time  the  nominal  commander-in-chief,  and  ex 
hibited  an  activity  unusual  at  his  age,  but  he  was  sur 
rounded  by  younger  generals — Barclay-de-Tolley,  and 
Miloradowich,  then  forty-nine,  Wintzengerode,  then  forty- 
three,  Schouvalof,  then  thirty-five,  and  the  Archduke  Con- 
stantine,  then  thirty-three, — generals  who,  at  the  heads  of 
their  corps,  and  under  the  young  emperor  and  his  able 
staff  of  young  officers,  in  the  two  succeeding  campaigns, 
rolled  back  the  waves  of  French  conquest,  and  finally 
overthrew  the  French  empire.  Wellington,  who  led  the 
English  in  these  campaigns,  was  of  the  same  age  as  Na 
poleon,  and  had  been  educated  at  the  same  time  with  him 
in  the  military  schools  of  France.  The  Austrians  were 
led  by  Schwartzenburg,  then  only  about  thirty,  and  the 
Prussians  by  Yorck,  Bulow,  and  Blucher.  The  last  of 
these  was  then  well  advanced  in  life,  but  all  his  movements 


396  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

being  directed  by  younger  men, — Scharnhorst  and  Gneise» 
nau, — his  operations  partook  of  the  energy  of  his  able 
chiefs  of  staff. 

In  the  campaign  of  1815,  Napoleon  was  opposed  by  the 
combinations  of  Wellington  and  Gneisenau,  both  younger 
men  than  most  of  his  own  generals,  who,  it  is  well  known, 
exhibited,  in  this  campaign,  less  than  in  former  ones,  the 
ardent  energy  and  restless  activity  which  had  character 
ized  their  younger  days.  Never  were  Napoleon's  plans 
better  conceived,  never  did  his  troops  fight  with  greater 
bravery ;  but  the  dilatory  movements  of  his  generals  en 
abled  his  active  enemies  to  parry  the  blow  intended  for 
their  destruction. 

In  the  American  war  of  1812,  we  pursued  the  same 
course  as  Austria,  Prussia,  and  Russia,  in  their  earlier 
contests  with  Napoleon,  i.  e.,  to  supply  our  armies  with 
generals,  we  dug  up  the  Beaulieus,  the  Wurmsers,  the 
Alvinzis,  the  Melases,  the  Macks,  the  Brunswicks,  and  the 
Kamenskis  of  our  revolutionary  war ;  but  after  we  had 
suffered  sufficiently  from  the  Hulls,  the  Armstrongs,  the 
Winchesters,  the  Dearborns,  the  Wilkinsons,  the  Hamp 
tons,  and  other  veterans  of  the  Revolution,  we  also  changed 
our  policy,  and  permitted  younger  men — the  Jacksons,  the 
Harrisons,  the  Browns,  the  McReas,  the  Scotts,*  the 
Ripleys,  the  Woods,  the  M' Combs,  the  Wools,  and  the 
Millers — to  lead  our  forces  to  victory  and  to  glory.  In 
the  event  of  another  war,  with  any  nation  capable  of  op 
posing  to  us  any  thing  like  a  powerful  resistance,  shal) 
we  again  exhume  the  veterans  of  former  days,  and  again 
place  at  the  head  of  our  armies  respectable  and  aged  in 
efficiency  ;  or  shall  we  seek  out  youthful  enterprise  and 
activity  combined  with  military  science  and  insti action? 
The  results  of  the  war,  the  honor  of  the  country,  the  glor) 

*  Scott  had  acquired  his  military  reputation,  and  attained  the  rank 
ef  major-general  at  twenty-eight. 


MILITARY  EDUCATION.  397 

of  our  arms,  depend,  in  a  great  measure,  upon  the  answer 
that  will  be  given  to  this  question. 

But  it  may  be  asked,  how  are  we  to  secure  this  combi 
nation  of  military  instruction  and  military  energy ;  how 
are  we  to  fill  the  higher  grades  of  our  army  with  young 
and  active  men  possessing  due  military  instruction  and 
talent  1  The  question  is  not  a  difficult  one,  and  our  gov 
ernment  can  easily  attain  the  desired  object,  if  it  will  only 
set  at  work  honestly,  disregarding  all  party  prejudices 
and  the  mercenary  and  selfish  interests  of  its  own  mem 
bers  and  advisers.  Other  governments  have  pointed  out 
to  us  the  way.  It  is  this  :  let  merit  be  the  main  test  for 
all  appointments  and  promotions  in  the  army.  Let  one  or 
more  of  the  subordinate  grades  be  thrown  open  to  the 
youth  of  the  whole  country,  without  distinction  as  to 
birth,  or  wealth,  or  politics ;  let  them  be  kept  on*proba- 
tion  in  this  subordinate  grade,  and  be  thoroughly  instructed 
in  all  that  relates  to  the  military  profession ;  after  strict 
examination  let  them  be  promoted  to  the  vacancies  in  the 
higher  grades  as  rapidly  as  they  shall  show  themselves 
qualified  for  the  duties  of  those  grades,  merit  and  services 
being  here  as  elsewhere  the  only  tests. 

The  first  part  of  this  rule  is  already  accomplished  by 
the  Military  Academy.  One  young  man  is  selected  from 
each  congressional  district,  on  an  average,  once  in  about 
two  years,  the  selection  being  made  by  the  representative 
of  the  district ;  these  young  men  are  made  warrant  officers 
in  the  army,  and  sent  to  a  military  post  for  instruction ; 
frequent  and  strict  examinations  are  instituted  to  deter 
mine  their  capacity  and  fitness  for  military  service  ;  after 
a  probation  of  a  certain  length  of  time,  the  best  are  select 
ed  for  commission  in  the  army,  relative  rank  and  appoint 
ments  to  corps  being  made  strictly  with  reference  to 
merit ;  birth,  wealth,  influence  of  political  friends — all  ex 
traneous  circumstances  being  excluded  from  considera 


398  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

tion.  What  can  be  more  truly  and  thoroughly  democratic 
than  this  ?  What  scheme  can  be  better  devised  to  supply 
our  army  with  good  officers,  and  to  exclude  from  the  mili 
tary  establishment  the  corrupting  influence  of  party  poli 
tics,  and  to  prevent  commissions  in  the  army  from  being 
given  to  "  the  sons  of  wealthy  and  influential  men,  to  the 
almost  total  exclusion  of  the  sons  of  the  poor  and  less  in 
fluential  men,  regardless  alike  of  qualifications  and  of 
merit  ?" 

Unfortunately  for  the  army  and  for  the  country  this  sys 
tem  ends  here,  and  all  further  advancement  is  made  by 
mere  seniority,  or  by  executive  favoritism,  the  claims  of 
merit  having  but  little  or  no  further  influence.  Indeed, 
executive  patronage  is  not  unfrequently  permitted  to  en 
croach  even  upon  these  salutary  rules  of  appointment,  and 
to  place  relatives  and  political  friends  into  the  higher 
ranks  of  commissioned  officers  directly  from  civil  life, 
"  regardless  alike  of  qualifications  and  of  merit,"  while 
numbers  "  of  sons  of  the  poor  and  less  influential  men," 
who  have  served  a  probation  of  four  or  five  years  in  military 
studies  and  exercises,  and  have  proved  themselves,  in  some 
thirty  examinations  made  by  competent  boards  of  military 
officers,  to  be  most  eminently  qualified  for  commissions, 
are  passed  by  in  utter  neglect !  Our  army  is  much  more 
open  to  this  kind  of  favoritism  and  political  partiality,  than 
that  of  almost  any  of  the  governments  of  Europe,  which 
we  have  been  accustomed  to  regard  as  aristocratic  and 
wholly  unfriendly  to  real  merit. 

In  the  Prussian  service,  in  time  of  peace,  the  govern 
ment  can  appoint  no  one,  even  to  the  subordinate  grade 
of  ensign,  till  he  has  followed  the  courses  of  instruction 
of  the  division  or  brigade-school  of  his  arm,  and  has 
passed  a  satisfactory  examination.  And,  "  no  ensign  can 
be  promoted  to  a  higher  grade  till  after  his  promotion  has 
been  agreed  to  by  the  superior  board  or  commission  of 


MILITARY  EDUCATION.  399 

examiners  at  Berlin,  and  his  name  has  been  placed  on  the 
list  of  those  whose  knowledge  and  acquirements  (connais- 
sances)  render  them  qualified  (aptes)  for  the  responsible 
duties  of  their  profession.  The  nomination  to  the  grade 
of  second-lieutenant  is  not,  even  after  all  these  conditions 
are  fulfilled,  left  to  the  choice  of  the  government.  When 
a  vacancy  occurs  in  this  grade,  the  subaltern  officers  pre 
sent  to  the  commandant  of  the  regiment  a  list  of  three 
ensigns  who  have  completed  their  course  of  study ;  the 
commandant,  after  taking  the  advice  of  the  superior  offi 
cers  of  the  regiment,  nominates  the  most  meritorious  of 
these  three  to  the  king,  who  makes  the  appointment." 
The  government  can  appoint  to  the  engineers  and  artillery 
only  those  who  have  been  instructed  as  eUves  in  the 
Berlin  school  of  cadets  and  the  school  of  artillery  and  en 
gineers,  and  these  appointments  must  be  made  in  the 
order  in  which  the  pupils  have  passed  their  final  exami 
nation.  In  these  corps  the  lieutenants  and  second  cap 
tains  can  be  promoted  to  a  higher  grade  only  after  they 
have  passed  a  satisfactory  examination.  No  political  in 
fluence,  nor  even  royal  partiality,  can  interfere  with  this 
rule. 

Even  in  the  arbitrary  monarchies  of  Austria  and  Rus 
sia  it  is  deemed  necessary  to  subject  all  military  appoint 
ments  and  promotions,  in  the  peace  establishments,  to 
certain  fixed  rules.  In  the  Austrian  army  all  sub-lieuten 
ants  must  be  taken  from  the  military  schools,  or  the  spe 
cially-instructed  corps  of  cadets  and  imperial  guards  ;  from 
this  grade  to  that  of  captain  all  promotions  are  made  by 
the  commandants  of  regiments  and  corps  on  the  advice  of 
the  other  superior  officers.  Above  the  grade  of  captain 
all  nominations  for  promotion  are  made  to  the  emperor  by 
the  Aulic  Council,  in  the  order  of  seniority  of  rank,  except 
the  claims  of  superior  merit  interfere.  "  In  the  Russian 
army,"  says  Haillot,  "  no  one,  not  even  a  prince  of  the  im- 


400  MILITARY  ART  A  N7D  SCIENCE. 

perial  family,  can  reach  ,the  grade  of  officer  till  he  hag 
satisfactorily  passed  his  several  examinations,  or  finished 
the  severe  novitiate  to  which  the  cadets  in  the  corps  are 
subjected."  Promotion  below  the  grade  of  colonel  is  made 
partly  by  seniority,  and  partly  by  merit ;  above  that  grade, 
by  selection  alone. 

In  the  British  service,  rank  in  the  line  of  the  army  is 
obtained  by  purchase,  and  the  higher  grades  are  in  this 
way  filled  with  young  men  of  energy  and  enterprise  ;  but 
this  efficiency  is  gained  by  injustice  to  the  poor  man,  who 
is  without  the  means  of  purchasing  rank.  In  some  re 
spects  it  is  preferable  to  our  ruinous  system  of  exclusive 
seniority  and  executive  favoritism,  but  far  more  objection 
able  than  that  based  on  merit.  Wellington  has  recently 
said  that  the  system  of  exclusive  seniority  would  soon  ut 
terly  destroy  the  efficiency  of  the  army,  by  preventing 
young  men  from  reaching  the  higher  grades.  "  At  first," 
says  an  officer  of  some  distinction  in  the  British  navy,  in 
speaking  of  promotions  in  that  arm  of  service,  "  it  certain 
ly  looks  very  hard  to  see  old  stagers  grumbling  away  their 
existence  in  disappointed  hopes ;  yet  there  can  be  little 
doubt  that  the  navy,  and,  of  course,  the  country  at  large, 
are  essentially  better  served  by  the  present  system  of  em 
ploying  active,  young,  and  cheerful-minded  officers,  than 
they  ever  could  be  by  any  imaginable  system  by  seniority. 
It  must  not  be  forgotten,  indeed,  that  at  a  certain  stage  of 
the  profession,  the  arrangement  by  which  officers  are  pro 
moted  in  turn  is  already  made  the  rule,  and  has  long  been 
so  :  but,  by  a  wise  regulation,  it  does  not  come  into  oper 
ation  before  the  rank  of  post-captain  be  attained.  Ante 
cedent  to  this  point,  there  must  occur  ample  opportunities 
of  weeding  out  those  persons,  who,  if  the  rule  of  mere  se 
niority  were  adopted,  would  exceedingly  embarrass  the 
navy  list."  We  fully  agree  with  this  writer  respecting  the 
evils  of  a  system  of  exclusive  seniority,  but  not  respecting 


MILITARY  EDUCATION.  401 

the  best  means  of  remedying  these  evils.  In  England,  where 
the  wealthy  and  aristocratic  classes  govern  the  state,  they 
may  very  well  prefer  a  system  of  military  appointment 
and  promotion  based  exclusively  on  wealth  and  political 
influence  ;  but  in  this  country  we  are  taught  to  consider 
merit  as  a  claim  much  higher  than  wealth,  or  rank,  or 
privilege. 

The  various  changes  in  the  rules  of  appointment  and 
promotion  in  the  French  service,  and  the  various  results 
of  these  changes,  both  on  the  character  of  the  army  and 
the  welfare  of  the  state,  are  so  instructive  that  we  regret 
that  our  limits  will  not  allow  us  to  enter  into  a  full  dis 
cussion  of  them.  We  can  give  only  a  very  brief  outline. 

Previous  to  the  Revolution,  military  appointment  and 
promotion  were  wholly  subject  to  the  rules  of  nobility, 
certain  grades  in  the  army  belonging  of  right  to  certain 
grades  of  the  noblesse ;  merit  and  service  being  excluded 
from  consideration.  But  the  constituent  assembly  changed 
this  order  of  things,  and  established  the  rule  that  three- 
fourths  of  the  sub-lieutenants  be  appointed  by  selection, 
after  a  concours,  and  the  other  quarter  be  appointed  from 
the  sub-officers,  alternately  by  seniority  and  selection, 
without  concours ;  the  captains  and  lieutenants  by  se 
niority  ;  the  colonels  and  lieutenant-colonels  two-thirds 
by  seniority  and  one-third  by  selection ;  marechaux-de- 
camp  and  lieutenant-generals  one-half  by  seniority  and 
one-half  by  selection.  In  1793  the  grades  were  still  fur 
ther  opened  to  selection,  and  in  the^  turbulent  times  that 
followed,  a  part  of  them  were  even  thrown  open  to  elec 
tion  by  the  soldiers.  But  in  1795  the  combined  system 
of  merit  and  seniority,  with  certain  improvements,  was 
restored.  In  1796  and  the  wars  that  followed,  merit  was 
the  only  qualification  required,  and  Bonaparte,  Moreau, 
and  other  young  generals  were  actually  placed  in  com 
mand  of  their  seniors  in  rank.  Military  talent  and  rail- 


402  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

itary  services,  not  rank,  were  the  recognised  claims  foi 
promotion,  the  baptism  of  blood,  as  it  was  called,  having 
equalized  all  grades.  Bonaparte,  in  leaving  Egypt,  paid 
no  attention  to  seniority  of  rank,  but  gave  the  command 
to  Kleber,  who  was  then  only  a  general  of  brigade,  while 
Menou  was  a  general  of  division.  Everybody  knows 
that  on  the  death  of  Kleber,  General  Menou  succeeded 
in  the  command ;  and  that  Egypt,  saved  by  the  selection 
of  Kleber,  was  lost  by  the  seniority  of  Menou. 

Napoleon  formed  rules  for  promotion,  both  for  peace 
and  war,  based  on  merit.  His  peace  regulations  were 
much  the  same  as  the  system  of  1795  ;  his  field  regula 
tions,  however,  from  the  circumstances  of  the  times,  were 
almost  the  only  ones  used.  The  following  extract  from 
the  Reglement  de  Campagne  of  1809,  (title  XX.,)  gives 
the  spirit  of  this  system : — "  The  next  day  after  an  action 
the  generals  of  brigade  will  present  to  the  generals  of 
division  the  names  of  all  such  as  have  distinguished 
themselves  in  a  particular  manner;  the  generals  of  di 
vision  will  immediately  report  these  to  the  commander- 
in-chief,  and  also  the  names  of  the  generals  and  superior 
officers  whose  conduct  has  contributed  most  to  secure 
success,  so  that  the  general-in-chief  may  immediately  in 
form  his  majesty." 

On  the  restoration  of  the  Bourbons  there  were  also  re 
stored  many  of  the  ancient  privileges  and  claims  of  rank 
by  the  officers  of  the  maison  militaire  du  roi,  and  court  fa 
voritism  was  substituted  for  merit  and  service.  But  the 
revolution  of  1830  produced  a  different  order  of  things. 
"  The  laws  now  regulate  military  promotion  ;  the  king  can 
appoint  or  promote  only  in  conformity  to  legal  prescrip 
tions  ;  and  even  in  the  exercise  of  this  prerogative,  he  is 
wise  enough  to  restrain  himself  by  certain  fixed  rules, 
which  protect  him  from  intrigues,  and  from  the  obsessions 
of  persons  of  influence,  and  of  party  politicians."  Would 


MILITARY    EDUCATION.  403 

that  the  same  could  always  be  said  of  the  executive  of  this 
country  in  making  appointments  and  promotions  in  the 
army. 

The  existing  laws  and  regulations  of  the  French  service 
differ  slightly  for  different  corps,  but  the  general  rule  is 
as  follows  :  No  one  can  be  appointed  to  the  grade  of  offi 
cer  in  the  army  who  has  not  graduated  at  one  of  the  mili 
tary  schools,  or  has  not  served  at  least  two  years  as  a  sub- 
officer  in  a  corps  d'armee.  In  time  of  peace,  no  one  can  be 
promoted  to  the  rank  of  lieutenant,  captain,  or  major,  (chef- 
d'escadron  and  chef-de-bataillon,)  till  he  has  served  two 
years  in  the  next  lower  grade  ;  no  one  can  be  made  lieu 
tenant-colonel  till  he  has  served  four  years,  nor  be  made 
colonel  till  he  has  served  three  years,  in  the  next  lower 
grade  ;  no  one  can  be  made  marechal-de-camp,  lieutenant- 
general,  or  marshal  of  France,  till  he  has  served  two  years 
in  the  next  lower  grade.  These  numbers  are  all  dimin 
ished  one  half  in  time  of  war.  For  the  grades  of  first- 
lieutenant  and  captain,  two-thirds  of  the  promotions  are 
by  seniority,  and  one-third  by  selection ;  for  the  chef-de- 
bataillon  and  chef-d'escadron,  one-half  by  seniority  and 
one-half  by  selection ;  for  all  the  other  grades  by  selection 
only.  In  time  of  war,  one-half  of  the  promotions  to  the 
grades  of  first-lieutenant  and  captain  are  filled  by  selec 
tion,  and  all  the  promotions  to  other  grades  in  this  way. 
For  promotion  by  selection,  a  list  of  the  authorized  candi 
dates  for  each  grade  is  made  out  every  year  by  inspectors, 
and  boards  of  examiners  appointed  ad  hoc,  and  the  name, 
qualifications,  and  particular  claim  are  given  of  each  offi 
cer  admitted  to  the  concours.  The  recommendations  of 

* 

these  inspectors  and  examiners  are  almost  invariably  fol 
lowed  by  the  government  in  its  selections.  This  com 
bined  system  of  seniority  and  merit  secures  a  gradual  pro 
motion  to  all,  and  at  the  same  time  enables  officers  of  great 
talents  and  acquirements  to  attain  the  higher  grades  while 


404  MILITARY -ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

still  young  and  efficient.  Merit  need  not,  therefore,  al 
ways  linger  in  the  subaltern  grades,  and  be  held  subordi 
nate  to  ignorance  and  stupidity,  merely  because  they  hap 
pen  to  be  endowed  with  the  privileges  of  seniority.  More 
over,  government  is  precluded  from  thrusting  its  own  fa 
vorites  into  the  higher  grades,  and  placing  them  over  the 
heads  of  abler  and  better  men. 

If  such  a  system  of  appointment  were  introduced  into 
our  army,  and  fixed  by  legal  enactments,  and  no  one  were 
allowed  to  receive  a  commission  till  he  had  either  distin 
guished  himself  in  the  field,  or  had  passed  an  examination 
before  a  board  of  competent  officers,  we  are  confident  that 
better  selections  would  be  made  in  the  appointments  from 
civil  life  than  have  been  within  the  last  ten  years  by  the 
present  system  of  political  influence.  It  would  scarcely 
be  possible  to  make  worse  selections.*  And  if  the  com- 

*  To  show  the  working  of  this  system  of  political  appointments,  we 
would  call  attention  to  a  single  fact.  On  the  formation  of  an  additional 
regiment  of  dragoons  in  1836,  thirty  of  its  officers  were  appointed  from 
civil  life,  and  only  four  from  the  graduates  of  the  Military  Academy. 
Of  those  appointed  to  that  regiment  from  civil  life,  twenty-two  have 
already  been  dismissed  or  resigned,  (most  of  the  latter  to  save  them 
selves  from  being  dismissed,)  and  only  eight  of  the  whole  thirty  political 
appointments  are  now  left,  their  places  having  been  mainly  supplied  by 
graduates  of  the  Military  Academy. 

In  case  of  another  increase  of  our  military  establishment,  what  course 
will  our  government  pursue  ?  Will  it  again  pass  by  the  meritorious  young 
officers  of  our  army, — graduates  of  the  Military  Academy, — who  have 
spent  ten  or  twelve  of  the  best  years  of  their  life  in  qualifying  themselves 
for  the  higher  duties  of  their  profession,  and  place  over  their  heads  ci 
vilians  of  less  education  and  inferior  character — men  totally  ignorant  of 
military  duties,  rrrere  pothouse  politicians,  and  the  base  hirelings  of  party, 
— those  who  screech  the  loudest  in  favor  of  party  measures,  and  de 
grade  themselves  the  most  in  order  to  serve  party  ends  ? — and  by  thus 
devoting  the  army,  like  the  custom-house  and  post-office,  to  political 
purposes,  will  it  seek  to  increase  that  vast  patronage  of  the  executive 
tvnich  is  already  debasing  individual  morality,  and  destroying  the  na- 


MILITARY    EDUCATION.  405 

bined  system  of  seniority  and  examination  were  pursued 
in  promoting  the  subalterns  already  in  service,  it  certainly 
would  produce  less  injustice,  and  give  greater  efficiency 
to  the  army,  than  the  present  one  of  exclusive  seniority 
and  brevet  rank,  obtained  through  intrigue  and  political 
influence,  or  high  military  appointments  bestowed  as  a  re 
ward  for  dirty  and  corrupt  party  services.  As  a  military 
maxim,  secure  efficiency,  by  limiting  the  privileges  of  rank ; 
exclude  favoritism,  by  giving  the  power  of  selection  to  boards 
of  competent  officers,  totally  independent  of  party  politics. 
Such  a  system  has  been  for  some  time  pursued  in  the  med 
ical  department  of  our  army ;  it  has  produced  the  most 
satisfactory  results  ;  stupidity,  ignorance,  and  aged  ineffi 
ciency  have  been  overslaughed,  and  will  soon  entirely  dis 
appear  from  that  corps  ;  they  have  been  replaced  by  young 
men  of  activity,  talent,  character,  intelligence,  and  great 
professional  skill.  Is  it  less  important  to  have  competent 
military  officers  to  command  where  the  lives  of  thousands, 
the  honor  of  our  flag,  the  safety  of  the  country  depend  upon 
their  judgment  and  conduct,  than  it  is  to  have  competent 
surgeons  to  attend  the  sick  and  the  wounded  ? 

We  wish  to  call  particular  attention  to  this  subject.  It 
deserves  attention  at  all  times,  but  at  the  present  moment 
it  more  especially  demands  a  close  and  candid  considera-  * 
tion.  The  higher  grades  of  our  peace  establishment  are 
now  filled  with  men  so  far  advanced  in  life  that,  in  case 
of  an  increase  of  the  army,  many  of  them  must  undoubt 
edly  be  either  passed  over,  or  put  on  a  retired  list.  Soon 
er  or  later  some  change  of  this  kind  will  undoubtedly  be 
made.  It  is  demanded  by  the  good  of  service,  even  in 
dme  of  peace  ;  and  in  time  of  war,  it  will  be  absolutely 

tional  character?  Should  any  administration  of  the  government  bo  so 
unmindful  of  the  interests  and  honor  of  the  country  as  to  again  pursue 
such  a  course,  it  is  to  be  hoped  that  the  sword  of  political  justice  will 
not  long  slumber  in  its  scabbard. 


406  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

necessary  to  the  success  of  our  arms.*  But  the  great 
danger  is  that  the  change  may  be  made  for  the  worse — • 
that  all  the  appointments  and  promotions  to  the  higher 
grades  will  be  made  through  political  influence,  thus  con 
verting  the  army  and  navy  into  political  engines.  Let 
proper  measures  be  taken  to  prevent  so  dangerous  a  re 
sult  ;  let  executive  patronage  in  the  army  be  limited  by 
wholesome  laws,  like  those  in  France  and  Prussia ;  and 
let  military  merit  and  services,  as  determined  by  boards 
of  competent  military  officers,  be  the  only  recognised 
claims  to  appointment  and  promotion,  thus  giving  to  the 
poor  and  meritorious  at  least  an  equal  chance  with  the 
man  of  wealth  and  the  base  hireling  of  party.  In  actual 
service  the  system  of  exclusive  seniority  cannot  exist ;  it 
would  deaden  and  paralyze  all  our  energies.  Taking  ad 
vantage  of  this,  politicians  will  drive  us  to  the  opposite 
extreme,  unless  the  executive  authority  be  limited  by 
wholesome  laws,  based  on  the  just  principles  of  merit  and 
service. 

But  the  importance  of  maintaining  in  our  military  or 
ganization  a  suitable  system  of  military  instruction  is  not 
confined  to  the  exigencies  of  our  actual  condition.  It 
mainly  rests  upon  the  absolute  necessity  of  having  in  the 
country  a  body  of  men  who  shall  devote  themselves  to 
the  cultivation  of  military  science,  so  as  to  be  able  to  com 
pete  with  the  military  science  of  the  transatlantic  powers. 
It  is  not  to  be  expected  that  our  citizen  soldiery,  however 
intelligent,  patriotic,  and  brave  they  may  be,  can  make 

*  Even  at  the  present  moment,  in  ordering  troops  to  Texas,  where 
immediate  and  active  service  is  anticipated,  it  is  found  necessary  to 
break  up  regiments  and  send  only  the  young  and  efficient  officers 
into  the  field,  leaving  most  of  the  higher  officers  behind  with  mere 
nominal  commands.  Very  many  of  the  officers  now  in  Texas  are 
acting  in  capacities  far  above  their  nominal  grades,  but  without  receiv 
ing  the  rank,  pay,  and  emoluments  due  to  their  servicea 


MILITARY  EDUCATION.  407 

any  very  great  progress  in  military  studies.  They  have 
neither  the  time  nor  opportunities  for  such  pursuits,  and  if 
they  can  acquire  a  practical  acquaintance  with  elementary 
tactics — the  mere  alphabet  of  the  military  art — it  is  as 
much  as  can  reasonably  be  expected  of  them.  As  a  gen 
eral  rule,  the  militia  are  individually  more  capable  and  in 
telligent  than  the  men  who  compose  a  regular  army.  But 
they  must  of  necessity  be  inferior  in  practical  professional 
knowledge. 

Technical  education  is  necessary  in  every  pursuit  of 
life.  It  is  possible  that  the  lawyer  may  succeed  in  some 
particular  cases  without  a  knowledge  of  law,  but  he  will 
probably  have  few  clients  if  he  remain  ignorant  of  the 
laws  and  precedents  that  govern  the  courts.  The  un 
learned  chemist  may  succeed  in  performing  some  single 
experiment,  but  his  progress  will  be  slow  and  uncertain  if 
he  neglect  to  make  himself  familiar  with  the  experiments 
and  discoveries  of  his  predecessors. 

Learning,  when  applied  to  agriculture,  raises  it  from  a 
mere  mechanical  drudgery  to  the  dignity  of  a  science.  By 
analyzing  the  composition  of  the  soil  we  cultivate,  we  learn 
its  capacity  for  improvement,  and  gain  the  power  to  stimu 
late  the  earth  to  the  most  bountiful  production.  How  dif 
ferent  the  results  attending  the  labors  of  the  intelligent 
agriculturist,  guided  by  the  lamp  of  learning,  from  those 
of  the  ignorant  drudge  who  follows  the  barren  formula  of 
traditional  precepts !  As  applied  to  manufactures  and  the 
mechanical  arts,  learning  develops  new  powers  of  labor, 
and  new  facilities  for  subsistence  and  enjoyment.  Personal 
comforts  of  every  kind  are  greatly  increased,  and  placed 
within  the  reach  of  the  humbler  classes ;  while  at  the  same 
time  the  "  appliances  of  art  are  made  to  minister^o  the 
demands  of  elegant  taste,  and  a  higher  moral  culture." 
As  applied  to  commerce,  it  not  only  greatly  increases  the 
facilities  for  the  more  general  diffusion  of  civilization  and 


408  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

knowledge,  but  is  also  vastly  influential  in  harmonizing 
the  conflicting  interests  of  nations. 

Nor  is  learning  less  humanizing  and  pacific  in  its  in 
fluence  when  applied  to  the  military  art.  "  During  the 
dark  ages  which  followed  the  wreck  of  the  Roman  power, 
the  military  science  by  which  that  power  had  been  reared, 
was  lost  with  other  branches  of  learning.  When  learning 
revived,  the  military  art  revived  with  it,  and  contributed 
not  a  little  to  the  restoration  of  the  empire  of  mind  over 
that  of  brute  force.  Then,  too,  every  great  discovery  in 
the  art  of  war  has  a  life-saving  and  peace-promoting  in 
fluence.  The  effects  of  the  invention  of  gunpowder  are 
a  familiar  proof  of  this  remark ;  and  the  same  principle 
applies  to  the  discoveries  of  modern  times.  By  perfecting 
ourselves  in  military  science,  paradoxical  as  it  may  seem, 
we  are  therefore  assisting  in  the  diffusion  of  peace,  and 
hastening  on  the  approach  of  that  period  when  swords 
shall  be  beaten  into  ploughshares  and  spears  into  priming- 
hooks." 


APPENDIX. 


SINCE  the  first  edition  of  this  work  was  published,  two  important 
wars  have  been  commenced  and  terminated — that  between  the  United 
^States  and  the  Republic  of  Mexico,  and  that  between  Russia  and  the 
Western  Powers  of  Europe — and  another  is  now  being  waged  between 
France  and  Austria,  upon  the  old  battle  fields  of  Northern  Italy.  In 
issuing  a  new  edition  of  these  Elements  of  Military  Art  and  Science,  it 
is  deemed  proper  to  refer  to  these  wars,  and  to  apply  the  principles 
here  discussed  to  the  military  operations  carried  on  in  Mexico  and  in 
the  Crimea.  It  is  proposed  to  do  this  in  the  form  of  Notes  to  the  sev 
eral  Chapters.  The  war  in  Italy  being  still  undetermined,  and  the  de 
tails  of  the  several  battles  which  have  already  been  fought  being  but 
imperfectly  known,  it  is  obviously  improper  to  attempt  to  criticize  their 
strategic  character  or  tactical  arrangement. 

H.  W.  H. 

NEW  YORK,  July,  1859. 


NOTE  TO  CHAPTER  II.— STRATEGY. 

In  the  invasion  of  Mexico,  the  United  States  formed  four 
separate  armies,  moving  on  four  distinct  lines  of  operation  : 
1st.  The  "  Army  of  the  "West,"  under  General  Kearny,  mov 
ing  from  St.  Louis  on  New  Mexico  and  California ;  2d.  The 
"  Army  of  the  Centre,"  under  General  Wool,  moving  from  Sail 
Antonio  de  Bexar  on  Chihuahua;  3d.  The  "Army  of  Occupa 
tion,"  on  the  Rio  Grande,  under  General  Taylor,  moving  from 
Corpus  Christi  on  Matamoras,  Monterey,  and  Saltillo ;  and  4th. 
The  "  Main  Army,"  under  General  Scott,  moving  from  Vera 
Cruz  on  the  capital  of  Mexico. 

The  Army  of  the  West,  under  General  Kearny,  moved 
35 


410  NOTES. 

upon  a  separate  and  distinct  line  of  operations,  having  nc 
strategic  relations  to  the  other  three ;  its  objects  were  the  con 
quest  and  occupation  of  New  Mexico  and  Upper  California. 
The  first  was  readily  accomplished ;  but  the  general  then  de 
tached  so  large  a  force  to  operate  on  Chihuahua  after  the  diver 
sion  of  "Wool's  column,  that  his  expedition  to  California  must 
have  utterly  failed  without  the  assistance  of  the  naval  forces  in 
the  Pacific. 

The  lines  of  Taylor  and  Wool  were  evidently  ill  chosen, 
being  so  distant  as  to  aiford  the  enemy  an  opportunity  to  take 
a  central  position  between  them.  Fortunately  Wool  proceeded 
no  further  than  Monclova,  and  then  turned  off  to  occupy  Parras. 
thus  coming  under  the  immediate  command  of  General  Taylor. 
The  latter  fought  the  battles  of  Palo  Alto  and  Resaca  de  la 
Palma,  and  sustained  the  siege  of  Fort  Brown  ;  then  crossing 
the  Rio  Grande  at  Matamoras,  he  captured  Monterey,  and, 
forming  a  junction  with  Wool,  defeated  the  army  of  Santa 
Anna  at  Buena  Vista.  This  battle  ended  the  campaign,  which, 
however  brilliantly  conducted,  was  entirely  without  .strategic 
results. 

Scott  landed  his  army  near  the  Island  of  Sacrificios  without 
opposition,  and  immediately  invested  Yera  Cruz,  which  sur 
rendered  after  a  short  siege  and  bombardment.  Having  thus 
secured  his  base,  he  immediately  advanced  to  the  city  of  Puebla, 
meeting  and  defeating  the  army  of  Santa  Anna  at  Cerro  Gordo. 
Piemaining  some  time  at  Puebla  to  reinforce  his  army,  he  ad 
vanced  into  the  valley  of  Mexico,  and  after  the  brilliant  vic 
tories  of  Contreras,  Churubusco.  Molino  del  Rey,  and  Chapul- 
tepec,  captured  the  city  and  terminated  the  war. 

With  respect  to  the  double  line  of  operations  of  Taylor  and 
Scott,  it  may  be  sufficient  to  remark,  that  Santa  Anna,  from 
his  central  position,  fought,  with  the  same  troops,  the  battles 
of  Buena  Vista  and  Cerro  Gordo.  It  should  also  be  remarked, 
that  the  line  of  operations  of  the  army  of  the  Rio  Grande  was 
not  approved  by  either  Scott  or  Taylor,  nor,  it  is  believed,  by 
any  other  officer  of  our  army.  Scott's  line  of  operations,  how 
ever,  was  truly  strategic,  and  in  turning  the  Mexican  flank  by 


NOTES.  41  ( 

Lake  Chalco  and  the  Pedregal,  he  exhibited  the  skill  of  a  great 
general. 

The  war  in  the  Crimea,  from  the  limited  extent  of  the 
theatre  of  operations,  afforded  but  little  opportunity  for  the 
display  of  strategic  skill  on  either  side.  Nevertheless,  the 
movements  of  both  parties,  prior  to  the  investment  and  siege 
of  Sebastopol,  are  fair  subjects  for  military  criticism  with  re 
spect  to  the  plans  of  operation. 

When  the  allies  landed  their  troops  at  the  Old  Fort,  three 
plans  were  open  for  the  consideration  of  the  Russian  general : 
1st.  To  destroy  or  close  the  harbors  of  Balaklava,  Ivamiesch, 
Kazatch  and  Strelitzka,  and,  garrisoning  Sebastopol  with  a 
strong  force,  to  occupy  with  the  rest  of  his  army  the  strong 
platifcu  south  of  the  city,  and  thus  force  the  allies  to  besiege 
the  strong  works  on  the  north.  2d.  Having  closed  the  harbors 
on  the  south,  and  secured  Sebastopol  from  being  carried  by  the 
assault  of  any  detachment  of  the  allies,  to  operate  on  their 
left  flank,  annoying  and  harassing  them  with  his  Cossacks, 
and  thus  delay  them  many  days  in  the  difficult  and  precarious 
position  which  they  would  have  occupied.  3d.  To  advance 
with  his  whole  force  and  offer  them  battle  at  the  Alma.  The 
last  and  least  advantageous  of  these  plans  was  adopted,  and  as 
the  garrison  of  Sebastopol,  during  the  battle,  consisted  of  only 
four  battalions  and  the  sailors  of  the  fleet,  it  might,  considering 
the  weakness  of  its  works,  have  been  easily  carried  by  a  de 
tachment  of  the  allied  fo'rces. 

For  the  allies  at  the  Alma  two  plans  presented  themselves : 
1st.  To  turn  the  Russian  left,  cut  him  off  from  Sebastopol,  and 
occupy  tliat  city  in  force.  2d.  To  turn  the  Russian  right,  and, 
throwing  him  back  upon  Sebastopol,  cut  him  off  from  all  exter 
nal  succor.  Neither  plan  was  fully  carried  out.  The  column  of 
General  Bosquet  turned  the  Russian  left  and  decided  his  re 
treat  ;  but  no  strategic  advantage  was  taken  of  the  victory. 
The  battle  was  fought  on  the  20th  of  September,  and  by  noon 
of  the  26th  the  allies  had  only  advanced  to  the  Balbeck,  a  dis 
tance  of  a  little  more  than  ten  miles  in  six  da}rs !  On  the  27th 
they  regained  their  communication  with  the  fleet  at  Balaklava, 


412  NOTES.  ' 

without  attempting  to  occupy  Sebastopol,  and  having  exposed 
themselves  to  destruction  by  an  ill-conducted  flank  march.  For 
tunately  for  the  allies,  the  Russians  failed  to  avail  themselves 
of  the  advantages  which  the  enemy  had  thus  gratuitously  af 
forded.  The  fleet  having  entered  the  open  harbor  of  Balaklava, 
the  allies  now  commenced  the  labor  of  landing  and  moving  up 
their  siege  material  and  of  opening  their  trenches,  while  the 
Russians  prepared  their  fortifications  on  the  south  of  Sebasto 
pol  for  resisting  the  operations  of  that  gigantic  siege  which 
stands  without  a  parallel  in  history. 


NOTE  TO  CHAPTER  III.— FORTIFICATIONS.          ^ 

In  the  war  between  the  United  States  and  Mexico,  the  latter 
had  no  fortifications  on  her  land  frontiers,  and,  with  the  single 
exception  of  Yera  Cruz,  her  harbors  were  entirely  destitute  of 
defensive  works.  The  Americans,  therefore,  had  no  obstacles 
of  this  kind  to  overcome  on  three  of  their  lines  of  operation ; 
and,  when  Scott  had  reduced  Vera  Cruz,  his  line  of  march  was 
open  to  the  capital.  Moreover,  nearly  every  seaport  on  the 
Gulf  and  Pacific  coast  fell  into  our  hands  without  a  blow. 
Had  the  landing  of  Scott  been  properly  opposed,  and  Vera 
Cruz  been  strongly  fortified  and  well  defended,  it  would  have 
been  taken  only  after  a  long  and  difficult  siege.  Moreover,  had 
the  invading  army  encountered  strong  and  well-defended  fortifi 
cations  on  the  line  of  march  to  Mexico,  the  war  would,  neces 
sarily,  have  been  prolonged,  and  possibly  with  a  different  result. 

The  Russian  fortifications  in  the  Baltic  prevented  the  allies 
from  attempting  any  serious  operations  in  that  quarter,  and 
those  in  the  Black  Sea  confined  the  war  to  a  single  point  of  the 
Heracleidan  Chersonese.  Had  Russia  relied  exclusively  upon 
her  fleet  to  prevent  a  maritime  descent,  and  left  Sebastopol 
entirely  undefended  by  fortifications,  how  different  had  been 
the  result  of  the  Crimean  war. 

This  subject  will  be  alluded  to  again  in  the  Notes  on  Sea- 
coast  Defences,  and  Permanent  Fortifications. 


NOTES.  413 


NOTE  TO  CHAPTER  IV.— LOGISTICS. 

The  war  in  Mexico  exhibited,  in  a  striking  manner,  onr 
superiority  over  the  enemy  in  this  branch  of  the  military  art. 
No  army  was  better  supplied  than  ours  in  all  matters  of  sub 
sistence,  clothing,  medical  and  hospital  stores,  and  in  means  of 
transportation.  Two  points,  however,  are  worthy  of  remark  in 
this  connection  :  1  st.  The  great  waste  of  material,  which  resulted 
from  the  employment  of  raw  troops  under  short  enlistments, 
and  commanded  by  officers  appointed  from  civil  life,  who  were 
without  experience  and  destitute  of  military  instruction ;  and, 
2d.  The  immense  expense  of  transportation,  which  was  due  in 
part  to  the  above  cause  and  in  part  to  the  employment,  in  the 
administrative  departments,  of  civilians  who  were  utterly  igno 
rant  of  the  rules  and  routine  of  military  service.  This  war 
was  conducted  on  the  system  of  magazines  and  provisions 
carried  in  the  train  of  the  army,  or  purchased  of  the  inhabitants 
and  regularly  paid  for,  forced  requisitions  being  seldom  resorted 
to,  and  then  in  very  moderate  quantities.  The  wisdom  of  this 
plan  was  proved  by  the  general  good  order  and  discipline  of 
our  troops,  and  the  general  good-will  of  the  non-combatant 
inhabitants  of  the  country  which  was  passed  over  or  occupied 
by  the  army. 

The  war  in  the  Crimea  proved  most  conclusively  the  vast 
superiority  of  the  French  administrative  system  over  that  of 
the  English — of  the  military  over  a  civil  organization  of  the 
administrative  corps  of  an  army.  The  French  troops  before 
Sebastopol  were  regularly,  cheaply,  and  abundantly  supplied 
with  every  requisite  of  provisions,  clothing,  munitions,  medical 
stores,  military  utensils,  and  hospital  and  camp  equipages; 
while  the  English  army,  notwithstanding  an  immense  expendi 
ture  of  money,  was  often  paralyzed  in  its  operations  by  the 
want  of  proper  military  material,  and  not  unfroquently  was 
destitute  of  even  the  necessaries  of  life. 

Instead  of  profiting  by  this  lesson,  the  recent  tendency  of 
our  own  government  has  been  (especially  in  supplying  the 


414  NOTES. 

army  in  Utah)  to  imitate  the  sad  example  of  the  English,  and 
to  convert  the  supplying  of  our  armies  into  a  system  of  political 
patronage  to  be  used  for  party  purposes.  If  fully  carried  out, 
it  must  nccessarity  result  in  the  ruin  of  the  army,  the  robbery 
of  the  treasury,  and  the  utter  corruption  of  the  government. 


NOTE  TO  CHAPTER  V.— TACTICS. 

The  war  in  Mexico,  from  the  small  number  of  troops  engaged, 
and  the  peculiar  character  of  the  ground  in  most  cases,  afforded 
but  few  opportunities  for  the  display  of  that  skill  in  the  tactics 
of  battle  which  has  so  often  determined  the  victory  upon  the 
great  fields  of  Europe.  Nevertheless,  the  history  of  that  war 
is  not  without  useful  lessons  in  the  use  which  may  be  made  of 
the  several  arms  in  the  attack  and  defence  of  positions.  The 
limit  assigned  to  these  Notes  will  admit  of  only  a  few  brief 
remarks  upon  these  battles. 

The  affairs  of  Palo  Alto  and  Resaca  de  la  Palma  properly 
constitute  only  a  single  battle.  In  the  first,  which  was  virtually 
a  cannonade,  the  lines  were  nearly  parallel,  and  Arista's  change 
of  front  to  an  oblique  position  during  the  engagement,  was 
followed  by  a  corresponding  movement  on  the  part  of  General 
Taylor.  Being  made  sensible  of  the  superiority  of  the  Ameri 
can  artillery,  the  Mexican  general  fell  back  upon  the  Ravine  of 
Resaca  de  la  Palma,  drawing  up  his  troops  in  a  concave  line  to 
suit  the  physical  character  of  the  ground.  The  Americans 
attacked  the  whole  line  with  skirmishers,  and  with  dragoons 
supported  by  light  artillery,  and  the  charge  of  a  heavy  column 
of  infantry  decided  the  victory.  General  Taylor's  operations 
at  Monterey  partook  more  of  the  nature  of  an  attack  upon  an 
intrenched  position  than  of  a  regular  battle  upon  the  field. 
No  dbubt  Worth's  movement  to  the  right  had  an  important 
influence  in  deciding  the  contest,  but  the  separation  of  his 
column  from  the  main  body,  by  a  distance  of  some  five  miles, 
was.  to  say  the  least,  a  most  hazardous  operation.  The  Mex 
icans,  however,  took  no  advantage  of  the  opening  to  operate 


NOTES.  415 

between  the  separate  masses  into  which  the  American  army 
was  divided.  The  loss  which  the  Mexicans  inflicted  upon  us 
resulted  more  from  the  strength  of  their  position  than  from 
any  skilful  use  of  their  defensive  works.  In  the  battle  of 
Buena  Vista,  the  efforts  of  Santa  Anna  were  principally  directed 
to  turning  the  American  left.  If  he  had  concentrated  his  masses 
more  upon  the  centre  at  the  plateau,  the  success  gained  in 
the  early  part  of  the  contest  would  probably  have  been  decisive. 
The  American  right  at  La  Angostura  was  made  almost  inacces 
sible  by  the  deep  ravines  in  its  front,  and  the  skilful  use  made 
of  the  artillery  from  this  point  enabled  General  Taylor  to  gain 
the  victory,  even  after  his  left  had  been  completely  turned,  and 
a  portion  of  the  volunteers  had  actually  fled  from  the  field. 

The  manner  in  which  Scott  handled  his  troops  in  the  various 
battles  on  his  line  of  march  from  Vera  Cruz  to  the  capital, 
proved  him  to  be  one  of  the  best  generals  of  the  age.  At 
Cerro  Gordo  he  so  completely  turned  Santa  Anna's  left  as  to 
cut  off  his  line  of  retreat,  and  nearly  destroyed  his  army,  the 
general  himself  barely  escaping  capture.  The  turning  of 
Valencia's  position  by  the  village  of  San  Geronimo,  at  the 
battle  of  Contreras,  and  the  charge  by  Riley's  columns  of 
infantry,  were  movements  well  planned  and  admirably  executed, 
as  were  also  the  rapid  pursuit  of  Santa  Anna  to  Churubusco. 
and  the  flank  and  rear  attacks  by  the  brigades  of  Pierce  and 
Shields.  The  victory  of  Molino  del  Key  was  mostly  won  with 
the  musket,  without  very  material  assistance  from  heavy  artil- 
lerj*,  and  was  one  of  the  most  brilliant  but  dearly  bought 
achievements  of  the  war.  The  assault  upon  Chapultepec  was 
preceded  by  a  long  and  heavy  cannonade,  which  produced  a 
decided  moral  effect  upon  the  enemy  and  greatly  facilitated  the 
assault. 

With  respect  to  the  battles  of  the  Crimean  war,  only  that 
of  the  Alma  is  subject  to  the  tactical  criticism  of  ordinary  bat 
tles  ;  those  of  Balaklava,  Inkerman,  and  the  Tchernaya,  were 
of  the  nature  of  sorties  made  to  prevent  an  assault  of  the  unfin 
ished  works  of  defence,  and  to  prolong  the  operations  of  the 
isicgc.  They  must  therefore  be  judged  as  such,  and  not  accord- 


416  NOTES. 

ing  to  the  ordinary  rules  applicable  to  contests  in  the  open  field. 
At  the  battle  of  the  Alma  the  Russians  were  attacked  in 
position,  the  two  lines  of  battle  being  nearly  parallel.  Accord 
ing  to  the  original  plan  of  attack, 'the  Turks  and  Bosquet's 
division  was  to  turn  the  Russian  left,  while  the  main  attack  was 
made  upon  the  centre.  But,  on  account  of  the  division  of  com 
mand  in  the  allied  army,  there  was  no  concert  of  action.  The 
heavy  column  of  Bosquet  probabty  decided  the  victory,  although 
the  battle  was  general  throughout  the  whole  line.  The  English 
army  advanced  in  columns  of  brigades  at  deploying  distances^ 
its  right  connected  with  the  French,  and  its  left  protected  by  a 
line  of  skirmishers,  of  cavalry  and  horse  artillery.  With 
respect  to  the  formation  and  use  of  troops  in  the  other  battles, 
it  may  be  remarked  that  the  charge  of  the  English  light  cavalry 
at  Balaklava  was  apparently  without  necessity  or  object,  and 
led  to  its  inevitable  destruction.  In  the  battle  of  Inkerman 
the  Russians  directed  their  main  attack  upon  the  English  right 
and  centre,  with  false  attacks  upon  the  French  left  and^towards 
Balaklava.  But  these  false  attacks,  as  is  usual  in  such  cases, 
were  not  conducted  with  sufficient  energy  and  decision,  and 
Bosquet  was  thus  enabled  to  perceive  the  real  intentions  of 
the  enemy  upon  the  English  portion  of  the  line  and  move  to 
its  assistance.  Moreover,  the  main  body  of  the  Russians 
moved  in  too  heavy  and  unwieldy  masses,  which  exposed 
them  to  terrible  losses,  and  rendered  impossible  a  rapid  and 
effective  deployment  of  their  numerical  force.  The  same 
criticism  is  applicable  to  their  formation  at  the  battle  of 
the  Tchernaya. 


NOTE  TO  CHAPTER  VI.— MEANS  OF  NATIONAL  DEFENCE. 

On  the  invasion  of  Mexico  by  the  United  States,  the  former 
republic  had  a  large  army  of  tolerably  good  troops,  though  badly 
officered,  still  worse  equipped,  and  almost  destitute  of  proper 
military  stores ;  but  she  was  entirely  wanting  in  two  important 
elements  of  national  defence — fortifications  and  a  navv.  Her 


NOTES.  417 

weakness  was  shown  by  the  rapid  and  easy  conquest  of  almost 
the  entire  country. 

We  have  already  remarked  that  the  fortifications  of  Russia 
confined  the  theatre  of  war  to  a  single  point  of  the  Crimea,  and 
limited  the  military  operations  of  the  allies  to  the  prolonged 
and  only  partially  successful  siege  of  Sebastopol. 


NOTE  TO  CHAPTER  VII.— SEA-COAST  DEFENCES. 

Allusion  has  already  been  made  to  the  weakness  of  Mexico, 
resulting  from  her  want  of  sea-coast  defences,  as  shown  by  the 
war  between  that  republic  and  the  United  States.  This 
would  have  been  still  more  manifest  had  she  possessed  any  thing 
like  a  commercial  marine,  exposed  to  capture  by  our  naval- 
forces.  As  it  was,  the  Mexican  war  afforded  not  a  single  con 
test  between  ships  and  forts,  no  opposition  being  made  to  the 
occupation  of  Mexican  ports  by  our  naval  force.  The  only 
coast  defence,  the  castle  of  San  Juan  d'Ulloa,  was  not  attacked, 
but  after  the  bombardment  and  capture  of  Vcra  Cruz,  it  sur 
rendered  without  a  blow. 

The  Crimean  war,  on  the  contrary,  exhibited  in  a  most 
marked  degree  the  importance  of  a  well-fortified  sea-const. 
Notwithstanding  the  immense  force  of  the  combined  fleets  of 
England  and  France,  no  naval  attack  was  made  upon  cither 
Cronstadt  or  Sebastopol,  and  the  large  naval  force  of  Russia 
proved  utterly  useless  as  a  defence  against  a  maritime  descent. 
There  was,  indeed,  a  simulachre  of  a  "naval  cannonade  "  on  the 
latter  place  on  the  17th  of  October,  1854,  intended  as  a  diver 
sion  of  the  attention  and  strength  of  the  garrison  from  the 
land  side,  where  the  real  struggle  for  predominance  was  going 
on  between  the  besieged  and  the  besiegers.  The  inutility  of 
this  attempt  was  so  manifest  that  no  serious  naval  attack  was 
undertaken,  notwithstanding  that  the  allies  were  ready  to  bring 
to  bear  upon  the  antiquated  and  ill-armed  Russian  works  the 
most  powerful  naval  armaments  the  world  had  ever  seen. 

The  results  of  this  u  simulachre  of  a  naval  cannonade,"  as  it 


418  NOTES. 

has  been  called,  is  worthy  of  note.  The  details  are  taken  from 
Major  Barnard's  able  pamphlet  on  ':  The  Dangers  and  Defences 
of  New  York,"  and  Commander  Dahlgren's  interesting  and 
valuable  work  on  "Shells  and  Shell  Guns.'1 

"  The  allied  fleet  consisted  of  14  French,  10  British,  and  2  Turkish 
ships-of-the-line  (some  few  of  which  had  auxiliary  steam  power),  and  a 
number  of  side-wheel  steamers  to  tow  these ;  and  carried  in  all  about 
2,500  guns.  It  was  opposed  by  about  280  guns  from  the  works.  The 
fleet  kept  itself  (in  general)  at  a  respectable  distance  (from  1500  to  2000 
yards) ;  too  far  to  inflict  any  material  injury  with  its  armament  (32- 
pounders,  with  a  moderate  proportion  of  8-inch  shell-guns)  upon  the 
works  ; — too  far  to  receive  much  from  the  inefficient  armament  of  the 
Russian  works. 

"  The  only  exception  to  this  remark  applies  to  the  detached  English 
squadron  under  Sir  Edmund  Lyons,  consisting  of  the  Agamemnon, 
Sanspareil,  London,  Arethusa,  and  Albion,  the  first-named  of  which 
vessels  took  a  position  at  750  or  800  yards  from  Fort  Constantine,  while 
the  others  stretched  along,  at  about  the  same  distance  from  Fort  Con 
stantine,  the  '  Wasp  Tower,'  and  '  Telegraph  Battery.'  Dahlgren  de 
scribes  the  result  as  follows  : — 

" '  The  Agamemnon  was  very  seriously  maltreated,  though  not  to 
such  an  extent  as  to  impair  her  power  of  battery  or  engine.  She  was 
on  fire  several  times ;  was  struck  by  240  shot  or  shells ;  and,  singular 
to  say,  only  lost  29,  while  her  second,  just  by,  lost  70  men.  The  Albion, 
suffered  still  more,  and  in  an  hour  was  towed  out  crippled,  and  on  fire 
in  more  than  one  place,  with  a  loss  of  81  men.  The  crews  of  the  Lon 
don  and  Arethusa  fared  rather  better,  but  the  ships  nearly  as  ill ;  and 
they  too  remained  in  station  but  a  little  time  after  the  Albion.  The 
Queen  was  driven  off  soon  after  she  got  into  her  new  position,  in  great 
danger;  and  the  Rodney  had  the  bare  satisfaction  of  getting  aground 
and  afloat  after  experiencing  some  damage. 

"  '  The  value  of  the  small  works  on  the  cape  and  bluffs,  was  clearly 
defined  in  these  results;  being  above  the  dense  cloud  of  smoke  that 
enveloped  the  ships  and  the  lower  forts,  their  aim  was  not  embarrassed, 
while  the  seamen  labored  under  the  difficulty  of  firing,  with  an  incon 
venient  elevation,  at  objects  that  they  saw  but  seldom,  and  then  but 
dimly  and  briefly.  As  a  consequence,  three  line-of-battle  ships  and  a 
frigate  were  driven  off  very  shortly  and  in  great  peril,  and  a  fourth 
badly  cut  up  ;  while  the  Agamemnon  lay  opposed  to  one  of  the  heaviest 
sea-forts  with  two  tiers  of  casemates,  and  at  the  end  of  five  hours  came 
off  with  comparatively  little  loss.' 

"  Whatever  superiority  of  effect  the  batteries  on  the  heights  may 
have  had  (and  we  have  so  few  details  about  these  works  that  we  can 


NOTES.  419 

draw  no  sure  conclusion  from  this  mere  naked  statement  of  damages 
received  by  the  vessels),  it  evidently  was  not  for  want  of  being  ?dt  often 
enough  (smoke  or  no  smoke),  that  the  Agamemnon  escaped  with  so 
little  injury.  She  '  was  struck  by  240  shot  and  shells;'  and  it  is  only 
due  to  the  inefficiency  of  the  projectiles  by  which  she  was  struck,  that 
she  was  not  destroyed. 

"  With  respect  to  the  damages  received  by  Fort  Constantine,  Dahl- 
gren  says : — 

"'The  distance  of  the  Agamemnon  and  Sanspareil  from  Fort  Con 
stantine  (17th  October,  1854),  was  assumed  to  be  about  800  yards  ;  Lord 
Raglan  states  it  to  have  been  rather  less.  These  two  ships  could  bring 
to  bear  about  87  guns,  and  the  firing  from  them  probably  lasted  some 
four  hours.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that  it  inflicted  much  damage,  for 
the  Russian  Commander-in-chief  admits  it  in  his  official  report ;  but  not 
sufficient  to  impair  the  strength  of  the  masonry,  and  far  short  of  effect 
ing  a  breach  in  it 

"  '  At  Bomarsund,  the  results  were  rather  different : — Three  32- 
pounders  of  42  cwt.  (guns  of  inferior  weight),  were  landed  from  a  ship's 
spar  deck,  and  placed  in  battery  at  950  yards  from  the  North  Tower — 
the  masonry  of  good  quality  and  6*  feet  thick.  In  eight  hours,  the  wall 
between  two  embrasures  was  cut  through  from  top  to  bottom,  offering 
a  practicable  breach,  to  effect  which  487  shot  and  45  shells  were  fired, 
being  at  the  rate  of  one  round  from  the  battery  in  rather  less  than  a 
minute ;  or,  from  each  gun,  one  in  2£  minutes.  The  Tower  surren 
dered. 

"  '  It  seems  almost  incredible  that  three  pieces  should  be  able  to 
accomplish  fully  that  which  eighty-seven  pieces  utterly  failed  to  do,  the 
distances  from  the  object  being  alike — particularly  when  it  is  considered 
that  many  of  the  latter  were  of  greater  calibre,  and  most  of  them 
employed  much  heavier  charges  where  the  calibres  were  similar.  The 
guns  of  the  ship,  if  fired  at  the  same  rate  as  those  of  the  battery,  which 
was  not  unusually  rapid  (one  round  in  two  and  three-fourth  minutes), 
would  have  discharged  some  seven  thousand  seven  hundred  shot  and 
shells  in  the  course  of  the  faur  hours,  supposing  no  interruption ;  a 
number  which,  if  properly  applied,  would  appear,  from  the  results  of 
three  guns,  to  have  been  sufficient  to  breach  the  wall  of  the  fort  in  four 
teen  places ;  whereas  they  did  not  effect  a  single  breach,  which  is  abun 
dant  proof  of  the  lack  of  accuracy.  They  must  either  have  been 
dispersed  over  the  surface  of  the  fort,  or  else  missed  it  altogether,  and 
this  could  have  been  due  only  to  a  want  of  the  precision  which  was 
attained  by  the  battery.  The  constantly  preferred  complaint  of  motion 
in  the  ships  was  not  to  be  urged,  because  on  the  day  of  cannonading 
Sebastopol,  there  was  scarcely  a  breath  of  wind,  and  the  ships  were  too 
large  to  be  easily  moved  by  the  swell,  unless  very  considerable.  That 


420  NOTES. 

the  fort  did  no  greater  damage  to  the  ships  than  it  received  from 
proves  no  more  than  that  its  fire  was  quite  as  illy  directed,  and  the 
calibres  too  low.  It  is  said  that  the  Agamemnon  was  struck  in  the  hull 
by  two  hundred  and  forty  shot  and  shells,  which  must  have  been  but  a 
small  portion  of  what  was  fired,  though  sufficient  to  be  decisive,  if,  as 
already  observed,  the  calibre  had  been  heavier.'  " 

Here,  then,  a  number  of  projectiles  thrown  from  the  ships, 
which  were  sufficient,  had  they  been  thrown  from  a  land  bat 
tery,  according  to  the  result  at  Bomarsund,  to  produce  fourteen- 
practicable  breaches,  failed  not  only  to  produce  a  single  breach, 
but  even  "to  impair  the  strength  of  the  masonry." 

The  reason  of  this  is  obvious.  That  degree  of  precision  of 
fire  by  which  a  breach  is  effected  by  a  land  battery  is  utterly 
unattainable  from  a  floating  structure,  for  the  motion  of  the 
water,  even  in  the  calmest  days,  is  quite  sufficient  to  prevent 
accuracy  of  aim  at  an  object  at  a  distance,  as  in  this  case,  of 
seven  and  eight  hundred  yards. 

With  respect  to  the  action  of  the  shot  and  shells  upon  the 
rAgamemnon,  it  is  to  be  remarked  that  we  have  as  yet  had  no 
fair  trial  of  the  power  of  the  fire  of  modern  shell-guns  of  large 
calibre  from  land  batteries  against  ships  of  war.  The  Russians 
had  some  of  them  in  their  fleet,  and  at  Sinope,  with  their  shell- 
guns,  they  blew  up  two  Turkish  frigates  in  fifteen  minutes. 
It  does  not  appear  that  in  the  Crimean  war  they  had  yet  pro 
vided  their  fortifications  with  the  modern  armaments,  for  where 
shells  were  thrown  from  their  sea-coast  batteries,  they  were  in 
every  instance  of  inferior  calibre. 

With  respect  to  the  naval  attack  upon  Kinburn,  which  has 
been  referred  to  as  showing  the  importance  of  floating  batteries 
as  an  auxiliary  to  ships  in  reducing  harbor  defences,  we  have 
no  official  reports  of  the  Russians  from  which  to  derive  accurate 
information  of  the  strength  of  the  works  attacked.  Dahlgren, 
drawing  his  information  from  the  official  accounts  of  the  "  English 
and  French  admirals,"  describes  the  works  and  their  location 
is  follows : — 

"  '  The  Boug  and  the  Dnieper  issue  into  a  large  basin,  formed  partly 
by  the  projection  of  the  main  shore,  partly  by  a  long  narrow  strip  of 
ftand-beach,  which  continues  from  it  and  takes  a  north-westerly  direction 


NOTES.  421 

until  it  passes  the  promontory  of  Otchakov,  where  it  terminates,  and 
from  which  it  is  separated  by  the  channel,  whereby  the  waters  of  the 
estuary  empty  into  the  Black  Sea. 

" '  The  distance  between  the  spit  or  extremity  of  this  tongue  and  the 
Point  of  Otchakov,  or  ,the  main  shore  opposite,  is  about  two  miles ;  but 
the  water  is  too  shoal  to  admit  of  the  passage  of  large  vessels  of  war, 
except  in  the  narrow  channel  that  runs  nearest  to  the  spit  and  its  north 
ern  shore.  Here,  therefore,  are  placed  the  works  designed  to  command 
the  entrance.  They  are  three  in  number.  Near  the  extreme  point  of 
the  spit  is  a  covered  battery  built  of  logs,  which  are  filled  in  and  over 
laid  with  sand, — pierced  for  eighteen  guns,  but  mounting  only  ten. 

"  '  Advancing  further  along  the  beach  is  a  circular  redoubt,  connected 
with  the  spit  battery  by  a  covered  way.  This  work,  built  of  stone, 
and  riveted  with  turf,  is  open,  and  said  to  be  the  most  substantial 
of  the  three  ;  it  has  eleven  cannon,  and  within  is  a  furnace  for  heating 
shot. 

"  '  Further  on,  and  where  the  beach  has  widened  considerably,  is 
Fort  Kinburn,  a  square  bastioned  work,  extending  to  the  sea  on  the 
south,  and  to  the  waters  of  the  estuary  on  the  north.  It  is  casemated 
in  part,  though  but  few  of  these  embrasures  were  armed, — its  chief  force 
being  in  the  pieces  en  barbette,  and  some  nine  or  ten  mortars.  The 
masonry,  though  solid,  is  represented  by  an  eye-witness  not  to  be  bomb 
proof,  and  so  dilapidated  by  age  that  the  mortar  was  falling  out  from 
the  interstices,  leaving  the  stone  to  disintegrate.  The  interior  space 
was  occupied  by  ranges  of  wooden  buildings,  slightly  constructed  and 
plastered  over. 

"  '  This  fort  is  said  to  be  armed  with  sixty  pieces.  The  English 
admiral  states,  that  all  three  of  the  works  mounted  eighty-one  guns  and 
mortars.  The  calibres  are  not  given  officially,  but  stated  in  private 
letters  to  be  18-pounders  and  32-pounders.'  " 

"  The  above  description  will  quite  justify  the  further  remark  as  to 
these  works  :— 

"  <  They  were  inferior  in  every  respect,  and  manifestly  incapable  ot 
withstanding  any  serious  operation  by  sea  or  land.  The  main  fort  was 
particularly  weak  in  design,  and  dilapidated ;  all  of  them  were  indiffer 
ently  armed  and  garrisoned.' " 

"  So  much  for  the  works.  As  to  the  character  of  the  armament 
brought  to  the  assault,  the  same  authority  says  : — 

" '  The  allied  force  was  admirably  adapted  to  the  operation,  em 
bracing  every  description  of  vessel,  from  the  largest  to  the  smallest, 
and  all  propelled  by  steam.  There  were  screw-liners,  and  like  vessels 
of  inferior  class,  side-wheel  steamers,  screw  gunboats,  floating-batteries, 
mortar-vessels,  etc.,  each  armed  in  what  was  considered  th?  most  ap 
proved  manner.'  And  this  truly  formidable  naval  force  carried  beside* 


422  NOTES. 

'some  thousand  troops'  on  board,  all  designed  to  attack  these  'dilapi 
dated  '  works  of  Kinburn. 

"  Without  going  into  the  particulars,  we  simply  give  Dahlgren's  ac 
count  of  the  affair : — 

"  '  The  French  floating-batteries  (Devastation,  Lave,  and  Tonnante) 
steamed  in  to  make  their  first  essay,  anchoring  some  six  or  seven  hun 
dred  yards  off  the  S.  E.  bastion  of  Fort  Kinburn,  and  at  9.20  opened 
fire,  supported  by  the  mortar-vessels,  of  which  six  were  English,  by 
the  gun-boats,  five  French  and  six  English,  and  by  the  steamer  Odin, 
16. 

"'  The  heavy  metal  of  the  floating-batteries  (said  to  be  twelve  50- 
pounders  on  the  broadside  of  each)  soon  told  on  the  walls  of  the  fort ; 
and  the  vertical  fire  was  so  good  that  the  French  admiral  attributed  to 
it,  in  great  part,  the  speedy  surrender  of  the  place.  The  gun-boats  also 
made  good  ricochet  practice,  which  was  noticed  to  be  severe  on  the 
barbette  batteries. 

"  '  The  ^Russian  gunners,  in  nowise  daunted  by  this  varied  fire,  plied 
their  guns  rapidly  in  return,  directing  their  attention  chiefly  to  the 
floating-batteries,  which  were  nearest. 

"  '  Exactly  at  noon,  the  admirals  steamed  in  with  the  Royal  Albert 
121,  Algiers,  91,  Agamemnon,  90,  and  Princess  Royal,W,  with  the  four 
French  liners  in  close  order,  taking  position  in  line,  ranging  N.  W.  and 
S.  E.,  about  one  mile  from  the  fort,  in  twenty-eight  feet  water. 

"  '  At  the  same  time,  a  squadron  of  steam-frigates,  under  Rear- 
Admirals  Stewart  and  Pellion,  dashed  in  through  the  passage  to  the 
basin,  opening  fire  on  the  spit  and  central  batteries  in  passing,  and  an 
choring  well  inside  of  Fort  Nicholaiev  and  Otchakov.  The  attack  sea 
ward  was  completed  by  the  Acre,  100,  Cura?oa,  30,  Tribune,  30,  and 
Spnynx,  6,  opening  on  the  central  battery;  while  the  Hannibal,  91, 
Dauntless,  24,  and  Terrible,  21,  assailed  that  on  the  spit.  To  this  storm 
of  shot  and  shells,  the  Russians  could  not  reply  long.  In  the  spit  bat 
tery,  the  sand  falling  through  between  the  logs,  displaced  by  shot  and 
shells,  choked  the  embrasures,  and  blocked  up  the  guns.  In  the  fort, 
the  light  wooden  buildings  were  in  flames  at  an  early  hour;  then  tne 
walls  began  to  crumble  before  the  balls  which  came  from  every  quarter, 
front,  flank,  and  rear;  and  as  the  guns  were  disabled  successively,  the 
return  became  feeble,  until  few  were  in  condition  to  be  fired,  the  central 
redoubt  alone  discharging  single  guns  at  long  intervals.  The  Russian 
commander,  however,  made  no  sign  of  surrender ;  but  the  admirals, 
seeing  that  his  fire  had  ceased,  and  further  defence  was  unavailing, 
hoisted  the  white  flag  at  1.35  P.  M.,  upon  which  the  works  were  given 
np  on  honorable  terms. 

"  *  The  garrison  consisted  of  about  fourteen  hundred  men  ;  their  loss 


NOTES.  423 

is  differently  stated, — the  French  admiral  says  eighty  wounded, — • 
another,  forty-three  killed  and  one  hundred  and  fourteen  wounded. 

" '  The  English  suffered  the  least,  having  but  two  men  wounded, 
besides  two  killed  and  two  wounded  in  the  Arrow,  by  the  bursting  of 
her  two  68-pounder  Lancaster  guns. 

*' '  The  superiority  of  the  allied  vessels  in  number  and  calibre  of 
ordnance  was  very  decided ;  they  must  have  had  at  least  six  hundred 
and  fifty  pieces  in  play,  chiefly  32-pounders,  and  8-inch  shell  guns,  with 
a  fair  proportion  of  GS-pounders  and  mortars,  besides  the  50-pounders 
of  the  French  floating  batteries.  To  which  the  Russians  could  only 
reply  with  eighty-one  cannon  and  mortars,  and  no  guns  of  heavier 
calibre  than  32-pounders,  while  many  were  lower.  The  great  disparity 
in  offensive  power  was  not  compensated  to  the  works  by  the  advantage 
of  commanding  position,  the  Russian  fort  and  redoubt  being  upon 
nearly  the  same  level  with  the  ships'  batteries,  and  also  very  deficient 
in  proper  strength.  On  the  other  hand,  the  depth  of  water  did  not 
allow  the  liners  to  approach  nearer  than  one  mile ;  and  thus  their  fire 
was  by  no  means  so  intense  as  it  would  have  been  at  shorter  range. 

"  '  This  was  the  sole  occasion  in  which  the  floating  batteries  had  an 
opportunity  of  proving  their  endurance;  which  was  the  question  of 
most  importance,  as  no  one  could  doubt  the  effect  of  long  50-pounders, 
or  68-pounders,  when  brought  within  a  few  hundred  yards  of  masonry, 
and  able  to  retain  the  steadiness  indispensable  to  a  breaching  fire. 

"  'No  siege  operation  had  ever  embraced  batteries  of  such  power, 
for  though  the  English  had  employed  long  68-pounders  at  Sebastopol, 
yet  the  distance  from  the  objects  exceeded  a  thousand  yards ;  and  the 
concentration  of  fire,  so  far  as  any  opinion  can  be  formed  from  the 
published  statements,  was  far  inferior  to  that  of  the  thirty-six  50- 
pounders,  in  the  broadsides  of  the  three  batteries  anchored  in  close 
order. 

"  '  They  were  hulled  repeatedly  by  shot ;  one  of  them  (the  Devasta 
tion),  it  is  said,  sixty-seven  times,  without  any  other  effect  on  the  stout 
iron  plates  than  to  dint  them,  at  the  most,  one  and  a  half  inches, — still, 
there  were  ten  men  killed  and  wounded  in  this  battery  by  shot  and  shell 
which  entered  the  ports, — and  the  majority  of  damage  to  the  French 
personnel  (twenty-seven  men)  occurred  in  the  three  floating-batteries.'  " 

Major  Barnard,  in  commenting  upon  this  affair,  says  that  it  "  proves 
nothing,  unless  it  be,  that  dilapidated,  and  ill-designed,  and  ill-con 
structed  works,  armed  with  inferior  calibres,  cannot  contend  against 
such  an  overwhelming  array  of  force  as  was  here  displayed.  *  *  *  The 
Fort  of  Kinburn  surrendered,  not  because  it  was  breached — not  because 
the  defenders  were  so  far  diminished  by  their  losses  as  to  be  un 
able  to  protract  the  contest, — but  simply  because  the  guns  and 
gunners,  exposed  in  all  possible  ways,  were  put  hors-du-combat,  and 


424  NOTES. 

the  calibres  (of  the  guns  in  Kinburn)  were  incapable  of  doing  anj 
great  damage  to  the  vessels,  at  the  distance  they  were  stationed." 

The  guns  in  the  low  open  batteries  were  exposed  to  a  ri 
cochet  and  vertical  fire,  to  which  latter  the  French  admiral 
attributed,  in  good  part,  the  surrender  of  the  place.  The 
buildings  behind  the  batteries,  built  of  wood,  "  slightly  con 
structed  and  plastered  over,"  were  set  on  fire,  and  the  heat 
and  smoke  must  have  rendered  the  service  of  the  guns  almost 
impracticable.  Nevertheless,  out  of  a  garrison  of  1,400,  only 
157  were  killed  and  wounded — a  very  small  loss  under  all  the 
circumstances.  If  the  works  had  been  well- construe  ted  case 
mates,  covering  the  men  from  the  ricochet  and  vertical  fires 
and  the  sharpshooters  of  the  troops  who  invested  the  land 
fronts,  the  loss  of  the  garrison  would  have  been  still  less ;  and 
if  they  had  been  armed  with  heavier  projectiles,  much  greater 
damage  would  have  been  inflicted  upon  the  attacking  force. 

With  respect  to  the  use  of  floating-batteries  in  this  case, 
Commander  Dahlgren  very  judiciously  remarks : — 

"  The  use  that  can  be  made  of  floating-batteries,  as  auxiliaries  in 
attacking  shore-works,  must  depend  on  further  confirmation  of  their 
asserted  invulnerability.  It  may  be  that  the  performance  at  Kinburn 
answered  the  expectation  of  the  French  emperor  as  regards  offensive 
power,  for  that  is  a  mere  question  of  the  battering  capacity  of  the 
heaviest  calibres,  which  is  undoubted ;  but  the  main  issue,  which  con 
cerns  their  endurance,  cannot  be  settled  by  the  impact  of  32-pounder 
shot,  fired  at  600  and  700  yards.  Far  heavier  projectiles  will  in  future 
be  found  on  all  sea-board  fortifications ;  and  the  ingenuity  of  the  artil 
lerist  may  also  be  exerted  more  successfully  than  at  Kinburn.  Still,  it 
is  not  to  be  doubted  that  the  floating-battery  is  a  formidable  element  in 
assailing  forts,  even  if  its  endurance  falls  short  of  absolute  invulner 
ability;  and  the  defence  will  do  well  to  provide  against  its  employ 
ment." 

The  works  at  Bomarsund  were  taken  by  means  of  land- 
fiatteries,  which  breached  the  exposed  walls  of  the  towers  and 
main  works.  An  auxiliary  fire  was  opened  upon  the  water 
front  by  the  fleet,  but  it  produced  very  little  effect.  But  after 
the  work  had  been  reduced,  an  experimental  firing  was  made 
oy  the  Edinburgh,  armed  with  the  largest  and  most  powerful 
guns  in  the  British  navy. 


NOTES.  425 

In  speaking  of  the  effects  of  the  siege  batteries  upon  the 
walls  of  Bomarsund,  and  the  experimental  fire  of  the  Edin- 
lurgh,  Sir  Howard  Douglas  remarks  : — 

"  This  successful  operation  (of  the  land  batteries)  is  very  generally, 
but  erroneously,  stated  to  have  been  effected  by  the  fire  of  the  ships, 
and  it  is  even  strongly  held  up  as  a  proof  of  what  ships  can  do,  and 
ought  to  attempt  elsewhere.. 

"  But  the  results  of  the  experimental  firing  at  the  remnant  of  the 
fort,  which,  unless  the  previous  firing  of  the  ships  during  the  attack 
was  absolutely  harmless,  must  have  been  somewhat  damaged,  and  more 
over  shaken  by  the  blowing-up  of  the  contiguous  portions,  do  not  war 
rant  this  conclusion,  even  should  the  attacking  ships  be  permitted,  like 
the  Edinburgh,  to  take  up,  quietly  and  coolly,  positions  within  500 
yards,  and  then  deliberately  commence  and  continue  their  firing,  with 
out  being  fired  at !  The  firing  of  the  Edinburgh,  at  1,060  yards,  was 
unsatisfactory.  390  shot  and  shells  were  fired,  from  the  largest  and 
most  powerful  guns  in  the  British  navy  (viz.,  from  the  Lancaster  gun 
of  95  cwt.,  with  an  elongated  shell  of  100  Ibs. ; — from  68-pounders  of  95 
cwt.,  and  32-pounders  of  56  cwt.,  solid  shot  guns ; — from  10-inch  shell 
guns  of  84  cwt.,  with  hollow  shot  of  84  Ibs. ; — from  8-inch  shell  guns  of 
65  and  60  cwt.,  with  hollow  shot  of  56  Ibs.),  and  did  but  little  injury  to 
the  work.  At  480  yards,  250  shot,  shells,  and  hollow  shot  were  fired. 
A  small  breach  was  formed  in  the  facing  of  the  outer  wall,  of  extremely 
bad  masonry,  and  considerable  damage  done  to  the  embrasures  and 
other  portions  of  the  wall ;  but  no  decisive  result  was  obtained — no 
practicable  breach  formed,  by  which  the  work  might  be  assaulted, 
taken,  and  effectually  destroyed,  although  640  shot  and  shells  (40,000 
Ibs.  of  metal)  were  fired  into  the  place,  first  at  1,060,  and  then  at  480 
yards." 

Surely,  this  "  naval  attack,"  taken  in  connection  with  the 
true  facts  of  the  capture  of  Kinburn,  the  abortive  attempt  of 
the  British  fleet  in  the  Pacific  upon  the  Russian  works  of 
Petropauloski,  is  not  calculated  to  affect  the  well  established 
opinion  of  the  ability  of  forts  to  resist  maritime  attacks. 

Few  are  now  disposed  to  dispute  the  general  superiority  of 
guns  ashore  over  guns  afloat ;  but  some  think  that  works  of 
masonry  are  incapable  of  resisting  the  heavy  and  continuous 
fire  which  may  now  be  brought  against  it  by  fleets  and  floating- 
batteries,  and  would  therefore  extend  the  area  of  the  works 
and  rely  mainly  upon  earthen  parapets,  with  guns  in  barbette. 


426  NOTES. 

This  conclusion  they  form  from  the  results  of  the  maritima 
attack  on  Kinburn.  and  of  the  land-batteries  on  Bomarsund. 

Major  Barnard,  in  his  valuable  work  on  "  The  Dangers  and 
Defences  of  New  York,"  draws  a  very  different  conclusion 
from  these  attacks,  and  contends  that  they  abundantly  prove 
the  capability  of  well-constructed  stone  masonry  to  resist  the 
fire  of  ships  and  floating-batteries,  if  the  latter  are  opposed  by 
proper  armaments  in  the  forts ;  moreover,  that  they  proved  the 
superiority  of  casemated  forts  over  low  open  batteries,  with 
guns  in  barbette,  in  covering  the  garrison  from  the  effects  of  a 
vertical  and  ricochet  fire.  Unquestionably  the  masonry  at 
Bomarsund  was  poorly  constructed ;  nevertheless,  the  fire  of 
the  shipping  produced  very  little  effect  upon  it.  It  is  also 
equally  certain  that  Kinburn  was  taken,  not  by  a  breaching 
fire,  but  mainly  by  the  effects  of  vertical  and  ricochet  fires. 

With  respect  to  our -own  system  of  sea-coast  defences,  it 
may  be  remarked,  that,  since  this  chapter  was  written,  the 
works  mentioned  therein  as  having  been  commenced,  have  been 
gradually  advanced  towards  completion,  and  that  the  acquisi 
tion  of  Texas  and  California,  and  the  settlement  of  Oregon  and 
Washington  Territory,  by  greatly  extending  our  line  of  mari 
time  defence,  have  rendered  necessary  the  fortification  of  other 
points.  It  should  also  be  noted  that  while  the  value  and  neces 
sity  of  these  works  are  generally  admitted,  and  while  the  gen 
eral  outline  of  the  system  is  almost  universally  approved,  many 
are  of  the  opinion  that  the  increased  facilities  for  naval  attacks, 
and  the  immense  power  of  modern  maritime  expeditions,  like 
that  upon  Sebastopol,  render  it  necessary  to  more  strongly 
fortify  the  great  naval  and  commercial  ports  of  New  York  and 
San  Francisco— one  the  key  point  of  the  Atlantic,  and  the 
other  of  the  Pacific  coast.  Perhaps  the  system  adopted  by 
our  Boards  of  Engineers  may  be  open  to  the  objection  that 
they  have  adopted  too  many  points  of  defence,  without  giving 
sufficient  prominence  to  our  great  seaports,  which  are  neces 
sarily  the  strategic  points  of  coast  defence.  However  this  may 
have  been  at  the  time  the  system  was  adopted,  there  can  be 
no  question  that  the  relative  strength  of  the  works  designed 


NOTES.  427 

for  the  different  points  of  our  coast  does  not  correspond  to  the 
present  relative  importance  of  the  places  to  be  defended,  and 
the  relative  temptations  they  offer  to  an  enemy  capable  of  or 
ganizing  the  means  of  maritime  attack.  On  this  subject  we 
quote  from  the  work  of  Major  Barnard: — 

"While  the  means  of  maritime  attack  have  of  late  years  assumed 
a  magnitude  and  formidableness  not  dreamed  of  when  our  defensive 
system  was  planned,  and  our  country  has  so  increased  in  population, 
wealth  and  military  resources,  that  no  enemy  can  hope  to  make  any 
impression  by  an  invasion  of  our  territory, — our  great  maritime  places 
like  New  York,  have,  on  the  other  hand,  increased  in  even  greater  pro 
portion,  in  every  thing  that  could  make  them  objects  of  attack. 

'•  The  works  deemed  adequate  in  former  years  for  the  defence  of 
New  York  could  not,  therefore,  in  the  nature  of  things,  be  adequate  at 
the  present  day. 

"  The  recent  war  of  England  and  France  against  Russia  may  illus 
trate  my  meaning ;  for  it  has  taught  us  what  to  expect  were  either  of 
these  nations  to  wage  war  against  the  United  States. 

"  No  invasion  of  territory,  no  attempt  at  territorial  conquest  was 
made,  or  thought  of;  for  it  was  well  foreseen  that  no  decisive  results 
would  flow  from  such  means.  The  war  consisted  exclusively  in  attacks 
upon  maritime  places — great  seaports — seats  of  commercial  and  naval 
power.  Such  places,  by  their  vast  importance  to  the  well-being  and 
prosperity  of  a  nation — by  the  large  populations  and  immense  amount 
of  wealth  concentrated  in  them,  and  by  their  exposure  to  maritime  at 
tack,  offer  themselves  at  once  as  points  at  which  the  most  decisive  re 
sults  may  be  produced.  Cronstadt,  Sebastopol,  Sweaborg,  Kinburn, 
Odessa,  Kertch,  Petropauloski,  and  other  places  of  less  note,  were  in 
succession  or  simultaneously  objects  of  attack ;  while  such  as  the  first 
named  became,  indeed,  the  true  seats  of  war. 

"  Around  Sebastopol  assailed  and  assailant  gathered  their  re- 
Bources,  and  on  the  result  of  the  arduous  struggle  may  be  said  to  have 
turned  the  issue  of  the  war.  Had  it  not  been  so  decided  there,  Cron 
stadt  would  have  been  the  next  field  of  combat, — for  which,  indeed,  the 
allies  had  made  the  most  enormous  preparations. 

"  Is  it  not  certain  that  in  future  all  war  of  maritime  powers  against 
the  United  States,  will  take  a  similar  course?  All  territorial  invasion 
being  out  of  the  question,  it  is  against  our  great  seaports  and  strategic 
points  of  coast  defence — such  as  New  York,  New  Orleans,  and  San 
Francisco — pre-eminently  New  York, — that  an  enemy  will  concentrate 
his  efforts.  Against  these  he  will  prepare  such  immense  armaments, — 
against  these  he  will  call  into  existence  special  agencies  of  attack,— 


428  NOTES. 

which  (unless  met  by  an  inexpugnable  defensive  system)  stall 
success. 

"  The  mere  defense  of  the  city  against  ordinary  fleets,  is  no  longer 
the  question;  but  through  the  defensive  WOrJa  to  be  here  erected,  the  na 
tion  is  to  measure  its  strength  against  the  most  lavish  use  of  the  resources 
of  a  great  maritime  power,  aided  by  all  that  modem  science  and  me 
chanical  ingenuity  in  creating  or  inventing  means  of  attack,  can  bring 
against  them  ;  in  short,  in  fortifying  New  York,  ^ve  are  really  preparing 
the  battle-field  on  which  the  issue  of  future  momentous  contests  is  to  bt 
decided." 

A  few,  however,  object  to  the  system  at  present  adopted, 
on  the  ground  that  casemated  works  do  not  offer  sufficient  re 
sistance  to  ships  and  floating-batteries,  and  that  earthen  works, 
covering  a  greater  area,  will  accomplish  that  object  much  more 
effectually,  while  their  longer  land  fronts  will  be  more  difficult 
of  reduction  by  siege. 

It  cannot  be  doubted  that  earthen  batteries,  with  guns  in 
barbette,  can,  as  a  general  rule,  be  more  easily  taken  by  as 
sault,  that  they  are  more  exposed  to  vertical  and  ricochet 
firing,  and  more  expose  their  gunners  to  be  picked  off  by 
sharpshooters.  Moreover,  they  give  but  a  very  limited  fire 
upon  the  most  desirable  point,  as  the  entrance  to  a  harbor. 
On  the  other  hand,  it  has  not  been  proved  that  masonry-case- 
mated  works,  when  properly  constructed  and  properly  armed, 
will  not  effectually  resist  a  naval  cannonade,  whether  from 
ships  or  floating-batteries.  The  results  of  recent  wars,  and  of 
the  West  Point  experiments  by  General  Totten,  would  seem 
to  prove  them  abundantly  capable  of  doing  this.  Against  such 
proofs  the  mere  ad  captandum  assertion  of  their  incapacity  caD 
have  but  little  weight — certainly  not  enough  to  justify  th« 
abandonment  of  a  system  approved  by  the  best  military 
authorities  of  this  country  and  Europe,  and  sanctioned  bj 
long  experience. 

Major  Barnard,  in  speaking  of  the  capacity  of  masonry 
casemated  forts  to  resist  the  fire  of  a  hostile  armament,  and  ot 
the  propriety  of  abandoning  them  for  earthen  batteries  in  oui 
system  of  Coast  Defences,  uses  the  following  forcible  Ian* 
guage :— 


NOTES,  429 

"  When  we  bear  in  mind  that  the  hostile  '  floating  batteries,'  of 
whatever  description,  will  themselves  be  exposed  to  the  most  formidable 
projectiles  that  can  be  thrown  from  shore  batteries, — that  when  they 
choose  to  come  to  'close  quarters/  to  attempt  to  breach,  their  'em 
brasures  '  present  openings  through  which  deluges  of  grape,  canister, 
and  musket  balls  can  be  poured  upon  the  gunners ;  and  consider  what 
experience  has  so  far  shown,  and  reason  has  taught  us,  with  regard  to 
the  casemate, — we  need  not  be  under  apprehension  that  our  caseinated 
works  will  be  battered  down ;  nor  doubt  that  they  will,  as  they  did  in 
Russia,  answer  the  important  purposes  for  which  they  were  designed. 

"  It  only  remains  to  show  the  necessity  of  such  works.  It,  in  general, 
costs  much  less  to  place  a  gun  behind  an  earthen  parapet,  than  to  build 
a  masonry  structure  covered  with  bomb-proof  arches,  in  which  to  mount 
it.  All  authorities  agree  that  an  open  barbette  battery  (Grivel's  very 
forcible  admission  has  been  quoted),  on  a  low  site,  and  to  which  vessels 
can  approach  within  300  or  400  yards,  is  utterly  inadmissible.  It  may 
safely  be  said,  that  in  nine  cases  out  of  ten,  the  sites  which  furnish  the 
efficient  raking  and  cross  fires  upon  the  channels,  are  exactly  of  this 
character ;  and  indeed  it  very  often  happens  that  there  are  no  others. 

"  When  such  sites  are  found,  it  rarely  happens  that  they  afford  room 
for  sufficient  number  of  guns  in  open  batteries.  Hence  the  necessity 
of  putting  them  tier  above  tier,  which  involves,  of  course,  the  case- 
mated  structure.  Such  works,  furnishing  from  their  lower  tier  a  low, 
raking  fire,  and  (if  of  several  tiers)  a  plunging  fire  from  their  barbettes, 
offer  as  favorable  emplacements  for  guns  as  can  be  contrived,  and  afford 
to  their  gunners  a  degree  of  security  quite  as  great  as  can  be  given  to 
men  thus  engaged. 

"  On  subjects  which  have  a  mere  speculative  importance,  there  is  no 
danger  in  giving  rein  to  speculation ;  but  on  those  of  such  real  and  in 
tense  practical  importance  as  the  security  against  hostile  aggression  of 
the  great  city  and  port  of  New  York,  it  is  not  admissible  to  set  aside 
the  experience  of  the  past,  or  the  opinions  of  the  best  minds  who  have 
devoted  themselves  to  such  subjects.  A  means  of  defence,  sanctioned 
by  its  being  confided  in  to  protect  the  great  ports  of  Europe — which  has 
protected  the  great  ports  of  Russia  against  the  most  formidable  naval 
armament  thai  ever  floated  on  the  ocean,  has  a  claim  upon  our  confi 
dence  which  mere  criticism  cannot  diminish ;  and  a  claim  to  be  adhered 
to  in  place  of  all  new  '  systems,'  until  time  and  trial  shall  have  necessi 
tated  (not  merely  justified)  the  change. 

"  If,  then,  we  refer  to  the  practice  of  other  nations,  to  find  what  has 
been  judged  necessary  for  the  defence  of  important  ports, — to  expe 
rience,  to  find  how  such  defensive  systems  have  stood  the  test  of  actual 
triui, — we  may  draw  useful  conclusions  with  regard  to  what  is  now  re 
quired  to  defend  New  York.  We  shall  find  at  Sebastopol—a.  narrow 


430  NOTES. 

harbor,  which  owed  its  importance  to  its  being  the  great  naval  d6pot 
of  Russia  on  the  Black  Sea — an  array  of  700  guns,  about  500  of  which 
were  placed  in  five  'masonry-casemated'  works  (several  of  them  of 
great  size),  and  the  remainder  in  open  batteries.  These  defensive 
works  fulfilled  their  object,  and  sustained  the  attack  of  the  allied  fleet, 
on  the  17th  of  October,  1854,  without  sensible  damage. 

"  The  facility  with  which  seaports  are  attacked  by  fleets — the  enor 
mous  preparations  required — the  great  risks  encountered  in  landing  a 
besieging  army  on  the  coast  of  a  formidable  enemy  (while,  for  protec 
tion  against  the  former  species  of  attack,  costly  works  are  necessary, 
and  against  the  latter,  field  works  and  men  can,  in  emergency,  afford 
protection),  naturally  caused  the  Russians  to  make  these  water  defences 
their  first  object.  Yet,  though  almost  unprotected  on  the  land  side,  Se- 
bastopol  resisted,  for  a  whole  year,  an  attack  on  that  quarter;  and  illus 
trated  how,  with  plenty  of  men  and  material,  an  energetic  and  effectual 
land  defence  may  be  improvised,  where  the  sea  defence  is  provided  for, 
as  thoroughly  as  it  was  at  that  place. 

"  Let  Cronstadt  be  another  example.  Great  as  was  the  importance 
of  its  defence  to  Russia,  it  was  not  greater, — it  was  by  no  means  as 
great,  as  that  of  New  York  to  our  own  country.  This  port,  and  military 
and  naval  depot,  was  defended  (in  its  main  approach)  by  upwards  of 
600  guns,  500  of  which  were  mounted  in  five  '  masonry-casemated ' 
works ;  the  remainder  in  an  open  barbette  battery,  which  enfiladed  the 
main  channel.  This  number  is  formidable  in  itself;  yet  the  same  num 
ber  mounted  in  New  York  hai-bor  would  not  afford  anything  like  such 
a  formidable  defence  as  was  found  at  Cronstadt,  owing  to  its  great  area, 
and  long  line  of  approach,  compared  with  the  latter. 

"  These  works  fulfilled  their  object.  They  protected  the  great  port 
and  depot  of  Cronstadt  and  the  capital  of  the  empire  from  invasion. 
For  two  successive  years  did  the  mighty  armaments  of  France  and 
England  threaten ;  but  they  were  overawed  by  the  frowning  array  of 
'  casemated  castles '  which  presented  itself,  and  declined  the  contest. 

"  Let  us  turn  our  eyes  now  to  the  great  naval  depot  of  France. 
After  the  almost  incredible  expenditure  lavished  here,  in  creating  a 
harbor  facing  the  shores  of  her  great  rival,  England,  and  an  equally 
profuse  expenditure  in  providing  all  that  constitutes  a  great  naval 
depot,  we  may  suppose  that  the  best  means,  without  regard  to  cost, 
which  the  science  of  man  could  devise,  would  be  employed  here  to  make 
this  great  seat  of  naval  power  secure  against  the  formidable  means  of 
attack  possessed  by  the  great  maritime  power  most  likely  to  be  the  as 
sailant.  The  means  there  employed  are  (so  far  as  regards  mere  harbor 
defence)  precisely  the  same  (viz.,  casemated  works  in  several  tiers,  com 
bined  with  open  batteries  where  the  locations  are  favorable) ;  and  the 
application  of  means  is  the  same  as  we  have  found  so  successful  in 


NOTES.  431 

Russia, — the  same  which  constitute  the  system  of  harbor  defence  of 
New  York." 

Captain  McClelland,  in  his  official  report  to  the  War  De 
partment,  on  the  siege  of  Sebastopol,  uses  language  equally 
strong  and  pertinent : — 

"The  permanent  defences  of  Sebastopol  against  an  attack  by  water, 
although  inferior  hi  material  and  the  details  of  construction  to  our  own 
most  recent  works,  proved  fully  equal  to  the  purpose  for  which  they 
were  intended.  Indeed,  the  occurrences  on  the  Pacific,  the  Baltic,  and 
the  Black  Sea,  all  seem  to  establish  beyond  controversy,  the  soundness 
of  the  view  so  long  entertained  by  all  intelligent  military  men,  that  well 
constructed  fortifications  must  always  prove  more  than  a  match  for  the 
strongest  fleet. 

"  It  is  deemed  that  a  calm  consideration  of  the  events  so  hastily  and 
imperfectly  narrated  in  the  preceding  pages  must  lead  all  unprejudiced 
persons  among  our  countrymen  to  a  firm  conviction  on  two  vital  points : 

"1st.  That  our  system  of  permanent  coast  defences  is  a  wise  and 
proper  one,  which  ought  to  be  completed  and  armed  with  the  least 
possible  delay. 

"  2d.  That  mere  individual  courage  cannot  suffice  to  overcome  the 
forces  that  would  be  brought  against  us,  were  we  involved  in  an  Eu 
ropean  war,  but  that  it  must  be  rendered  manageable  by  discipline,  and 
directed  by  that  consummate  and  mechanical  skill  which  can  only  be 
acquired  by  a  course  of  education,  instituted  for  the  special  purpose, 
and  by  long  habit. 

"  In  the  day  of  sailing-vessels  the  successful  siege  of  Sebastopol 
would  have  been  impossible.  It  is  evident  that  the  Russians  did  not 
appreciate  the  advantages  afforded  by  steamers,  and  were  unprepared 
to  sustain  a  siege.  • 

"This  same  power  of  steam  would  enable  European  nations  to  dis 
embark  upon  our  shores  even  a  larger  force  than  that  which  finally  en 
camped  around  Sebastopol.  To  resist  such  an  attack,  should  it  ever  be 
made,  our  cities  and  harbors  must  be  fortified,  and  those  fortifications 
must  be  provided  with  guns,  ammunition,  and  instructed  artillerists. 
To  repel  the  advance  of  such  an  army  into  the  interior,  it  is  not  enough 
to  trust  to  the  number  of  brave  but  undisciplined  men  that  we  can 
bring  to  bear  against  it.  An  invading  army  of  15,000  or  20,000  men 
could  easily  be  crushed  by  the  unremitting  attacks  of  superior  num 
bers  ;  but  when  it  comes  to  the  case  of  more  than  100,000  disciplined 
veterans,  the  very  multitude  brought  to  bear  against  them  works  its 
own  destruction ;  because,  if  without  discipline  and  instruction,  they 
cannot  be  handled,  and  are  in  their  own  way.  We  cannot  afford  a  Mos 
cow  campaign. 


432  NOTES 

"  Our  regular  army  never  can,  and,  perhaps,  never  ought  to  be,  large 
enough  to  provide  for  all  the  contingencies  that  may  ariso,  but  it  should 
be  as  large  as  its  ordinary  avocations  in  the  defence  of  the  frontier  will 
justify;  the  number  of  officers  and  non-commissioned  officers  should 
be  unusually  large,  to  provide  for  a  sudden  increase  ;  and  the  greatest 
possible  care  should  be  bestowed  upon  the  instruction  of  the  specia] 
arms  of  the  artillery  and  engineer  troops.  The  militia  and  volunteei 
system  should  be  placed  upon  some  tangible  and  effective  basis ;  in 
structors  furnished  them  from  the  regular  army,  nnd  all  possible  means 
taken  to  spread  sound  military  information  among  them.  In  the  vicinity 
of  oui<6ea-coast  fortifications,  it  would  be  well  to  provide  a  sufficient 
number  of  volunteer  companies  with  the  means  of  instruction  in  heavy 
artillery,  detailing  officers  of  the  regular  artillery  for  instructors." 

On  this  subject  of  instructing  our  volunteers  and  militia  in 
the  use  of  sea-coast  batteries,  we  add  the  following  quotation 
from  Major  Barnard's  pamphlet: — 

"  One  of  the  main  causes  of  inefficiency  in  coast  batteries,  which 
has  given  color  to  the  idea  that  they  may  be  passed,  or  even  attacked 
with  impunity,  I  conceive  to  be  the  want  of  skill  and  care  in  the  use  of 
the  guns.  The  result  is  a  prodigious  smoke,  and  a  prodigious  throwing 
away  of  balls,  and  very  little  damage  done.  This  has  been,  however, 
by  no  means  ^peculiarity  of  coast  defences.  The  same  system  of  ran 
dom  firing  has  hitherto  prevailed,  both  in  the  use  of  small  arms  in  land 
and  of  heavy  ordnance  in  sea  battles;  nor  has  it  occurred  apparently  to 
even  the  greatest  masters  of  the  art  of  war,  to  ask  why,  for  one  man 
wounded,  or  for  one  effective  shot  in  a  vessel's  hull,  so  many  thousands 
of  shot  should  be  thrown  uselessly  into  the  air. 

"  But  this  question  'is  now  asked,  both  in  the  use  of  the  soldier's 
rifled  musket,  and  in  the  management  of  ships'  guns,  as  well  as  of  ar 
tillery  of  all  kinds. 

"  It  is  at  last  discovered  that  it  is  of  more  importance  to  teach  the 
soldier  to  direct  his  piece  with  accuracy  of  aim,  than  to  perform  certain 
motions  on  parade  with  the  precision  of  an  automaton.  The  same  idea 
is  now  infused  into  all  the  departments  of  military  and  naval  science, 
and  is  a  necessary  result  of  the  recent  great  improvements  in  the  con 
struction  of  arms.  In  short,  the  truth  has  at  last  become  apparent  that 
the  old-feshioned  system  of  random  firing,  though  perhaps  like  the 
'  charge  of  the  six  hundred  '  at  Balaklava,  '  bien  magnifique,  n'est  pas 
la  guerre.1 

"It  is  of  the  utmost  importance  that  we  should  apply  this  principle 
to  the  management  of  our  sea-coast  batteries,  and  give  it  a  practical 
effect.  The  volunteers  of  our  cities  will  constitute  mainly,  in  time  of 


NOTES.  433 

war,  the  gunners  of  our  forts  and  manipulators  of  our  sea-coast  guns. 
In  time  of  war,  they  will  probably  be  exercised  in  these  duties.  But  it 
is  most  desirable  that  we  should  have  at  all  times  a  body  of  gunners, 
practised  in  these  exercises.  The  result  would  be,  not  only  to  give  to 
our  citizens,  as  well  as  citizen-soldiers,  confidence  in  the  defences  pro 
vided  for  their  security,  but  it  would  disseminate  military  knowledge, 
and  an  intelligent  idea  of  the  bearing  and  objects  of  the  different  de 
fensive  works.  To  carry  out  this  idea,  it  would  be  desirable  that  there 
should  be  at  each  considerable  seaport  town,  a  sufficient  garrison  of 
artillery  troops  to  aid  in  the  instruction  of  the  volunteers.  In  the 
present  condition  of  the  army  this  cannot  be  hoped ;  but  perhaps  it 
might,  at  least,  be  found  practicable  to  detail  an  artillery  officer  or  two 
for  the  purpose." 


NOTE  TO  CHAPTER  VIII.— OUR  NORTHERN  FRONTIER  DEFENCES. 

The  author  has  seen  nothing  since  this  chapter  was  written 
to  induce  him  to  change  the  views  therein  expressed  with  re 
spect  to  the  superior  strategic  importance  of  the  line  of  Lake 
Champlain,  both  as  a  line  of  military  operations,  and  as  a  line 
of  defence.  The  mutual  commercial  interests  of  the  United 
States  and  the  Canadas  render  a  war  between  the  two  countries 
less  probable  than  formerly ;  nevertheless,  such  an  event  is  by 
no  means  impossible,  and  common  prudence  should  induce  us 
to  prepare  in  the  best  possible  manner  for  such  a  contingency. 


NOTE  TO  CHAPTERS  IX.,  X.,  XI.   AND  XII.— ARMY  ORGANIZA 
TION. 

Since  these  chapters  were  written,  several  important  changes 
have  been  made  in  our  army  organization.  The  rank  of  Lieu- 
tenant-General  (at  least,  by  brevet)  has  been  revived,  the  staff, 
administrative  corps,  infantry  and  cavalry  have  been  in 
creased,  and  a  company  of  engineer  troops  organized.  But 
this  company  is  mainly  employed  at  West  Point  for  instruction 
of  the  cadets  in  the  several  branches  of  military  engineering, 
37 


434  NOTES. 

and  thus  serves  to  supply  a  deficiency  long  felt  in  the  system 
of  education  at  the  Military  Academy.  The  want,  however, 
of  troops  of  this  arm  for  the  construction,  care,  and  preserva 
tion  of  our  permanent  fortifications,  and  for  the  general  duties 
of  field  engineering,  still  remains  to  be  supplied.  Of  all  the 
arms  of  military  organization,  this  one  most  requires  instruc 
tion  in  time  of  peace ;  it  cannot  be  supplied  at  the  moment  a 
war  is  declared. 

In  speaking  of  our  present  army  organization,  as  compared 
with  those  of  the  different  European  powers  which  he  was  sent 
to  examine  and  report  upon,  Captain  McClelland  says : — 

"  Our  force  of  artillery  is  large  in  proportion  to  the  other  arms  of 
service,  while  the  number  of  our  engineer  troops  is  ridiculously  and 
shamefully  small ;  it  is,  therefore,  more-than  probable  that  in  any 
future  siege  it  will  be  easy  for  the  artillery  to  construct  their  own  bat 
teries,  while  the  engineers  will  be  sufficiently  burdened  by  the  con 
struction  of  the  other  works  of  attack  ;  we  have  now,  at  last,  the  germ 
of  an  artillery  school  of  practice ;  I  would  then  suggest,  for  the  consid 
eration  of  the  Secretary,  the  propriety  of  causing  the  artillery  to  con 
struct  their  own  batteries.  The  position  and  armament  of  siege  bat 
teries  should  be  determined  by  consultation  between  the  engineers  and 
the  artillery,  the  former  having  the  preponderating  voice,  in  order  to 
secure  the  necessary  harmony  and  connection  between  all  parts  of  the 
works  of  attack.  This  change,"  he  says,  "  will  require  to  be  intro 
duced  into  the  artillery  manual  and  course  of  instruction  everything  in 
relation  to  the  preparation  of  the  fascines,  gabions,  platforms,  and 
magazines,  the  dimensions  of  batteries,  manner  of  arranging,  working 
parties,  etc." 

With  regard  to  the  suggestion  of  Captain  McClellan.  it  is 
sufficient  to  remark,  that  it  seeks  to  remedy  one  evil  by  intro 
ducing  another  equally  as  great  and  equally  as  objectionable. 
The  defect  in  our  present  army  organization  is  that  one  of  its 
arms  is  too  small  for  the  duties  which,  from  the  very  nature 
of  military  service,  naturally  and  properly  belong  to  it ;  and  it 
surely  is  no  remedy  for  this  defect  to  permanently  transfer  a 
part  of  these  duties  to  another  arm.  As  well  might  it  be  said, 
if  our  artillery  force  were  "ridiculously  and  shamefully  small " 
in  proportion  to  the  infantry  and  cavalry,  that  the  field  bat 
teries  should  be  permanently  transferred  to  those  arms,  and 


NOTES.  435 

that  light  artillery  tactics  should  be  comprised  in  our  infantry 
and  cavalry  manuals. 

There  are  certain  duties  which  the  military  experience  of 
ages  has  shown  to  properly  and  almost  necessarily  beloug  to 
each  particular  arm  of  an  army  organization,  and  every  at 
tempt  to  make  one  branch  perform  the  appropriate  duties  of 
another  has  invariably  destroyed  its  efficiency  for  either  ser 
vice.  Suppose  our  medical  corps  were  "  ridiculously  and 
shamefully  small  "  in  proportion  to  our  pay  department,  shall 
our  paymasters  perform  the  duties  of  surgery,  and  be  instructed 
in  the  use  of  the  scalpel  and  amputating  instruments  !  This 
is,  perhaps,  an  extreme  case,  but  it  serves  to  illustrate  the 
principle. 

The  defect  referred  to  by  Captain  McClelland,  and  which 
has  so  often  been  pointed  out  by  our  best  military  men,  cannot 
be  obviated  by  any  transfer  or  assignment,  whether  temporary 
or  permanent,  of  the  appropriate  duties  of  one  corps  to  another. 
Indeed,  such  a  measure  would  only  tend  to  make  this  defect 
permanent,  and  to  convert  a  temporary  into  a  lasting  evil.  It 
can  readily  be  remedied  by  legislative  action,  but  in  no  other 
way.  The  executive  action  suggested  would  be  deprecated  by 
all.  Moreover,  the  evil  is  now  so  obvious  and  so  generally  ad 
mitted,  that  there  can  be  little  doubt  that  Congress  will  soon 
perceive  the  importance  of  applying  the  only  proper  and 
effective  remedy. 


NOTE  TO  CHAPTER  XIII.— PERMANENT  FORTIFICATIONS. 

Although  the  general  principles  of  the  plan  and  arrange 
ment  of  a  permanent  fortification,  as  established  by  the  great 
masters  of  this  branch  of  militar}'*  science,-  remain  the  same  ; 
nevertheless,  the  vast  improvements  which  have,  within  the 
last  few  years,  been  made  in  projectiles,  require  some  changes 
in  the  details  of  defensive  works  of  this  character.  These 
changes  consist  mainly  in  an  increased  thickness  of  stone  and 
earthen  parapets  and  of  the  covering  of  magazines,  in  the 


436  NOTES. 

arrangement  of  embrasures,  and  in  protecting  the  garrison  from 
an  enemy's  sharpshooters.  The  introduction  of  heavier  siege 
guns,  and  of  heavier  ordnance  on  ships  of  war,  and  especially 
on  those  propelled  by  steam,  require  much  larger  ordnance  in 
forts  designed  for  the  defence  of  harbors.  In  the  Russian  war, 
Sweaborg  was  made  to  suffer  from  a  distant  bombardment 
which  left  her  fortifications  intact.  These  modifications  in  the 
arrangements  and  armaments  of  forts  are  absolutely  necessary 
in  order  to  restore  the  relative  power  of  defence  against  the 
improvements  made  in  the  means  of  attack.  They  can  very 
easily  be  introduced  without  changing  the  form  or  general 
character  of  the  works,  and  they  are  really  so  very  essential 
that,  without  them,  a  fort  constructed  25  or  30  years  ago,  and 
well  suited  to  the  then  existing  state  of  the  military  art,  will  be 
likely  to  offer  no  very  considerable  resistance  to  modern  siege 
batteries  or  well  organized  maritime  attacks. 

Some  have  gone  much  further  in  their  estimate  of  the  effect 
produced  by  the  increased  size  and  force  of  military  projectiles, 
and  boldly  assert  that  masonry  works  of  strong  relief  can  no 
longer  be  used,  and  that  the  increased  range  of  small  arms 
requires  an  entire  change  of  the  bastioned  front,  with  lines 
more  extended. 

With  respect  to  the  effect  of  the  increased  range  of  small 
arms,  it  is  very  natural  that  a  superficial  observer  should  adopt 
the  opinion  that  this  improvement  must  be  followed  by  an  ex 
tension  of  the  lines  £f  a  defensive  military  work;  but  a  close 
study  of  the  subject  will  probably  lead  to  a  different  conclusion. 
Such  at  least  is  the  opinion  of  the  ablest  military  engineers 
of  Europe.  The  lines  of  the  bastioned  front  now  generally 
in  use,  were  really  too  long  for  a  good  defence  with  the 
arms  in  use  at  the  time  it  was  adopted,  and,  in  theory,  the 
"  rampart  gun  "  was  to  be  relied  upon  for  the  defence  of  certain 
exposed  points.  But  this  weapon  is  no  longer  in  use  ;  its 
place,  however,  is  better  supplied  by  the  increased  range  of  the 
musket  and  rifle.  The  latter  weapon  is  almost  invaluable  for 
defending  the  approaches  to  a  permanent  work. 

With  respect  to  the  breaching  of  stone  masonry  by  siege 


NOTES.  437 

batteries,  it  has  long  been  an  established  principle  that  all 
masonry  exposed  to  the  fire  of  land  batteries  should  be  masked 
by  eartnen  works.  The  neglect  of  this  rule  caused  the  fall  of 
Bomarsund.  Those  who  so  readily  draw,  from  the  results  of 
that  siege,  the  inference  that  the  present  mode  of  fortifying 
land  fronts  must  be  abandoned,  exhibit  their  ignorance  of  mili 
tary  engineering.  The  facts  do  not  justify  their  conclusions. 

"With  respect  to  sea  fronts,  which  can  be  reached  only  by 
guns  afloat,  the  case  is  very  different.  They  arc  usually  case 
mates  of  'masonry,  not  masked  by  earthen  works.  Whether 
the  increased  efficiency  of  projectiles  thrown  by  ships  and 
floating  batteries  now  require  a  resort  to  this  mode  of  protect 
ing  masonry  on  the  water  fronts  of  fortifications,  is  a  question 
well  worthy  of  discussion.  This  subject  has  already  been 
alluded  to  in  the  Note  on  Sea-coast  Defences,  and  it  is  there 
shown  that  no  facts  have  yet  been  developed  which  require  or 
authorize  any  change  in  our  present  system. 


NOTE  TQ  CHAPTER  XIY.— FIELD  ENGINEERING. 

As  Mexico  had  no  permanent  fortifications  to  be  besieged, 
the  war  in  that  country  afforded  very  little  practice  in  that 
branch  of  engineering  which  is  connected  with  the  attack  and 
defence  of  permanent  works,  particularly  sapping  and  mining. 
The  only  operation  resembling  a  siege  was  the  investment  and 
bombardment  of  Vera  Cruz,  and  it  is  worthy  of  remark  that 
if  General  Scott  had  stormed  that  place,  weak  as  it  was,  he 
must  have  lost  a  large  number  of  his  men,  while  from  his 
trenches  and  batteries  he  reduced  it  with  scarcely  the  sacrifice 
of  a  single  life. 

Nor  did  either  party  in  this  war  make  much  use  of  field 
works  in  the  attack  and  defence  of  position^.  Nevertheless, 
no  one  can  read  the  history  of  the  war  without  appreciating 
the  important  influence  which  Fort  Brown  had  upon  General 
Taylor's  defence  of  the  left  bank  of  the  Rio  Grande.  Again 


438  NOTES. 

if  we  compare  our  loss  in  other  Mexican  battles  with  that  which 
the  Americans  sustained  in  their  'attacks  upon  Monterey,  Chu- 
rubusco,  Molino  del  Key,  and  Chapultepec, — places  partially 
secured  by  field  works — we  shall  be  still  more  convinced  of  the 
value  of  temporary  fortifications  for  the  defence  of  military 
positions,  although  it  was  manifest  that  the  Mexicans  neither 
knew  how  to  construct  nor  how  to  defend  them. 

Nor  was  there  much  practice  in  this  war  in  the  use  of  mili 
tary  bridges,  for,  with  the  exception  of  the  Rio  Grande,  our 
armies  had  no  important  rivers  to  cross.  We  must  not,  how 
ever,  omit  to  note  the  important  fact  that  General  Taylor  was 
unable  to  take  advantage  of  the  victories  of  Palo  Alto  and 
Resacade  la  Palma  to  pursue  and  destroy  the  army  of  Arista, 
because  he  had  no  pontoon  equipage  to  enable  him  to  follow 
them  across  the  Rio  Grande.  It  should  also  be  remarked  that 
even  a  very  small  bridge  equipage  would  have  been  of  very 
great  use  in  crossing  other  streams  and  ravines  during  the 
operations  of  this  war.  One  of  our  cavalry  officers  writes : — 

"  On  our  march  from  Matamoras  to  Victoria  and  Tampico,  in  1846 
and  1847,  we  had  infinite  difficulty  in  bridging  boggy  streams  (there 
being  no  suitable  timber),  and  in  crossing  ravines  with  vertical  banks  ; 
a  few  ways  of  the  Birago  trestles  would  have  saved  us  many  days  and 
a  vast  amount  of  labor.  In  the  operations  in  the  valley  of  Mexico,  our 
movements,  checked  as  they  so  often  were  by  impassable  wet  ditches 
and  sometimes  by  dry  ravines,  would  have  been  rendered  so  much  more 
free  and  rapid  by  the  use  of  the  Birago  trestles,  that  our  successes 
could  have  been  gained  at  far  less  cost,  and  probably  with  more  ra 
pidity  than  they  were." 

With  regard  to  military  reconnoissance,  the  splendid  achieve 
ments  of  Lee  and  others  connected  with  the  operations  of 
General  Scott,  proved  the  value  and  importance  of  this  parti 
cular  branch  of  field  engineering. 

But  field  engineering,  as  a  branch  or  arm  of  the  military 
service,  received  its  greatest  development  and  most  brilliant 
application  in  the  Crimean  war,  particularly  in  the  siege  of 
Sebastopol,  and  the  measures  resorted  to  by  General  Todtleben 
to  defend  that  place  against  the  attack  of  superior  forces. 


NOTES.  439 

A  brief  sketch  of  these  defensive  works  may  be  of  interest 
to  the  reader  : — 

When  the  allies  reached  Balaklava.  Sebastopol  was  defended 
on  the  south  side  only  by  a  loop-holed  wall  about  four  feet  and 
a  half  thick,  and  from  eighteen  to  twenty  feet  high,  and  a  semi 
circular  redoubt  with  two  stories  of  loop-holes,  and  five  guns 
in  barbette.  These  works  would  have  afforded  some  protection 
against  a  coup-de-main  by  infantry  and  cavalry,  but  could  have 
offered  no  very  considerable  obstacle  to  a  combined  attackvof 
these  arms  with  artillery. 

The  Russian  engineer  commenced  his  operations  for 
strengthening  this  position  by  occupying  the  most  important 
points  in  his  line  of  defence  with  detached  field  works  of  suffi 
cient  relief  to  resist  an  assault,  and  generally  closed  at  the 
gorge.  These  works  were  afterwards  connected  by  re-entering 
lines  of  a  weaker  profile,  which  served  to  enfilade  the  ravines 
and  to  flank  the  advanced  works.  The  old  wall  was  strength 
ened  with  earth,  and  rifle-pits  for  sharpshooters  were  con 
structed  at  a  considerable  distance  in  front. 

The  most  important  points  of  the  main  line  of  defence  were : 
1st.  The  Flagstaff  Bastion.  2d.  The  Central  Bastion.  3d. 
The  Malakoff.  4th.  The  Redan.  5th.  The  little  Redan.  The 
command  of  the  first  was  about  fifteen  feet,  its  ditch  thirty 
feet  wide  and  from  twelve  to  fifteen  feet  deep.  A  portion  of 
the  scarp  was  provided  with  palisades  some  ten  feet  high.  The 
construction  of  the  Central  Bastion  was  similar  to  that  of  the 
Flag-staff,  but  weaker  in  profile.  The  relief  of  the  other 
works  was  still  less.  The  command  of  the  Malakoff  was  about 
fourteen  feet,  its  ditch  eighteen  feet  wide  and  twelve  feet  deep. 
The  thickness  of  parapet  in  these  works  was  generally  about 
eighteen  feet,  and  the  bombproofs  were  covered  with  timber 
eighteen  inches  thick  and  six  feet  of  earth.  The  loop-holed 
walls  connecting  these  works  were  covered  by  a  rampart  and 
parapet,  or  entirely  replaced  by  a  simple  parapet.  Many  of 
the  embrasures  were  revetted  with  the  common  boiler  iron 
ships'  water- tanks  filled  with  earth.  The  same  material  was 
sometimes  used  for  traverses.  Rope  mantelets  were  used  to 


440  NOTES. 

protect  the  artillerists  at  the  pieces  from  rifle  balls  and  small 
grape.  Great  attention  was  given  to  the  construction  of  bomb- 
proofs  to  cover  the  men  from  vertical  firing.  These  were 
sometimes  under  the  rampart  and  the  second  line  of  defence 
(where  there  was  one),  often  under  special  traverses,  or  en 
tirely  under  ground,  and  occasionally  excavated  in  the  solid 
rock.  Some  had  fireplaces  and  chimneys,  and  were  well  venti 
lated.  Interior  slopes  were  revetted  with  gabions,  crowned  by 
fascines  and  sand  bags.  Gabions  were  also  employed  to  repair 
the  damage  caused  by  the  enemy's  artillery.  Abattis,  military 
pits,  caltrops  and  spikes,  stuck  through  planks,  and  explosive 
machines  were  employed  in  front  of  different  parts  of  the 
defences.  Mines  were  resorted  to  in  front  of  the  Flag-staff 
Bastion  to  retard  the  French  approaches.  They  were  made  in 
rocky  soil  with  craters  from  twelve  to  fifteen  feet  deep.  The 
Russian  counter-approaches  generally  consisted  of  fleches, 
united  by  a  simple  trench. 

Captain  McClelland,  one  of  our  officers  sent  to  the  Crimea, 
from  whose  valuable  Report  most  of  the  foregoing  details  are 
gathered,  adds  the  following  remarks  upon  these  works  of  de 
fence  : — 

'•"  From  the  preceding  hasty  and  imperfect  account  of  the  defences 
of  Sebastopol,  it  will  appear  how  little  foundation  there  was  for  the  gen 
erally-received  accounts  of  the  stupendous  dimensions  of  the  worlds, 
and  of  new  systems  of  fortifications  brought  into  play.  The  plain  truth 
is,  that  these  defences  were  simple  temporary  fortifications  of  rather 
greater  dimensions  than  usual,  and  that  not  a  single  new  principle  of 
engineering  was  developed.  It  is  true,  that  there  were  several  novel 
minor  details,  such  as  the  rope  mantelets,  the  use  of  iron  tanks,  etc., 
but  the  whole  merit  consisted  in  the  admirable  adaptation  of  well- 
known  principles  to  the  peculiar  locality  and  circumstances  of  the  case. 
Neither  can  it  be  asserted  that  the  plans  of  the  various  works  were 
perfect.  On  the  contrary,  there  is  no  impropriety  in  believing  that  if 
Todtleben  were  called  upon  to  do  the  same  work  over  again,  he  would 
probably  introduce  better  close  flanking  arrangements. 

"  These  remarks  are  not  intended  to,  nor  can  they,  detract  from  the 
reputation  of  the  Russian  engineer.  His  labors  and  their  results  will 
be  banded  down  in  history  as  the  most  triumphant  and  enduring  monu 
ment  of  the  value  of  fortifications,  and  his  name  must  ever  be  placed 
in  the  first  rank  of  military  engineers.  But,  in  our  admiration  of  tha 


NOTES.  441 

talent  and  energy  of  the  engineer,  it  must  not  be  forgotten  that  the 
inert  masses  which  he  raised  would  have  been  useless  without  the  skil 
ful  artillery  and  heroic  infantry  who  defended  them.  Much  stronger 
places  than  Sebastopol  have  often  fallen  under  far  less  obstinate  and 
well-combined  attacks  than  that  to  which  it  was  subjected.  There  can 
be  no  danger  in  expressing  the  conviction  that  tho  siege  of  Sebastopol 
called  forth  the  most  magnificent  defence  of  fortifications  that  has  ever 
yet  occurred." 

We  will  now  pass  to  the  works  of  attack.  When  the  allies 
decided  that  the  works  of  Sebastopol  could  not  be  carried  by 
a  simple  cannonade  and  assault,  but  must  be  reduced  by  a 
regular  siege,  the  first  thing  to  be  considered  was  to  secure  the 
forces  covering  the  siege  works  from  lateral  sorties  and  the 
efforts  of  a  relieving  army.  The  field  works  planned  for  this 
purpose  were  not  of  any  great  strength,  and  many  of  them 
"were  only  undertaken  when  a  narrow  escape  from  some  immi 
nent  danger  had  demonstrated  their  necessity."  The  French 
line  of  defence  consisted  of  eight  pentagonal  redoubts,  con 
nected  by  an  infantry  parapet.  The  English  seemed  to  attach 
but  little  importance  to  field  works  for  the  defence  of  their 
position ;  the  terrible  slaughter  at  Inkerman  was  the  natural 
consequence  of  this  neglect. 

In  describing  the  engineering  operations  of  the  allies  at  this 
siege.  Captain  McCJelland  says : — 

"  In  regard  to  the  detailed  execution  of  the  French  attacks,  little  or 
nothing  novel  is  to  be  observed.  Even  when  coolly  examining  the 
direction  of  their  trenches,  after  the  close  of  the  siege,  it  was  very  rare 
that  a  faulty  direction  could  be  detected ;  they  always  afforded  excellent 
cover,  and  were  well  defiladed ;  in  some  cases,  the  excavation  of  the 
double  direct  sap  was  carried  to  the  depth  of  six  and  a  half  feet  in  the 
solid  rock !  The  execution  of  many  of  the  saps  and  batteries  was 
worthy  of  a  school  of  p-actice.  In  the  parallels,  bomb-proofs  were 
provided  as  temporary  hospitals,  offices  for  the  generals  on  duty,  etc- 
They  did  not  use  the  sapper  armor.  The  use  of  the  sap-roller  was 
often  attempted,  but  it  could  be  employed  only  during  the  latter  part  of 
the  attack  upon  the  Malakoff,  when  the  fire  of  the  Russian  artillery  wras 
nearly  extinguished  by  the  mortars  ;  before  that,  as  soon  as  a  sap-roller 
wfD  placed  in  position — some  thirty  guns  would  be  brought  to  bear 
up  5n  it,  the  result  being  its  immediate  destruction.  It  may  justly  be 
said  of  the  French  approaches,  that  they  admirably  carried  into  prac- 


442  NOTES. 

tice  their  system  of  sapping.  The  technical  skill  and  patient  courage 
evinced  by  their  officers  and  men  in  pushing  forward  such  excellent  ap 
proaches,  under  a  most  deadly  fire,  is  worthy  of  all  commendation,  and 
is  such  as  might  have  been  expected  from  the  antecedents  of  their  corps 
of  engineers. 

"  With  regard  to  the  English,  the  case  was  different ;  it  seemed  as 
if  they  systematically  abandoned  the  excellent  system  taught  and  per 
fected  with  so  much  care  at  Chatham.  "Whenever  the  ground  was  diffi 
cult,  their  trenches  generally  ceased  to  afford  shelter;  a  shallow  exca 
vation  in  the  rock,  and  a  few  stones  thrown  up  in  front,  appeared  to  be 
all  that  was  considered  necessary  in  such  cases.  They  were  often  faulty 
in  direction  as  well  as  in  profile,  being  not  unfrequently  badly  defiladed, 
or  not  gaining  ground  enough  and  entirely  too  cramped ;  nor  were 
they  pushed  as  close  to  the  Redan  as  they  ought  to  have  been  before 
giving  the  assault.  In  too  many  cases  the  expression  '  tatonnement ' 
of  the  French  would  seem  to  convey  the  best  idea  of  their  operations. 
Their  batteries,  however,  were  very  well  constructed.  The  magazines, 
platforms,  etc.,  were  usually  similar  to  those  adopted  at  Chatham,  al 
though  unnecessary  deviations  were  sometimes  complained  of.  They 
employed  neither  armor  nor  the  full  sap,  sometimes  the  half-full,  but 
generally  the  flying-sap  were  employed." 

It  may  also  be  added,  that,  at  the  time  of  the  assault,  the 
French  approaches  had  been  pushed  to  the  distance  of  thirty- 
two  paces  of  the  counterscarp  of  the  Malakoff,  while  the 
English  had  scarcely  reached  within  two  hundred  and  twenty- 
five  yards  of  the  ditch  of  the  Redan. 

This  description  of  the  operations  of  the  English  at  the 
siege  of  Sebastopol  carries  the  professional  reader  directly 
back  to  their  sieges  in  the  Spanish  Peninsula.  It  certainly  is 
very  strange  that  a  great  nation  leading  the  van  of  civilization 
should,  after  such  experience,  have  neglected  to  provide  its 
army  with  a  proper  number  of  engineer  officers  and  engineer 
troops,  well  instructed  in  the  peculiar  and  difficult  duties 
of  that  arm.  What  excuse  can  ever  be  offered  for  sub 
stituting  human  life  for  professional  skill  in  the  operations  of 
a  siege,  when  that  skill  may  so  readily  be  acquired  in  time  of 
peace,  and  is  always  so  necessary  an  element  of  a  good  military 
organization ! 

While  every  one  admits  that  the  siege  of  Sebastopol  proved 
the  immense  importance  of  fieldworks  against  land  attacks, 


NOTES.  443 

some  would  conclude  from  the  operations  of  that  siege  that 
good  earthen  works  of  a  large  development  are  better  suited 
for  the  defence  of  a  large  city  than  permanent  fortifications 
with  masonry  revetments,  and  which  will  necessarily  have  a 
less  extended  line  of  fire  and  less  capacity  for  men  and  military 
stores.  We  quote  the  remarks  of  Captain  McClelland  on  this 
point,  and  also  make  a  short  extract  from  the  recently  pub 
lished  Journal  of  the  siege  of  Sebastopol  by  General  Niel. 
Captain  McClelland  says : — 

"  This  would  seem  to  be  the  proper  place  to  notice  a  popular  fallacy, 
which,  for  a  time  at  least,  gained  extensive  credence.  It  was,  that  the 
siege  of  Sebastopol  proved  the  superiority  of  temporary  (earthen)  forti 
fications  over  those  of  a  permanent  nature.  It  is  easy  to  show  that  it 
proved  nothing  of  the  kind ;  but  that  it  only  proved  that  temporary 
works  in  the  hands  of  a  brave  and  skillful  garrison  are  susceptible  of  a 
longer  defence  than  was  generally  supposed.  They  were  attacked  as 
field  works  never  were  before,  and  were  defended  as  field  works  never 
had  been  defended.  The  main  difference  between  properly  constructed 
permanent  fortifications  (intended  to  resist  a  siege)  and  temporary 
works,  is  that  the  latter  seldom  present  an  insuperable  obstacle  against 
assault,  while  the  former  always  do.  In  addition,  permanent  works 
have  a  better  command  over  the  adjacent  country,  and  are  more  care 
fully  and  perfectly  planned.  The  masonry  walls,  which  render  an  as 
sault  impossible,  cannot  be  seen  from  the  distance,  and  can  be  de 
stroyed  only  by  establishing  batteries  on  the  crest  of  the  glacis,  or  the 
edge  of  the  ditch ;  the  earthen  parapet  alone  being  visible  beyond  that 
point,  they  may,  until  the  besiegers  arrive  there,  be  regarded  in  the 
same  light  as  field  works,  with  the  difference  that  the  garrison  are  not 
harassed  by  the  necessity  of  being  constantly  prepared  to  repel  an 
assault. 

"Now,  in  the  siege  of  Sebastopol,  the  trenches  of  the  besiegers 
never  reached  the  edge  of  the  ditch  ;  so  that,  had  the  fortification  been 
a  permanent  one,  the  most  difficult,  slow,  and  dangerous  part  of  the 
siege  remained  to  be  undertaken,  viz.,  the  crowning  of  the  covered 
way,  the  establishment  of  the  breach  batteries,  the  descent  and  passage 
of  the  ditch,  and  the  assault  of  the  breach ;  in  other  words,  at  the  mo 
ment  when  the  weakness  of  the  temporary  works  became  apparent  and 
fatal,  the  true  strength  of  the  permanent  defences  would  have  com 
menced  coming  into  play. 

"  Assuming  the  progress  of  the  attack  to  have  been  as  rapid  as  it  was 
under  existing  circumstances,  the  besiegers,  on  the  8th  of  September, 


444  NOTES. 

would  not  yet  have  been  in  a  condition  to  crown  the  covered  way,  thtf 
siege  would  certainly  have  extended  into  the  winter  ;  and  it  may  even 
be  doubted  whether  the  place  would  eventually  have  fallen,  until  the 
allies  were  in  sufficient  force  to  invest  the  north  as  well  as  the  south 
side." 

General  Neil  remarks : — 

"  Struck  by  the  length  of  the  siege  of  Sebastopol,  certain  foreign 
officers  have  expressed  the  opinion  that  masonry-revetted  scarps  are  not 
of  incontestable  utility  in  fortified  places. 

"  Sebastopol,  a  vast  retrenched  camp,  defended  by  field  fortifica 
tions  of  strong  profile,  derived  its  principal  strength  from  an  armament 
such  as  could  only  exist  in  an  extensive  maritime  arsenal,  and  from  a 
large  army  which  always  preserved  its  free  communications  with  the 
interior  of  Russia. 

"  If  the  enceinte  had  been  provided  with  good  revetted  scarps ; 
if  it  had  been  necessary  to  breach  these,  and  subsequently  have  been 
compelled  to  penetrate  through  difficult  passages,  in  rear  of  which  the 
heads  of  our  columns  would  have  met  an  army,  Sebastopol  would  have 
been  an  impregnable  fortress. 

"  When  we  compare,  in  effect,  the  works  of  attack  at  Sebastopol 
with  those  of  an  ordinary  siege,  we  will  see  that  on  the  8th  of  Septem 
ber,  1855,  the  day  of  the  last  assault,  we  had  only  executed,  after  the 
greatest  effort,  the  besieging  works  which  precede  the  crowning  of  the 
covered  way  ;  we  had  not  then,  as  yet,  entered  upon  that  period  of  the 
works  of  a  siege  which  is  the  most  difficult  and  the  most  murderous ; 
and  there  was  no  occasion  to  engage  ourselves  in  them,  since  the  ditches 
and  parapets  of  the  enceinte  were  not  insurmountable,  as  the  sequel 
has  proved. 

"  The  difficulty  consisted  in  conquering  the  Russian  army  upon  a 
position  prepared  long  beforehand  for  its  defence,  quite  as  much  as  in 
surmounting  the  material  obstacle  of  the  fortification. 

"  Our  places  of  arms  being  established  at  thirty  metres  from  the 
besieged  works,  we  were  able  to  choose  our  own  time  for  action,  and  tc 
throw  ourselves  unexpectedly  upon  the  enemy  when  the  fire  of  our  ar 
tillery  had  forced  him  to  shelter  himself,  up  to  the  last  minute,  behind 
his  numerous  blindages  ;  to  have  gone  further  would  have  been  inviting 
the  initiative  in  the  attack  on  the  part  of  the  Russian  army. 

"  The  absence  of  scarp  walls,  which  would  have  secured  the  place 
from  escalade,  did  not  exercise  a  less  influence  upon  the  defence; 
for  the  besieged  were  compelled  to  keep  permanently  at  the  gorges 
of  the  works,  strong  reserves,  in  readiness  to  repulse  the  assault, 
which  they  saw  themselves  menaced  with  from  the  commencement  ol 
the  siege. 


NOTES.  445 

"  Finally,  it  can  be  remarked,  that  these  reserves,  which  were  deci 
mated  night  and  day  by  the  concentric  fire  of  our  batteries,  were  able 
to  issue  out  from  the  enceinte  through  wide  debouches,  without  having 
to  pass  through  the  narrow  defiles  which  are  formed  by  the  draw 
bridges  of  revetted  places ;  they  were,  then,  a  permanent  threat  for  the 
besiegers,  who  were  exposed  to  seeing  their  trenches  unexpectedly  in 
vaded  by  the  greater  part  of  the  Russian  army. 

"  Neither  side,  consequently,  was  in  a  position  analogous  to  that 
which  is  presented  in  the  siege  of  a  fortified  place,  protected  from  insult 
by  good  masonry  scarps.'  (Note  to  page  443.) 

And  again,  page  423,  the  same  authority  remarks : 
"Now,  it  (the  Russian  army)  is  no  longer  able  to  escape  from  the 
concentric  fires  of  our  batteries ;  for,  not  being  protected  by  masonry 
scarps,  it  is  obliged  constantly  to  keep  united  strong  reserves,  in  order 
to  repulse  the  assault  with  which  it  is  at  every  instant  menaced  '  " 


NOTE  TO  CHAPTER  XV.— MILITARY  EDUCATION,  &c. 

With  regard  to  the  subjects  discussed  in  this  chapter  it  will, 
perhaps,  be  sufficient  to  remark  that  the  Mexican  war  incon- 
testably  proved  the  value  of  the  West  Point  Military  Academy  j 
for  the  superior  efficiency  of  properly-educated  officers  over 
those  who  had  been  appointed  from  civil  life  without  any 
knowledge  of  the  profession  they  were  called  upon  to  practice, 
fully  satisfied  the  country  of  the  importance  of  that  institution, 
and  even  silenced  the  clamors  of  the  few  who  refused  to  be 
convinced. 

The  recent  abortive  attempt  to  give  efficiency  to  our  navy 
by  means  of  a  retired  list,  has,  it  is  feared,  destroyed  for  a 
time  all  hopes  of  introducing  this  very  necessary  measure  into 
our  military  service  ;  although  it  is  very  certain  that  without 
this  we  can  never  have  our  system  of  promotion  placed  upon 
an  effective  and  satisfactory  basis,  which  shall  give  efficiency  to 
the  army  by  rewarding  merit,  while  it  prevents  injustice  by 
closing  the  avenues  of  political  favoritism. 

The  Mexican  war  also  most  abundantly  proved  that  our 


446  NOTES. 

objections  to  the  system  of  military  appointment  were  well 
founded,  and  it  is  hoped  that  the  more  recent  abuses  of  that 
system  will  call  public  attention  to  the  necessity  of  a  change ; 
for  if  military  office  continue  to  be  conferred  for  partisan  ser 
vices,  it  will  soon  destroy  the  integrity  as  well  as  the  efficiency 
of  our  army. 


EXPLANATION  OF  PLATES, 

Figs.  1,  2,  3. — Used  to  illustrate  the  strategic  relations  of  the 
armies  A  and  B. 

Fig.  4. — Line  of  operations  directed  against  th.e  extremity  of  the 
enemy's  line  of  defence,  as  was  done  by  Napoleon  in  the 
Marengo  campaign. 

Fig.  5. — Napoleon's  plan  of  campaign  in  1800,  for  the  army  of  the 
Rhine,  and  the  army  of  reserve. 

Fig.  6  shows  the  plan  adopted  by  Napoleon  in  the  campaign  of 
1800,  to  preserve  his  communications. 

]£ig.  7  illustrates  the  same  thing  in  the  campaign  of  1806. 

Fig.  8. — Interior  and  central  line  of  operations. 

Fig.  9  represents  a  camp  of  a  grand  division  of  an  army.  The 
distance  from  the  front  row  of  tents  to  the  line  of  camp- 
guards  should  be  from  350  to  400  feet ;  thence  to  the  line 
of  posts,  from  150  to  200  feet ;  thence  to  the  line  of  sen 
tinels,  from  100  to  200  feet.  In  many  cases,  the  line  of 
posts  between  the  camp-guards  and  sentinels  may  be  dis 
pensed  with.  The  distance  between  battalions  will  be 
from  50  to  100  feet ;  and  the  same  between  squadrons 
and  batteries. 

Fig.  10. — Details  of  encampment  for  a  battalion  of  infantry.  The 
width  of  company  streets  will  depend  upon  the  strength 
of  a  company,  and  will  be  so  arranged  that  the  front  of 
the  camp  shall  not  exceed  the  length  of  the  battalion, 
when  drawn  up  in  line  of  battle.  This  width  will  be  from 
50  to  100  feet.  The  distance  between  the  tents  of  each 
row  will  be  2  or  3  feet ;  the  distance  between  the  tents  of 
one  company  and  those  of  another,  from  4  to  6  feet. 

Fig.  11  S  the  camp  of  a  squadron  of  cavalry.  A  single  company 
encamping  alone,  would  be  arranged  in  the  same  way  as 
an  entire  squadron.  The  horses  are  picketed  in  two  lines 
parallel  to  the  tents,  and  at  a  distance  from  them  of  about 
12  feet.  The  forage  is  placed  between  the  tents.  A  squad 
ron  of  two  companies  will  occupy  a  front  of  about  180 
feet  The  fires,  or  company  kitchens,  should  be  50  or  60 
feet  in  rear  of  the  non-commissioned  officers'  tents. 


448  MILITARY  ART  AND  SCIENCE. 

\ 

Fig  12  is  the  camp  of  two  batteries  of  foot  artillery,  or  two  com. 
panies  of  foot  engineers. 

[The  plan  of  encampment  for  artillery,  as  given  in  the 
"  Instruction  of  U.  S.  Field  Artillery,  horse  and  foot,"  may 
be  employed  where  a  single  battery  encamps  by  itself,  or 
where  only  the  skeleton  of  companies  is  maintained ;  but 
it  will  be  found  exceedingly  inconvenient,  where  a  full 
batterjs  with  a  large  train,  encamps  on  the  same  line  with 
other  troops.  The  plan  we  have  given  is  that  which  is  em 
ployed  in  most  European  services.] 

Fig.  13. — In  this  plan  for  mounted  artillery  and  engineers,  the  fires 
are  so  arranged  as  to  expose  the  ammunition  as  little  as 
possible  to  the  sparks  from  the  kitchens. 
Fig.  14. — Simple  parallel  order  of  battle. 

15. — Parallel  order,  with  a  crochet  on  the  flank. 

16. — Parallel  order,  reinforced  on  a  wing. 

17. — Parallel  order,  reinforced  on  the  centre. 

18. — Simple  oblique  order. 

19. — Oblique  order,  reinforced  on  the  assailing  whig. 

20. — Perpendicular  order. 

21. — Concave  order. 

22. — Convex  order. 

23. — Order  by  echelon  on  a  wing. 

24. — Order  by  echelon  on  the  centre. 

25. — Combined  order  of  attack. 

26. — Formation  of  infantry  by  two  deployed  lines. 

27,  28. — Arrangements  corresponding  to  depth  of  column. 

29. — Formation  by  squares. 

30. — Mixed  formation  of  three  battalions. 

31. — Deep  formation  of  heavy  columns. 

32. — Formation  in  columns  by  brigade. 

33.— Formation  of  two  brigades  of  cavalry,  by  the  mixed 
system. 

34. — Passage  of  the  Sound  by  the  British  fleet,  in  1807. 

35. — Attack  on  Copenhagen. 

36. — Attack  on  Algiers. 

37. — Attack  on  San  Juan  d'Ulloa. 

38. — Attack  on  St.  Jean  d'Acre. 

39. — Plan  of  a  regular  bastioned  front  of  a  fortification. 

40. — Section  of  do.  do. 

41. — Tenaillons. 


EXPLANATION    OF    PLATES.  449 

Fig.  42. — Demi-tenaillons,  with  a  bonnet. 
43. — A  horn-work. 
44. — A  crown-work 
45. — A  redan. 
46. — A  lunette. 
47. — A  mitre  01  priest-cap. 
48. — A  bastioned  fort. 

49. — Vertical  section  of  a  field  intrenchment. 
50. — Simple  sap. 
51. — Flying  sap. 
52.— Full  sap. 

53. — Crater  of  a  military  mine. 
64. — Plan  of  the  attack  of  a  regular  bastioned  work. 


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